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

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THE

HISTORY

OF THE

CHRISTIAN RELIGION AND CHURCH

DURING

THE THREE FIRST CENTURIES.

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BY

DR. AUGUSTUS NEANDER.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN,

BY HENRY JOHN ROSE, B.D.

RECTOR OF HOUGHTON CONQUEST,

AND LATE FELLOW OF ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

B-C-2

CONTAINING

THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN SECTS AND DOCTRINES, AND AN ACCOUNT OF THE CHIEF FATHERS OF THE CHURCH.

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
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LONDON:
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THE

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

presenting to the public the second volume of this translation Dr. Neander's History of the Church, I may be allowed to express my regret that the promise of its speedy appearance (made at the publication of the first volume), has not been duly realized. It would be of little interest to detail the causes of this delay, as they are chiefly of a personal character, if they were not calculated to show that some of them are unlikely again to operate, so as to prevent my rapid progress in finishing my translation of the succeeding volumes of this able work[1]. The circumstances of our own country, at the period of the publication of the first volume, left those, who took much part, as I did then, in periodical literature, but little time or thought for studies of a less stirring character, and however higher in value, of a more remote interest; and the same cause led me to presume that such a work then would find but few readers. University employments, and many other avocations which I had not anticipated, at first took me away from the subject, and every one knows with what difficulty employments once suspended are again resumed. About the beginning of this year, however, the publishers having informed me that the first volume was out of print, I determined to finish the second immediately, part of it having been printed some years ago, and the result has been the present publication.

[1] Should no unforeseen obstacles occur, I trust, in a very short period, to publish two more volumes, which will contain the same proportion (three Bands, or Parts) of the original.

The second volume, now published, completes the history of the first three centuries, and the first portion of the work is now finished. I must therefore take the present opportunity of offering a few remarks, both upon the original work and on the translation. With regard to the former, I have expressed my own opinion very fully in the preface to the first volume, and I do not see anything there which I should wish to retract, nor is there much which I think it necessary to add. I have the same opinion of the candour and integrity of the author; and I entertain the same dissent from some of his opinions. The few remarks which I would here offer, are rather to be taken as cautions to those younger readers, who apply to these volumes for instruction. I would suggest to them the unsatisfactory nature of some of its statements, and attempt to point out one of the causes from which this circumstance proceeds. With regard to the whole of the *Church question*, I have spoken so fully in the preface and the notes to the first volume, that I need not touch upon it now. But the great doctrinal point, which I think is treated in an unsatisfactory manner, is that of the Trinity (see pp. 256, and 289-90); the most important of all the doctrines of Christianity.

The author may, perhaps, think it foreign to the province of the historian, to express a decided opinion on doctrinal points—a view in which I cannot wholly coincide. I think a perfectly impartial statement of the arguments of those who differ from us, and a perfectly fair account of their conduct, are quite compatible, not only with entertaining a decided opinion on such matters, but with the expression of it. And I confess that it would have given me great satisfaction to find in Dr. Neander's statements with regard to the great doctrine of the Trinity, something less indistinct and shadowy, than the passages to which I have here pointed attention. I think such statements might have been made, without any fear of appearing to explain that mysterious dogma. It appears to me a question rather of fact than of speculation, as one might attempt to show in the following manner. Without any presumptuous attempt to explain to ourselves the doctrine of the Trinity, if we ask ourselves one or two simple questions, we

must bring the matter to an issue at once; *viz.* Is our Saviour spoken of in Scripture, in language inapplicable to any created Being, and at the same time is the idea of the Father suffering on the cross entirely excluded? And again: is the Holy Spirit spoken of in Scripture in a manner inconsistent with anything but a clear objective sense? These things belong to the class of facts, rather than to that of opinions, and the doctrine of the Trinity does nothing more than enounce these facts—the Athanasian creed itself contains no speculative explanation of them, and no attempt at it. Let us therefore with this impression before our minds, enquire to what the remarks of Dr. Neander are really applicable. I think it will be seen that they not only admit a construction, by which they do not oppose the doctrine of the Trinity, even as laid down in the most precise manner in the Athanasian creed; but that they properly apply to further speculative attempts to explain this doctrine. But still I think they are expressed in so indistinct a manner, that a very large proportion of readers would consider them, as directed against any positive declarations of the necessity of a belief in this doctrine, as held by the orthodox; and I think the tendency of the language, and the manner in which it is used, calculated rather to lower the notion of the absolute necessity of a right faith, even in such essential points as this—a tendency, which, in other hands, might be carried much further, and where the moderation and Christian feelings of Dr. Neander were wanting, might produce great mischief. We must never forget that the disciples of any erroneous system or tenet, always diverge more widely from the truth than their master. The divergency of error is invariably a progressive operation.

I regret, therefore, the indistinctness, of which I speak, both for these reasons, and because I think it the province of ecclesiastical history to give witness to the great doctrines of Christianity, and warning to future generations from the errors of those which have passed away. The author, however, of this work appears to be chiefly solicitous about the improvement of the heart and the affections of man by Christianity, for which solicitude no one can

do otherwise than honour and respect him; but at the same time it is certain, that to effect this great end, the maintenance of all the great doctrines of Christianity in their integrity is absolutely essential. Whatever is revealed, whatever has been universally maintained in the Christian Church from the first ages, I believe to be necessary to be received, in order that Christianity may produce its full effect in the amelioration of man's nature, and that any departure from them will soon be felt in its practical influence.

The next point to which I would draw attention, is the general view which the author takes of the progress of Christianity, in regard to the formation of the opinion of the Church on great questions of doctrine. We can scarcely conceive more than three ways in which Christian doctrines may be supposed to have obtained their recognition in the Church in express formulæ.

1. They may be supposed to have been *explicitly* maintained in the same words, and with the self-same limitations from the very first ages of the Christian Church,—a view which the amplifications of doctrine, as exhibited in the history of existing creeds, sufficiently shows to be untenable.

2. They may be supposed to have been held implicitly[1], and in some degree only as matters of consciousness, until the prevalence of opposite errors required this consciousness to be embodied in definite terms, and expressed in public formulæ;—or

3. We may suppose that all doctrines were in a mere chaotic state till controversies arose, and then that the doctrines were actually formed during the controversies, and new doctrines were thus, as it were, thought out and made by these controversies.

Of these views the second appears to me the most consistent with history, and the third appears to be that which I should derive as my impression from reading this work. It may not be the opinion of the author, and he might probably disavow it, if placed thus before him; but still I think it is the impression, which would generally be entertained by most of his readers. I

[1] Thus a belief in the Trinity implied a belief in the eternity of the Son, &c. We must remember, however, that the shorter confessions of faith (for baptism, &c.) are summaries, which vouched for more than they expressed. See Bull, Judicium Eccl. Cath. cap. iv.

am not about to argue the question here, as that would, of itself, require a volume [1]. I only point out the difference between these two positions, and request the readers of ecclesiastical history to bear it in mind, and judge for themselves. I should deeply regret it, if in any way I have misrepresented the view of my author. I only state that this is the impression left upon my mind by close attention to his work.

The last point to which I would draw attention is the manner in which the views which Dr. Neander has embraced, appear sometimes to influence the judgment he forms on points only incidentally connected with them. His aim, indeed, is to be perfectly impartial and unprejudiced,—an aim which, we know, it is almost impossible for any man entirely to attain; and therefore we may not wonder if sometimes we see, in his case, pre-conceived opinions affecting his decisions. The point, to which I more particularly allude, is the judgment he passes on the genuineness and integrity of some of the most remarkable remains of Christian antiquity. As a single example, I would only mention the decision of Dr. Neander (p. 331-2), that § 40 of the Epistle of Clement of Rome is an interpolation. The learned and amiable author of this work believes, that the transference of Jewish terms to the Christian priesthood is of later date than the time of Clement of Rome, and accordingly decides that this must be an interpolation. He alleges, indeed, that it *contradicts* the rest of the Epistle; but this term appears to me too strong to apply to the case in question. To a person who had not formed so strong an opinion on this subject as Dr. Neander, such a contradiction would hardly appear to exist. No doubt, whenever so learned and candid a writer as Dr. Neander has arrived at an opinion, like that to which I have adverted, every passage, which appears to militate against it, challenges an inquiry, at least from him, into its genuineness; but such an opinion is no argument against its genuineness in the minds of others, whose opinions differ on

[1] I would only suggest to my younger readers one or two works on the great doctrine of the Trinity, from which they will derive great advantage. I mean the works of Bp. Horsley, Dr. Waterland, Bp. Bull, and, as a very convenient and useful work of reference, Dr. Burton's "Testimonies of the Ante-Nicene Fathers."

that very point; and it is hardly a just method of proceeding on this sole ground to refuse the testimony of one of the witnesses before the controversy is decided[1]. I think in these respects there is a degree of caution required in admitting some of the conclusions of this work; and my conviction of the necessity of such caution probably may originate, and is certainly strengthened by the circumstance, that on many points our views do not coincide.

These are the principal circumstances which I would point out as likely to prevent this work from being as generally acceptable and useful in this country, as its great merit in other respects would lead us to expect that it might become[2]. I trust that, in expressing my opinion on these points, I have been betrayed into no presumption, and shown no disrespect to the author, whose work I have translated, and also that I have not stepped beyond the proper province of a translator. It might be supposed that I coincided in all the views here maintained, if I intimated nothing to the contrary; and as I think some of them unsound, I should feel that I was thus far promoting erroneous opinions. But having pointed out what appear to me, after paying considerable attention to the work, the sources of its chief

[1] Of course these remarks are not meant to apply to clear cases of anachronisms, which are often of service in detecting forgeries. Take for example the will of St. Patrick which mentions Indulgences. Which word was not in use for centuries after his death.

[2] I might, perhaps, justly appeal in this point to the almost unanimous opinion of those writers in whose works I have seen any notice of those of Dr. Neander. All bear testimony to the excellence of the author, but all with a reserve on some point. They all express their unfeigned respect for the learning of the author, his excellent qualities of head and heart, as well as the general usefulness of his works, but all qualify it by expressing a dissent from some of his views. See for instance, the Bishop of Lincoln's preface to his work on Tertullian, where he controverts many of Dr. Neander's statements and opinions; or Dr. Burton's introduction to his Bampton Lectures, where, in speaking of this very history, and expressing a hope that it would be translated, he adds, "The writer is a theorist, as are many of his countrymen; and I could wish that some of his observations had not been made. But he has investigated with great patience of research, and with a very original train of thought, the early history of the Church; and if he carries into execution what he has partly promised to undertake, a full and special history of the Church in the time of the apostles, he will probably confer a lasting benefit on literature in general." p. xvii.

faults, I leave my readers to exercise their own judgment on the subject, and to derive all the advantage and instruction from this history, which, in most respects, it is calculated to bestow.

With regard to the translation itself, I must, as I before observed, leave others to judge of the manner in which my humble task has been performed. I remain of the same opinion still as to the duty of a translator. In works of this nature fidelity is his first merit, and ought to be his chief aim; and for this reason, I think we ought very rarely to resort to a paraphrastic version [1].

The style of this work in general is not such as to render it particularly easy to bring into English, with fluency and freedom; but this difficulty is, of course, very much increased, when the subjects of which it treats approach the subtil regions of metaphysics. A large portion of this volume, it will be seen, is devoted to a development of the various systems of Gnosticism, and to an explanation of the views of Manes and his followers. Oriental mysticism and theosophy has long been noted as full of obscurity; and even the acute and learned Bayle has not hesitated to express his utter inability to enter into it. After speaking, in his article on Zerdusht, or Zoroaster, of the Persian notions of light and darkness, he adds, "This chaos of thought is incomprehensible to us western people. None but the eastern nations, accustomed to a mystical and contradictory language, can bear such excessive nonsense without disgust and horror." This is too sweeping a position, and too strong language; much has been done since his days to introduce us to a more intimate acquaintance with the ideas of the eastern nations, but still this difference in the habits of thought between these two families of the human race, will always tend to make the speculative views of the one difficult to the other. Dr. Neander has done much to arrange and systematize the various theories of Gnosticism; but their obscurities have not been entirely removed, nor are they in all cases lessened by a passage through the regions of German meta-

[1] I am fully aware that a different principle has been maintained, and that some translators from German works have professed to give their author's sense rather than his words; and have thought themselves justified in altering, and even omitting whole passages. It must be obvious that this proceeding is liable to many dangers, and it can never represent the mind and opinions of the author; which is always desirable.

physics. There is one difficulty, however, which no one can properly appreciate, except those who have known it by experience, in every attempt to present the metaphysical and philosophical speculations of German writers to English readers; and that difficulty arises from the copiousness of the German metaphysical vocabulary, and the poverty of our own.

Without passing any judgment on the various systems of philosophy which have made their appearance in Germany within the last fifty years, we may say that the Germans have paid more attention to metaphysics latterly than our countrymen have done; and, whether these systems be true or false, they have certainly carried to a very high point of refinement their analysis of the subtle processes of thought within us. In reducing their analysis to systems, they have made minute distinctions between these processes, which they have been enabled to embody in their language, and thus to introduce a definiteness into their copious vocabulary, of which our own language is hardly capable. And besides this, the lax manner in which all words in English, referring to mental processes [1] are used, renders it impossible to represent such distinctions intelligibly, without expressly defining beforehand in what sense we mean to use the words. *Conception* [2],

[1] The same is true in some degree in respect to our mental faculties also.

[2] Sir G. Haughton, in his Prodromus (more particularly mentioned in the next note) has, however, endeavoured to recal us to a more definite use of these words. He seems rather inclined to banish *idea* altogether and substitute for it *image* or *perception*. He says, "an idea must either be the equivalent of a perception, or a conception; and these two words are merely abstractions, that could have no sense, if we did not refer them respectively to the only assertion any of us can truly make; namely, I PERCEIVE *Things*, and I conceive *States*," p. 205. It must be remembered that Sir G. Haughton's fundamental principle is this. Every word necessarily means nothing more than THING or STATE, "and even the last of these two terms is a mere sound—a symbol boldly invented by the intellect, for the purpose of reasoning," p. 5. He says also, p. 45, "that all reasoning is effected solely by means of words, either single or linked together in those chains which we call Conceptions; but *no single word*, STATE *even not excepted*, can be a conception in any other sense than as a sound preserved by the memory." To the class of *Perceptions* according to him belong all objects we PERCEIVE when we *see*, *hear*, *smell*, *taste*, or *touch*. To *Conceptions* belong all the Combinations, Relations, and other States, of the objects or things we perceive, and of which we are enabled to *think* or CONCEIVE by the mysterious operations of the intellect, aided by the almost equally mysterious mechanism of language which it had previously prepared

thought, *idea*, *notion*, *perception*, *apprehension*, and other words are used synonymously, which might be devoted to different processes, and the very distinction of the Reason and the Understanding, on which so much stress is laid in Germany, is seldom brought forward in English works[1]. These circumstances make it difficult

by and *for* the process, to which we give the name of *thought*. To this class must likewise be referred those *essences* which we derive by strict inference when we observe the design, harmony, and operations of nature, such as God, Soul, and Power."

This is definite enough, and this author will perform a service to our language and to our habits of thinking, if he can persuade all writers to be more precise in the use of such terms, whether they adopt his definitions or not.

But let not my meaning be misunderstood. I do not here pretend to give any judgment either about the German systems or Sir G. Haughton's book. I only point out the existence of certain refinements of speculation among our German neighbours, which *our* language scarcely enables to present in the symbols which it affords us. In professedly metaphysical works, the difficulty may, perhaps, be obviated by definitions, but where these words only occur incidentally, as in this history, the difficulty introduced by this consideration is not slight. The cause perhaps lies deeper, and this has been most ably touched upon by one, whose memory I revere, whose guidance I daily miss, and whose correcting hand would have rendered these pages far more worthy of consideration; and it would be injustice not to quote his words:—

"The English are not a thinking and speculative, but a practical people, and they are accustomed to look at things only in a practical point of view. This habit is carried into their literature, and he who wishes to gain their attention must not deal in abstractions, or he will write in vain. Things must be presented in a definite tangible form, or the English capacity cannot receive them. It may be a very good or a very bad state of the intellect; on that point I say nothing; but I maintain that this is the state of English intellect, and this will sufficiently account for the neglect experienced by many valuable works of latter days."—The State of Protestantism in Germany, by the late Hugh James Rose, p. 208.

[1] To this sweeping remark there are of course some exceptions, and among these it would be wrong to omit mentioning the late Mr. Coleridge's admirable little volume, entitled 'Aids to Reflection.' I may also add that Sir G. Haughton in his Prodromus has distinguished between *Reason* and *Understanding*, but not exactly in the same manner as the German metaphysicians. Of the understanding he says, "The first great delusion we are under, is in supposing that the word Understanding represents any thing whatsoever. We, that is, our thinking selves, may *understand* what we hear or see; but when we employ the Abstract word Understanding for some part of ourselves, we do so clearly by a fallacy. When we *understand* anything, we necessarily *feel*, are *conscious*, and *intelligent*; and were I to analyse the term Understanding, according to the usual mode in these cases, I would consequently say, that it is compounded of Feeling, Consciousness, and Intelligence. For, if I analyse one Abstraction, I shall

adequately to represent in any English translation the exact views of the author in those passages, where any words occur,

most likely do it by the help of others; but in reality there is neither Understanding, Feeling, Consciousness, nor Intelligence; and instead of these, we must remember that it is the union of soul with matter, which, being organized into human frames, *understands, feels,* is *conscious* and *intelligent.*" Of the Reason, on the contrary, he says, "Of all the divisions into which we separate 'the Mind,' *Reason* is the only one which is not a misconception arising from the delusive nature of language. It is not a faculty, but a *real agent,* aiding and assisting the intellect of man in all its varied operations." The view which Sir G. Haughton developes is briefly explained thus: "Intellect" (that which thinks). "Sensorium" (that portion of the brain which is conscious), "and Nerves" (the seat of sensation), "constitute the mysterious agent called Self;" and he elsewhere says of the Intellect, "It is this unknown organ so highly endowed, and constituting the thinking, reflecting agent, resulting from the combination of soul with matter duly organized, that I call in these pages by the name of INTELLECT. The author immediately after the above assertion about Reason as an *Agent,* not a *faculty,* begs his readers to suspend their judgment on the point till he has developed his views in some future work.

It would be altogether foreign to the subject of these volumes to enter at any length into metaphysical disquisitions, but in noticing the difficulty which arises to the English translator of a German work, from the difference in the mental condition of the two nations, it is not perhaps altogether out of place to allude to an English work on the subject of Metaphysics, written with considerable clearness and ability, which proposes to throw a new light on all the phenomena of our minds, and to show that all metaphysical systems have hitherto been founded on delusions, arising from our mistaking the nature and force of the words we use. That the work deserves serious, and impartial consideration, as a remarkable exposition of Nominalism given in a systematic form, and applied in a novel manner, few persons would be inclined to deny; but whether the author establishes his views, I do not undertake to decide. I think however in some instances, our author's Nominalism carries him too far. When he speaks of our attachment to the Church, the State, the Constitution, a principle, &c. as showing the 'hold which Abstractions have upon our nature,' and 'how much we are swayed by mere words;' when he observes,—that 'not one of these designate any thing that has a real existence, except as a sound: still we are ready to sacrifice our lives for them . . . . . Without language, not one of these conceptions could have had an existence; nor could one drop of the torrents of blood that have flowed from such causes have been shed'—is not the author carried away by his own theory? We can hardly reason on what we should be "without language;" but it can scarcely be said that we are ready to sacrifice our lives in these cases for mere abstractions. Had the author here used his usual clearness and acuteness, would he not have seen that if these words are mere abstractions, they are only convenient symbols (abridging as symbols do the processes of reasoning), which stand for matters which exert a very practical influence on men's happiness? When we say a man is ready to sacrifice his life for the Constitution, what do we mean but that he is ready to resist changes in all

which pre-suppose a recognition of the distinctions common among his countrymen. I have endeavoured to grapple with this difficulty as well as I was able; but in order that I might apprize the reader that there was something, which could not be rendered by a word exactly synonymous with the original, I have occasionally inserted the German word, and sometimes referred to the preface for some observations on the subject. This is particularly the case with such words as *Anschauung*, *Begriff*, *Bewusstseyn*, &c.; and I have thought that it might be advantageous to the English reader, if, at the end of this Preface, I threw into the form of a brief vocabulary a few remarks on such words, and a translation of a few passages from German philosophical works, in which they are expressly defined. To this I will, therefore, refer those readers who require further satisfaction on this point.

It will be seen that in some passages, where I have thought a literal translation might appear obscure or ambiguous, I have given a paraphrase in a note, or vice versâ, in order that I may not appear to evade a difficulty in this manner. There is, however, one passage in which, if there is no incorrectness

the relations of life, which he considers likely to bring misery on himself and all around him. Let us take another instance to make this clearer. The words *Slavery* and *Freedom* express mere abstractions, exactly as much as the words cited by Sir G. Haughton; but would the resistance to the one, and the struggle for the other, appear to him to be a struggle about a mere abstraction? In these cases men contend about changes of condition involving practical consequences to themselves, and it is in vain, in order to persuade them to lay aside their differences, to tell them that the watch-words of their cause are mere abstractions. And the same reasoning is applicable, *mutatis mutandis*, to the instances selected by Sir G. Haughton. With regard to 'the Church,' to those who believe that our Saviour bound men together under certain laws, to contend for the welfare and extension of the society, comprising all who embrace those laws, must be a duty. The term may be an abstract term, but it comprehends truths and realities, for which men are bound to contend, though they cannot be justified in using Persecution for the sake of them. Men *talk* about these abstractions, but they *contend* about realities, included among the complicated notions, of the aggregate of which these abstractions are the conventional symbol. I trust in making these observations I have not misrepresented, nor mistaken this author, for although he appears to despair of a fair hearing in England, and looks for it to the truth-inquiring spirit of Germany, I can say that I opened his essay with perfect impartiality, and shall look with much interest to any further development of his views.

in the text, I have left it without any attempt to explain its meaning, which is certainly obscure. It occurs in p. 321, line 6—13, and it may perhaps be right to state the sense I deduce from it. It appears to express a notion of Origen, in which he intimates that the word of God, through which the Logos communicates himself to the soul of man, is called the flesh and blood of Christ, and is also the heavenly bread, (symbolized under the sacramental bread,) of which we must eat in order to live for ever; and that the breaking of the bread, and pouring out of the wine, are symbols of the multiplication of the words, by which it is made effectual to the heart of each individual believer. This I believe to be the general purport of the sentence, although there is an awkwardness about the construction of it in the original which I cannot entirely clear away, and I have accordingly left only an exact and literal translation of it. Had I been able to consult the passages of Origen, on which the statement is founded, I might have been able to remove all difficulty; but the references did not enable me to do this. The only edition of Origen which I possess is that of Huet; and in this place Neander does not refer to that edition, nor does he give means by which it may be traced in that edition.

With regard to the quotations generally from Greek and Latin Fathers, I have followed the same course as in the first volume. I have verified them whenever I was able, and have generally enabled my readers to do so with much greater ease than myself, by referring to other editions. This is particularly the case with the very numerous quotations from Clemens Alexandrinus. The edition to which Dr. Neander refers is almost invariably the edition of Paris, 1629; and unfortunately it happens to be the most inconvenient one possible for those who possess any other. There are no divisions in it, but that of pages, and these pages are not marked in other editions. The pages of Sylburg's and Potter's editions are marked in that of Klotz (Leipsic, 1831); and I have in almost every instance given the reference to each of these. The books of Clemens Alexandrinus are of very considerable length, and a reference to the page of the Paris edition is of no value except to those who possess that particular edition. I have

not always given the reference to Klotz; but the pages of Potter and Sylburg being found in the margin of that edition, it is by no means necessary.

I now proceed to give a list of such words as may be productive of some obscurity or difficulty, with an explanation of them from German works of authority, especially the Philosophical Lexicon of Krug[1]. I insert also a few words, of which Dr. Neander makes frequent use, and respecting which some brief remarks may be acceptable.

"*Anschauung* (intuitio), in its most restricted sense, is synonymous with an image-presented-to-us-through-the-sight [2], from the verb *schauen*, to see. But because the representations of-the-sight [Gesichtsvorstellungen] have the greatest clearness and objectivity of all our sensuous perceptions, under the term *Anschauung*, taken in a more extended sense, we understand generally an *objective* representation to any of our senses, and contrast with it an *Empfindung*, or *sensation* [sensatio], as a subjective, sensuous representation. This contrast is, however, not to be understood exclusively, but only as the predominant distinction. In the case of an *Anschauung*, the *Objective* (the condition of the object represented) comes most strongly into consciousness; in an *Empfindung*,

[1] Allgemeines Handwörterbuch der philosophischen Wissenschaften, nebst ihrer Literatur und Geschichte. Nach dem heutigen Standpuncte der Wissenschaft bearbeitet und herausgegeben von D. Wilhelm Traugott Krug, Professor der Philosophie an der Universität zu Leipzig, &c. Zweite verbesserte und vermehrte Auflage. Vier Bände. Leipzig, 1832. Fünfter Band, als Supplement zur zweiten Auflage. Leipzig, 1838.

[2] The original word is Gesichts-vorstellung, representation of-the-sight. *Object of sight* would not be a just translation, as this would leave out the notion of the *subject* in whom the representation is formed. Of *Vorstellung*, Krug says (sub voce), *Vorstellung* (repræsentatio), is properly an outward operation through which we set anything before ourselves, or before others; on which account this word is also used when any one at court, or in society, allows himself to be presented to others, to personal acquaintance. But since with that outward act [*Thätigkeit, act, agency*] there is always conjoined an inward one also, by which something is made present to our consciousness; this making-present to us is also called a *vorstellen* [or setting before us], and the inward effect is called a *Vorstellung* [or representation]. And every [Vorstellung] representation is a more or less clear and striking image of something, which is the circumstance or the object of the representation, as the *ego* is the *subject* of it.

or sensation, the Subjective (the condition of the *subject* in which the representation takes place). In its widest meaning *Anschauung* is equivalent to a sensuous representation[1]. Hence, sensuous knowledge[2] is called *anschauliche*, or *intuitive*.

"*Pure* or *à priori* intuitions [Anschauungen] are those which are referred to space and time generally, and to that which can be constructed therein independently of experience (purely mathematical magnitudes); *empirical*, or *à posteriori* intuitions, are those which are referred to objects of experience, perceivable in space and time. An *intellectual* Anschauung is one which proceeds from the Understanding; a *rational* one, that which proceeds from the Reason.

"As soon as we distinguish the Reason and the Understanding from Sense, it becomes inconsistent to speak of perceiving intuitively [anschauen] as an act of the senses, and at the same time as an act of the Reason or of the Understanding. But still it may be said that the imagination performs this act [anschauet], because it is itself nothing but an inward sense. But the Sense itself is called also the Anschauungsvermögen, or faculty-of-intuition (facultas intuendi). The *Anschauungsweise*[3] [or mode of intuition]—the *forma intuitionis*, on which account the word *Anschauungsform* is sometimes used—is nothing but the law, according to which our Sense performs the act of intuition. . . . .

"Anschauungs- or Intuitions-Philosophie is opposed by many to Verstandes- or Reflexions-Philosophie, and they prefer the former to the latter. But they ought properly to be taken together, because the ideas derived from intuition, [Anschauungen] and from reflection [or Begriffe, see the next word] are the elements of all human knowledge."—Krug's Lexicon, vol. i. p. 160-1.

To this extract from Krug, I may append the following from Kiesewetter's Logik zum Gebrauch für Schulen, Vienna, 1824:—

[1] Perhaps *impression* would give the best translation of this word.

[2] Sinnliche Erkenntniss, a cognition obtained through the senses. See the word Erkenntniss, further on in this preface.

[3] This expression is used, rather more laxly by Neander, p. 27. See note.

"All *thoughts* are *representations*, but all *representations* are not *thoughts*. All representations must present something; this something which they present (which does not, however, on that account require to have a real existence) is called their *object* [or Gegenstand]. Now that representation which refers itself to a single object, and that too, *immediately*, (without any intermediate representation) is called an Anschauung [or Intuition]. All representations, which are not [Anschauungen or] Intuitions, and also all representations which are referred to more than one object, as also all mediate representations, are *thoughts*. The representation [or image in the mind,] which I have of the picture of my friend, which is hanging before me, and which I look upon; the representation I have of the tones of a violin, which I am actually listening to; the representation which I have of the flower I am smelling, the tea I am tasting, or of the pain of burning, which I feel at the moment; the representation of the late king, which my imagination recals into consciousness; or the image of a mountain stream presented to my fancy; the representation of the present condition in which my mind actually is—all these are *intuitions* [Anschauungen], because they refer to *one* object, and we see at once that this reference is immediate, and that they do not require any intermediate representation. The representations of *Man*, *Flower*, &c. are not intuitions, for they do not refer to one object, but comprehend many; and still further, they do not refer *immediately* to an object, but do so by means of intuitions (the representation, *Man*, for instance, is referred first to the intuition of individual men, as Caius, Titus, &c.) and hence they are *thoughts* (Gedanken). Dr. Kiesewetter then proceeds to show that the statement, 'Caius is sick,' and the syllogism, 'All men are mortal, Caius is a man, therefore Caius is mortal,' are *thoughts* [Gedanken], not intuitions [Anschauungen], as in the first case we do not rest in the simple image of Caius, but unite the proposition with it that he is sick, &c."

To this extract I might add the article from the *Conversations-Lexicon*, in which the writer draws a distinction between *outward* and *inward* intuitions, the former being the intuitions of all

objects in *space*, the latter of all objects only in *time*, which we perceive only as changes in ourselves, such as the images of our imagination [as in the examples of Kiesewetter, the mountain-stream, or the late king] our thoughts, &c. He then proceeds to say, that all *outward things*, having a representation, and being necessarily in some *time*, are also *inward*, and thus by our imagination we can represent the objects of space in our minds; 'but on the contrary, that *inward* representations, being only representable in *time*, not in *space*, cannot at the same time be *outward* things, and hence that the latter class of representations have no form.' After speaking of the fine arts, he then proceeds further to say, that "the effect of any work of art depends chiefly on its Anschaulichkeit, and is more lively and will please more, the more its representations resemble our intuitive-representations."

I might accumulate more extracts on this subject, but the above will be sufficient for our present purpose, which is, not to write an Introduction to the elements of German Philosophy, but to bring forward sufficient to illustrate the use of some of the terms which occur in this volume (see pp. 21, 26, 27, 29, 67, 68, 214 215). It will be seen from these extracts that in its *strictest* philosophical sense, *Anschauung* means an image of one outward object in the mind, conveyed thither by the sight, but that it is used generally for any *ideas* of sense. I may perhaps observe, that in page 214, I should have done better to translate it by *intuition* than by *perception*, and in the note, page 215, it would have been better to translate it by *intuition* than by 'immediate *knowledge*!' although in both these cases the context and the note will prevent any misapprehension. In page 68 also, Intuition would perhaps be the best translation. In page 26, I believe that the note and the translation when compared with the above extracts from other writers, will convey the meaning of my author with tolerable justice. He there contrasts the *Anschauungen* of the Eastern people with the abstractions of the Western,—the lively pictures which the former raised in their imaginations with the abstractions of the latter. Thus *Sophia* became with the Eastern

people, not an abstract idea of Wisdom [1], which they would not attempt to reason upon, but a person, whom they could picture to their minds, and to which they could attribute all the qualities and actions of a person, and thus represent to themselves all that related to her, with the most graphic liveliness. Their whole system of Æons, Pleroma, &c. are nothing but a set of pictures, called up and figured in their prolific imaginations; and it is in this respect in which they are said to be so devoted to *Anschauungen* in preference to *Begriffe*. *Intuition* and *pictorial representation to the mind*, are the two chief points to which we must turn our attention in all passages where the word Anschauung occurs, and these two leading points will, I think, explain all such passages in this volume.

I now pass on to the next word, which may be much more briefly treated, in consequence of the length to which the preceding discussion has been carried.

"*Begriff.* Begriff is a representation, through which something is thought upon; but an object is thought-upon, when we represent it *by means of certain signs* [2]. From the collecting together of these signs (a concipiendis notis), such a representation is called a [Begriff, or] Conception (Conceptus, notio). The Begriff or Conception is therefore a mediate and general [or common, *gemeinsame*] representation, and is therefore essentially distinguished from an *Anschauung*, or an *Empfindung*, through which something individual is always represented; as when any one beholds a house, or feels a pain. But he, who only thinks upon that, which we call a house or a pain, he has a [*Begriff*] conception of it, which he may refer to any house or pain whatsoever.

[1] I do not by the use of this word mean to assert we can have really any *abstract idea* of wisdom, or that *wisdom* is more than an abstract *term*, which we must unite with a Being, before we can conceive it: in which case it becomes a *concrete*, not an *abstract* idea. I do not enter into this question at all, which most metaphysical writers discuss at great length.

[2] Under *Begreifen*, Krug says, 'This word means to feel with the fingers, as we do in order to acquaint ourselves accurately with anything. But *begreifen* also means to form *Begriffe*, because these exist by means of the *taking together* of a variety of things.'

A Conception, therefore [or Begriff] is the unity of a multitude [eines Mannigfaltigen[1]], which multitude may be greater or less, but is always more comprehensive than the multitude of the Anschauung. He who looks upon the starry heaven, beholds many stars, but the conception [Begriff] of a star goes far wider; it comprehends those under the horizon, and even those which are invisible by reason of their distance. So also he who thinks upon a house or a mountain by means of conceptions, has a more comprehensive representation of it, than he, who merely looks upon many houses and mountains, although the intuitive representation [or Anschauung] is fuller of contents or subject-matter, and therefore more lively than the *conception* [Begriff] which only contains what is common to these things. If we wish to become thoroughly acquainted with any [Begriff, or] Conception, we must analyse it, that is, divide it into its signs or marks, as far as this is possible. We thus learn its contents [its subject-matter, its complexus], and we can then determine how far it goes, that is, to how many things it applies," &c.—Krug, vol. i. p. 306.

Kiesewetter (l. c. p. 14—17) says, "There are three kinds of thoughts, *Conceptions*, *Judgments*, and *Conclusions*," (Begriffe, Urtheile, und Schlusse,) and then characterises the first of them thus. "A Conception (Begriff] is, like an Anschauung, a single representation, but not like the latter, a representation of a single object, as it represents many objects; it is also mediate, whereas on the contrary, an Anschauung is immediate. The conception *Man*, is a single representation, but refers to many objects; I do not obtain the Conception on *Man* immediately, as I do the Anschauung of Caius, but mediately."

He afterwards says:—

"Our first conceptions arise out of intuitions, but it is quite clear that we do not merely separate our conceptions only from intuitions, as explained above[2]; but can also create new conceptions from our existing conceptions. Thus abstracting from

[1] This might be translated, 'the unity of the Multifarious,' which is always more comprehensive than the Multifariousness of the Anschauung.

[2] He had explained the process of abstraction in another section.

Lion, Tiger, Wolf, &c. all in which they differ, and combining what remains, we have a new conception, 'a quadruped of prey.' "

This will suffice on the subject of Begriff.

Bewusstsein, Consciousness. It is not necessary to enter into the philosophical questions connected with this word, as Dr. Neander seems generally to apply it in its common and usual sense, although sometimes, by a more lax usage of language; he may unite with the common meaning of consciousness, a moral sense, which renders it more nearly equivalent to our word conscience.

The note subjoined to the word Gottesbewusstsein, will suffice for its explanation, p. 236.

Erkenntniss, Cognition. Erkenntnisse, Cognitions.

"*Erkennen* (Cognoscere) means not only to represent or to think of anything, but to refer one's representations (Vorstellungen [1]) to real objects, and to distinguish these objects from each other, as things of a definite character. This Erkennen, or cognizing, is more than merely thinking; it is a real laying-hold (erfassen, or ergreifen) of things—on which account the old philosophers designated it also by the name καταλαμβανειν, or comprehendere —but then this takes place by means of representations (Vorstellungen). These representations are partly *sensuous* [derived from the senses], or, are intuitions [Anschauungen, see the word], and sensations [Empfindungen], which refer to the Individual (this or that particular object), and, partly *intellectual* [derived from the Understanding], or Conceptions [Begriffe] which refer to the General (or that which is common to many things). But if anything real is to be known (*erkennt, cognized*), it must be *given* (datum), or at least *capable-of-being-given* (dabile), *i. e.* it must be capable of being seen, or felt; or to speak more generally, of being perceived (wahrnehmen). Whatever is not in any manner perceivable (neither inwardly nor outwardly) that is also not cognizable (*erkennbar, knowable*); it cannot be pointed out and

[1] It must be remembered, as an able writer has well stated it, (Ed. Rev. Oct. 1832) that Vorstellung is the genus of which Idee, Anschauung, and Begriff, are the species. Of these, Idee is used in strict philosophy only for the ideas of the Reason.

defined objectively in its reality, although subjectively in the consciousness of the Ego[1] there may be grounds for maintaining its existence. In this case it is an object of Belief, not of knowledge, the latter being only said of what we maintain from objective or real sources of cognition.'

'*Erkenntniss* (Cognitio). Cognition, as the result of cognizing (Erkennen, see the foregoing article), is said both individually and generally. In the case of individual things, cognition is the reference of a representation to a given object, by which it is distinguished as a definite thing, from other things which more or less resemble it. Thus we have a cognition [or knowledge] of the Moon, when it is represented as a heavenly body revolving round the Earth, and undergoing certain changes. Thus we perceive it competently, and consider it a real thing, although to us it is only an appearance [Erscheinung, a Phenomenon]; for what it is, independently of the manner in which it is represented to us, *i. e.* what it is in its own nature[2] we do not know. The same is true of other things which we perceive, as we do the moon, constantly in a certain manner, and necessarily represent according to this perception of it. We are therefore justified in laying down as a general principle-of-cognition the following proposition. All which is necessarily represented in the case of a real thing, as far as it appears, according to our original mode of perception, belongs to it as an object-of-cognition, and may therefore be predicated of it in judgments which are universally valid. The sum [Inbegriff] of these judgments is *Human-knowledge generally*. We also consider ourselves as the containers, or bearers of cognition (the subjecta cognitionis, or subjects in which these cognitions reside), and the things which we thus know are its objects (objecta cognitionis).'—Krug, vol. i. p. 816-17.

In the Conversations-Lexicon the writer, after giving an explanation nearly equivalent to the above, and distinguishing between Sense, Understanding, and Reason, goes on to say,

[1] The word here stands for the thinking subject.

[2] As a thing-in-itself, is the literal translation, 'Ding an sich.'

"Reason is elevated above Sense and Understanding, and its peculiar representations are called Ideas, as e. g. the representations of Godhead, Freedom, Immortality, Duty, Virtue, &c. Whether and how far any thing can be known [erkannt] through these Ideas, is taught by the Theory of the Faculty-of-Cognition, which investigates the laws and limits of this faculty. But pre-supposing that something can be known by our Reason, it must be called the highest faculty of Cognition, as there is nothing in human nature higher than the Reason. The Understanding and the Reason are often classed together under the name of the higher faculty of Cognition, because these two faculties in common language are not distinguished so accurately as scientific precision requires.

"The distinction between empirical and rational cognition belongs here. The former (from ἐμπειρια, experience) is a knowledge whose validity rests on experience, and herein upon the lower or sensuous faculty-of-cognition. The latter is a knowledge, the validity of which reposes on grounds which can be known only through the higher, the intellectual[1], or the rational faculty-of-cognition. The whole knowledge of man, however, is an indivisible whole, connected together within him, and as such, a common production of Sense, Understanding, and Reason, jointly."

I need not add more on the subject of the word Erkenntniss, which the reader will find used in p. 220, 234; but the above observations may serve to rectify any mistake into which the translation might otherwise lead. The word is, perhaps, in neither case used by our author in its strictest philosophical sense; but if it be, 'definite conception,' would not be accurate, but simply 'cognition.' Again, in p. 234, I have translated 'speculative Erkenntnisse' by 'speculative ideas,' which in popular language may adequately represent the original, although it is not philosophically just. 'Speculative cognitions' would be the accurate

[1] Even in this sentence the Understanding and the Reason seem too little distinguished.

translation, which would be nearly equivalent to what we should call 'a philosophical knowledge,' or theoretical, as opposed to *moral* and *practical*. (See Krug's Lexicon, under the word '*speculative*.')

I may here conveniently point out an inaccuracy in p. 80 of this translation, which, although it does not lead to any great misapprehension of the author's meaning, deserves correction.

The sentence to which I allude is the following: "All the powers and modes of operation of the soul, which are directed to that which is temporal and perishable—such as its powers of reflection and the understanding, in which, according to Valentinus, is contained the ψυχη, will then utterly cease[1]."

The error here is very easily corrected. I would substitute for the latter part of it the following translation: "such as its faculty of reflection, the understanding, the sum of which powers, according to Valentinus, is the ψυχη, will then utterly cease." Der Verstand is in apposition with das Reflexions-vermögen—with which it is synonymous, and therefore the connecting particle 'and' is erroneous. The former translation 'in which is contained the ψυχη,' is neither so accurate nor so free from ambiguity as the latter. But the error which I am anxious to correct is the making two faculties out of two words used synonymously.

These are the chief words which require illustration, or give me reason to fear that my version may in some degree fall short of the full meaning of the original; but I think, after this full explanation, no one can find any difficulty in placing himself in the condition of a reader of the original work in these passages.

There are, however, one or two other words or phrases, which are used in this work, in a manner which almost baffles exact translation. For instance, the words *Menschheit* and *die menschliche Natur*, are used with a two-fold reference. When we speak of the renovation, improvement, &c. of human nature, we may mean two things, either a general renovation and improvement

[1] The original is: Wie das Reflexions-vermögen, der Verstand, deren Inbegriff dem Valentinus die ψυχη ist, &c.

over the whole mass of human beings, or improvement in every part of man's nature, his will, his affections, &c. Now it is not always easy to determine to which of these notions it is to be referred, or whether to a sort of notion compounded of these two. But this cannot offer any obscurity which a little thought and consideration will not readily remove, and it has hardly, therefore, been deemed worth while to add any explanatory periphrasis, which would only encumber the text, already sufficiently complicated in its structure.

Again, the word *Leben* 'Life,' admits of an use, which is inadequately represented by our word 'Life,' although the word 'vital' is used in a kindred sense. It is used in a religious sense for all in religion which animates and excites us to an endeavour after improvement in our spiritual condition—all which raises us from the death of sin to the life of Righteousness—all which raises us up from a dead and lifeless unconcern about our souls to a lively interest in them—all that excites, raises, and purifies our religious affections. Now although 'lively' and 'vital,' are applied in a sense somewhat analogous to this, our English word 'Life,' hardly represents this range of ideas, except in the combination of particular phrases. Thus it would be legitimate to use it in a phrase like the following, "There is no life in that man's religion;" and such a phrase would be intelligible, but the word hardly bears so wide an application as the German 'Leben,' in the first sentence in section v. page 169. I have, however, ventured to use it there, as the context would explain it. The word there translated 'understanding' is Begriff, which is more properly 'conception;' but the word 'understanding,' or 'knowledge,' in the popular acceptation of the terms, perhaps, conveys the meaning of the author better than a translation more philosophically accurate. At all events with the context, and these few observations, there can be no difficulty to any one in fixing the exact import of the phrase.

Eudæmonism (see p. 216). Perhaps the following explanation from Krug (vol. i. p. 848) may be of service. After showing the

meaning of Eudämonie to be *happiness*, (εὐ and δαιμων, having a condition like that of a good genius, or happiness) Krug proceeds:—"*Eudæmonist* therefore means one who strives only after happiness, and that, too, his own happiness; and *Eudæmonism* means that line of opinion and conduct which is thoroughly embued with such an endeavour, as well as a system adapted to it."

I may, perhaps, be allowed to mention that I have employed the article and the adjective, to express abstract terms, more frequently than is common in English composition. In German it is a phraseology of most frequent occurrence; and I have sometimes found it almost impossible to express the meaning of the original without it. I have, in order to call attention to the circumstance, usually prefixed a capital letter to the adjective.

In translating the word Kirchen-lehrer, I have generally avoided the more convenient and common phrase of 'the Fathers,' except when reference is made to them as authors. The phrase, Church-teachers, seems more appropriate in the translation of a work of this kind, where the author speaks of what was actually taught in the Church, more especially as the phrase of 'the Fathers' is used in German, as well as in English.

Where I have given explanatory additions, &c., I have enclosed them usually in brackets of this form [ ], to distinguish them from the parentheses of the author, which are within the common parenthetical signs. I regret to observe, that in a few cases this precaution has been overlooked, but, I trust, not so as to create any confusion.

With these remarks on the phraseology, &c. of the original and the translation, I now close this preface. I fear some readers may think it too extended, and that I have descended to too minute particulars, and to explanations which can hardly be needed by those into whose hands this volume is likely to fall. But as some of these words and explanations refer to most interesting portions of the original (e. g. the explanation and development of the Gnostic systems), I am desirous to place every one as far

as possible, in the condition of a reader of the original, and to obviate by every means in my power, any difference between the original and the copy. It is a matter of interest to see the light in which a mind, like that of Dr. Neander, views the subjects he here treats; and the more faithful I can make my transcript of the original, the more I shall have done for the satisfaction of those who feel this interest. It is still my maxim that it is the chief business of a translator to 'say every thing which the author says, and nothing whatever which he does not say.' (Pref. to vol i. p. xiii.) How far I have succeeded in this I must leave others to judge. I will only add that, both in translating the work, and in the observations I have made on any of its tendencies or views, the single object I have had in view has been to serve the cause of truth and religion; and if those who are entitled to judge on these great questions, shall think that I have not entirely failed in that object, I shall feel that my labour has not been in vain.

H. J. Rose.

Houghton Conquest,

1841.

THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE

TO THE

SECOND PART [1].

To the readers, who have given to the first half of the first volume of my Church History such a reception, as makes me still more responsible to them, as an author; I here communicate the continuation of my work. On the object at which I have aimed in treating the History of the Church I need not add anything further, after what I have stated in the preface to the first part; to him, who finds himself on too opposite a position, in regard to knowledge and to life, to be able or willing to understand what is here advanced, I cannot expect to make myself intelligible by further explanation; our disagreement is unavoidable. Even with regard to those readers, for whom I have written, I need not express more fully my gratitude to them. The word which comes *from* the heart and the spirit, finds, as it can, without further preface, its way *to* the heart and spirit; *discourse must find its own hearers, and writings their own readers* [2], nothing further can be done to recommend and attract.

[1] This preface belongs to the second of the three brochures in which this first portion of the History of the Church was written. It contains Sections iii. and iv. beginning p. 215 of vol. i. of the translation, and ending in vol. ii. p. 168.

[2] *Das Wort muss sich seine Hörer und die Schrift ihre Leser selbst suchen.* This seems to be a proverbial phrase, especially as it is printed in what are equivalent to our italics.

I feel only that it is a duty to add a word on one subject; *viz.* the extent to which this volume has proceeded, which may appear disproportionate to many. It was from the beginning my plan to treat the History of the Church in the three first centuries at great length, because this period appeared to me the most weighty for every Christian and every theologian; because I believed that the establishment and the propagation of just and unprejudiced views on the composition of the Christian Church, on Christian worship, on Christian life, and Christian doctrines, would be particularly important and salutary, both in a general point of view, and in particular for our times in opposition to different kinds of errors now in circulation from many different quarters. The fermentation which the appearance of Christianity produced in the moral, religious, and intellectual nature of mankind, is of particular service in directing attention to the peculiar nature of the Gospel in the greatest number of different points of view[1], and therefore this extraordinary object certainly requires and deserves consideration in the greatest number of lights. We recognize here the different directions of the human mind and spirit, which are repeated in following periods, often only under other forms, and often in a less free and original manner. When these foundations of the whole History of the Church, are more fully developed, in the following centuries much may be presupposed and handled in a shorter and more compressed manner. The history of the sects of this period,—in which the differences and contradictions proceed from the inmost depth of the human spirit and heart, and, being as yet uncontrolled and forcibly repressed by the deadening influence of a court, and State-Church, can develope themselves *with more breadth and freedom*—is so much the more interesting and instructive than the doctrinal controversies of the Oriental Church in the succeeding centuries, which often lose themselves in dry dialectics, and are often debased by the mixture of the miserable elements of the party-squabbles of the Byzantine court.

[1] The literal translation would here be 'in the most *many-sided* manner;' and 'the most *many-sided* consideration.'

These and similar grounds induced me to treat this first volume of the Church History with greater fulness, and we are therefore by no means to reckon the number of volumes likely to follow upon the same scale. The third part, which is about to appear D. V. at Easter next, will contain the conclusion of the first volume, and if possible the representation of the Apostolic Age, of which I spoke in the preface to the first part. I must request the learned reader to suspend his judgment on the arrangement of the whole to the conclusion of the first volume [1].

A. NEANDER.

[1] A paragraph or two are here omitted, containing thanks to Dr. Rheinwald of Stuttgard for correcting the press. H. J. R.

THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE

TO THE

THIRD PART[1].

I HERE publish the conclusion of the first volume of my History of the Church. I must at the same time acknowledge in some degree the justice of the remark made by excellent men, viz. that the representation of the Apostolic period ought properly to have preceded the whole of the work. There were, however, many reasons which were certainly more of a subjective than an objective character, which induced me still to delay the history of this period. At the same time, after I had once followed this plan, I found also, upon close consideration, that it might prove convenient to attach this representation [of the Apostolic period] as an appendage to the completion of the whole; and therefore I have thought it best to complete this volume, according to the plan on which I had begun, and according to the decision I had previously announced, to reserve the representation of the Apostolic period for a separate treatise[2]. The more I believe myself to have come to this undertaking by an inward calling [durch einen innern Beruf], the more full of importance the idea of it appears, as it forms itself out of the whole of my life and study, the more I acknowledge on that account how much the realiza-

[1] This Part contains Section V., and commences in vol. ii. p. 169, of the English Translation.

[2] This has since been published, and is now announced as in the course of translation by Mr. Hamilton.

tion falls below the ideal conception, by so much the more welcome will it be to me, if other unprejudiced friends of truth, who are men of sound knowledge, will point out to me any deficiencies in it as a whole, or in its several parts; and certainly, as far as I can do it without prejudice to the fundamental views maintained throughout the whole work, I shall use such remarks, in order to bring the work in a future edition nearer to its proper object. And, in this feeling, I must first express at once my most hearty thanks to the excellent man, who, with an unprejudiced love of truth, with an earnestness of mind, and with profound knowledge, and in a friendly spirit, wrote a notice upon the work in the Literatur-Zeitung of Halle, for March, 1827, (p. 60—62). As I do not agree in my doctrinal opinions with the critic, and as he has himself brought forward this difference in our dogmatical views, I must on that account the more prize and acknowledge with gratitude the calm love of justice, and the kind-hearted moderation of the writer; and I do this the more also, because it is so rare amidst the party passions of our present theological and ecclesiastical criticism, to find this spirit of genuine toleration, which, in the decision of one's own opinions, is ready to acknowledge the rights of another, and is mindful of the necessity ἀληθευειν ἐν ἀγαπῃ. And yet I might find fault with the author, for having accused me of an inclination to a pietistic character, if he had used the name pietism in as indistinct a manner, as is usual among certain parties at present, and as has been the case always in the application of those names, by which the predominant spirit of the times stamps the character of heresy on all which is opposed to its own views. But as the author expressly states what he understands by it, and as I really acknowledge as my dogmatical persuasion what he designates by this name, viz. "the view of Christianity, as healing the corruption implanted in human nature, and as destined to represent the Divine in the form of a servant, with which [view] the supranaturalistic principle is connected, that it communicates a knowledge [Erkenntniss] which lies beyond the range of human nature." —As, I say, I acknowledge this as my belief, I can find no fault

with the reviewer, either on the ground of injustice or unfairness. Only I might contend with him about the use of the name pietism, according to a just development of its meaning both etymologically and historically; but this would not be the proper place for it. I will make besides only the following remark, that when we speak here of a knowledge lying beyond the reason of man, I mean thereby such a knowledge as is necessary for the curing of that corruption which lies in human nature, and not the revelation of a speculative dogmatical system; and yet my belief in regard to this, [viz. the revelation of a speculative system,] may be recognized in the third part, which I now publish, as far as it can be done in such an historical representation as this. I will only add that what the critic represents as the object of Christianity, "that man should attain to a *free moral change of mind*, and to a *child-like reliance* on a God of love," according to my doctrinal belief, is by no means in contradiction to those principles, which appear to the critic to denote an inclination to a pietistic character of mind; but are far rather founded upon it. Where certain differences in philosophical or dogmatical views exist, misunderstandings are hardly to be avoided, even where there is the most candid love of truth and the most perfect good will, and I think, without meaning to impugn in any way the reviewer's love of truth, that still some of these mistakes have crept into this review, which is a sound one, when considered from the position which its author takes. When, for example, the reviewer opposes to my statement of the heathen religions, the Hellenic καλον κἀγαθον, and thinks, that, reversing my sentence, men might deny to Christianity the idea of Beauty [the Beautiful], with the same justice that I deny to Heathenism the idea of Holiness, I must reply, that when I say that in the religions of antiquity the idea of the Beautiful, and not the idea of Holiness, was the animating principle (as every one must acknowledge, who sees in Antiquity the position of the development of religion in an æsthetical direction), it by no means follows that the idea of Holiness was *altogether* wanting; which I freely confess can never be the case, where the God-consciousness implanted in man beams

through the surrounding corruption, and therefore any one might justly say, conversely [*literally* reversing the proposition], that the animating principle of Christianity is the idea of Holiness, not that of the Beautiful, from which it by no means follows that the idea of the Beautiful is altogether wanting; only with this difference, that Christianity does not stand in opposition to the one-sided heathenism, as itself a one-sided modification of religious materials; but that it is the highest element, which receives into itself all inferior elements for the fashioning of man, and is destined to set forth the harmony in human nature from the highest position, so that here also the Beautiful, which in heathenism appeared oftentimes at variance with Holiness, must become ennobled into a form under which Holiness is revealed. When, further, the critic accuses me of maintaining that myths are synonymous with lies, I must beg leave to observe that in the passages alluded to by the reviewer (vol. i. p. 6—9), I have represented, not my own view of the origin and existence of the heathen religion, but the view of the old legislators and statesmen, who were accustomed to consider religion only in the light of a handmaid of the State. To suppose an absolute lie, which —existing as a lie—could maintain a dominion over the hearts of men throughout centuries, is truly something unintelligible. There exists as the foundation of all religious phenomena, somewhat of that revelation which beams through and reveals the undeniable connexion of the human spirit with the God in whom we live and move and have our being. But the lie which exists at first unconsciously, or the error, engrafts itself upon the Original and the Divine. Universally there is, in the lie, which exists involuntarily, a misunderstanding and a falsification of what is true, and I think that I have spoken plainly on this point in p. 7, and in other passages. I am from my very heart an enemy to the harsh one-sided mode of considering history, so unsuited to the spirit of the Gospel, so as to see in all that is Ante-Christian, exclusive of Judaism, nothing but the works of Satan, and so as not to trace throughout the whole history of human nature, as through every individual human life, the pro-

gress onward from father to son—and I hold this mode to be as unchristian as it is unintelligible.

It would carry me too far to offer explanations on other points, and I must reserve this in individual cases for any future new editions, where I shall with pleasure make use of all the observations of this excellent man, whether they suggest corrections, or by being opposed to my views, they excite me to further enquiry.

From my heart I coincide with the declaration of the reviewer against those "who seek to banish the life-giving spirit by formulæ, and to deaden the force of faith by a new-stamped orthodoxy." Certainly, as the consideration of Christianity, human nature, and history teaches us, formulæ and symbolical books cannot bring into the hearts of men vital Christianity, from which alone the cure of man's nature can proceed—but they far rather introduce in its stead a dead, delusive, and limiting substitute. It is only where truth wins the heart and spirit of man through her own inward power, utterly unsupported by outward means, that the power of faith, and the true right faith, can be established. As far as regards the anxiety expressed by the reviewer, (for which I heartily thank him,) lest I should be determined by outward circumstances to spare space to the injury of the work, the excellent arrangements made by our esteemed friend, the publisher, have put me in a condition to meet the wishes expressed, and at the same time a cheaper edition, with smaller type, will lighten the expense of the work to those who are in indifferent circumstances.

As far as the judgment of those is concerned, who recognize nothing, which does not come under a certain definite form, adapted to their own particular school, and who arrange *à priori* first a dogmatical system, and then an interpretation and a history after the formulæ of certain schools, which must suit every thing, and which can only impede freedom of thought, studies, and life; I can do nothing but despise the judgments that proceed from such a quarter, whether expressed or implied in silence;—and, indeed, all this arrogant and pretended knowledge of certain

parties of our times is my detestation. I willingly stand on the position of a *general* history; and may God preserve me from such a plan, as can be deduced from a few miserable formulæ, without study and without life! a true pest both for the spirit and the heart! It would be well if we would learn from general history, that there is nothing new under the sun, and if we would hear how John of Salisbury characterizes this disposition in the twelfth century:

"Itaque recentes magistri e scholis et pulli volucrum e nidis sicut pari tempore morabantur, sic pariter avolabant. Sed quid docebant novi doctores et qui plus somniorum quam vigiliarum in scrutinio philosophiæ consumpserant? Numquid rude aliquid aut incultum, numquid aliquid vetustum aut obsoletum? *Ecce nova fiebant omnia*, innovabatur grammatica, immutabatur dialectica, contemnebatur rhetorica, et novas totius quadrivii vias, evacuatis priorum regulis, de ipsis philosophiæ adytis proferebant. *Solam rationem* loquebantur, argumentum sonabat in ore omnium et asinum nominare vel hominem aut aliquid operum naturæ aut ineptum nimis aut rude, et a philosopho alienum [1]."

Let this work, therefore, be dedicated to all those who, with an humble heart, and in freedom from the service of man, seek the truth which is with God alone, and comes from God.

Deo soli gloria, omnia hominum idola pereant!

Berlin, 1827. A. NEANDER.

[1] [One paragraph is here also omitted, the object of which is merely to thank Dr. Rheinwald for correcting the press, and preparing the table of contents, the index, chronology, &c.

I have not translated the index, as the table of contents will fully answer the purpose. H. J. R.]

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ERRATA.

Page	34*,	*line* 24,	*after* And yet upon a more accurate investigation, *add* it appears.
—	35*,	— 11,	*instead of* the influence of which, on their religious, &c. *read* the influence of which was very great on their religious, &c.
—	57,	— 18,	*for* Basilidas, *read* Basilides.
—	108,		— Eucratites, — Encratites, *in the title to the section.*
—	177,	— 22,	— Andaban, — Ardaban.
—	226*,	— 8	*from bottom, for* denied, *read* desired.
—	258*,	— 4	———, — learning — leaning.
—	263*,	— 15	———, in note, *for* Theodotion, *read* Theodotian.
—	323,	— 16,	*for* Hieropolis, *read* Hierapolis.
—	355,	— 11,	*dele the comma after* senses.
—	382,	— 10	*from bottom, for* Heracles, *read* Heraclas.
—	—,	— 6	———, — Sakkas, — Saccas.

* For the correction of an error in p. 80. See Preface, under the word Erkenntniss, p. xxiii-ix.

The reader is requested to correct the errata marked *, as they materially affect the sense of the passages to which they belong.

THE

HISTORY

OF THE

CHRISTIAN RELIGION AND CHURCH,

DURING THE THREE FIRST CENTURIES.

SECTION IV.

THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY, AS CONCEIVED AND DEVELOPED UNDER THE FORM OF A SYSTEM OF DOCTRINES.

(1.) *General Introductory Remarks.*

CHRISTIANITY showed itself in doctrines as well as in human life to be no constraining, dead, and killing letter, but a spirit developing itself freely, and promoting its own free development,—a living spirit that made alive also. It was not given to man as a compact, dogmatical system in one definite form, which was to be propagated from the very beginning as something unchangeable in a lifeless channel of transmission, but the One truth was to be developed in various forms, and manifold relations, and applications, through the means of its *first instruments*, so characteristically distinguished from each other, and sanctified for the work; and particularly by the *four* pillars of the Church, the apostles *Paul* and *James*, *Peter* and *John*, who represent whole characteristic dispositions of human nature, when enlightened by Christianity. It was left to the free conceptions of each individual human spirit to recognise the oneness of divine truth under the variety of human representation, and just as each man felt himself more attracted by *this* or *that* form of apostolic Christianity, according as his peculiar nature was more akin to this or that disposition, and according as the peculiarities

of his nature and his individual education conducted him from this or that side to Christianity, which may be approached from so many different sides. It was left to each man also to appropriate Christianity to himself in his own individual mode, and when once appropriated to exhibit it again in his own individual mode in his spiritual life. In those first documents of the communication of the grace of the Holy Spirit the holy truths were revealed in their simplicity and loftiness, and made capable of a manifold lively application, but not set forth in a perfectly-formed human system. *System* and organic unity lay in the *thing itself;* there was the *real inward unity* and the *inward connexion* of Christianity as One whole, in which all individual parts develope themselves from one center-point, and are harmoniously interwoven together by means of one fundamental principle. Now this inward unity laid its foundations in the inward life of men, together with Christianity itself, as soon as they had received Christianity into their hearts by a lively faith; and yet it was only by degrees that out of this inward unity Christianity could develope itself as a systematic whole, in thought as well as in all other branches of life, with clear and full perceptions and consciousness. In relation to its spiritual, as well as to its moral reception, it proved itself by its peculiar efficacy a leaven destined by degrees to penetrate the whole mass of human life. This is true, as well of the individual doctrines of Christianity as of the whole religion itself.

As Christianity therefore, considered in the light of a whole, could only by degrees, and with a constantly increasing clearness, unfold itself in the spiritual conscience of the thinking man, as a connected system, rejecting every thing foreign to its nature which attempted from without to join itself with it; so also it was *only gradually* that the full scope of the *single doctrines* contained in this one whole could stand forth clearly and definitely in this same conscience. As in life, so in thought Christianity found a *world already in existence, which was formed on different principles, and in which it must first* create a way for itself by means of its overcoming and reforming spirit. As in life, so in the regions of thought it was necessary for Christianity to contend against the opposite dispositions which were then in vogue, and which opposed it not only with open enmity, but by partially stealing something of Christianity, and making it their own threatened to mix themselves up with it. This was the

more likely to happen then, because Christianity appeared in a period so full of ferment and of expectation, and exercised a power which attracted the opposite elements and dispositions of human nature from so many different sides; and those peculiar dispositions which were unable to resist the attractive power of Christianity were yet unwilling to give themselves up to it wholly, and suffer their own deficiencies to be supplied by it, but they were inclined to set up a Christianity of their own for themselves, and capriciously to sever what in that religion is one and inseparable. But still the opposition against these adulterated and partial conceptions of Christianity and of Christian doctrines served well to bring forward more clearly and definitely in the thinking conscience the peculiar nature and inward unity of Christianity, and the peculiar import and character of its several doctrines.

But since the development of the Christian scheme of doctrine can only be fully understood by means of its connection and its contentions with these manifold oppositions to it, we shall find it absolutely necessary previously to give these oppositions, as they appear in the various Christian sects, a more accurate consideration.

(2.) *The History of Sects.*

THERE were two main divisions of the religious character; the one a *carnal* spirit, that endeavoured to lower every thing to the level of sense, and the other an *exclusively spiritual* disposition, that spiritualized and refined every thing away too much;—which opposed Christianity from the very beginning, or threatened to adulterate it by mixing themselves up with it[1]. The one party rested wholly on the *earthly appearance of the divine*, and in it overlooked the higher Spirit which animated it; the other thought that they could grasp the overwhelming Spirit without the reality of the appearance: the one would have in Christianity only the human without the divine; the other only the divine without the human. When first Christianity arose out of Judaism, it was from Judaism that the first intermixture of these two dispositions with it proceeded also. The first disposition was the most prevalent among the great mass of the Jewish people, and therefore this came the first into contact with Christianity, and thence proceeded all those sects, which, mistaking the *peculiar and charac-*

[1] Compare the Introduction to this work, vol. i. p. 54.

teristic difference between the law and the gospel, made out of Christianity only a perfected Judaism, and which were unable to comprehend and acknowledge what is thoroughly new in Christianity and its effects, as well as that by which Christ is distinguished from all the sages and saints of the Old Testament.

(a.) *The Judaizing Sects.*

THE origin of these sects carries us back into the apostolic age. Among those things of which Christ said that the apostles could not yet understand them, and that they should first be revealed to them by the illumination of the Spirit, one of the most pre-eminent was that doctrine which is so intimately interwoven with the nature of the gospel,—the doctrine of the *foundation of the kingdom of heaven in all mankind, only by faith in the Redeemer;* from which the abrogation of the ceremonial law of Moses followed as a matter of course. Even after the apostles, by the illumination of the Holy Ghost, had attained to the right knowledge of the Redeemer, they were nevertheless not immediately in clear possession of all the consequences which flow from this doctrine in regard to the all-sufficiency of faith in Him, and the needlessness of the Mosaic ceremonial law. Even when they perceived that the preaching of the gospel was to reach the heathen also, and that *they* were to become fellow-partakers in the kingdom of Christ, (as indeed many of the better spirits among the Jews had already deduced this from the prophecies,) even then they had no other notion than that the heathen, together with the gospel, were to embrace the whole ceremonial law of Moses. It was only when St. Peter, having been called to the conversion of Cornelius, by means of a vision connected with this call, the meaning and object of which the Spirit of God had taught him to understand, had been persuaded that God made no difference between Jew and Gentile, and when he saw faith in the gospel working with the same divine power among the heathen, that he became the man to stand up among the apostles at Jerusalem as a witness to the truth which he now recognized; and the apostles then, by the light of the Spirit, attained to a knowledge of that which hitherto had been sealed up to them in the counsels of God in regard to man's redemption. When St. Paul afterwards was chosen out especially as the instrument of God for

the preaching of the Gospel, what he calls the mystery of Christ, into which he had received so deep an insight, was announced to the rest of the apostles, as well as to himself (Ephes. iii. 4, 5.); and here also no contest of principles could take place among them, as is beautifully declared in the apostolic council at Jerusalem (Acts xv.). But the different spheres of operation chosen by the apostles, introduced an outward difference in their mode of proceeding.

Those apostles, whose exertions lay entirely among the Jews in Palestine, themselves observed the ceremonial law, and left its observance to be continued, for this was a matter of perfect indifference, being only an outward thing, as long as the conscience made no more of it, and as long as people did not profess to seek justification and sanctification by it. But *the fancy*, that sanctification might be found in ceremonial observances, could not be destroyed by an outward attack, from simply throwing away the ceremonial law at once; for what was founded on persuasion, could only be removed by persuasion also. If the belief, that sanctification and holiness can only be attained through the grace of God in Christ, had once been able thoroughly to penetrate the consciences of mankind, ceremonies would have fallen away of themselves. But if men were persuaded over-hastily to throw them away, many weak-minded people might be led away to do things which their consciences might reproach them for,—and others, who might have been won to the Gospel by degrees, had they only been able to join it outwardly at first, would then be wholly inclined to reject it from the very beginning. This was always the plan pursued by a pure evangelic spirit, not to begin with an *outward* amendment, but to suffer only the *inward* power of truth to effect every thing itself, working *from within to things without.*

The case of St. Paul, whose sphere of exertion lay among the heathen, was different. Among them, the connection of Christianity with the ceremonial law would only increase, to the utmost degree, the difficulty of its propagation; because the prevailing peculiarities of the heathen people were so strongly opposed to that law. The only thing which could possibly have brought them to submit to a yoke so burthensome to their peculiar habits, and to make so great a sacrifice, would have been the *persuasion*, that their justification and salvation depended upon it; and to introduce or to further such a persuasion, would have been nothing

else than undermining in them the whole foundation of the Christian religion, and giving them a Jewish-Christian ceremonial worship, instead of the living faith of Christianity. Therefore, the apostle St. Paul—the very same person whose principle it was to become to the Jews a Jew, in order to win the Jews to Christianity—was obliged so expressly to oppose himself, as a defender of Christian freedom, to the Judaizing teachers, who wished to force the Jewish ceremonial law on the acceptance of the Churches formed from heathen converts also.

The Churches, which consisted entirely of Jews, who, in their Christian faith, still lived entirely as Jews, must have formed a striking contrast to the Churches formed from heathen converts, in whom the pure spiritual character of the Christian worship was the most prominent feature, and among whom religion was connected with no outward ceremonies whatever. But the communion of faith and love was not to be broken in consequence of all these differences in the outward circumstances and form of life; Christians of both descents and classes were to look upon each other as brethren. Those who had attained to the full ripeness of Christian knowledge, to τελειοτης ἐν Χριστῳ, were to bear with those, who were not as far advanced, in a spirit of love and tenderness, in the hope that God would reveal to those also in his own time, those views in which they were deficient, if only all would endeavour to apply faithfully to the purposes of a Christian life the measure of knowledge, which was vouchsafed to them. Phil. iii. 15.

The knowledge of many of the Jewish Christians was deficient also in regard to other things, besides the importance of the ceremonial law. Their limited and narrow-minded representations of the nature of Christianity, and their limited views as to the person of Christ himself, served admirably to go hand in hand. As in their opinion the difference between the Gospel and the law was only a difference of degree, they could also perceive between what Christ was, and what Moses and the Prophets were, only a difference of degree. They knew, therefore, in this point of view, the Messiah more after the flesh than after the Spirit; they knew him rather as the *Son of David*, than as the *Son of God*. And yet, in the first place, the belief in Jesus as the Messiah was to be a point of union for all, even amidst all other differences in their measure of Christian knowledge, and in their other religious opinions; and from this *one point* all further development

of Christian knowledge was to proceed. The apostles left it to the guidance of the Spirit, to lead all men from this one point to the unity of the faith, and knowledge of the Son of God.

But, although the apostles agreed in their principles, as to the relation of Christianity to Judaism; although the apostles in Palestine and St. Paul recognized each other mutually, as independent fellow-labourers in the same work, this their agreement was, nevertheless, not acknowledged by all, who called themselves their disciples. There were Jewish-Christians, who were not content with having toleration and tenderness shown to their narrow-minded notions, but who wished to force those notions on all others, and persecuted every freer evangelical spirit with blind zeal. These men maintained most strictly, that no person could have an equal share with the Jews in the blessings of the Messiah's kingdom, unless he received the Mosaic law in all its extent: and these were the people who endeavoured to destroy the foundation of Christianity, laid by St. Paul in the Churches of the heathen converts, and to introduce, instead of it, doctrines which savoured more of Judaism than of Christianity. They would not, therefore, acknowledge St. Paul, who opposed their influence so strongly, for an apostle. In their opinion, those only were apostles whom Jesus himself had instructed during his life on earth, and had placed in their apostolic calling. St. Peter and St James[1] were the *pillars* of the Church, to which they more particularly appealed, although they did not act in accordance with the spirit or the notions of those apostles. Hence there arose a pseudo-Petrian and a pseudo-Jacobite party of Jewish Christians. It was natural enough that the spirit of opposition *on one side* should call forth a similar spirit *on the other;* and a party of zealots among the heathen converts, who prided themselves most haughtily on their freedom, as Christians, opposed themselves to these narrow-minded Jewish-Christians, and would not allow the observers of the ceremonial law to be reckoned by any means as genuine Christians: these people vaunted their freer *Gnosis*, and by their contempt of the Jewish people, and by their exaggeration of the contrast laid down by St. Paul, between the law and the Gospel, they were in danger of being seduced into despising the Old Testament itself. They would acknowledge Christianity

[1] The James, who is known under the name of the brother of the Lord, probably the apostle, the son of Alpheus or Cleophas; being the relation of Jesus by blood. He was also called his brother by an use of the word in an extended sense.

only in the mode in which it was represented by St. Paul, and St. Paul was to be their only apostle. He, however, would acknowledge only one Christ for all, and only one Church of Christians sanctified by Him, and calling on their common Lord; and he would know nothing of *Paul's* party, and *Peter's* party. But still, where the genuine evangelical spirit and the power of love did not quench these differences, it was necessarily the case, that this opposition should be developed still more distinctly as time went on.

In the first half of the second century we find again the four parties, which had formed themselves in the apostolic age.

1. The Jewish zealots—the pseudo-Petrians.
2. The more moderate, and genuine evangelical Jewish Christians.
3. The zealots among the heathen converts—the pseudo-Pauline Christians.
4. The more moderate and genuine apostolic heathen Christians.

Among these latter was Justin Martyr. He says in his Dialogue with Trypho[1], "There are persons who will have no intercourse with those who observe the ceremonial law, and will not share the hearth with them, and say that they cannot be saved. I do not agree with these persons; but if the others, from weakness of persuasion, wish to observe as far as they can, even those laws of Moses, which we think were given on account of the hardness of man's heart; if they will only, at the same time, rest their hope on Christ, and do that which is lawful and holy by its own nature, and by eternal laws, and have no hesitation in living with other Christians, without endeavouring to compel them also to the observance of these things, then we say, that such persons are to be looked upon as our brethren in all respects. But if those from among your people (the Jews) who say that they believe in Christ, compel those of the heathens, who embrace the faith in this same Christ, to live entirely according to the law laid down by Moses, or else decline all intercourse with them, then I cannot approve *of such persons at all.* And yet I believe, that perhaps those who follow them in the observance of the ceremonial law, if they believe in Christ at the same time, will be saved."

[1] Ed. Colon. p. 200. [P. 137. Ed. Jebb. P. 266. Ed. Paris.]

The Church of Jerusalem, which must have been induced by the Jewish war to take refuge in Pella beyond the Jordan [1], from its origin till the first half of the second century, consisted entirely of Christians of Jewish descent, who therefore unitedly continued in the observance of the ceremonial law. By means of this outward bond they were all united together, whatever differences besides might be found in their opinions on doctrinal points and their religious dispositions. It was a peculiar circumstance of an outward nature which first caused a separation amongst them. In fact, when Hadrian was induced by the rebellion of the Jews under Barchochab to prohibit them entirely from setting foot on the earth and the neighbourhood of Jerusalem, since they generally drew upon themselves the jealousy of the Roman governors, it was natural enough that the Christian Church, which apparently had returned back to Jerusalem in this interval [2], should wish to escape being confounded with the Jews. Those, therefore, who were restrained by religious scruples from doing what might enable them to attain this object, were obliged to separate themselves from the rest. The others joined themselves with Christians of heathen descent, and formed with them a Church in the heathen colony, Ælia Capitolina, which had arisen on the site of old Jerusalem, and in this Church the ceremonial law was entirely abandoned [3].

We often find it the case in the history of sects, that people describe under one common name sects which are really different, but agree with one another in *some* points, without remarking the points of difference between them, so that they attribute to all these sects what may justly be said only of one or other of them. This was the case here also; from the time of Irenæus all those Christians of Jewish descent, who considered it necessary to continue in the observance of the ceremonial law, were designated by the common name of the sect of the Ebionites. In regard to the derivation of the name, Tertullian is the first who makes mention of a founder named Ebion, and others have followed him in this account. Better informed writers, such as Irenæus and Origen, know of no such person; and it is clear that the

[1] Euseb. iii. 5. [2] Epiphanius de mensuris et ponderibus, c. 15.

[3] See Euseb. iv. 6., and the remarkable words of Sulpicius Severus, after he has quoted that prohibition of Hadrian; Hist. Sacr. ii. 31. "Quod quidem Christianæ fidei proficiebat, quia tum pœne omnes Christum Deum sub legis observatione credebant."

invention of such a person only arose from the not understanding the name of Ebionite. Origen gives us the proper derivation of the term, namely, from the Hebrew אֶבְיוֹן (Ebion) poor; but the meaning which we find attributed to the word *by him*, that is to say, as containing a reference to the poverty of their religious conceptions and of their faith [1], cannot possibly be the original meaning of the term, for they themselves gave their own sect this name, and they clearly would not have set themselves a name which would be a reproach to them. But even if we grant that this name was given them by *others*, and by such as were of sentiments hostile to their sect, who were the persons who would have branded them with *this name* understood in this sense? Could it be Christians of heathen descent? These might, indeed, have applied the name to them in *this very signification*; but then we can hardly imagine that *they* would have chosen an *Hebrew* name. Or was it the Jews, who were angry at Christianity in general? This might be possible, if we modify in some degree the notion of *poverty of thought*, after the idea of a very acute enquirer, who has recently distinguished himself in this walk of knowledge [2], and if, putting the word into the mouth of those Jews who expected a Messiah to come in *visible glory*, we imagine them to designate by this name the faith in a *poor* and *crucified* Messiah. And yet this meaning, taken by itself, does not appear to be the simplest nor the most natural; for even this learned writer himself connects *this meaning* with one we are about to mention. If we follow the interpretation of the name which we find in the later Ebionites of Epiphanius, it originally denoted a class of *poor* men. This may have been applied to them either as consisting of *poor* persons of the *lower orders*, whom none of the rich and the learned had joined (see John vii. 49.), a reproach

[1] Origen, t. xvi.; Matt. xii. Τῳ ἐβιωνειῳ και πτωχευοντι περι την εἰς Ἰησουν πιστιν. Origen can hardly mean in this place to give an etymological explanation; but he is only making an allusion in his own way to the meaning of the word. However, in the book c. Celsum, ii. c. 1. he says expressly, ἐπωνυμοι της κατα την ἐκδοχην πτωχειας του νομου.

[In Neander's earlier work, Genetische Entwickelung der Vornehmsten Gnostischen Systeme, Berlin, 1818, there is a long appendix on the subject of the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies, and on the Ebionites. In Burton's Bampton Lectures, note 80, the authorities may be found by whom the existence and the non-existence of Ebion are respectively supported. Matter, Hist. du Gnosticisme, vol. ii. p. 320, says, that "at least it is certain there was no such founder of a sect as Ebion." H. R.]

[2] Dr. Gieseler, in Staüdlin and Tzschirner's Archive for Ancient and Modern Ecclesiastical History. IV. Band. Second Part, p. 307.

which the heathens made to the Christians [1], and which the proud and the wise in their own opinion have constantly made to the disciples of simple truth; or they may have been persons who had voluntarily renounced all earthly property, and voluntarily given up all their earth's wealth, in order that they might devote their whole life to Divine things; and in this case we should be reminded of a similar name in the case of later sects [2]. The latter idea corresponds the most nearly with the explanation given by the later Ebionites themselves in Epiphanius; for they appealed to the conduct of their ancestors in laying down all their goods at the feet of the apostles. In truth, however, this is no decisive proof, for we may certainly imagine it possible that these later Ebionites had introduced a meaning into the term which was foreign to its original sense. According to either of these explanations this appellation may have been originally a *general name of the Christians* in Jerusalem, or it may have been from the very beginning the name of *a certain ascetic sect* among the Jewish Christians, which the Church teachers afterwards extended by mistake to all Judaizing Christians. Such an appellation, in such a sense, suits admirably the spirit of the ascetic Ebionites, who paint themselves to us in the apocryphal book called the Clementines [3]; for in that book, according to the *contrast between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of Satan, which they misunderstood*, (as if the whole earthly world, not merely in regard to its sinful misuse, but of itself and by its very nature, necessarily belonged to Satan); in this book we find it required of those who wish to belong to the kingdom of God, that they should renounce as far as possible all possessions in a world which was none of theirs, but which belonged to Satan; that they should possess nothing but what was absolutely necessary to their bare subsistence, that they should only possess bread, water, and one garb, and even these necessaries of life they should obtain by the sweat of their brow [4].

[1] See Vol. i. p. 62.

[2] Humiliati, pauperes de Lugduno.

[3] [In Neander's Genetische Entwickelung, &c. he says, p. 367, "although all the opinions which the first Fathers, who have given us but very scanty notices of the Ebionites, attributed to them, are not to be found in him (the author of the Clementines), yet he belongs far more to this class of Judaizing Christians than to the class of the Nazarenes." He therefore considers the work written by a man of Ebionitish views. See also Matter, Hist. du Gnosticisme, vol. ii. p. 329. H. R.]

[4] Clementin. Homil. 15. c. 7, 8, 9.

Many among these Judaizing Christians had brought their carnal Jewish habits of thought with them into Christianity, and they had thus only applied the common Jewish representation of the Messiah to Jesus. According to this representation they considered him a man, like other men, who had been chosen as Messiah by a peculiar decree of God's counsel, solemnly dedicated to this office by Elias, that is, according to their notions, by John who represented Elias, and at this moment had been furnished with the Divine power requisite for the accomplishment of his office. This was the only class of Ebionites known to Irenæus, and they appear to us as the offspring of those old Jewish opponents of St. Paul. Like them, these Ebionites considered circumcision as an indispensable condition to a perfect participation in the kingdom of God: the *earthly* Jerusalem was still to them the *true city of God*, and they abused St. Paul as an apostate from the law [1].

The mild manner in which Justin Martyr speaks of these opinions of the Ebionites on the person of Jesus [2], is worthy of observation:—"There are some," he says, "of our people, who acknowledge him to be the Messiah, and yet consider him a man, born of men; with whom I do not agree: and the greater number also, being of my opinion, do not say this; for we are commanded by Christ not to follow the doctrines of men, but to hold that which has been proclaimed by the holy prophets, and taught by him [3]." Thus Origen [4] sees in the Ebionites weaker brethren, who

[1] Irenæus, i. 26. and alibi. I am no longer so strongly of the opinion, that the difficult passage, "Quæ autem sunt prophetica, curiosius exponere nituntur," is to be understood after the ideas of the Clementine, of a too subtile investigation into the meaning of true prophecies, as I endeavoured to show in my book on the Gnostics, p. 391; for only the common sort of Ebionites, whose notions were entirely those of carnal-minded Jews, appear to have been known to Irenæus; and the idea brought forward in the Clementine, of true and false prophecies, would be quite foreign to their spirit. We can say nothing more than that Irenæus found himself at a loss among interpretations of the prophets after the Jewish Rabbinic method, which were in vogue among the Ebionites, but entirely at variance with the usual Christian methods of interpretation, and therefore that he took occasion to accuse them as hypercritical subtilties.

[2] It is at least probable, although not certain, that he had the Ebionites here in his thoughts; but notwithstanding, they are not mentioned by him at all as a peculiar sect. The reading *ἀπο του ἡμετερου γενους*, does not, therefore, appear to me suspicious. Not only the authority of manuscripts, but the antithesis to the phrase, *του γενους ὑμων*, which precedes, appears to support this reading.

[3] Dial. c. Tryphon. Jud. § 48. [P. 142. Ed. Jebb: p. 267. Ed. Par.]

[4] Matt. t. xvi. c. 12.

did not reject Christ, who was their Messiah, and to whom they looked for all assistance; although they recognized in him only the Son of David, and not the Son of God. He gives a very pretty allegorical turn to the account of the blind man in Mark x. 46: he makes the blind man, who calls on Jesus, an *Ebionite*, and the multitudes around, who commanded him to hold his peace, *believers* from among the heathen converts, who generally held the more exalted notions in regard to the person of the Messiah; and he then continues thus: "But although the multitudes commanded him to be silent, yet he cried the more, because he believed in Jesus, although his faith was of an human kind[1]; and he cried out aloud, and said to him, 'Son of David! have mercy on me.'"

How different would many things have been, if men, in this spirit of love and freedom, had always allowed the grace of the Redeemer to fall on all who call upon him! if they had always taken into their account the various stages in the Christian progress up to the ripeness of manhood in the faith, and had not wished to force different spirits all at once into the same measure and degrees! But even Origen considered the Ebionites as heretics against St. Paul, and as persons who were but little different from Jews[2].

Irenæus judged *all Ebionites together* by *those*, of *whom he had heard*, and attributed to all the same ideas with regard to the person of Jesus. On the contrary, Origen, a man of more accurate investigation, who had been in Palestine himself, distinguishes the Ebionites into two classes; of which one denied the miraculous birth of Jesus, and the other admitted it[3]. We may see from this difference having been overlooked by earlier writers, how easy it was to overlook the differences in opinion between different branches of the same party. It is not unlikely that those who acknowledged the supernatural operations of the Divine Spirit at the birth of Jesus, and considered his birth as a miracle which stood forth from the chain of usual human events, supposed also a certain original union of God or of the Divine Spirit, with the human nature of Jesus,—and then they would already have retreated farther from the opinions of the narrow-minded Jews, and more nearly approached those of the Christ-

[1] Πιστευων μεν επι τον Ἰησουν, ἀνθρωπικωτερον δε πιστευων.

[2] Jerem. Homil. xviii. c. 12. Τυπτουσι τον ἀποστολον Ἰησου Χριστου λογοις δυσφημοις. Matt. t. xi. s. 12. Ὀλιγῳ διαφεροντες των Ἰουδαιων.

[3] Origen c. Celsum, v. c. 61.

ians, because they did not make the peculiar operation of the Divine Spirit on the man Jesus begin all at once, at one definite moment of his life; namely, the season of his consecration to the office of Messiah, by John; but instead of isolating the human nature of Christ, they allowed that it developed itself from the very beginning, in union with God; and from the very beginning they made a very essential difference between Christ and the other organs of God among men.

In the representation of the Ebionites given by Epiphanius [1], we actually find some, who believed in the higher nature of the Messiah, and busied themselves in speculations upon it. One party of them recognized in the appearance of Jesus, from the very beginning, a spirit of an higher kind, which could not proceed from the chain of the natural progress and development of human nature;—that pure outpouring of the Divine Spirit (the original form of human nature) which first existed in the person of Adam, and then again appeared on earth, at various times, as the renovator of fallen humanity; until at last it returned in the person of the Messiah, in order to bring all his children to himself, and to raise them with himself to the eternal kingdom, where he will repose with them for ever from all his wanderings, and all his cares. This is the same doctrine which is found in the apocryphal book of the Clementines, from which we have been able in this representation, to fill up the account of Epiphanius. The others adopted the common Jewish idea, that Jesus was first invested with Divine powers, while yet merely a man, only at his solemn consecration to the office of Messiah. But, instead of the indefinite notion of Divine power, they imagined a Spirit elevated above all angels, the highest representative of God; and, according to them, this was the *real heavenly Messiah* [2], who united himself with the man Jesus, as his instrument, at his baptism, and effected every thing through him.

It may be said, that we cannot judge of those older Ebionites by the Ebionites of the *fourth* century, mentioned in Epiphanius, for these latter may have appropriated to themselves, in later times, notions quite foreign to their original dispositions, by intercourse with many other theosophico-ascetic sects: but then these notions bear completely the stamp of a far more ancient Jewish theosophy; and their agreement with the ideas of the Clementine be-

[1] Hæres. 30.

[2] Ὁ ἄνω Χριστος.

speaks a higher antiquity; for the Clementine, at least in its ground-work, certainly cannot come to us from a later period than the second century. Nor can we be surprised at finding theosophico-ascetic dispositions among the Judaizing Christians; for there were many sects of that kind among the Jews, who united a certain attachment to the ceremonial law with these dispositions, and many of whom would be attracted by Christianity in some one point of view, without being able to receive it quite pure, and by itself, and would therefore endeavour to amalgamate it with their earlier habits of thought. And although we usually find St. Paul engaged in controversy with Jews, of entirely gross and carnal habits of thought, which were only directed to earthly views, yet, in the Epistle to the Colossians, his adversaries are those Judaizing and false teachers, who united a theosophico-ascetic disposition with a certain attachment to the ceremonial law; and they are as different from his other usual antagonists, as those Ebionites of Epiphanius, to whom the author of the Clementine belonged, were from those usually called Ebionites, which was the only party known under that name to the older Fathers of the Church. We recognize here one peculiar family of the Judaizing Christians; the seed of which, as well as of the common sort of Ebionites, is to be sought in the apostolic age[1].

If we compare the Clementine with the accounts in Ephesians, the example of this sect will make it very clear, how people of this kind might have so inward a feeling of religion in one point of view, while in another they adhered so closely to its outward things: on the one hand might prize so highly an authority given by God, while on the other they subjected it so capriciously to the theosophic system *established in their schools*, and separated at the dictates of their own will, whatever did not suit their ideas.

They supposed a simple *original religion*, which that first pure man, who received the immediate outpouring of the Divine Spirit in his heart, and learnt from it all divine truth, had in the first

[1] Only Methodius, who lived at the end of the third and the beginning of the fourth century, appears to have known them, when he says of them (Symposion Decem Virgin. Bibliothec. Græcor. Patr. auctor. noviss. T. i. Paris, 1672. fol. 113.) that they had denied the inspiration of the Holy Ghost in the Prophets, and maintained that they wrote only ἐξ ἰδίας κινησεως; and although we cannot here with certainty recognize the whole of the Clementine notion of prophecy, it is at least certain, that he speaks of persons, who, unlike the usual Jews of a Pharisaic cast, very much lowered the *authority of the Prophets*, and would not acknowledge their writings to be inspired in the same degree as the Pentateuch.

instance delivered to his children. This religion was to be always propagated pure and unmixed, by means of oral transmission; it did not however maintain its purity, but was constantly adulterated more and more by the interspersion of the evil principle. Many new institutions, proceeding from God, were therefore needed to purify the original religion from these adulterations. Moses was one of the restorers of this original religion; it was to be spread by oral delivery, and thus it was also to be constantly propagated among a number of initiated people. But when the revelations of God imparted by Moses were set down in Scripture, many errors mixed themselves up with it, being strewn among them by the evil principle, as God permitted, in order to try in mankind their sense of divine things, and their love to God, by their separation of the truth from falsehood, and their rejection of every thing which opposed the pure idea of God. (Under this head were reckoned every passage in which God lets himself down to the notions of humanity in order to instruct mankind, and is represented after an anthopopathical manner [1], as well as all that related to the sacrifice of victims.) But the mass of carnal-minded Jews did not know how to distinguish the original Mosaism from these adulterating additions. And then that pure outpouring of the Spirit of God, the Forefather of the human race, out of love to his children scattered over the whole earth, was impelled to appear again on earth in the person of Jesus, in order to purify the original religion from the additions which deformed it. He himself points out this object of his appearance, when he says, Matt. v. 17, "Ye must not imagine that I am come to destroy the law, but to fulfil it [2]." That which he destroyed cannot belong to that which he call the law, cannot belong to that original religion [3]. He appeared

[1] Although in the author of the Clementine a lively eastern power of imagination prevailed too strongly over the powers of conception, to allow him to form to himself a pure spiritual idea of God, he himself looked on God as an higher Being, of radiant appearance in an human form. ["Ein höheres Lichtwesen in menschlicher gestalt." GERM.]

[The word I have translated *powers of conception* is "begriffsvermögen." It must be remembered that *Begriff.* means an *abstract idea.* See the Preface. H. R.]

[2] The words τους προφητας are here capriciously left out, because this sect did not acknowledge the Divine illumination of the prophets, and saw in them, in fact, only the propagators of many errors—as, for instance, of the error of an earthly political kingdom of the Messiah.

[3] Clementin. Homil. iii. 51.

particularly for the purpose also of extending his blessings over the rest of his children, the heathen, of imparting that original religion also to them, which had been always propagated among the initiated [1]. The doctrine of Christ is, therefore, entirely one with the pure original Mosaism. The Jewish Mystic, an Essene, or something of the same kind, converted to Christianity, did not need to receive any new doctrines; the doctrine of Christ was to him only a ratification of his earlier theory of religion, and he was only delighted to find that the secret doctrines had been made known for the common good of all mankind, which he had never before thought possible. He saw in Jesus a new appearance of that Adam whom he had always honoured as the source of all that is true and Divine in human nature. Only a father could love his children as Jesus loved mankind: "But what gave him most sorrow was, that he was opposed from ignorance by those for whom he was struggling, as for his own children, and yet he loved those who hated him,—and yet he wept over their disobedience,—and yet he blessed them that blasphemed him,—and yet he prayed for his enemies; and all this he did, not only as a father himself, but he taught his disciples also to conduct themselves towards other men as their brethren [2]."

The following conclusion would be deduced from this: one and the same original religion is in pure Mosaism, and in Christianity; he who has the former can dispense with the latter, and he who has the latter can very well dispense with the former; at least if the Jew will not blaspheme Christ, whom he knows not, nor the Christian Moses, whom he also knows not. The doctrine is given by God, and man has received it without any of his own co-operation, and all depends on this, whether the Jew practises what Moses commands, and the Christian what Christ appoints. Christianity is also here (in this system) only the doctrine of another *law*; the author of the Clementine, like many other ascetics and mystics, had experienced nothing of the opposition between this law of God and the law of sin in human nature, —of the gulf between the acknowledgment of this law, and the loving and perfecting it,—or of the difference between the letter that kills, and the Spirit that makes alive; and therefore he was unable to recognise the real difference between Mosaism (of

[1] Τα ἀπ' αἰωνος ἐν κρυπτῳ ἀξιοις παραδιδομενα κηρυσσων.

[2] Homil. iii. 19.

which he had formed an entirely arbitrary notion) and Christianity—that is to say, the real, peculiar, fundamental nature of Christianity. He says, in fact, "There would have been no need for the appearance, either of Moses or of Christ, if men would have chosen to acknowledge what is right of themselves[1]." Which means, 'if they would have suffered themselves to be brought to a proper understanding of the original religion, by means of that part of their own nature which is akin to the Divine.'

He perverts in a remarkable manner those glorious words of Christ, Matt. xi. 25, which require child-like resignation and simplicity[2]. He finds nothing in this passage more than that God had hidden the Divine Teacher, Jesus, from the wise among the Jews, who knew already from Moses what they had to do, as he had, on the contrary, revealed him to the heathen, who did not yet know, how they ought to live[3].

In the Clementine a certain asceticism is recommended, and yet at the same time the holiness of the marriage state is maintained, and to mislead mankind to celibacy is represented as the mark of a false prophet. Now this appears as a characteristic mark of the Ebionites also in Epiphanius, and the comparison of these two accounts shows that this disposition in the Ebionites did not arise afterwards out of opposition to the monkery of the predominant Church, but that we are to recognize the original Hebraism in it, and therefore it may have been a trait common to the different Ebionitish sects. Traces of the enmity of the Judaizing parties to *celibacy* are to be found as early as the time of St. Paul. See his first Epistle to the Corinthians, chap. vii.

In these Clementine Ebionites there are also symptoms of a Judaizing sect, which, although it could only consider the apostle St. Paul, who opposed so strongly their doctrine of the identity of Mosaism and Christianity, and other ideas peculiar to themselves, only in the light of a perverter of the doctrine of Christ, was yet mildly disposed towards the heathen, and by no means wished to force the ceremonial law upon them. In Jerome, on the contrary, under the name of *Nazarene* (the original name

[1] Hom. viii. 6. Εἰπερ ἀφ' ἑαυτων το εὐλογον νοειν ἐβουλοντο.

[2] As we usually find in the Apocryphal Gospels, he certainly robs these words in some degree of their simplicity, because he quotes the words σοφων with the addition of πρεσβυτερων. To νηπιοις he adds θηλαζουσιν.

[3] Hom. viii. 6.

given to all Christians by the Jews, see Acts xxiv. 5.) we find the descendants of those Jewish Christians of a *genuine evangelic disposition*, who would not allow the existence of any contradiction between the apostles, the same people, of whom we found the last trace in Justin Martyr (see above). They pointedly combated the regulations and the ceremonial worship of the Pharisees; and while they themselves observed the ceremonial law, they did not force it on the heathen. They acknowledged the apostle Paul as a teacher of Divine wisdom, whom God had peculiarly chosen for his instrument, for the purpose of bringing the tidings of salvation to the heathen nations. They lamented the unbelief of their own people, and longed for the time when they also should be converted to the Lord, whom they had crucified, and renounce all their idols. Then nothing would be done by the power of man, but every thing which Satan set up in opposition to the kingdom of God, would fall down by the power of God, and all who had hitherto pleased themselves, in the fancy of their own wisdom, would be converted to the Lord. They thought that they found this promise in the prophecies of Isaiah (xxxi. 7, 8[1]). The conclusion which we are entitled to draw clearly from all this is, that from the very times of the apostles various sorts of Jewish Christians spread themselves abroad, which people have been led into confusion with each other by the common names which were given to them.

(b.) *The Sects which arose from the mixture of the oriental Theosophy with Christianity.*

1. *The Gnostic Sects.*

(*a.*) *General remarks on their origin, character, and differences.*

We pass from the Judaizing sects to the Gnostics, who, proceeding from *one* common stock with the former, developed themselves afterwards in a manner which set the two parties into a constantly increasing opposition. If we contemplate the characteristics of both dispositions pushed to the extreme, we cannot conceive a stronger opposition than that between the narrow and carnal disposition of Judaism, which cleaves to outward things,

[1] Hieronymi commentar. in Iesaiam. ed. Martianay, t. iii. p. 79. 83. 250. 261.

and comprehends every thing only after the senses,—and the spirit of Gnosticism, which gives itself up to unbridled licence in its speculations on Divine matters, despising the letter, idealizing every thing, and striving to reach beyond the limits of earthly existence and the material world;—and yet, just as one is often led to observe, that dispositions, which in our conceptions are widely opposed, really are connected together in the outward world [1] by various means, and unite together by many points of communication, so the following considerations will verify such an observation in regard to *this very difference*.

At the time of the first propagation of Christianity, the name γνωσις [*gnosis*, knowledge], in the widely-extended phraseology of the Jewish divines of Alexandria, denoted a deeper insight into the nature and the inward connection of the various doctrines of religion. As far as the word denotes *only this general idea*, it might be used in regard to Christianity, without prejudice to the peculiar nature of Christian faith. Nay, even here, in conjunction with other *charismata* more immediately connected with what is *practical*, there might be a *charisma* of Gnosis, which, setting out from its own peculiar position, might exert a general and beneficial effect on the development of the Christian life; and, in fact, St. Paul mentions such a thing in the first Epistle to the Corinthians. Thus the name Gnosis, in the Epistle ascribed to Barnabas, betokens that deep insight into the spirit of the Old Testament, and the object of the economy of the Old Testament, which was afforded by Christianity.

Although this idea was applied in an arbitrary, and therefore in a false manner,—as, for instance, in that very letter, (see below)—yet, considered in itself, and by itself, it contains nothing repugnant to the simple nature of the Gospel, because that Gospel, in its very simplicity, is destined to imbue and appropriate to itself all the powers and dispositions of human nature, even those that are spiritual, and in its very simplicity it opens the inexhaustible depths of Divine wisdom in the eye of the spirit. Among the *mystical sects of the Jews* and *their philosophical teachers of religion at Alexandria* [2], we have already remarked the germ of a Gnosis, conceived under an entirely different notion. Here, under the name of "the *Religion of the*

[1 "Erscheinungswelt." Lit. World of appearances, or phenomena.—Tr.]

[2 See Part I. Introduction.]

Perfect, an esoteric system of doctrines, containing only *pure ideas*, which could be comprehended only by a small number of initiated persons, consisting of men distinguished for their high intellectual gifts of perception [1], and their high spiritual nature, (the πνευματικοι,)—was opposed to the *faith founded on authority*, and entertained by the sense-bound multitude, who held fast only the symbolic covering of these pure ideas, and were utterly incapable of understanding them in their real meaning. (These were the ψυχικοι, the πολλοι.) Such an opposition, although necessarily grounded on the very nature of the religion that preceded Christianity, would entirely overthrow the fundamental characteristics of Christianity, because Christianity pulled down every such partition wall between man and man, and Greek and barbarian, educated and uneducated, were to become one in Christ, and one source of Divine life and inward illumination was to be present in one common faith; this illumination was to develop itself in proportion to their advances in holiness, and Christian views were not to be made dependent on intellectual powers, bestowed only on a certain class of men, but were to proceed, in all, out of their inward Christian life, and out of their own inward experience, although, nevertheless, peculiar depth or clearness of view might be a particular *charisma*. Christ, indeed, thanks his heavenly Father for having revealed to children what he had hidden from the wise; and St. Paul requires that those who are wise in this world should become fools that they might receive Divine wisdom. But then, such Gnostics as these were unable to comprehend these truths and to become children, in order to enter into the kingdom of heaven, and *to be poor* with the rest of mankind, and to be rich only in Christ: they wished to have precedence of the multitude of the believers by means of a pretended higher kind of wisdom.

Another disposition belonging to this Gnosis, which is at variance with the peculiar nature of the gospel, is closely connected with that of which we have just treated. It was because Christianity presented religion in its independence and elevation above every thing earthly, that it was able to find entrance and extend itself among all the different habits of life which mankind adopts, and form a Church differing in its constitution from all other social unions among men, and independent on them; and thus also it presented religion, considered in a doctrinal point of view, in

[1 Anschauungsgabe. See Preface.]

a substantial form, entirely independent of all speculations as well as of all mythology, and in a form adapted to all the various degrees of advancement which are found in human nature, and all the various periods of its progress. That Gnosis, on the contrary, brought the doctrines of religion into connexion again with all the enquiries which can occupy a speculative reason, as was the case in the old Oriental systems of religion, such as those of Zoroaster, of Brahma, and the Buddhists. A speculative cosmogony, desirous of explaining what is incomprehensible, and a theosophy, which would anticipate the views reserved for a higher state of being, were made the basis of the doctrines of religion, and these would therefore be unintelligible to the greater mass of mankind, and, *in consequence of this*, an opposition would necessarily follow between the esoteric and the exoteric religion. This mixture of religion and speculation would besides necessarily be dangerous to the essentially *practical* character of Christianity, in virtue of which all is made to turn on the acknowledgment of sin, the application of the redemption provided for man, and the sanctification which proceeds out of it by means of faith working by love.

It appears, then, that the VIEW *of religion* on which this Gnosis was founded, was the *old Oriental* system, to which also the Platonic joined itself, as well as the *new Platonic*. It might happen that men, who were altogether devoted to some such Oriental theosophy would constantly find themselves attracted on one side or the other by Christianity, which is calculated to lay hold on human nature from so many different sides, while yet they might be unable to conquer themselves so far as to sacrifice their former habits of thought entirely to Christianity; and hence they endeavoured to form for themselves a theosophical Christianity of their own, and a theosophic Christ of their own, after their own manner. And thus also, if the Gospel were now to make its way powerfully among the Persians, the Brahmins, and the Hindoos, it is most probable that similar phenomena would take place again; the real and genuine Christians would be accompanied by converts who would endeavour to amalgamate Suphism, Buddhism, and Brahminism with Christianity; and in fact we find traces of such an attempt here and there even now [1].

In order to perceive clearly the formation of *those Gnostic sys-*

[1] The English Missionary reports from the East Indies, and the conversations of that genuine evangelical missionary, Martyn, with the Persian Suphi, in the very instructive biography of that person, will give proofs of this assertion.

tems, one must put oneself into that remarkable time of ferment from which they proceeded. A lively intercourse and an unusual interchange of ideas was then taking place between the nations of the western and the eastern world, which are otherwise so widely separated by their situation and by their differences in their peculiarities of character; an intercourse that arose from the overgrown empire of Rome, which embraced within it all these nations, or at least brought their boundaries into close connexion with each other. The spirit, which sighed after new revelations from heaven, and after some new excitement of the spiritual life, unsatisfied alike by the Hellenic mythology and by the dicta of philosophical systems among the Greeks (Hellenes), mingled together all these various elements of religion, and endeavoured to put together out of them the fragments of a system of truth which had been lost. The comparison of different systems of religion would of course open many resemblances to their view, which to the surprised enquirer would seem as evidences of truth; for the religious development of human nature is a mirror which reflects, partly, the *original revelation* of a Divine Being who draws man to him,—a revelation which has been variously propagated by tradition, either more or less corrupted: partly, the needs, desires, and wishes that arise from the religious nature of man; and partly also, that speculative reason which mixes itself up in all religious contemplations, which has its own fundamental principles that constantly recur under different forms, and which is for ever wearying itself in vain to pass over that line, which the limits of human knowledge draw around it. At Alexandria, and in different parts of Asia, even Jewish theologians were unconsciously carried away by this religious eclecticism [1].

Accordingly, in the Gnostic systems the elements of the old Oriental systems of religion, (especially the Persian, but certainly the East Indian also,) of Jewish theology, and of Platonic philosophy, may be found melted down together, and a more extensive acquaintance with the different religious systems of the interior of Asia might perhaps give us a great many new disclosures as to the connexion between these systems; but then at the same time we must carefully guard ourselves against immediately concluding that an outward communication has at some time or other taken place solely from finding an agreement which may arise

[1] See the Introduction in vol. i.

from an inward source, namely, in the self-same essential dispositions of human nature, from which similar phenomena will result under similar circumstances.

This Gnosis opposed Judaism as a religion too carnal, too earthly, too narrow, and too little theosophical; for how little spiritual, how cold, how little, and how empty must Judaism appear to men of this disposition, when they compared it with the old colossal systems of religion in Asia, although to one who knows what purpose religion is to serve for man, the very comparison which led them to despise Judaism would be the first thing which would lead him to recognize its full value for the religious development of human nature. Those old religions, in their enigmatic form, in which men are inclined to look for lofty wisdom rather than in a simple one, appeared to promise far more decisions on the *questions* which exercised *their enquiries.* Mere Platonism appeared to them too jejune [1] and too measured [2]; it appeared to them constantly to confine itself entirely to the narrow limits of finite reason, and to have no sense and perception of higher intercourse with the spiritual world. Gnosis was desirous, by means of the new ideas opened to it by intercourse with the East, of obtaining higher and more recondite conclusions about the nature of things, their origin and development, than Platonism had to offer. Had this Gnosis been consistent in its disposition, and had it not been carried away by the mighty attracting power of that which is Divine in Christianity, it might have come in good earnest into controversy with Christianity as a religion of too practical and human a nature, and as a religion that did not raise itself enough into the supernatural regions. The self-same character of mind which in the Christian Gnostics opposed only the *ecclesiastical* disposition, and a faith that would set limits to speculation, would have opposed Christianity in general, had it been carried to extremes, and had it been clearly aware of its own principles; and, indeed, the traces of an un-Christian, and also of an openly anti-Christian Gnosis are to be

[1] Zu nüchtern. Germ: perhaps it may mean too sober, too temperate.

[2] Zu besonnen. Germ: too ratiocinative, too much the result of deliberative meditation.

[I add the German words here that those of my readers who understand that language may draw their own conclusions as to what Neander intends here; for I am not aware of any expressions in English, which are entirely synonymous with his. H. R.]

found, perhaps in a certain class of the Ophites (see below), in the Jewish Cabbalists, and in the Zabians, or the disciples of John.

Although the Gnostic systems contained elements selected out of various old systems of religion, yet they can never be entirely explained from the supposition of an intermixture and joining together of these alone; there is *a soul and spirit of a peculiar kind*[1], which animates most of these collections. In the first place, the time, in which they originated, has impressed upon them a wholly peculiar character, just as it often happens in times of great ferment, that certain dispositions communicate themselves to a whole series of spiritual phenomena, even without any outward connexion or intercourse. Now the prevailing tone[2] in most serious minds of that time, was the feeling of disunion, and of being unsatisfied by the existing world; a longing which would overclimb the limits of the earth; a desire after a new and higher order of things. This tone of feeling pervades also the Gnostic systems, and Christianity worked in an especial manner on this tone; and without Christianity, the Christian Gnostic systems would have become an utterly and entirely different thing. The idea of *redemption* was that which formed the peculiar nature of Christianity; and this idea suited that peculiar tone of feeling prevalent among those systems, although it could be embraced by them only in a partial manner, and not in its whole extent, and all the consequences deducible from it. The ideas of restoring an harmonious tone to a world in which it had been broken, of restoring a degraded creation to its original state, of restoring the lost connexion between heaven and earth, of the revelation of a mighty and Divine life in man, elevated above the limits of human nature, as well as the notion of a new course of development, which had entered into the whole economy of the world;—these were the ideas which communicated a new and imposing character to Gnosis altogether.

Those theosophists busied themselves with the investigation of the great enquiry, the answer to which has always been the highest problem of human speculation; but in answering which, human reason must always recognize its own insufficiency; or, if it will explain that which is incomprehensible, must always deceive itself with mere phrases, or with the fictions of fancy.

[1] [Ein eigenthümliches beseelendes Princip. Germ. Literally, a peculiar animating principle.]

[2] [Grundton, key-note. The word translated disunion is zwiespalt, which expresses division, in consequence of a violent rent.]

These Gnostics, as Oriental theosophists, in whom, at least for the most part, the Oriental element predominated over the Hellenic, must in no manner or degree whatever be compared with the thinking people of the Western world; they engaged themselves far more in representations and visible images, than in abstract ideas[1]. Where the thinking man of the west would have formed to himself only an abstract conception, with them a living appearance, a living personality stood before their souls, for them absolutely to look upon in reality. They disregarded the abstract notions of the mind as a lifeless sort of thing; every thing hypostasized itself in their eyes, where nothing but abstract ideas were presented to the thinkers of the Western world. The image, and that which was represented by the image, were so constantly joined together in their modes of thought, that they were unable to separate the one from the other. They were far rather carried away unconsciously by the ideas that floated before their minds, or that inspirited them, from one mental picture to another[2], from image to image, so that they were not in a condition to develope these ideas with any thing like a clear consciousness of their nature. The enquiries which chiefly occupied them were these: How is the transition from infinite to finite? How can man imagine to himself the beginning of a creation? How can he think of God as the original projector of a material world, so foreign to his own nature? Whence come those wide differences of nature among men, from the man of truly godly disposition, down to those who appear given up entirely to blind desires, in whom no trace of the rational and the moral creature can be found[3]?

Now it was exactly here that Christianity made religious faith independent of speculation, and cut off at once all that could lead to those speculative cosmogonies, by which the element of pure religious faith was only troubled, and the confusion between the ideas of God and nature furthered, inasmuch as it (Christianity) directed the eye of the spirit beyond the whole extent of the

[1] Sie bewegten sich viel mehr in *Anschauungen* und *Bildern*, als in *Begriffen*. Germ. [It is difficult to render these words exactly. Anschauung, (*intuitio*) *looking upon*, in its *original* sense, means the representation or image of an object conveyed to the mind by the *sight*; and it is used also *secondarily* of the notices conveyed by other senses. It is here used of *visible representations* or *images*, as opposed to *Begriffen* or *abstract* ideas. For some further remarks on these words, see the Preface. H. R.]

[2] [From *anschauung* to *anschauung*.—See last note.]

[3] [On this portion of the subject, see the 5th Book of Beausobre's Histoire du Manichäisme. Vol. ii. especially p. 205, &c. H. R.]

visible world, where, in the chain of cause and effect, one thing is constantly unfolding itself out of another, to an Almighty work of creation performed by God, by which the worlds were produced, and in virtue of which the visible did NOT spring out of that which appears. Heb. xi. 3. Creation is received here as an incomprehensible fact, under the constraint of a faith, that raises itself above the position occupied by the understanding, which wishes constantly to deduce one thing from another, and to explain every thing, while it denies all that is immediate[1]. This, which is the only real point of practical importance, the doctrine of the Church endeavoured to maintain in its conception of the creation out of nothing; opposing itself thus to the old methods of[2] representation, which limits the creation of God by supposing matter already in existence, and represents him, after an anthropopathical manner, not as an independent original Creator, but as a being who acted on and formed pre-existing matter. Gnosis would not acknowledge any such limits to speculation; she wished to explain and represent to the mind *how* God is the foundation and the source of all existence. As it misunderstood the *negative* import of the creation out of nothing, it opposed to it the old principle, "out of nothing comes nothing." Instead of this it presented to its imagination the idea of an outflowing of all Being, from the highest Being of the Divinity. This idea of an emanation would allow itself to be conceived under a variety of images: under the form, for instance, of a numerical development from an original unity; of an outstreaming of light from an original light; of an unfolding of spiritual powers or ideas, which obtained substantiality, and of an utterance of a series of syllables and sounds, till they were re-echoed.

The idea of such an emanation corresponds to a feeling deeply rooted in the human mind, and found in it something to fasten itself upon; but at the same time, it gave occasion to many speculations by which men might easily be led away, for ever, farther from that which is of practical importance for religious belief, and indeed might lose it altogether.

[1] [Alles unmittlebare. Germ. I understand by this all immediate acts of the Divinity, such as creation. The word translated *understanding*, is *verstand*, and we must bear in mind the distinction usually made in Germany between verstand and *vernunft*, the understanding and the *reason*. See Coleridge's Aids to Spiritual Development. H. R.]

[2] [Anschauungsweise. Germ. I suppose this word to mean a habit of considering these subjects, where all the operations of the Divinity are presented to the view of the mind in a palpable form or image. See Preface. H. R.]

In this mode of representation God appeared as the incomprehensible original source of all perfection[1], and shut up within himself; and no means of transition between this incomprehensible Being of God, and finite existence, could be imagined. *Self-limitation, a letting down*, is the first beginning of a communication of life on the part of God, the *first revealing* of the hidden God, from which every other revelation of God, which unfolds itself further, proceeds[2]. Now from forth of this first member of the chain of life there develope themselves, first, the manifold powers or attributes, which dwell in the very Being of God, which, up to that first time of his letting himself down had been shut up in the abyss of his Being, every one of which represents the whole Divine existence, in some one particular point of view, and to which, in this point of view, the names that belong to the Deity were transferred[3]. These Divine powers, therefore, unfolding themselves into substantiality, are the seeds and elements of all other developments of life. The life contained in them developes and individualizes itself constantly more and more, and in such a manner also, that the degrees of this development of life constantly go lower down, and the spirits constantly become weaker, the more distant these developments are from the first link of the chain. We must remark that a Gnosis which, in its endeavour to explain the incomprehensible, was for ever falling into anthropopathism, has here unconsciously attributed the relations of Time to the Eternal.

Granting now that the existence of a pure spiritual world, akin to God, was fairly to be explained, men could represent to themselves the development of different degrees of perfection; but how was it possible to explain the origin of the *material*[4] *world* by means of an emanation from God? and how the *origin of evil?* Even in respect to the latter,—a problem on which specu-

[1] The unfathomable Βυθος, according to Valentinus, the Being raised above all description, of whom nothing can be suitably (eigentlich) predicated; the ἀκατονομαστος of Basilidas, the ὠν of Philo.—See Part i. p. 48—50.

[2] Α πρωτη καταληψις ἑαυτου: the πρωτον καταληπτον του Θεου hypostatically embodied (hypostasirt. hypostatized) in a νους or Λογος.

[3] Hence comes the difference in the use of the word αἰων among the Gnostics; according to its etymological meaning, namely, *eternity*, it sometimes denotes *the Eternal*, as a distinctive predicate of the Supreme Being; sometimes it denotes those Divine original energies, and sometimes the whole world of emanations, πληρωμα, in opposition to the *temporal* world. It occurs in the latter sense in Heracleon ap. Origen. 7. xiii. in Joh. c. 11.

[4] [*Sinnliche*, that which is the object of the senses. The *external*, or material world.]

lation has made shipwreck so often, to the prejudice of God's holiness, and the freedom of man, a being gifted with reason, and destined for morality,—even in regard to this point, Gnosis would not allow any limits to be put to speculation. If God gave free-will to man, and if this free-will is the cause of evil, then the origin of evil, said the Gnostics, falls back *on God himself*. They would not hear of a difference between a permission, and an actual originating cause, on the part of God [1]. Now whosoever does not follow the necessities of his moral nature, and the law inscribed upon his inmost conscience, and with immoveable certainty of faith, and with the assurance of inward moral experience, firmly hold, that evil can be founded in nothing else, and be explained from nothing else, but can only be comprehended as the act of *a wilfulness, that falls away from God's holy law, and a self-seeking which opposes itself to the will of God*,—he must necessarily either prejudice the holiness of God, and take away the objective importance of the opposition between good and evil, and therefore utterly remove in its foundations the idea of moral good and evil, considered in themselves, because he throws back the origination of the latter upon God,—or else he must prejudice the omnipotence of God, because he establishes an absolute evil, and an independent foundation of that evil beyond God, by which also, in fact, he fundamentally removes the idea of evil in a moral point of view, because he deduces it from without, and makes of it an independent nature, which operates necessarily; by which means he involves himself at the same time in a contradiction with himself, through the idea of an independent being besides God, of a God who is not God, who is not good. The Gnostics, avoiding the first rock, made shipwreck on the second.

They united a Dualism with their system of emanations, and endeavoured to explain the origin of this whole earthly world, in which good and evil are mingled together, and which does not answer to the ideal of the spirit, from the intermixture of two opposite principles and their mutual operations; and this endeavour to explain opened a wide space to their speculation and their formation of fantastic theories. There now developed themselves here two modes of viewing these matters [2], which, however, in those days of religious and philosophic eclecticism, did not

[1] Το μη κωλυον αιτιον εστιν—was their usual motto in opposing the Church doctrine.

[2] [Anschauungsweise.]

always come into sharp opposition, but came into connection with each other by the amalgamation of various intermediate members, while the same idea, in fact, forms the foundation of both these modes of view, only that it was conceived in the one case after a more *speculative* fashion, in the other after a more *mythical*. In the one mode of conception the element of *Grecian speculation* more prevails, in the other the element of *Oriental imagery* [anschauung]; and hence these two modes of view make the difference between an Alexandrian Gnosis and a Syrian Gnosis, (the latter being determined particularly by the *influence* of *Parsism*,) as far as we can oppose, in abstracts, these two kinds of Gnosis to each other, without regard to the intermixture of them together, which we find in the phenomena of those times.

In *the first* the *Platonic notion of an ὑλη prevails*; this is dead and lifeless matter; the boundary which, from without, limits the development of life, that proceeds by regular gradations, in virtue of which imperfect beings develope themselves out of the perfect, each more imperfect than the preceding; and this ὑλη again is represented under various forms—as the Darkness that stands by the side of the Light—as Emptiness (κενωμα, κενον) in opposition to the Fulness of the life of God—as the Shade that stands beside the Light—and as Chaos and the dark stagnant water. This matter of itself being lifeless, has by its nature no impulse; every kind of life is foreign to it, and of itself it makes no attack on the Divine Being; but inasmuch as the Divine developments of life, (the beings that proceed from the preceding emanation,) the farther they are removed from their first member, become always weaker and weaker, because their connection with that first member is always less close, there arises in the last grade of the development an imperfect work, which cannot maintain itself in connection with the divine chain of life, which sinks from out of the world of Æons into that Chaos, or else—which is the same representation a little differently modified—something froths over out of the fulness of the Divine life into the neighbouring chaos [1].

Lifeless matter now receives, by means of its intermixture with the Living Being, that of which it was in want, a quicken-

[1] According to the representations (auschauungsweise) of the Ophites, and of Bardosanes.

ing[1]; but then the Divine Being, the Living Being, is also injured by means of its intermixture with the chaotic. Being multiplies itself; a subordinate, deficient life arises; ground is taken for a new world, and a creation forms itself beyond the bounds of the emanation-world; but, as the chaotic principle of matter, on the other hand, has obtained a spirit of life, a *clear, active* opposition to the Divine nature now comes forward, a blind, un-divine natural power, of an entirely negative character, which opposes itself hostilely to all formation through the Divine Being; and thence come, as the works of the spirit of the ὑλη (the πνευμα ὑλικον)—Satan, evil spirits, and wicked men, in all of whom no reasonable, no moral principle, no principle of free-will, prevails, but only blind desires. As Dualism carries in itself a self-contradiction, it cannot maintain its ground with any clear speculative thinker, who is conscious of the course of his reasoning. The more Gnosis inclined to this side, and became clearly conscious to itself of this disposition, which to say the truth rarely happened, because of the prevalence of oriental imagination over occidental abstract comprehension, in all Gnostic systems,—the more must it have endeavoured to lead back this Dualism to a higher unity. It then declared expressly what the Cabbala and the Neo-Platonism taught,—that *Matter is nothing else than the necessary limit*[2] *between existence and non-existence*, which can be conceived as any thing having an independent existence, only by the power of abstraction[3]:—it is the opposition to being, which arises as a necessary limit, on every development of life from out of the Deity[4]. In such a manner *Dualism* might finally resolve itself into *Pantheism*.

The other mode of viewing these matters engrafted itself more upon the *Parsic* doctrine of an Ahriman and his kingdom, which it would be an obvious course for the Gnostic sects, especially those which were formed in Syria, to appropriate to themselves. This mode of view supposed an active, wildly-raging dominion of

[1 Eine Beseelung—Germ. Literally, a quickening, an animation, the infusion of a soul of life.—H. R.]

2 It was thus also called the exterior rind of existence, קְלִיפָה.

3 By means of a νοθος λογος according to the Neo-Platonists.

4 Thus the Gnostics in Irenæus (ii. 4.) expressly defend themselves against the reproach of Dualism. "Continere omnia Patrem omnium et extra Pleroma esse nihil et id quod extra et quod intus, dicere eos secundum agnitionem et ignorantiam, sed non secundum localem distantiam." The lower creation was contained in the Pleroma veluti in tunica maculam.

evil or darkness, which by means of its attack on the empire of light, introduced a mixture of light and darkness of the Divine, and that which opposes it. Different as these two modes of conception may appear in their way of representation, yet the self-same fundamental idea may be recognised in them. When the latter mode of view takes a somewhat more speculative turn, it passes into the first, of which we shall find traces in the views of Manicheeism, which bears upon it far more than all Gnostic systems the mark of Parsism (see below); and where the first mode of view takes a more poetical character, and endeavours to picture itself upon the imagination, it passes over involuntarily into the last [1].

Even among the Platonists there were some, who supposed that from the very beginning, together with an unorganic, dead matter, as the materials for the *bodily world*, there existed also a *blind, unbridled, moving power*, an undivine soul, as the originally-moving and active principle. Thus, while that unorganic matter was organized into the bodily world by the formative power of the Deity, that formative power communicated also law and reason to that wild, tumultuous, and reason-opposing soul. Thus the chaos of the ὑλη was formed into an organized body of the world, and that blind power into a reasonable principle of the soul of the world, that animates the universe. Thus, while all reasonable spiritual life in human nature descends from this last, all that is contrary to reason comes from the other: all that is impelled by desire and passion; all evil spirits are its productions. One sees easily how the idea of this ψυχη ἀλογος, floating over the chaos, might fall in with the idea of a Satan, who originally presided over the kingdom of darkness [2].

In the system of the *Zabians* or *disciples of John*, which is undoubtedly connected in its origin with the Syrian Gnosis, although there appears an independent kingdom of darkness with its own peculiar powers, yet this has no influence on the higher kingdom

[1] Thus, for example, where Plotinus paints matter as seized with a longing after light or the soul, and speaks of it as darkening the light, while it endeavours to embrace it. Plotin. Enneas I. lib. viii. c. 14. Ὑλη παρουσα προσαιτει, και οιον ἐνοχλει, και εἰς το εἰσω παρελθειν ἐθελει, την δε ἀλλαμψιν και το ἐκειθεν φως ἐσκοτωσε τῃ μιξει.

[2] See Plutarch de Animæ Procreat. e Timæo, especially c. 9. Opera, Ed. Hutten. t. xiii. p. 296.

of light[1]. It was the thought of one of the genii of the kingdom of light, to tear himself loose from the source which every thing ought to glorify, and to form an independent world that should exist for itself——it was this thought that first became the cause of a mixture between the two kingdoms, the first foundation of this visible world, built upon an earth won from the kingdom of darkness; *i. e.* from chaos, which world the powers of darkness at once endeavour to seize upon or to destroy, because they will not suffer any strange rule in their domain. Now, while this genius, *Abatur*, who formed the third stage in the development of life, was looking into the dark water of chaos, there arose out of his reflection in it an imperfect genius, formed from a mixture of this form of light with the being of darkness, and to be ennobled by degrees hereafter, namely, *Fetahil*, the former of the world, from whose imperfection all the defects of this world are derived[2]. In the system of the Syrian Bardesanes also, matter appears as the mother of Satan[3].

This sufficiently shows how the modes of view of the Syrian and the Alexandrian Gnosis pass into each other on this side. It may indeed very fairly be asked, whether one is justified in speaking of a Gnosis as originally Alexandrian, or whether Syria be not the birth-place of all Gnosis, whence it was only transplanted to Alexandria, and received a peculiar stamp at this latter place in consequence of the Platonizing, Hellenizing disposition, which prevailed there? In Alexandria, such a Gnosis

[1] This sect of Zabians, (*βαπτισται*, from צָבַע,) Nazarenes, Mandæans, (according to Norberg, from יָדַע, *μαθηται* or *γνωστικοι*,) clearly derives its origin from those disciples of John the Baptist, who, contrary to his spirit and feeling, after his martyrdom took up an hostile disposition towards Christianity. Traces of such persons are to be found in the Clementine, and the Recognitiones Clementis, and perhaps also in the *ἡμεροβαπτισται* and the *γαλιλαιοι* of Hegesippus. See F. Walch. de Sabæis comment. Soc. Reg. Gott. t. iv. Part. Philolog. From these a sect afterwards formed itself, whose system being formed out of the elements of older Oriental theosophy, is of great importance for the history of Gnosticism. A critical treatise on their most important religious book, the Liber Adami, would contribute much to this object. See the critique of that work by Gesenius, in the Literatur Zeitung of Jena. Jena, 1817. Nos. 48—51. and (Kleuker's?) critique on it in the Anzeigen of Gottingen.

[2] Lichtnatur, Being of light. Germ.

[3] This idea is entirely to be compared with the ophiomorphos of the ophitish system, (see below,) although in the ophitish system this appears of a lower kind; and the ophitish system, in its speculative notions, is yet akin to the Alexandrian system of Valentinus in many respects.

would probably find much to engraft itself upon in a certain Jewish idealistic philosophy of religion, already in existence there; but in this the Platonic and occidental element, which keeps itself more on the pure idealistic point of view, and does not immediately hypostasize ideas, and make representations of them, was too predominant to suffer the peculiar character of Gnosis to proceed forth from it, without the influence of the pure Orientalism from Syria.

One might imagine that this double mode of view would have produced a peculiar distinction in the practical spirit of these two systems. As the Syrian mode of view supposed an active empire of evil, which was destroyed with the empire of matter, one might be led to imagine that it made the avoidance of this abominable matter and its hostile productions, and the strictest asceticism, the chief object of morality. As, on the contrary, the Alexandrian Gnosis considered matter as unorganized materials for formation, and the *Divine Being* as the *formative principle*, one would think that it would recognize no such negative system of morality, but would establish a more active formation and improvement of the world, by the power of the Divine principle as the foundation of their moral system. This supposition might perhaps appear still more probable on a comparison of many Alexandrian and Syrian systems.

And yet on a more accurate investigation, that such a difference in the practical influence of these two systems, is by no means necessary. Even a system, in which the *Parsic dualism* prevailed to the utmost extent, might recognize in the whole universe a higher life, which was only bound prisoner in the bonds of matter, and might recommend co-operation towards the freeing of that life, by victory over the empire of darkness, by means of a practical forming and improving influence over nature. And so, in fact, Parsism commanded an outward activity, because it represented all formative influence upon the outward world, especially agriculture, as a struggle against the destroying and order-opposing power of Ahriman, and as an activity which was employed in the service of Ormuzd. And therefore the dualistic Manicheeism furthered a *great reverence towards nature*, and by no means an *enthusiastic and ascetic contempt* of it; although on another ground this system led to a strict asceticism: and certainly it cannot be denied, that the prevailing feeling of Oriental notions, as we may even now see from the people of the East, in

general shone forth in highly prizing an ascetic and contemplative disposition, which elevated itself above the ordinary earthly life. But this disposition had also spread itself already in the district, where a Grecian spirit prevailed, and had found reception particularly in Alexandria[1]. The *pure Platonic doctrine* of *gross matter*, as being the source of blind desires, and of the guilt contracted by the soul in a former life, might become a point for a strict asceticism to fix itself upon; as in fact it did to many Platonists.

The most *essential* difference between the different Gnostic systems, the influence of which upon the whole religious and spiritual character of these sects, concerns their different view of the relation of the temporal, earthly system of the world, to that higher and invisible one, of the relation of Christianity, to the whole development of human nature, (whether they supposed a gradual development of the theocracy, as an organically-connected whole; or whether they made Christianity out to be a fragment which appeared all on a sudden, without previous preparation,) and of the relation of Christianity to Judaism. All these considerations are closely connected together.

All Gnostics agree in this, that they suppose, as we have above remarked, a world in which there is a pure development of life out of God; a creation, which is nothing but a pure unfolding of the Divine Being[2], as being elevated far above that creation which was produced from without by means of the formative power of God, and was limited by matter previously existing;—and they agreed in *this* also, that they did not allow the Father of that higher emanation world to be the immediate Former of *this lower* creation; but they brought down the Former of the world, (the δημιουργος,) far below that higher system and its Father, because he (the δημιουργος) was connected with the universe, which was formed and governed by him. But the difference among them was this; namely, that though they agreed as to the existence of this inferiority, they were at variance as to the mode of it. One party, setting out from views which had already long been prevalent among the Alexandrian Jews, supposed that the supreme God had produced, and still governed this world, by means of the angels, who were his ministering spirits. At the head of these angels stood one, who guided and ruled every

[1] See Part I. The Introduction.

[2] עולם אצילות.

thing, and on that account was especially called the Former and the Governor of the world. They compared this Demiurgos with the Spirit that formed and animated the world, after the system of Plato and the Platonists, which also (according to the Timæus of Plato) endeavoured to form the image of the Divine reason in that which belonged to time, in that which was "Becoming to be[1]." This angel is a representative of the supreme God on this lower stage of existence: he does not act independently, but only according to the ideas given to him by the supreme God, as the world-forming soul of the Platonists creates every thing after the ideas imparted to him by the supreme νους[2]: but these ideas are elevated above his own limited being; he is unable to understand them; he is only their unconscious instrument, and is, therefore, unable himself to understand the meaning of the whole work wrought by him: as an instrument guided by a higher inspiration, he reveals what is above his own comprehension. Here, therefore, they grafted themselves on the current ideas of the Jews, in supposing that the supreme God had revealed himself to their ancestors through the medium of an angel that served him as the organ of his will; and that the Mosaic legislation was derived from such an angel. And they considered the Demiurgos as the representative of the supreme God in this respect also; just as the rest of the nations of the world were partitioned among the other angels, as their guides, so the Jewish people, as the peculiar people of Jehovah, that is, the supreme God, were committed to the care of the Demiurgos, as his repre-

[1] [As Neander has only referred generally to the Timæus, I have taken this phrase from the translation by Taylor. I add the original of Neander: Das ideal der göttlichen vernunft in dem *werdenden*, zeitlichen darzustellen strebt. We have no word that answers to *werdenden*, which expresses the *beginning of existence*, the *becoming*, not the actually *being*. H. R.]

[Since the above note was written, a friend lent me "Bockshammer on the Freedom of the Will; translated by A. Kaufman, of Andover; 1835:" in which the word 'becoming' is used substantively, *e. g.* p. 75.—"Yet this connecting love, according to the representation of the above-named treatise, is rather *an originated becoming*, man, an original being:" and a note referring to Neander is added by the translator, to this effect: "The idea of a secondary Being, without beginning, anfangslosen werdens, an originated becoming in opposition to an unoriginated Being, (eternal generation,) was somewhat refined, was somewhat incomprehensible; nay, it appeared even contradictory to Arius, who had but little of the speculative or intuitive, &c. Neander," &c. H. R.]

[2] The ὁ εστι ζωον (in opposition to the γενητον, or the θεος γενητος of Plato,) the παραδειγμα of the Divine reason hypostatized.

sentative [1]. He also revealed here in the establishment of their religion, as well as in the creation of the world, those higher ideas which he himself could not understand in their true meaning. The Old Testament, like the whole creation, was the *veiled symbol of a higher system.*

But in the Jewish people itself they made a complete distinction, after the Alexandrian fashion, between the great multitude, which is only a representative type of the people of God (the Israelites according to the flesh, the Ἰσραηλ αἰσθητος, κατα σαρκα), and the small number of those who become really conscious to themselves of the destination of the people of God. (The souls of this number are the spiritual men of Philo, the Ἰσραηλ πνευματικος, νοητος, the generation consecrated to God which really lived in the contemplation of God, the ἀνηρ ὁρων τον Θεον, the πνευματικοι, γνωστικοι, in opposition to the ψυχικοι or πιστικοι.) The latter (the ψυχικοι) with their fleshly thoughts kept fast to that which was outward only; they did not observe that *this* was merely a symbol, and therefore they did not recognize the intention of that symbol [2]. Those sensuous-minded men did not recognize the angel through whom God *revealed* himself in all the appearances of God (the Theophanies) in the Old Testament, that is to say, the Demiurgos, in his just relation to the hidden supreme God, who never reveals himself in the world of sense; they confused form and prototype, symbol and idea [3]. They did not elevate themselves above the Demiurgos, but considered him as the supreme God himself. Those spiritual men, on the contrary, have clearly recognized the ideas which were wrapped up in Judaism, or at least have a presentiment of them; they have raised themselves up beyond the Demiurgos to recognize the Supreme God, and thence they become peculiarly

[1] According to the Alexandrian version of Deuteron. xxxii. 8, 9. ὁτε διεμεριζεν ὁ ὑψιστος ἐθνη, ἐστησεν ὁρια ἐθνων κατα ἀριθμον ἀγγελων Θεου και ἐγενηθη μερις Κυριου λαος αὐτου Ἰακωβ.

[2] Thus a moderate Gnostic, who had not reached that refined Gnosticism formed by the mixture of Alexandrian idealism with Syrian theosophy, determines (in the letter ascribed to Barnabas) that the Jews had entirely misunderstood the whole ceremonial law, by observing it outwardly, instead of seeing in it only an allegorical representation of general religious and moral truths. It was Gnosis, which first opened this true sense of it.

[3] [The form, and the original form represented by it; the symbol, and the idea symbolized. The German is, sie verwechselten auch hier bild und urbild, symbol und idee.]

his true worshippers (*θεραπευται*). The religion of the former class was solely founded on a faith which they took upon authority, while these latter lived in the contemplation of Divine things. The former required to be educated by the Demiurgos by rewards and punishments, and the means of terror; but these latter required no such means of discipline; they raised themselves up by the force of their spirit to the Supreme God, who is a source of blessing only to those who are capable of communion with him, and they love him for his own sake [1].

Now, when these Jewish theosophists of Alexandria had embraced Christianity, and interwoven their former notions with it, they saw the spirit of the Old Testament entirely unveiled in Christianity, and the highest ideas of the whole creation brought clearly before the light; and now for the first time the object of the whole creation and of the whole development of human nature became clear. As far as the highest Æon [2], who appeared in the person of Christ, was elevated above the angels and the Demiurgos, so far is Christianity elevated above Judaism and the whole earthly creation. The Demiurgos himself now recognizes a revelation which entered into his kingdom, and from henceforth serves it as its instrument, conscious that he was only an instrument [3].

The *other party of the Gnostics* consisted especially of persons who had *not* been attached to the Mosaic religion before their conversion to Christianity, but had formed to themselves in former times an Oriental Gnosis opposed to Judaism as well as to all national religions, a kind of system of which we find some traces in the books of the Zabians, and which is constantly found in the East among the Persians and the Hindoos. They did not, like the former, consider the Demiurgos and his angels merely as subordinate and limited beings, but as beings entirely hostile to the supreme God. The Demiurgos and his angels wished to establish themselves in their limited condition as independent beings and would suffer no foreign sovereignty in their dominion.

[1] See above, Part I. p. 48. et seqq. on the twofold views mentioned by Philo.

[2] *Νους* or *Λογος*.

[3] We see easily how these Gnostics might use the passages of the New Testament where the *λογος λαληθεις δια του Υιου* is compared with the *λογος λαληθεις δι' αγγελων*, (see *e.g.* Heb. ii. and Ephes. iii. 10.) in order to form their artificial superstructure of doctrines, by means of their fanciful and idle speculation, on the foundation of a Jew, hints only thrown out, *en passant*, by the apostle.

Whatever of a higher nature comes down into their sphere they endeavour to keep imprisoned there, that it may never be able to raise itself above their narrow limits. In this system it is probable that the empire of the world-forming angels coincided for the most part with that of the deceiving spirits of the stars, which are hostile to man's freedom, and exercise a tyrannic sway over the affairs of this world[1]. The Demiurgos (according to this system) is a limited and limiting being, proud, envious, and revengeful, and this his character declares itself in the Old Testament which is derived from him. As these Gnostics were unable, from want of the requisite exegetic and hermeneutic knowledge, as well as of the proper pædagogo-historical[2] point of view, to understand the Old Testament, which was so opposite to their system, and were yet nevertheless accustomed to give their judgment upon every thing, they attributed all the errors which arose from a gross and sensuous anthropopathical view of the Old Testament among the common sort of Jews, to the *Old Testament itself*. But, according to their view, the error of the Jews consisted solely in this, that they considered the Demiurgos who reveals himself such as he is, in the Old Testament, to be the Supreme God, who differs from him infinitely. The Demiurgos is (according to them,) really such a being as that which the Jews represented to themselves under the notion of the Supreme God. These Gnostics believed that they recognized the form of that hateful Demiurgos in the Old Testament, and also in nature, which they judged with the same dogmatical human rashness. The Supreme God, the God of holiness and love, who stands in no connexion with the world of sense, has not revealed himself in this earthly creation by any thing, except by some Divine seeds of life which are scattered abroad in human nature, and whose unfolding the Demiurgos endeavours to stop and to overwhelm. He can be acknowledged and honoured in the highest degree only in the mysteries, by the few who are spi-

[1] Thus the seven star spirits, and the twelve star spirits of the zodiac, which were produced by the evil connexion between the deceived Fetahil with the Spirit of darkness, in the Zabian system, play an important part in all that is evil. It is from their deceitful artifices that Judaism and Christianity, which are so hateful to the Zabians, are produced.

[2] [I suppose Neander here considers the Jewish history as affording an instructive lesson to man, as containing the Divine mode of education for human nature; but as I am not certain that this is his view, I have only put the German compound word into literal English; pädagogisch-geschichtliche gesichtspuncht. H. R.]

ritual men; and now (according to them) this God has let himself down all at once, without previous preparation, to this system of the world by means of his *highest Æon*, in order to draw up to himself the higher spiritual natures akin to himself which are imprisoned there. Christianity can find no point in all creation to attach itself upon, except in some mysteries and philosophical schools, in which a higher kind of wisdom is propagated as their common doctrine.

This difference between the Gnostic systems was of the greatest importance in a theoretical and practical point of view. As the Gnostics of the first class recognized in the Demiurgos the instrument of the Supreme God and his representative, who formed nature according to the ideas of the Supreme God, and conducted the development of the kingdom of God, in history, they might, in accordance with their principles, search for the revelation of the Divinity in nature and in history; they needed not of necessity to be entangled in *an unchristian hatred of the world.* They might acknowledge that the Divinity might be revealed under earthly relations, and that every thing earthly might by this means become ennobled. They might therefore be very moderate in an ascetic point of view, as in fact we find was the case with many of this class, although the practically injurious disposition of deducing evil only from the existence of objects of sense, must easily have arisen from their notion of the ὑλη; and although their overprizing of a contemplative Gnosis must have been in danger of becoming prejudicial to the spirit of active love.

On the contrary, the other sort of Gnosis, which considered the Creator of the world as a being entirely at enmity with the Supreme God and his system, would naturally produce a wild, dark hatred of the world, entirely at variance with the spirit of Christianity. This exhibited itself outwardly in two ways; it either shewed itself with nobler and more rational men in an extravagantly strict asceticism, and an anxious avoiding of all intercourse with the world,—on which, however the Christian is bound to exert a forming influence, and then, at all events, morality would be a thing merely of a negative kind; nothing, in short, but a way of purification as a preparation for contemplation,—or else it shewed itself in men of an impure nature, and inclined to wild fancies, and in men of ungoverned passions, in a *licentious contempt for all moral laws.* When once these Gnostics

set out from this principle,—'this whole world is the work of a limited ungodly spirit, it is utterly incapable of all revelation of the Divinity, and we higher natures, who belong to a far higher world, are imprisoned in it,'—this conclusion would immediately follow; 'Every thing outward is utterly and entirely indifferent to the inward man; nothing of an higher nature can here be expressed, and the outward man may give himself up to every kind of lust, provided the inward man be not thereby disturbed in the tranquillity of his contemplation. The very means by which we must prove our contempt and our defiance of this wretched and hostile world, is by not suffering ourselves to be affected by it in any condition whatever. The means by which we must extinguish the empire of our senses, is by remaining undisturbed in our tranquillity of spirit, while we give ourselves up to every kind of desire. "We must struggle against our lusts by the indulgence of them," said these freethinkers; "for there is nothing great in abstaining from pleasure, if we have never tried it; but it argues greatness when a man finds himself in the midst of pleasure, and yet is not overcome by it[1]." The heathen philosopher Plotinus makes a very striking remark against these men, which all, who view the matter even from the ground of Christianity, must recognize as true, namely, that while they venture with *more boldness* than Epicurus, who denied any overruling providence of this world, to throw out the same accusations that he did, they must necessarily bring men to *the same result*, in regard to morals; which result would be this: "That nothing is left for us here, except to give ourselves up to our desires, and to despise all the laws of this world, and all morals, for there is nothing good to be found in this abominable world[2]."

This difference is also shewn in the consideration of individual moral relations. The Gnostics of the latter class either prescribed celibacy and abhorred marriage, as something unclean and profane, or else, according to the principle that every thing

[1] Clemens, Stromata, lib. ii. p. 411. Porphyry de Abstinentia Carnis, lib. i. § 40, &c. paints the notions of these men in a manner quite accordant with that of Clemens. "It is only some little standing water," say they, "which can be defiled by receiving into it something unclean; not the ocean, which receives every thing, because it knows its own greatness. So also little men may be overpowered by what they feed upon, but not he who is an ocean of power (ἐξουσια, apparently an expression peculiar to them, founded on a misuse of that of St. Paul in 1 Cor. viii. 9. vi. 12.), which receives all things into itself, and becomes not defiled."

[2] See the excellent argument in Plotinus, Ennead. ii. lib. ix. c. 15.

relating to the senses is entirely indifferent, and that people here must only defy the Demiurgos by contempt of his limiting laws—they justified the indulgence of every desire. Those of the former class, on the contrary, honoured marriage as an holy state, by which the natural state of man was to be ennobled. And the *Valentinian* Gnosis, in fact, as it universally considered the lower world as a symbol and mirror of the higher, and as it sought for the revelation of the highest law of that higher system in the different stages of existence in manifold degrees,—so also it recognized, in the marriage connection, the image of a higher connection, which runs through all stages of existence, from the very highest link of the whole chain. (See below.) Besides, the influence of the *originally Jewish notions*, which were inclined to prize the marriage condition highly, is also shewn here.

The difference between these two classes of Gnosis is still farther brought prominently forward in their different mode of considering the *person* of Christ. *All Gnostics*, however, in a certain respect agree in this, that, as they separated the God of heaven and the God of nature from each other, and as they therefore severed also the invisible and the visible system, the Divine and the human, too widely from each other; so also they would not recognize the union of the Divine and the human in the person of Christ. And yet, just as we have observed a remarkable difference in regard to the first of these matters, between the two chief divisions of the Gnostic system, we shall also be able to remark such a difference in regard to the latter of them. We shall find here also an essential gradation in the views entertained of the relation between the Divine and the human in Christ. The one party, indeed, recognized the manhood of Christ as real, and also conceded to it a certain dignity, although, as they made two Gods out of the one God of heaven and of nature, and allowed the Creator of the latter to be only the instrument of the former, they also divided the one Christ into two Christs, a higher and a lower, a heavenly and an earthly one, in such a manner, that the latter was merely the instrument of the former; and these two they held were not originally indissolubly bound together, but the former had united himself to the latter, for the first time, at the baptism in the river Jordan. But the other class of Gnostics, as they denied the connection of Christianity with Judaism, and with all historical development of God's kingdom among mankind, and as they made out of the God of

Christ and of the Gospel a different God from that of nature and of history, so also they rejected the connection of the appearance of Christ with nature and with history. Christ did not here, (according to them) enter into nature, nor into the historical development of human nature. The view, which suited the fantastic disposition of the East, and had long since been spread abroad among the Jews, namely, that a higher Spirit might represent itself to the eye of sense in a multitude of delusive forms[1], which appeared to the senses, but had no reality,—this notion was applied to Christ, and one whole essential part of his earthly existence and his personality, was thus argued away; *the whole of his human* nature was denied; the *whole human appearance of Christ* was made a mere *deceptive appearance*, a *mere vision* —and this was *Docetism*, the direct contrary to mere *Ebionitism*, which would recognize nothing but the human in Christ. And this view might, at last, be carried so far—as it was among the more fanciful *Basilidians*—as exactly to despise the most holy points in the human life of Jesus in the most profane manner.

The Gnostic systems will also admit of a very natural division into two classes by means of their most essential and influential differences. *The first class*, consisting of those sects *which acknowledge the connection between the visible and the invisible world, —between the revelation of God in nature, in history, and in Christianity, and the connection between the Old and the New Testament, as the development of one whole theocratical scheme—and the second class, of those which tear asunder these connections, and which make Christianity only an insulated fragment in the history of man;* or, as we may explain it more shortly, the sects *which founded their views on Judaism*, and those which set themselves *entirely at enmity against it*[2]. It is, we avow, natural enough, that between these opposite extremes many intermediate opinions should be

[1] My readers may remember the Indian Maja, and many other Indian Myths.

[2] This division has this circumstance in its favour, that it is only in this manner that the peculiar system of Marcion—which, however, is necessarily connected with the Gnostic systems only *from one side*,—can find its proper place among them. Clement of Alexandria in a certain degree confirms this division, when he calls Valentinus the κορυφαιος των πρεσβευοντων την κοινοτητα. (Strom. lib. vi. 641.) —the leader of those who maintain *a common source of the revelation of the Divinity among men*, and do not deny the connection of Christianity with all earlier revelations of God. The πρεσβευοντες το ιδιον του χριστιανισμου, who would not acknowledge any such κοινοτης between Christianity and any other revelation whatever of Divine truth, according to him, also, would be the contrast to this class.

found, which do not, however, invalidate the correctness of the division.

It is peculiarly instructive to consider the mode and manner by which these Gnostics were able to come to the persuasion, that their doctrines, so foreign to the simple Gospel, could have been delivered by Christ and the apostles, and how they endeavoured to prove this. We find here the same phenomena, which, arising out of causes that lie in the very inmost nature of man, were often repeated in following centuries. With a ready-formed Theosophic system, based on its own fundamental principles, they went to the Holy Scriptures, and sought to find in them something to hang their system upon. And this they might easily find, because they were wholly unacquainted with the rules of grammatical and logical interpretation [1], and despised attention to such matters as carnal [2], for their inward intuition was to open every thing. But they were punished for the pride, which, trusting to a certain inward light, only granted to higher natures of a certain class, despised the usual human means of knowledge. Therefore they were given up to every kind of error which can arise from *the want of considering the occasion and the connection in which any thing is said, from the confusion between different meanings of a word* [3], *from the want of distinguishing between metaphorical and proper expressions*, and from the arbitrary application of single traits in comparison, *without regard to that which constitutes the real points of comparison.* The *subjective caprice* of the imaginative faculty, of the feelings, and of speculation, without an objective law, proceeding from the application of the rules of thought and language, might find whatever it chose in the Scriptures, and introduce it into them. The Parables, for the simplicity and practical depth of which they had no feeling, were therefore peculiarly acceptable to them, because an arbitrary interpretation, when they had once put the real point of comparison out of their view, had the freest play here. But contention against the arbitrary biblical interpretation of the Gnostics had also the advan-

[1] Origen (Philocal. c. 14.) shews how much strengthened in their errors the Gnostics were by their ἀγνοια των λογικων in their interpretation of the Bible.

[2] Only fit for the ψυχικοι.

[3] As, for example, where they found the word "world" used with blame in the New Testament, these passages served them for a proof, that this whole creation is something imperfect, and could not come from the supreme and perfect God; for it never entered into their heads, that the word "world" might be used in the New Testament in a different sense.

tageous effect, that it made their opponents attentive to the necessity of a more accurate grammatical and logical interpretation of the Bible, and induced them to the establishment of the first Hermeneutic Canons, as we may observe from various proofs in the writings of Irenæus, Tertullian, Clemens, and Origen.

The bolder among the Gnostics used a theory of interpretation likely to lead to arbitrary principles of criticism. They said,—Christ and the apostles spoke according to the different conditions and views of the man to whom they spoke; they took these different positions themselves. With the ψυχικοι—those who were in the condition of a blind unintellectual faith (those who were fettered by Jewish prejudices)—they spoke only of a Demiurgos, because their limited natures could not understand any thing higher. (The Gnostics are the fathers of *the theory* of *an accommodation*, as *used in the Christian Church* in an exegetical point of view, although of itself the theory of an accommodation is as old as the difference between an esoteric and an exoteric religious system.) The higher truths from the world of Æons, and those above that world, they (*i. e.* Christ and the apostles) had (according to this view) communicated only to a small circle of initiated men, who were capable of receiving such truths in virtue of their higher spiritual natures (as πνευματικοι), and these truths *they indicated* only in detached images and hints, which could be understood by none but such natures. That higher wisdom they had delivered (as St. Paul says, 1 Cor. ii. 6.) only orally among the perfect, and only orally was it for ever to be propagated in the narrow circle of the initiated.

The knowledge of this secret tradition, therefore, first gives the true key of the deeper interpretation of the Scriptures. Irenæus says, on the contrary [1], "For the apostles, who were sent forth to find the wandering, and to give sight to those who saw not, and to heal the sick, did not address them in language suited to their then notions, but according to the revelation of truth. . . . . For what physician, who wishes to heal the sick, would act according to the desires of the sick man, and not according to that which is proper to cure him? . . . . . [2] The apostles, who are the disciples of the truth, are far from all lies;

[1] Contra Hæres. iii. 5.

[2] [This passage, in the original, precedes the rest of the quotation. H. R.]

for a lie has nothing in common with the truth, any more than darkness with light. . . . . Our Lord, who is the truth, lied not."

Or else they said, "From the account of the apostles itself, we cannot learn the pure doctrine of Christ, for the apostles were fettered by psychical and Jewish opinions; and the Pneumaticus (*i. e.* the spiritual man) must separate the psychical from the pneumatical in their writings." Or they even ventured to separate, in *the very discourses of Christ himself*, what the psychical Christ spoke in him by the inspiration of the Demiurgos,—what the Divine wisdom, still hovering between the dominion of the Demiurgos and the Pleroma, and not yet arrived at its full perfection [1],—and what the highest *νους*, uttered from out the Pleroma [2].

If these Gnostics had been thinkers of the same sort with the people of the western world, they would have separated in their composite (construirten) Christ what he said under the influence of immediate inspiration, out of an intuition elevating itself above all that belongs to time, and what he said speaking from a reflection disturbed by ideas belonging to time; but they would only have been expressing the same notions in different language.

These Gnostics were, in part, not thoroughly resolved to break from the rest of the Church, and to found separate communities. They were, indeed, persuaded, that the *ψυχικοι*, as they were conditioned, could receive Christianity in no other than the Churchly form; that they could arrive at no higher degree than that of faith upon authority; that their faculty for the higher spiritual intuition was utterly gone, and therefore they wished not to disturb these men [3], whose views were more of the common ecclesiastical kind, in their tranquil faith,—but they wished, after grafting themselves upon the common Church assemblies, to found, in connection with them, a kind of theosophic schools, and of Christian mysteries, into which all those in whom they believed they could observe that higher faculty, not conceded to all, might be received. They made complaints also that men would not suffer them to remain in the communion of the Church, and

1 "Sophia," or "Achamoth." See below.

2 See Irenæus, lib. iii. c. 2.

3 *Τους κοινους ἐκκλησιαστικους.*

called them heretics, whereas they entirely agreed with the doctrine of the Church [1].

But what would have become of the Church, if this intention of theirs [2], of extending themselves in the Church by this distinction of two different stages of religion, had succeeded. How deeply would it have injured the simplicity, the confidence, and the clearness, of the Christian faith, the practical spirit of Christianity, the bond of Christian communion that unites all hearts, and reason also which attains the development due to its nature in the light of Christianity, while it is conscious to itself of its natural limits,—limits which a presumptuous intellectual intuition pretended to pass over [3]. But the spirit of Christianity, as we shall see when we come to consider the theological development of spiritual knowledge in the Church, awakened two different dispositions, which, uniting in this warfare, opposed Gnosticism.

That which procured an entrance for Gnosticism, was a pride (founded, we confess, on one side in human nature,) which has always especially contributed to further those dispositions which are not willing to content themselves with that which is simple, but are always anxious to have something of their own, which sets them above others, a pride which finds it very hard to let itself down so far, as *simply to receive and accept*, together with the rest of mankind. Irenæus and Plotinus, two men of such thoroughly different characters, both point out to us how the pride of human nature is flattered by the phantasies of the Gnostics. The former says [4], "He who has given himself up to them becomes instantly puffed up; he believes himself to be neither

[1] Queruntur de nobis, quod cum similia nobiscum sentiant, sine causa abstineamus nos a communicatione eorum, et cum eadem dicant et eandem habeant doctrinam, vocemus illos hæreticos. Iren. lib. iii. c. 15.

[2] In which they themselves were conscious of no impropriety, because this sort of proceeding was founded on the entire view which they entertained of religion.

[3] The doctrine of Plotinus,—*το δε υπερ νουν, ηδη εστιν εξω του νου το πεσειν*, —is quite just, in as far as it opposes the Gnostics, who spoke of a higher organ than reason for the *knowledge* of the Divine nature, that is to say, the *πνευματικον*, a faculty which resided only in certain natures. But *this proposition is false* when it is used, as in the notions of Plotinus it might be, to oppose Christianity in general, which gave us an objective *source of knowledge* of Divine things, elevated above human reason, in a revelation of God, from which reason, as an organ (or instrument) is to draw (its knowledge) under the illumination of a higher Spirit.

[4] Lib. iii. c. 15. [This passage is paraphrased, but not translated, by Neander; in fact, the first part of it almost baffles translation. We must remember that part of Irenæus has descended to us only in a Latin translation. H. R.]

in heaven nor on earth, but to have entered into the Pleroma, and carries himself most proudly." And Plotinus says, "Irrational men are at once caught by such speeches as these: 'Thou shalt become better, not only than *all men*, but than *all Gods* also,' for great is the pride of men. The man who was before humble and discreet, now hears with pleasure—'Thou art a son of God[1], but the rest, whom thou lookest up to with admiration, are no sons of God; thou art also higher than heaven, without doing any thing for that purpose.'"

On the other hand, as it usually happens that every prevailing error of any age has its opposite in another error, by which it has been called forth, and the combating of which lends it a plausible appearance; and as, for the most part, it happens that whenever any false tendency spreads itself abroad among one part of mankind, it has for its foundation some truth, which is misunderstood, and partially conceived, and some want of human nature, which, *in itself*, and of itself, is real, but has been led astray,—so it happened here also. It was opposition against a gross and sensuous conception of Divine things, among the Jews and Christians, which called forth Gnosticism; and it furthered its propagation the more, because Christianity had awakened also new spiritual wants, which could find no satisfaction in a mere faith founded on authority, which despised every thing ideal, cast away from it all higher contemplation and intuition, and abruptly rejected all speculation. If the Gnostics did imagine faith so mean a thing, and if they did not attain to a knowledge of what it is in vital Christianity, and in the ideas of St. Paul, they may have been induced to such a course by their opposition to men, who either did not in their lives manifest the true power of faith, by shewing that it was an animating principle of life, or at least did not understand how to shew, in its full development, the truth, that faith is something more than a mere belief on the strength of authority, and than a mere subjection to outward authority, that it is an *inward living disposition* and an *inward principle of life*, the source of a *new life within*.

Many have been led to Gnosticism by an unsatisfied desire after a deeper Christian knowledge, and after a knowledge of the inward organic connection of the doctrines of Christianity[2]. The

[1] A πνευματικος, who alone could descend immediately from the Supreme God.

[2] As Ambrosius, of whom and to whom the great Origen (who converted him from

Gnostics made the first attempt to develop the Christian doctrine as a whole, and in its individual parts, according to their interior connection, and to form out of Christianity a continued and connected mode of viewing divine and human things. The desire and endeavour after an inward connection and an inward unity of knowledge, is not to be mistaken among them; although we acknowledge this endeavour of theirs, which in one point of view was right, was sadly led astray, and took a false and destructive turn, because they would not know Christianity from its own peculiar and essential nature, because they mixed heterogeneous elements with Christianity, which is complete and sufficient in itself, because they did not regard the natural limits of human knowledge, and because they were unable to perceive the limits which belong to religion, and those which belong to knowledge. Their tremendous errors stand in history as an instructive warning and example.

After these general reflections, we now proceed to the individual Gnostic sects, and, according to the division which has appeared the most suitable, we shall first speak of those *Gnostic sects which, engrafting themselves on Judaism, supposed a gradual development of the theocracy to take place in mankind, proceeding from one original foundation.*

(β.) *The individual sects.*

(1.) *The Gnostics, whose system was engrafted on Judaism.*

(a.) *Cerinthus.*

As the doctrine of this Gnostic shows us clearly how Gnosis formed itself out of Judaism, he forms the natural transition-point from the Judaizing sects to the Gnostics. In the accounts which remain to us of his opinions, we find contradictions and difficulties which can only be explained by taking a just view of the manner in which Gnosticism was deduced from Judaism. Cerin-

the errors of Gnosticism) said, "From want of persons who preach the better truths, while you could not, out of your love to Jesus, bear an unreasonable and ignorant faith (*αὐτος γουν ἀπορια των πρεσβευοντων τα κρειττονα, μη φερων την ἀλογον και ἰδιωτικην πιστιν, δια την προς τον Ἰησουν ἀγαπην*), you gave yourself up formerly to doctrines which afterwards, using the understanding bestowed upon you rightly, you knew to be erroneous, and cast away."—Origen. T. v. Joh. towards the end.

thus, according to an old tradition which we have no valid reason to doubt, lived at Ephesus at the same time with St. John. He lived in those regions, where corruptions of Christianity had already in early times threatened Christianity; which were, however, different corruptions from those[1] with which Christianity had to contend in its very birth, and which proceeded from a Pharisaical Judaism, while these rather arose from a mixture of Jewish theosophy with Christianity.

The most striking contradiction between the accounts of the doctrines of Cerinthus appears to lie in this; that Irenæus makes him out a *complete Gnostic*, while the Presbyter Caius of Rome, who wrote *at the end of the second century*, and Dionysius, Bishop of Alexandria, after the middle of the third century, ascribe to him a gross sensual Chiliasm, which bears upon it the garb of the carnal notions of Judaism. We might, however, bring these two accounts nearer to each other, if we were at liberty to subtract a little from each. It may easily have happened to Irenæus, that, where he found a few traits resembling Gnosticism, he made out of them a whole Gnostic system. To the Presbyter Caius, as a zealous opponent of Chiliasm, every thing was welcome which could serve to place Chiliasm in an unfavourable point of view; and certainly he was not inclined to explain the expressions of a system which he detested, in the mildest manner; and was the less likely to do so, because these expressions might easily be misunderstood by a person not accustomed to the Jewish-Oriental mode of speaking allegorically. And besides, it was natural that Irenæus, in whose persuasion a belief in Chiliasm was necessary to a perfect orthodoxy, should not quote such a view among the peculiar opinions of a Gnostic, whom he hated. We shall now endeavour, from the fragments which we can gather from the above-cited reports, compared with the account of Epiphanius, to put together a whole.

According to Irenæus[2], Cerinthus taught that the world was created by a power[3] quite subordinate to the highest God, which did not even so much as know this God who was elevated above

[1] See Acts xx. 29. Comp. 1. and 2. Epistles to Timothy, and the Epistle to the Colossians.

[2] The passage which is most to be used for this purpose, being that in which Irenæus mixes up Cerinthus less than elsewhere, with other Gnostics, is lib. i. 26.

[3] Virtus, *δυναμις*, גְּבוּרָה, a *terminus technicus* of Jewish theology.

every thing. According to Epiphanius [1], he held that the world was created by angels. The Jewish element, which is the foundation of all this, is here easily recognized; he thought that the God [2], who was elevated above all contact with material things, and who came not forth from the hidden recesses of his incomprehensible nature, had created this world by means of ministering angels. He supposed, in accordance with the Jewish theories, different ranks and degrees in the higher world of spirits, and ascribed to the angels or powers, through which God had created earthly things, a lower stage in this gradation; just as he chose to place earthly things, without denying their divine origin, yet far below heavenly things. Perhaps he did not teach, that those angels did not know the supreme God; but only that they had a very imperfect knowledge of God and of the highest heavens, and not the perfect knowledge which was first to be communicated by the revelation of the Divine Logos. At the head of these angels, Cerinthus (according to Irenæus) placed a power, which was taken from among them, and presided over them. He maintained also, according to the apparently common representation of the Jews, that the Mosaic law had been revealed by means of this angel [3]. While he said this, he still desired strictly to bring forward and elevate the dignity of the Mosaic law, as compared with all human systems, and all other national religions: but then when compared with the revelation of the Messiah, he desired to sink this same law as low as the angels are below the highest Logos. In his doctrine as to the person of the Messiah, he was in some respects entirely inclined to cling to the usual Jewish notion. (See above.] The man Jesus was (in this view) a son of Joseph and Maria, begotten in the natural way, provided with no sort of miraculous gifts, who had distinguished himself from the rest of the Jews only by a superior degree of obedience to the law [4] and wisdom. By these qualities he made himself worthy of being chosen [5] from among all mankind as the Messiah. He himself knew nothing of this destination appointed for him; this was first revealed to him in his baptism by John, at the time destined to his consecration for the office of Messiah, and at the

1 Hæres. 8, or 28.

2 The ὢν of Philo.

3 According to Epiphanius, by *one* of those, perhaps the presiding one, to whom, as the representative of the supreme God on this stage of being, the guidance of the people consecrated to God, was especially confided.

4 By δικαιοσυνη in its usual Jewish sense.

5 τῃ ἐκλογῃ Χριστος.

same time he was furnished with the powers necessary to him for the fulfilment of this destination. That supreme Logos or Spirit of God [1] appeared and descended from the heavens, which opened above Jesus, in the radiant form of a dove, and it sunk down into the heart of Jesus. The narrative given in an Ebionite recension of the Εὐαγγελιον καθ' Ἑβραιους, where it is said [2], "While the people were being baptized, Jesus came and suffered himself to be baptized by John," (probably without being conscious that he was different from the rest of those baptized by John, or that any thing peculiar would take place in regard to him,) "and when he came forth from the water, the heavens were opened, and he saw the Holy Spirit of God in the form of a dove, descending and entering into him [3]." (The luminous form descended visibly upon his head, and entered into him. It now disappeared: a proof that the Holy Spirit or Logos had wholly united itself with his person.) "And there was a voice from heaven which said, Thou art my beloved Son, in thee am I well pleased;" and again, "this day have I begotten thee [4];" that is to say, I have brought thee to the dignity of a Son, that is, of the Messiah, by means of the connexion with this Spirit of God; "and immediately there shone around a great light [5]." By means of a connexion with this supreme Spirit Jesus now first attained to a rank, a power, and a wisdom, elevated above this whole world, and the angels that preside over it. He now first attained to the perfect knowledge of the supreme God, and of heavenly things. *Now* the angels themselves might learn from his revelations; and now he performs miracles by the Divine power of this Spirit, which is united to him. This is that which used him as its instrument in every thing; this is the πνευμα του Χριστου, the Messiah himself, in the highest sense of the word [6]. The

[1] It is quite allowable to suppose that Cerinthus, like many Jewish theologians, considered the πνευμα ἁγιον and the λογος as identical.

[2] [This extract is taken from Epiphanius Hæres. xxx. Ebion. § 19. and is printed in Grabe Spicilegium Patrum Sæculi I. p. 27. H. R.]

[3] Εἰδε το πνευμα του Θεου το ἁγιον, ἐν εἰδει περιστερας κατελθουσης και εἰσελθουσης εἰς αὐτον.

[4] εγω σημερον γεγεννηκα σε.

[5] [I have distinguished the parts which occur in the Greek text by inverted commas; the rest is the interpretation put upon it by Neander, which is hardly distinguished enough in the German. It contains his view of the interpretation the Gnostics put upon this passage. H. R.]

[6] The ἀνω Χριστος, the Χριστος ἐπουρανιος, of whom Jesus was only the human instrument, the κατω Χριστος.

idea of a Messiah, who should redeem by means of his sufferings, did not suit the notions of a Cerinthus, who had no feeling for the Divine nature in the form of a servant, and who was attached to the imposing grandeur of a magical and theosophic system [1]. In union with the mighty Spirit of God, Jesus could not have suffered: by this union he must necessarily have triumphed over all his enemies. The very fact of suffering is of itself a proof that the Spirit of God which was united with him, had been beforehand separated from him, and had gone up again to the Father. To the suffering of the Man, now left to himself, Cerinthus apparently ascribed no part of the work of redemption [2].

According to Epiphanius, this theosophist, who arranged every thing anew so as to suit his own notions, denied the resurrection of Jesus Christ. In pursuance of this idea he may have supposed that the Divine Logos would unite itself again to the man Jesus, only when it was about to appoint him the victorious king of the Messiah's kingdom, and raise up all the faithful with him to take their share in that kingdom. The account of Epiphanius, however, is not entirely to be relied on; because as he proceeded on the supposition that St. Paul was contending in every place against the followers of Cerinthus, he may have attributed to Cerinthus a doctrine which he did not hold, in consequence of the passage in 1 Corinth. xv.

Cerinthus further agreed with the Ebionites in holding the perpetual obligation of the Mosaic law, in a certain sense, upon Christians. He might well suppose that the highest meaning of Judaism, which was not clearly known even to the law-giving angel himself, the Ιουδαισμος πνευματικος, the heavenly Judaism, which was shadowed forth by the earthly, had been first revealed by the revelation of the Logos, and that yet that earthly and shadowy form was still to last till the triumphant approach of the kingdom of the Messiah, or to the beginning of a new and heavenly order of things. But as Epiphanius says of him, that he *partly* [3] held fast to Judaism, and it is not likely that the latter should have invented any thing of this sort; we may conclude from it, that Cerinthus did not look on every thing in Judaism

[1] [*Literally*, who love magic-theosophic grandeur. H. R.]

[2] See below, under the head Basilides.

[3] Προσεχειν τῳ Ἰουδαισμῳ ἀπο μερους.

as equally divine; and that in some degree, like the author of the Clementine, and many other mystic sects of the Jews, he made a distinction between an original Judaism, and the later corruptions of it; and that he insisted on the continued obligation only of that part of the ceremonial law which he considered as among the genuine parts of it. As a sort of middle and transition point from the earthly system of the world to the new, eternal, heavenly system, Cerinthus, with many Jewish theologists, supposed a thousand-year season of happiness, under the government of the Messiah rendered triumphant through the power of the Logos, which was to take place in Jerusalem as the centre-point of the ennobled earth. A too literal interpretation of the passage in Ps. xc. 4. led people to suppose, that as a thousand years in the sight of God are but as one day, the world would last in its present state six thousand years; and then at the conclusion of the earthly course, a sabbath (a time of undisturbed blessing) of a thousand years would take place on earth for the pious, now delivered from all struggles. We are certainly inclined to ask, whether he made to himself so gross and carnal a representation of the blessings of this thousand-years' sabbath, as Caius and Dionysius accuse him of, which does not appear to harmonize well with the general character of his opinions. He spoke of a marriage-feast, which was at that time an image commonly used to represent the happy union of the Messiah with his own people[1]; but those who explained his words with a feeling of bitterness against him, might misinterpret such images. Dionysius says, that when he spoke of fasts and sacrifices, he was only endeavouring to gloss over his gross and carnal representations. But what was there to justify him in this declaration[2]?

(b.) *Basilides.*

We pass now from Cerinthus to Basilides, who wrote in the first half of the second century. It is most probable that Alexandria was the sphere of his activity; the stamp of an Alexan-

[1] The Gnostics also pictured the happiness of the πνευματικοι received into the Pleroma, under the image of a marriage-festival, a marriage between the σωτηρ and the σοφια; between the spiritual natures and the angels. (See below.) So in Heracleon ap. Origen. t. x. Joh. § 14. we find ἀναπαυσις ἡ ἐν γαμῳ.

[2] Euseb. Hist. Eccles. iii. 28.

drian Jewish education cannot be mistaken in him and in his son Isidore, whose name points out his Egyptian birth. But the account of Epiphanius, that Syria, the general birth-place of Gnostic systems, was also the native land of Basilides, is not in itself improbable, although it is on the other hand not a sufficient proof. The doctrines of emanation and dualism were the foundation of his system; at the fountain-head of these emanations he placed the hidden God, elevated above all representations and images [1]. The middle point between this incomprehensible origin and all following developments of life, is the unfolding of that Being in his several powers which individualize themselves, and become in fact, so many names of the unnameable Being. Man can only think on God after the analogy of *his own spirit;* and an objective truth forms the foundation of that analogy, inasmuch as the spirit of man is the image of God. He can form to himself no representation of the most perfect Being, without breaking the idea of the most perfect, which resides within his spirit, into the several parts of which it consists; and he feels himself compelled to distinguish the several attributes of this most perfect Being, in order to make this idea comprehensible to himself: but a deep thinker is well convinced, that this is merely a necessary expedient to assist human imperfection, and knows how to distinguish that which is objective, from that which is subjective. And yet the Gnostic was not capable of entering into this distinction: what is necessary to *human conceptions*, he attributed to the objective development of existence; as thus:—in order to bring forth life out of himself, the Being which contains all perfection within himself, must first unfold himself into the several qualities which the idea of absolute perfection contains; and then, instead of the abstract conception of attributes, that suits not with Oriental habits of thought, there come *living, personified* [hypostasirte] *powers, which continue working in independent activity;* as, for instance, first, the *intellectual* powers, the Spirit, (νους,) Reason, (λογος,) Thought, (φρονησις,) Wisdom, (σοφια,) and then Power, (δυναμις,) by which God puts the resolves of his wisdom into execution; and, lastly, the *moral attributes*, without which God's almighty power never shows itself active; namely, *holiness or moral perfection*, (δικαιοσυνη [2], a word which must be understood

[1] Ὁ ἀκατονομαστος, ἀῤῥητος.

[2] It is remarkable that Basilides used the word δικαιοσυνη according to its He-

according to the Hellenistic and Hebrew phraseology, and not in the narrow sense of the German word, gerechtigkeit, unless people will understand this German word in its original etymological sense,) and then, after moral perfection, follows inward tranquillity, *peace* (εἰρηνη), which, as Basilides justly acknowledged, can only be there where holiness is; and this tranquillity is the characteristic of the Divine life: and this forms the close of this inward Divine development of life [1]. The number seven was a holy number to Basilides, as well as to many theosophists of these times; and thus, in his system, these seven δυναμεις, together with the first original, which had unfolded himself into them, formed the πρωτη ὀγδοας, and the root of all existence. From thence the spiritual life went on developing itself, constantly farther and farther into manifold degrees of existence, every lower one being always the impression, the resembling image (αντιτυπος) of the higher. If we may draw conclusions as to the doctrines of the original school from what we find of the later Basilidians in Irenæus, and from the gems and amulets of the Basilidians, as Basilides, in accordance with the seven days of the week, always supposed seven similar beings in every stage of the spiritual world,—so also, in consideration of the days of the year, he supposed there were three hundred and sixty-five such regions, or stages, in the spiritual world. This is expressed in the mystical word ἀβραξας (which was a symbol of his sect) when it is interpreted by the usual method of reckoning Greek letters numerically [2].

Within this *emanation-world* every thing was that which it ought to be in its own proper position: but out of an union between the Divine and the undivine there arose a disharmony, which was to be brought again into harmony.

There is, alas! in this place, an hiatus in our accounts of the Basilidian system. It is a matter of question whether Basilides

brew and Hellenistic sense, to denote moral perfection, while other Gnostics, especially those of the second class, used it only to denote a more imperfect moral condition; an idea *of righteousness* (gerechtigkeitsbegriff) in a more confined sense.

[1] Iren. lib. i. c. 24. lib. ii. c. 16. Clem. Strom. lib. iv. 539.

[2] [α=1 + β=2 + ρ=100 + α=1 + ξ=60 + α=1 + ς=200. H. R.]
It may be that this name, which designates the whole emanation-world as development of the Supreme Being, had also another meaning; but all attempts at an explanation of it will for ever be merely arbitrary ones, for there are no sure grounds in existence from which one could argue about it.

followed the mode of conception in use with those who supposed the intermixture to take place by the falling down of some of the Divine seed of life into the chaos bordering upon it; or of those, who imagined an empire of evil, which was active by its own energy, and supposed the intermixture to have taken place by an aggressive assault of this empire upon the Empire of Light. In a fragment[1] which is still extant, Basilides quotes the opinion of the Persians on the two opposite empires of Ormuzd and Ahriman; but as the passage which follows has not been preserved to us, we cannot with certainty conclude whether he quoted this doctrine in approbation or disapprobation. If we remember that he belonged to those who wished to complete the propositions of the Grecian, that is, the Platonic philosophy, by means of the profounder wisdom of the East, the first of these suppositions will appear the most probable. Also, when he spoke of a confusion and intermixture of principles[2], this might very naturally lead to such a conclusion. The accusation made by Clemens of Alexandria against Basilidas, that he deified the devil[3], leads also to the supposition that Basilides gave occasion to this accusation by his representation of a substantial evil Being[4]. And, besides, the Basilidian doctrines have much that is akin to the Parsic and Manichæan[5].

But howsoever this intermixture of Light and Darkness, of the Divine and the un-divine, might have arisen, it would nevertheless, according to this system, necessarily be subservient to the glorification of the Divine Being, to the fulfilling of the ideas of the Supreme Wisdom, and of the law of all the development of life; because the empire of evil is of itself naturally nothing-worth. The empire of the Divine Being is the real empire, and that which is naturally victorious.

Light, *Life*, *Soul*, *Good*; on one side:—*Darkness*, *Death*, *Matter*, *Evil*, on the other. These in the system of Basilides,

[1] Disputat. Archel. et Mani. opp. Hippolyt. ed. Fabricii. lib. iii. p. 193.

[2] ταραχος και συγχυσις ἀρχικη. Clem. l. ii. f. 408.

[3] Clemens Strom. lib. iv. p. 507. πως οὐκ ἀθεος, θειαζων τον διαβολον.

[4] Διαβολος, Ahriman.

[5] If Basilides, l. c. in the Dissertation of Archelaus, speaks in his own person of a pauperis natura, sine radice et sine loco rebus superveniens, must not these enigmatic words be taken to express the doctrine of an empire of evil, without beginning, which, in its poverty, is smitten with desire after the treasures of the kingdom of Light; and penetrating into the light, would wish to seize these, and carry them off for itself.

were the members which answered to each other, and maintained the opposition which he supposed to exist throughout the whole course of the universe. In general, just as rust fastens itself from without on iron, so *Darkness* and *Death* cleave to the fallen seed of *Light* and *Life*, *Evil* cleaves to *Good*, and the *un-Divine* to the *Divine*, without, however, effecting the annihilation of the original Being; it must only by degrees purify itself from every thing foreign to it, in order to attain to its original splendour, just as iron must be cleansed from rust in order to obtain again a higher polish[1]. Such a process of purification the whole course of *this world* affords to the fallen being, as a system which was formed for the perfection of this purification, in order to separate that which is Divine from that which is foreign to its nature, and to conduct it again to what is akin to it, and to a re-union with its original source.

One would be inclined to think that a system in which a *moral retribution* was the prevailing idea, might perhaps admit the notion of a passage of the soul into *various human bodies*, according to the measure of its deserts in a former state of existence, so that it might be placed, according to its *deserts*, in a different human body, and in different circumstances, and a different situation, and so that it might have to expiate by penitence the guilt contracted in its former state, although only conscious of it in a mysterious and general manner. But the doctrine of a banishment of the soul into the bodies of animals does not appear to suit so well the prevailing moral notion of the system, as one cannot imagine any penitence taking place where there is no moral consciousness at all. And yet, in all systems of this nature, the moral element is not purely and abstractedly conceived, but is always mixed with physical considerations. We have, therefore no reason to doubt an account which makes Basilides introduce such a metempsychosis in his own words; as it is a doctrine which, by means of the intermixture of Orientalism, Platonism, and Judaism, was certainly at that time widely diffused even among many Jewish sects.

Two modes, however, of viewing this doctrine may now be thought of; the one, when the notion of *moral retribution* is con-

[1] Basilides speaks thus in general terms about the *sufferings* of all fallen Beings of Light: "Trouble and anxiety naturally fall on things, as rust on iron." Ὁ πονος και ὁ φοβος ἐπισυμβαινει τοις πραγμασιν ὡς ὁ ἰος τῳ σιδηρῳ. Clemens Alex. Strom. lib. iv. p. 509. *a*.

stantly kept stedfastly in view, and the soul is supposed to be banished into the bodies of animals, only as a mode of *punishment:* the other, when it is conceived under the more *physical notion* of a gradual development of the spiritual seed of life, which constantly becomes more freed from matter, which keeps it prisoner, and constantly attains more and more to consciousness, and to the development of its original nature. Basilides appears in one passage to favour this latter notion, and appears to be declaring how the soul struggles itself into *consciousness*, in the *body of an animal out of an unconscious state.* The words in Rom. vii. 9. about a life without the law, he understands as relating to such a life in the body of an animal, whether that of a quadruped, or that of a bird; where no law for the soul could exist[1]. The view, that the soul might be still more imprisoned and hemmed in by matter, in yet lower degrees of existence, would easily engraft itself on this interpretation; and also that in plants, and in stones, there is a soul, only more imprisoned, which, by degrees, freeing itself more and more, developes itself from stone to plant, from plant to animal, and from animal to man. This mode of representation suits also with his whole system; because he considers matter not as anything that lives, but only as that dead stuff, which has joined itself with that which is living. And besides, there is with him no such thing as a *dead nature;* but in all nature there is a life which is held prisoner by matter, and striving to set itself free. And thus he might well say, that all existence is connected together one part with the other; and that, according to the will of God, man must love all that exists, in virtue of this mutual connexion[2].

Two different views were here also united together: the one was, a gradual development from the lowest to the highest, from which that *original intermixture* and *that original fall* had proceeded; and the other, a voluntarily-incurred degradation into a lower state of being. And yet, one is inclined to ask, whether Basilides really supposed that the being of light (lichtnatur) or soul, which had once attained to humanity, in the process of its purification and development, could ever sink back into the body of an animal; or whether he did not, on the contrary, confine the

[1] See Origen Commentar. in Ep. ad Rom. vol. iv. Opp. p. 549.

[2] Ἐν μερος ἐκ του λεγομενου θεληματος του Θεου ὑπειληφαμεν, το ἠγαπηκεναι ἁπαντα, ὁτι λογον ἀποσωζουσι προς το παν ἁπαντα. Strom. lib. iv. fol. 508.

process of purification for a nature which had once attained to this point, entirely within the limits of human nature.

To the whole earthly system, or to this whole purifying process of nature and history, Basilides assigned such a Creator (of whose place in the Gnostic systems we have already spoken in the introductory remarks) as he called by the name of the Ruler, or the angel that has the government of this world, (ὁ ἀρχων.) And yet, according to the doctrine of Basilides, this archon does not act independently and by his own power in the conducting of the universe; all at last proceeds from the providence of the supreme God, which presides over every thing.

In the first place, all beings develop themselves according to the law implanted in their peculiar individual natures; which law, together with their nature, proceeds from the supreme God. The archon only gives the first impulse to this natural course of development, and then he himself becomes guided in his whole conduct by the ideas of the supreme God, who animates every thing, without being able to comprehend them[1]. We cannot, therefore, in any way accuse Basilides of an unchristian contempt of the world, a denial of a revelation of God in the universe, or an unchristian dualism, which does not recognise the God of grace as the God of creation, and which tears asunder the harmonious connexion between revelation and nature; such a violent dualism can by no means be laid to his charge. It was rather that he made it a matter of great consequence to set forth the law of unity which bound every thing together, from the highest to the lowest; "the world is only one, and is the temple of God." (See below.) It was a great object to him to justify Providence against every reproach. His conclusion always was, "I will rather say anything whatever, than cast the slightest imputation on Providence[2]."

[1] Clem. Strom. lib. iv. p 509. Ἡ προνοια, ει και ἀπο του ἀρχοντος κινεισθαι ἀρχεται, ἀλλ' ἐγκατεσπαρη ταις οὐσιαις συν και τῃ των ὁλων γενεσει προς του των ὁλων Θεον. Thus, also, in Plotinus (Ennead. iii. lib. ii.), on the subject of προνοια as a natural development in virtue of an indwelling eternal law of reason, we find the following remark: την προνοιαν τῳ παντι εἰναι, το κατα νουν αυτο εἰναι. There is, however, this difference, that in Basilides there is a more Christian consideration brought forward; because he supposes, in co-operation with the law of nature, a personal God, who acts independently, and guides the development of that law of nature; and, by means of the act of redemption, brings to perfection higher results, than could proceed from the mere development of the law of nature.

[2] Clem. Strom. lib. iv. p. 506. c. Παντ' ἐρω γαρ μαλλον, ἠ κακον το προνοουν ἐρω.

With regard to the relation of Judaism to the revelation of the loftiest truth and to Christianity, it is in the highest degree probable that Basilides thought in a manner analogous to the Alexandrian Jewish notions on this point, and to his own notions as to the relation between the earthly world and the loftiest system of the universe. He supposed that the archon, in the conduct of the Jewish people, as well as in the conduct of the universe, had served the supreme God as an instrument, which was not itself conscious of the ideas which were implanted in it, and that the archon had been taken by the great mass of the Jewish people for the supreme God himself, whom he was to represent. It was only those higher natures, which were to be found dispersed among the Jewish people; it was only the "people of God," in its true sense; the πνευματικος Ισραηλ, that had been able to raise themselves above the archon himself, to a recognition of the supreme God represented by him, and thus, above the sensuous covering of Judaism to the contemplation of those ideas, which were contained under this covering, but not understood by the archon himself. An example of his allegorical notions is found in the following saying, "The one temple of Jerusalem is the type of the one world, which is the temple of God[1]."

But he supposed also the existence of written documents, in which the higher wisdom was brought forward, perhaps more unreservedly than in the writings of the Canon of the Old Testament. In accordance with an idea then widely spread, he traced the tradition of such a philosophical secret doctrine up to the Patriarchs in particular; and it would appear to him hardly any thing else than natural, that the great mass of the sensuous-minded Jews should not receive those writings, of which they could understand nothing, as canonical. According to the Alexandrian fashion, he deduced all the traces of truth found in the best Greek philosophers[2], which he eagerly hunted after, from that original tradition. "Let no one believe," says Isidorus, the son of Basilides, "that that which we call a peculiar possession of the elect, was earlier said by some philosophers; for it is not their discovery, but they have taken it out of the Prophets,

[1] Clem. Strom. lib. v. p. 583. D. Ενα νεων ιδρυσαμενος του Θεου (ὁ Μωσης) μονογενη τε κοσμον κατηγγειλε. Similarly also Philo says, περι μοναρχιας lib ii. το μεν ανωτατω και προς αληθειαν ιερον Θεου νομιζειν τον συμπαντα χρη κοσμον ειναι, το δε χειροκμητον. This idea is still further carried into particulars both by Philo and Josephus.

[2] As with Plato and Aristotle.

and attributed it to their pretended sages (or to their false wisdom)[1]." It certainly deserves to be remarked (as Gieseler has remarked), that Basilides supposed even Ham to have been among those who handed down this higher wisdom, and perhaps he deduced peculiarly from him the φιλοσοφια βαρβαρος[2], which he probably, as a recognizer of the higher wisdom, set above the Greeks[3].

The fundamental Christian doctrine of a redeeming grace had its essential place in the system of Basilides, as the Supreme God was to manifest himself to human nature, and communicate to it a life akin to his own, in order to raise it above the limits of the mundane system, or the world of the Archon, to communion with himself, and to the higher world of spirits. It is clear that *this* operation of the Supreme God, according to the system of Basilides, could only relate to those spiritual natures which were destined by their very constitution for a higher world, but which found themselves prisoners in a lower one. These might, through the progressive development of the metempsychosis raise themselves from one stage to another in the kingdom of the Archon; but they could not, in compliance with the desire implanted in them, attain beyond this kingdom and the Archon himself, to communion with the highest system of the world, and to clear knowledge, as well as to the free exercise of their higher nature, unless the Supreme God himself brought his Divine life near to their kindred seed of life, and thereby first set this into activity. And while spiritual natures, by the act of redemption, are raised to the highest position, the influence of redemption at the same time extends itself also to the subordinate stages of being; harmony becomes universally re-established, and every class of being attains the condition which is conformable to its nature. But although Basilides on the one side brought forward an element in the doctrine of redemption, which was entirely foreign to the fleshly Judaism that clung to earth,—he was on the other side, like Cerinthus, altogether *Ebionitish*, inasmuch as he supposed a

[1] Clem. Strom. vi. 641. Και μη τις οιεσθω, ὁ φαμεν ἰδιον εἰναι των ἐκλεκτων, τουτο προειρημενον ὑπαρχειν ὑπο τινων φιλοσοφων, οὐ γαρ ἐστιν αὐτων εὑρημα, των δε προφητων σφετερισαμενοι, προσεθηκαν τῳ μη ὑπαρχοντι κατ' αὐτους σοφῳ. It appears to me now, that this passage requires no emendation, if we may take the word σοφῳ either as masculine or neuter. The expression that follows, οἱ προσποιουμενοι φιλοσοφειν, confirms this explanation of it.

[2] The traces of the higher wisdom, to be found among the Persians and Hindoos.

[3] Ἑλληνες ἀει παιδες.

sudden entrance of the Divine nature into the life of Jesus, and did not recognize any God-man, in whom the Divine and the human natures had been inseparably united from the first. He supposed, as his fundamental position, a redeeming *God*, but no redeeming *God-man*.

The man Jesus was not to him the Redeemer, he was distinguished from other men only in degree; and Basilides does not appear ever to have ascribed *absolute* unsinfulness to him. He was, in the notions of Basilides, only the instrument which the redeeming God chose, in order to reveal himself in human nature, and to seize on that nature so as to work upon it. With him the Redeemer, in the peculiar and highest sense of the word, was the highest Æon [1], who was sent down from the Supreme God for the highest Æon [1], who was sent down from the Supreme God for the fulfilment of the work of redemption: this Being united himself with the man Jesus at his baptism in the Jordan. From this point the whole work of redemption set forth: from that time the man Jesus spoke things which were far beyond the reach of this lower creation.

The Archon himself, as well as John the Baptist (who was, in the name of the Archon, to consecrate Jesus to the office of Messiah, in the subordinate sense in which the Archon wished, and had promised a Messiah,) was surprised, and seized with astonishment, when he saw the Νους descend, and when he heard at the same time the voice that sounded from heaven, and perceived the accompanying appearances [2], and heard this Jesus, whom he had supposed a man of his own kingdom, announce such extraordinary things. He now himself, for the first time, recognises the Supreme God, and the highest system of the world, to both of which he had involuntarily served, till now, as an unconscious instrument, which believed that it acted independently. He now submits himself willingly to an higher Power, imploring it with astonishment; and from this moment he works freely and consciously, as the instrument of that higher Power. He now recognizes the truth, that even *in the kingdom* in which he had hitherto believed himself to be supreme, there are beings imprisoned, which are elevated above himself and his world, and which the Νους will free from these bounds, as well as

[1] Or *νους*, which is called *διακονος*, as serving to the salvation of mankind.
[2] Which Basilides apparently learned from an apocryphal Gospel.

the man Jesus, and raise them to the higher system of the world; he recognizes the essential distinction between the natures that belong to him of right and are akin to him[1], and those which, by their kind, belong to a higher kingdom, and are capable of communion with the Νους; he separates each from the other, and lets the latter go free out of his kingdom, without putting any impediment in the way of their elevation. We shall now quote the very words of this man, who conceived every thing under his own peculiar imagery: "When the ruler of the world heard the words of the Redeeming Spirit[2], he became astonished at that which he heard and saw, as he heard unexpectedly the glorious message; and his astonishment was called fear.' The words, 'The fear of God is the beginning of wisdom,' are thus to be understood; they mean that the fear of *this* God is the beginning of wisdom, which separates the different kinds of beings from one another, allows them to come to perfection, and leads them all to the stage of existence for which they are destined; for he that rules over all does not separate merely those which belong to the world, but even the elect, and suffers them to depart freely from his dominion[3].

[1] The κοσμος,—the κτισις,—the κοσμικοι,—the κλητοι.

[2] Also in the Ευαγγελιον καθ' Εβραιους, which Jerome had received from the Nazarenes, the words which sounded from heaven, are ascribed to the "fons omnis Spiritus Sancti, qui requievit super Christum," who descended from heaven.

[3] Clemens, Stromat. lib. ii. p. 375. τον Αρχοντα ἐπακουσαντα την φασιν του διακονουμενου πνευματος, ἐκπλαγηναι τῳ τε ἀκουσματι και τῳ θεαματι και την ἐκπληξιν αὐτου φοβον κληθηναι ἀρχην γενομενον σοφιας φυλοκρινητικης τε και διακριτικης και τελεωτικης και ἀποκαταστατικης, οὐ γαρ μονον τον κοσμον, ἀλλα και την ἐκλογην διακρινας, ὁ ἐπι πασι προπεμπει. We must here add a few remarks. The explanation of the words of Ps. cxi. 10. or of Eccles. i. 16. according to the Basilidian system, gives a remarkable example of the caprice of a theosophical exegesis, which, without regard to the context in which the words stand, lets them, according to this system, mean any thing which they can possibly mean in any context whatever. If the announcement of the heavenly διακονος is called an ευαγγελιον for the ἀρχων, then it is clear (they conclude) that he did not merely submit himself by compulsion to the higher powers, but that his first astonishment passed into a mingled feeling of delight and reverence. The prospect, as soon as the elect natures should have attained the glory destined for them, of becoming freed from the tiresome regimen of this world, and of entering into rest with his own people (to which expectation of the Demiurgos the Gnostics referred Rom. viii. 20, 21. according to Origen, t. i. in Joh. p. 24.) must assuredly have been a joyful one for him. Comp. Didascal. anatol. opp. Clem. p. 796 D., where the fact that the Demiurgos established the Sabbath, is adduced as a proof how disagreeable labour is to him. Perhaps it may occur to some persons, that we ought to read τῳ ἐπι πασι instead of ὁ ἐπι πασι, so that it would mean that the Archon freely leads the elect natures out

We see here how Basilides conceived and painted after his own eccentric manner, that which Christianity effects, as a divinely animating, freeing and enlightening principle, as the matter which sets human nature in fermentation. These effects, partly judging by the deep penetration of his own mind, and applying its inward operations to outward things, he traced to some fundamental law of Christianity, and partly from observation of the phenomena of his own time. That which Christianity effected generally, in reference to the history of human nature, Basilides represented as an impression made on the Archon which represented that nature.

Like Cerinthus, he also attributed the whole work of redemption to the redeeming heavenly Genius, and most probably coincided with him in the supposition that this Genius had left the man, whom he had hitherto made use of as his instrument, to himself at the time of his suffering. According to his system, the suffering of Christ could have nothing to do with the work of redemption; for, according to his narrow views of justice, it was not consonant to the Divine justice that one, who deserved it not, should suffer for others; and it was required, that all evil should be atoned for by suffering. He considered not merely suffering in general, but also every suffering *in particular*, as a punishment for sin. He held the theory against which Christ spoke in John ix. 3. Luke xiii. 2. Every one suffers for his actual sins, or for the evil present in his nature,—evil which he brought with him out of a former state of existence, and which, nevertheless, had not yet come into a state of activity [1]. And thus, by reference to evil of this kind, he justified Providence in the sufferings inflicted on children. If any one made an objection to him from the sufferings of *acknowledged* good men, he had a fair right to answer by an appeal to the general fact of the presence of sinfulness in human nature, and to say,—"Be the man you shew me what he may, he is still a man, and God only is holy; who will find harmony among those, where there is no harmony [2]?" Job xiv. 4.

of his kingdom to the God who is above all, to whom it is their last destination to elevate themselves.

[1] Sufferings,—the penances and purifications of ἁμαρτια, or ἁμαρτητικον.—Stromat. iv. 506. [Sylburg, p. 217. Potter, p. 600. Klotz, vol. ii. p. 322.]

[2] [Germ. "Wer will eine Stimme finden bei denen, da keine Stimme ist?" The Hebrew of the passage, however, is different from this, and exactly agrees with our English translation. H. R.]

But then the case was different, where this proposition was applied to the Redeemer, who, as sure as he is the Redeemer, must be free from sin. Clement of Alexandria expressly blames Basilides because he went so far in the extension of this proposition. But in *those words* of his which Clemens quotes, this is not necessarily implied; he says only,—"But if you, leaving this whole enquiry on one side, come to this, that you put me into a difficulty by *particular persons*, if you say, for instance,—'Then *he* has sinned, because *he* has suffered.'"—It may be said that Basilides here speaks only of certain persons held in particular reverence, and in great fame for holiness; and that Clement has allowed himself to draw an inference. But, *in the first place*, the reproach which Basilides here suffers to be made against his proposition, would lose its proper force and signification, if it were not so understood; and *in the second*, the extension of this proposition thus far, altogether coheres also with his theory of the relation of suffering to sin, and with his theory of the Divine justice, and of the process of purification, to which every nature belonging to the kingdom of the Archon is subject. The Jesus which belonged to this kingdom, required redemption even himself, and could be made partaker of it only by his connection with that heavenly redeeming Spirit (the διακονος). In order to become worthy of being redeemed before all others who needed redemption, and being used as an instrument to extend further the operations of the redeeming Spirit to others, it was sufficient if he, as the most excellent and purest man, and the most advanced in the process of purification, had merely the minimum of sinfulness. We must here observe that the Basilidian system, which at any rate supposed a proportion between the sin and the degree of punishment, was certainly liable to the following objection: "How does so great suffering consist with the smallest degree of sinfulness?" But, apparently he was not at a loss for an answer here, if we may judge from what he says on the subject of martyrdom. He says, "The consciousness of serving as an instrument for the highest and holiest things of human nature, and of *suffering* in this office, (perhaps also a prospect of the glory into which he should enter by means of his suffering,) sweetened his sufferings to him so much, that it was to him as if *he did not suffer at all.*

According to the same principle, he also consistently acknowledged no justification in the sense indicated by St. Paul, no

objective justification before God; no forgiveness of sin as a release from sin and the punishment of sin. According to his doctrine, every sin, whether before or after faith in the Redeemer, or baptism, must be alike atoned for by suffering. That is a necessary law of the system of the world, which nothing can annul. The only exception he makes is in the case of sins proceeding from ignorance, or involuntary sins[1]: but it is a pity that his explanation of this very indefinite expression has not been preserved to us. But if, on the contrary, under the term justification (δικαιωσις, δικαιοσυνη) be understood an inward subjective making just, a sanctification through the communication of Divine life, then such a doctrine would hold a very necessary place in the system of Basilides.

Among the religious and moral notions of the Basilidian school, there is much that deserves attention, which we are desirous of bringing forward particularly.

In regard to the idea of *Faith*, the Basilidian school distinguished itself by this,—that they expressly opposed the usual Jewish and Jewish-Christian notion of Faith, as another kind of *opus operatum*, an acknowledgment of certain religious truths, which exists as something individual in the soul of man, and operates no farther on the whole inward life, a mere outwardly existing traditional belief, which brings forth no fruits in the life of man—and also that they, with a deeper penetration into the spirit of St. Paul's doctrines, represented Faith as an inward thing, an entire bent of the inward life, an entrance of the Spirit into an higher sphere, and a *real communion with that higher system*. But, on the other hand, he receded from the genuine notion of St. Paul, because, like all Gnostics (except Marcion) he considered religion in its contemplative, more than in its practical, character; and also, in his notion of Faith, made the contemplative element more prominent than the practical. With him Faith is a certain kind of view[2], which includes in itself a certain intellectual appropriation of that which is beheld, and a new spiritual life also in it. On the contrary, according to the genuine Christian idea of St. Paul, Faith is a *practical* appropriation of Divine things, by a *devotion* of the will, a practical entrance into a new relation with God, given by a peculiar revelation from him, from which an

[1] Μονας τας ἀκουσιας και κατ' ἀγνοιαν ἀφιεσθαι. Strom. iv. 536. [Sylb. p. 229. Potter, p. 633—4. Klotz. vol. ii. p. 362.]

[2] [Anschauung. See the former notes on this word, and the Preface. H. R.]

entirely new direction and employment of the inward life proceeds. From this, we acknowledge, as the whole spiritual life is formed anew from this foundation, an entirely new kind of religious view must develope itself. When therefore Basilides supposed different degrees in *this* view [anschauung] (in respect of purity, clearness, elevation and depth), no objection could lie against him on that account, on any genuine Christian grounds, had he only recognised the common foundation of faith in all Christians, and deduced every thing only from the different degrees in which the influence of that faith developed itself on the spiritual life. But he, confounding between faith and sight[1], supposed, instead of one and the same life in a Faith, which is the same in all Christians, *different kinds* of Faith, according to the different sorts of natures. That is to say, just as men, according to their nature, belonged to a higher or a lower grade of the spiritual world, so also they were capable of a higher or a lower kind of view. Those higher ideas need no proof, but they prove themselves through themselves, to those higher spiritual natures which are akin to them, and which become involuntarily attracted by the revelation of the higher world, which is their proper home. Therefore Basilides says, "The faith of the elect finds out doctrines without any demonstration by means of a spiritual comprehension" (an intellectual sight[2]); and in this sense he gives this definition of faith; "an assent of the soul to something which does not act upon the senses, because it is not present[3]." That is to say,—although the elect live in this world as strangers, nevertheless, by the influence of faith, they recognize, as real, those things of the higher world which beam upon them from afar. And hence he supposes the degree of faith to which a person can elevate himself as a stranger in this world, to correspond to *that* grade of the spiritual world to which he belongs[4].

From the principles of Basilides, his *moral doctrines* must have been of a *severe* nature. In his morality the ruling principle must

[1] [Anschauung. Between faith and that faculty, by which Basilides supposed a view, an image or visible representation, to be present to the mind of the believer. See Preface. H. R.]

[2] Clem. Strom. ii. 363. ἡ πιστις της ἐκλογης τα μαθηματα ἀναποδεικτως εὑρισκουσα καταληψει νοητικῃ. [Sylb. p. 156. Potter, p. 433—4. Klotz, vol. ii. p. 128.]

[3] Clem. Strom. ii. 371. ψυχης συγκαταθεσις προς τι των μη κινουντων αἰσθησιν, δια το μη παρειναι. [Sylb. p. 159. Potter, p. 443. Klotz, vol. ii. p. 139.]

[4] Clem. Strom. ii. 363. πιστις και ἐκλογη οἰκεια καθ' ἑκαστον διαστημα· ἐπακολουθημα της ἐκλογης της ὑπερκοσμιου ἡ κοσμικη πιστις.

have been *this*, that man should free himself from that foreign admixture, which having attached itself to his original nature, disturbs and controls it, and that he should constantly attain more and more to a free development and exercise of that original nature. According to this system, man is a little world; just as, according to his spirit, he may be akin to the different natures of the higher spiritual world, so also, in accordance with his lower nature, he bears within himself that which is akin to the different grades and natures of the lower earthly world. He has within himself many admixtures[1] of a foreign nature, wherein the different qualities of the world of animals, of vegetables, and of minerals, are reflected: and thence come the desires, passions, and affections corresponding to these (as, for example, the imitative and pranksome nature of the ape, the murderous propensities of the wolf, the hardness of the diamond); and the collection of all these influences of the world of animals, plants, and minerals, forms the blind unreasonable soul[2], which always opposes the operations of that part of man's nature which is akin to God. It seemed of importance to Isidorus, the son of Basilides, to guard this doctrine from the objection, or the misunderstanding, which would represent it as endangering moral freedom, and holding out an excuse for every wickedness, as if it proceeded from the irresistible influences of these foreign admixtures. He appealed to the superior power of the Divine nature: "Since we have so much vantage-ground by means of our reason, we must therefore appear as conquerors over the lower creature in us[3]." He says also, "Let a man *only desire* to do good, and he will attain it[4]." It is already to be deduced from the whole connection of the Basilidian scheme, that while he placed the power of the will so high, yet he by no means ascribed to it an independent self-sufficiency, nor at all denied the necessity of the assistance of grace from a higher power. According to his theory of redemption, he acknowledged it as necessary that the Divine in man should receive power from its connection with a higher source in

[1] Appendages of matter, προσαρτηματα.

[2] The ψυχη προσφυης ἀλογος.

[3] Δει δε τῳ λογιστικῳ κρειττονας γενομενους, της ἐλαττονος ἐν ἡμιν κτισεως φανηναι κρατουντας.

[4] Strom. iii. 427. Θελησατω μονον απαρτισαι το καλον και ἐπιτευξεται. [Sylb. p. 183. Potter, p. 510. Klotz, vol. ii. p. 213.]

order to give it a just activity. How far men were admonished by him of their need of help, is shewn by the advice which Isidorus gives to him who is suffering under temptations: "Let him only," he says, "not withdraw himself from the brethren; let him only confide in his communion with the body of saints; let him say, 'I am entered into the sanctuary, nothing evil can happen to me[1].'" It is also proved by the distinction which he made, of the two conditions of the inward life, the one, where a man in temptations prays for strength to conquer, and the other, where he gives thanks for the victory, which he has obtained by the support of the Divine power[2]. I grant that the doctrine of certain higher natures, which are elevated above the weaknesses of other men, might always easily create dangerous self-deceits of pride, because it is irreconcileable with the existence of Christian humility. There were later Basilidians, who corrupted this doctrine in a most pernicious manner, and thence deduced the freedom of the saints, which was to be bound by no law[3]. (See below.) The doctrine of matter might have led to an exaggerated and partial ascetic tendency in morality: but the acknowledgment of the communication and the interlacing which exists between the visible and the invisible world, as well as the recognition of the Divine nature as a victorious forming-principle for all creation, had here a counter-balancing effect, as we have already observed in regard to this whole class of Gnostics. Basilides considers marriage as a holy state, in no way inconsistent with the existence of Christian perfection; and, under certain circumstances, as a means of guarding against evil propensities. And it was only under certain circumstances that he allowed celibacy to be efficacious, as a means of attending to Divine things, with less interruption from earthly cares[4].

(c.) *Valentinus and his School.*

Next to Basilides we place Valentinus, who was contemporary with him, although a little later. If we judge from his Hellen-

[1] Strom. iii. 427. [See above, in the last note, for references.]
[2] Strom. l. c. *ὅταν δε ἡ εὐχαριστια σου εἰς αἰτησιν ὑποπεσῃ.*
[3] Strom. iii. 427. [See last note but one.]
[4] Strom. lib. iii. from the beginning.

istic expressions, and the Aramaic names, which appear in his system, he was of Jewish origin. He was born an Egyptian[1], and most probably he owes his education likewise to Alexandria. He travelled thence to Rome, where he appears to have passed the latter part of his life; and this gave him an opportunity of making his doctrines more known, and propagating them in these regions also. In his fundamental notions he agreed with Basilides; it was only in the manner of explaining them, and in the representation of the images in which he developed his ideas, that he differed from him. But as people did not carefully distinguish from one another, the doctrines of the founders of Gnostic schools, and those of their later followers, by whom these doctrines had only been modified in a peculiar manner, and as they joined with the Valentinian system many kindred doctrines, which flowed from one common source, it is difficult, from the representations which have come down to us, to determine with certainty what doctrines properly belonged to Valentinus himself, as the founder of the school.

What the δυναμεις were with Basilides, the Æons[2] were with Valentinus; but the *following notion* is peculiar to him, namely, that as the veil (or covering) of all life resides in the original source of all existence (the Bythos), but is not yet unfolded, together with the development of life that proceeds from that first source, members which mutually supply the defects of each other form themselves, that is to say Æons, both male and female, one of which is *chiefly generative*, the other *receptive*[3]; and that by the mutual communication of these Æons the chain of that development of life constantly goes on. The female is the supplement of the male, το πληρωμα[4], and the perfect line of Æons is now considered as an whole, as the fulness of the Divine life streaming out of the Bythos, which must again be constantly rendered fruitful, as it were, by it (the Divine life), and it is called, in relation to him, the female, the Pleroma! The *hidden being* of God cannot be known by any one; it is the absolutely

[1] According to the account given by Epiphanius.

[2] See the explanation of this word given above.

[3] Just as in all the rest of the creation, which represents an image of that higher world, this twofold line of agents is to be found.

[4] Πληρωμα. These Theosophs, who certainly did not scrupulously adhere to the strict grammatical meaning of terms, perhaps understood this word both in an active and a passive sense at the same time, and applied it both to το πληρουν and το πληρουμενον.

ἀγνωστον; it is only in as far as he has revealed himself in the unfolding of his powers or Æons, that he can be recognized. All individual Æons, in their varied modes of revelation, are called forms and names of that Being[1], who, in his secret existence is inconceivable, not-to-be-named, and elevated above conceptions and images, just as the Monogenes, that first self-revelation of the hidden Being, is called peculiarly the INVISIBLE NAME *of the Bythos.* It is an idea deeply rooted in the Valentinian system, that since all existence has its foundation in the self-limitation of the Bythos, so also the existence of all created being depends on *limitation.* When every thing remains within the limits of its peculiar sphere, and is that which it ought to be according to its assigned position in the development of life, then every thing can dovetail together well, and a just harmony exist in the chain of the development of life. As soon as any being endeavours to overpass these limits,—as soon as ever a being, instead of recognizing God in the revelation which he makes of himself to that being, according to his position,—emboldens himself so as to wish to penetrate into His hidden Being, it runs a risk of sinking into annihilation. Instead of laying hold of that which is real, it loses itself in that which is without existence. The Horos (ὁρος), the Genius of limitation, of bounding (the power of truth personified, which assigns and sets fast the boundaries of each individual being, which watches over those boundaries, and when they are broken restores them), therefore takes an important place in the system of Valentinus. Gnosis is here, as it were, giving testimony against itself. The ideas of the Horos and the Redeemer must have been much akin to each other in the Valentinian system, and in fact the Horos was called by many the λυτρωτης and σωτηρ, the *Redeemer* and *Saviour*; and we find traces which indicate that he was meant to represent only one mode of operation of the one redeeming Spirit,—that Spirit which, according to the different places of his operations, that extend themselves throughout all the stages of existence, and according to his different modes of operation, is betokened by different names, and by others is divided into different persons (Hypostases). The Valentinians ascribe two modes of operation to this Horos; *the one* of a negative kind, by means of which he lays down the limits for all existence, and separates and

[1] The Æons are μορφαι του Θεου, ὀνοματα του ἀνωνομαστου.

removes from it all that is foreign to it[1]; and in virtue of this power he is *properly* called ὁρος; and *the other* is that operation, by means of which he sets fast and establishes, in their peculiar sphere, and forms, all those beings who are purified from that, which, being foreign to their nature, troubles their existence[2]; and in virtue of this power, he is called σταυρος, a word which is used both for a cross, and a stake or bulwark; to both of which meanings the Valentinians here made allusion. Their remarks on those sayings of the Redeemer, in which they thought they recognized the Horos, make their ideas on the subject plain. Thus they referred, Luke xiv. 27, to the *establishing* power of the Horos[3], and Matthew x. 34, and Mark x. 21, to *his separating power*[4]. In the first of these passages, according to them, our Saviour means that only those persons can be his disciples who bear his cross, *i. e.* who give themselves up to that Divine power of the Redeemer which is symbolically represented by the cross, and suffer themselves to be formed and firmly established by it in his own peculiar way. In the second passage our Saviour hints at his Divine purifying power, by which he clears that which is akin to God from the admixture of the ungodly, and produces the annihilation of the latter[5]. Both are intimately connected together, the *clearance* from the foreign admixture of the ὑλη, from intermixture with which this irregular, indefinite, and unquiet vacillation between existence and non-existence proceeds, and a firm establishment in a definite, peculiar, Divine existence, unmingled with any thing else.

If Basilides deduced the intermixture of the Divine with matter from an assault of the kingdom of darkness upon the kingdom of light, on the contrary, Valentinus deduced it from a commotion that arose in the Pleroma, and a descent of the Divine seed of life from the Pleroma into matter, consequent upon that commotion. He acknowledged, as well as Basilides, a Divine wisdom, which revealed itself in the world; but here, also, in his view, the lower is only *an image* of the higher. It is not the Divine wisdom itself, not the Æon σοφια herself, but the untimely fruit of her travail, which is to unfold itself and arrive at

[1] The ἐνεργεια μεριστικη και διοριστικη.
[2] The ἐνεργεια ἑδραστικη και στηριστικη.
[3] The ἐνεργεια στηριστικη και ἑδραστικη.
[4] The ἐνεργεια μεριστικη και διοριστικη.
[5] Irenæus i. c. 3. § 5.

its maturity only by degrees. He distinguishes between an *ανω* and a *κατω σοφια* (Achamoth[1]): this latter is the soul of the world, from the admixture of which with the *ὑλη* all living existence is produced, and is in different stages, higher, in proportion as it can keep itself clearer from connexion with the *ὑλη*, and lower, in proportion as it is attracted and affected by matter. There exist, therefore, these *three* stages of being.

1. The *φυσεις πνευματικαι*, or those Divine seeds of life, which are elevated above matter by their nature, and which are akin to *σοφια*, to the soul of the world, and to the Pleroma.

2. The *φυσεις ψυχικαι*, or such natures as proceeded from the life that had been divided by admixture with the *ὑλη*; and an entirely new stage of being begins with these natures, an image of the higher world, but in a subordinate position.

3. The ungodly, which is opposed to all improvement; the being which can only disturb, and is entirely the slave of blind desires and passions.

There is only a *difference of degree* between all, which proceeds from the unfolding of the Divine life (which flows forth from the Bythos through the Æons), from the Pleroma downwards to its seed, which has fallen down into human nature—that seed which, being sown, must attain its ripeness in the earthly world; but between those three classes of being there is an *essential* difference *of nature*. Each one, therefore, of these classes must have its own independent principle which predominates in it, although every process of improvement and development leads back in the end to the Bythos, which works on every thing by means of various organs in the various grades of being, and whose law is the only ruling one. He cannot, however, himself enter into any immediate connexion with that which is foreign to him, and, therefore, in that subordinate grade of being which lies between the perfect or Divine, and the ungodly or material, there must exist a Being as the image of the Most High[2], which, while it thinks that it acts independently, must yet serve the universal law, from which nothing is exempt, for the realization of the ideas of the Supreme even to the very extreme limits of matter. This Being is in the psychical world, what the Bythos is in the higher world, only with this difference, that it involuntarily acts as the organ of the former; and this being is the Demiurgos of Valentinus. The *Hyle* also has its principle, which represents it,

[1] חכמות

[2] The *μεσοτης*.

and through which it operates; but by its very nature it is not of a forming and creative, but of a *destructive* kind: this is Satan.

1. The nature of the πνευματικον is that which is essentially akin to God (the ὁμοουσιον τῳ Θεῳ), and thence comes simple and undivided existence [1], the life of unity or oneness (οὐσια ἑνικη μονοειδης).

2. The Being of the ψυχικοι, divided into number and variety, but still submitting itself to a higher unity, and allowing itself to be guided by that unity, at first unconsciously, afterwards consciously.

3. The Being of Satan and his whole kingdom: mere opposition to all unity; the Being divided and distracted in itself, without any capability for unity, or any point for unity to begin from; and with all this, an endeavour to destroy all unity, to spread its *own* indwelling distraction over every thing, and to distract every thing [2].

In that first grade of being the life, which, by its very nature, is eternal, exists as something inalienable, a necessary ἀφθαρσια; the ψυχικον, on the contrary, stands in the middle between immortal and mortal. The ψυχικοι obtain immortality, or they become subject to death, according as they give themselves up by their inclinations to the Divine or to ungodliness. The nature of Satan, like that of the ὑλη, is death itself, annihilation, the negation of all existence, which, in the end, when all existence, which has been divided by its means, shall have developed itself to the full extent of all its properties, and shall have fixed itself sufficiently in itself, shall then destroy itself in itself, being overcome by the power of the positive, after it (the negative, annihilating power) has drawn to itself all its kindred ungodliness. The existence of the first is the pure development of life from within,—an activity which is not directed outwards, and which has no obstacles to overcome; and a tranquillity which is a life and action.

2. The existence of the ὑλη is of itself, and by its own nature, the stillness of death; but after a spark of life has fallen into it, and communicated to it a certain something analogous to life, it becomes in its representative, Satan, a wild kind of self-contradicting impulse.

[1] [The German is here "das Leben der Einheit." I think in English the same idea would be better rendered 'oneness of existence.' H. R.]

[2] The οὐσια πολυσχιδης, which endeavours to assimilate every thing to itself.

3. To the Demiurgos, and to those that are his, namely, the Psychical, there is peculiarly assigned an activity directed outwardly; an impelling activity: they desire to do much, as it usually happens with such busy people, without rightly understanding what they do [1],—without becoming themselves properly conscious of the ideas which direct them [2].

The doctrine of the redemption took also a very important place in the Valentinian system, and peculiarly forms its centerpoint; but it was by him, even more than by Basilides, removed from the regions of practical things into those of speculation and metaphysics. As, according to his system, a process of the development of life pervades all regions of existence, and as the disharmony, which, as far as its seed is concerned, first arose in the Pleroma itself, beginning thence, has spread itself farther [3], so the *whole course of the world can only then first attain its proper object*, when *harmony* shall be again restored, *in all grades of existence*, as well as in the Pleroma; that which happens in the Pleroma must be imaged in all other grades of existence. And thus, therefore, as the work of redemption takes place in different stages of existence, and the same law is here fulfilled in different forms, and in different conditions, it is the same agent of the revelation of the hidden God, the same agent, through whom the life that streamed forth from God becomes united with him again, who, continuing his work, till the completion of the whole, is imaged (or reflected) in different hypostases, wherever he is perfecting his work in different stages of existence. So it is the same idea which is represented in a Monogenes, a Logos, a Christus, and a Soter. The Soter is the Redeemer for the whole of the world that lies beyond the Pleroma, and therefore also the plastic Being for that world; for in this system, to form and to redeem hang closely together, as is already evident from the twofold operations of the Horos. By means of this *formative process*, the higher nature is first made free from the matter that adheres to it; and out of an unorganic, formless being, is unfolded into a definite, organized being, gifted with individual qualities [4].

[1] Φυσις πολυεργος, πολυπραγμων.

[2] The documents on which this rests will be found in the writings of Heracleon, quoted by Origen. Tom. xiii. Joh. c. 16. 25 30. 51. 59. Tom. xx. c. 20.

[3] The foundation of the whole of the new creation, lying beyond the Pleroma, which new creation can proceed from division alone.

[4] [Literally, "into a definite, individual, and organized being."—H. R.]

It is by means of redemption that the higher property first attains to its mature and perfect development, and to clear consciousness. Redemption is the completion of the formative process. All the Divine life of the Pleroma concentrates itself, and is reflected in the Soter, and through him extends its operations for the individualizing of the Divine life, in order that the spiritual natures, which are akin to the Pleroma, may be sown abroad in the world, and ripen into perfect existence. The Christus of the Pleroma is the working principle, the Soter beyond the Pleroma[1] is the receiving, the forming, and the perfecting principle[2].

The Soter first proves his redeeming and forming power on that still imperfect soul of the world, which came from the Pleroma, as this soul must, at some time or other, spread itself abroad over all the spiritual natures that are akin to it, and which sprouted forth from it, as the universal mother of spiritual life in the lower world. (See above). The Soter is the proper fashioner and governor of the world, as he is the Redeemer; for the formation of the world is the first beginning of the process of development, which can only be brought to completion by means of redemption. The Soter, as the inward active principle, puts into the soul-of-the-world[3], destined to make up a syzygy[4] with him, the formative ideas, and she communicates them to the Demiurgos, who imagines that he is acting independently; and he, unconsciously to himself, under this cultivation becomes animated and influenced by the power of these ideas. Whilst Valentinus[5] represented the Demiurgos and the world fashioned

[1] In the τοπος μεσοτητος.

[2] Thus Heracleon says of the Soter, in relation to Christians, that the former receives the Divine seed out of the Pleroma from the latter, as a yet undeveloped seed; and that he communicates to it the formation into a definite and separate being—την πρωτην μορφωσιν την κατα γενεσιν, εἰς μορφην, και φωτισμον, και περιγραφην ἀγαγων και ἀναδειξας. Origen, Joh. t. ii. c. 15. To *bring to light, to form*, and to *individualize*, are identical ideas among the Gnostics. The indefinite, the unorganic, corresponds in spiritual beings to the ὑλη. Thus in the Valentinian fragment in Irenæus i. c. 8. §. 4. the μορφουν, φωτιζειν, φανερουν, is opposed to the προβαλλειν σπερματικως την ὁλην οὐσιαν. Christus sows the seed, the Soter harvests it. Origen, Joh. i. 13. p. 48.

[3] Κατω σοφια, Achamoth.

[4] [It will be remembered that in this system all the Æons were evolved by pairs, or syzygies.—H. R.]

[5] After Plato, who considers the Spirit that fashions the world, and the world animated by him, as one whole, one Θεος γενητος, ἐν ζωον; and after the example of Philo, who represents the Λογος, and the body of the world animated by him, as *one whole*.

and animated by him as one whole, he paints this whole as an image of the glory of God, sketched by the Soter, as by a painter. But, to say the truth, as every image, from its very nature, is an imperfect representation of the original prototype, and can be rightly understood only by him who has the power of beholding the original,—thus also the Demiurgos, with his creation, is only an imperfect image of the glory of God; and he alone who has received in his inward soul the revelation of the invisible Divine Being, can rightly understand the world as the image, and the Demiurgos as the prophet, of the Supreme God. The inward revelation (which is the portion of the πνευματικοι) is an authentication of the outward, an authentication of the Demiurgos as the representative of God. Valentinus himself expresses this thus[1]: "as much as the picture is less than the living countenance, so much the world is less than the living God. And what is the cause of the picture? The greatness of the countenance, which afforded the original to the painter, in order to become honoured by the manifestation of his name; for no form has been invented as an independent thing. But as the name of the thing itself supplies that which is wanting in the paintings, so also the *invisible* God[2] acts for the authentication of the image which is made."

It is a fundamental notion of the Valentinian and of all Gnostic systems, that *man* is destined to represent and to maintain the connection between the higher world and the empire of the Demiurgos, that is, to reveal the Supreme God in this world. Human nature, and the revelation of God, are here kindred notions; and hence the *first man*[3] [Urmensch] was one of the Valentinian Æons; and, according to other Valentinian systems, it was said, "When God wished to reveal himself, this was called *man*[4]." The Demiurgos created man, to image and represent himself; he breathed into him a soul akin to his own being. But, even here, he was acting as the instrument of a higher Being. Man

[1] Clem. Strom. lib. iv. 509. [Sylb. p. 218. Potter, p. 603. Klotz, vol. ii. p. 326—7.] [The quotation from Valentinus is probably corrupt, and requires the alteration of ἐπληρωσαν into ἐπληρωσεν, which the common interpreters, as well as Neander, have made. The only difficulty lies in the latter part, which I here quote: τις ουν αἰτια της εἰκονος; μεγαλωσυνη του προσωπου παρεσχημενου τῳ ζωγραφῳ τον τυπον, ἱνα τιμηθῃ δι' ὀνοματος αὐτου: οὐ γαρ αὐθεντικως εὑρεθη μορφη, ἀλλα το ὀνομα ἐπληρωσαν το ὑστερησαν ἐν πλασει. H. R.]

[2] God's invisible Being.

[3] The Adam Kadmon of the Cabbala.

[4] See Iren. lib. i. c. 12. §. 4.

was to represent that first man. Without the Demiurgos being conscious of it, the Sophia communicated to him the spiritual seed, which he transplanted into the soul of man; and thence it happened that man at once revealed something which was of a more elevated nature than the whole creation, into which he entered; so that the Demiurgos himself, and his angels, were seized with astonishment, for as yet they knew nothing of a higher world. The Demiurgos thought that he himself was an independent ruler; but now, to his astonishment, he saw a higher power enter into his dominions. This astonishment is universally repeated, wherever man, limited as he is, being animated by the ideas of a higher world, expresses them in his works, as in art and indeed universally, where the hands of men execute any thing in relation to the name of God. Thus it happens that men fall down and worship their own images, being filled with a reverential astonishment by the sensation [1] of a higher power, which is unknown to them. We will bring forward the words of the man himself: "And just as the angel was seized with fear at that creature (πλασμα), when it spoke of loftier things than such as suited its creation, by means of him who had invisibly communicated to it the seed of the life from above, (namely, the Soter,) and when it spoke with freedom and confidence,—so also, in the race of the men of this world, the works of man become a terror even to those who made them, such as pillars, and statues, and every thing which the hands of all men execute in honor of the name of God [2]."

But that which human nature was universally to represent, became now really brought to pass only in those spiritual men [3]. Through them was the life-giving, purifying principle of the Divinity to be spread abroad, and penetrate even to the utmost limits of the ὑλη; these spiritual natures are the salt and the light of the earth, the leaven for all the race of man. The ψυχη is only the *vehiculum* for the πνευματικον, in order that it may be able to enter into the temporal world, in which it is to develop itself to maturity. When this aim shall have been attained, the spirit, which is only destined for the life of intuition [4], will leave

[1] [Ahnung. Literally, a *presentiment*. It expresses here a feeling indicating a sense that leads us to recognize this higher Power. H. R.]

[2] Clem. Strom. lib. ii. 375. [Sylb. p. 161. Potter, p. 448. Klotz, vol. ii. p. 145.]

[3] The φυσεις πνευματικαι.

[4] [Das Leben der Anschauung. See Preface. H. R.]

that vehiculum in the lower sphere; and every spiritual nature, as the female and recipient element in regard to the higher world of spirits, will be elevated in the Pleroma to its syzygy with the angelic nature which corresponds to it. Only the highest and immediate intuitive powers (that is the meaning of Valentinus) will then come into operation. All the powers and modes of operation of the soul, which are directed to that which is temporal and perishable,—such as its powers of reflection, and the understanding, in which, according to Valentinus, is contained the ψυχη, will then utterly cease [1].

The attractive power, with which the Divine Being works on every thing, without those who receive the impression understanding it, or being able to explain it to themselves, is a favorite notion with Valentinus. The Demiurgos was attracted by the spiritual natures which were scattered among the Jewish people, without being conscious of the reason of it. He made them, therefore, prophets, priests, and kings. Therefore it happened that the prophets were enabled especially to hint at the higher order of things, which should be brought among men by the Soter. According to Valentinus, a fourfold principle acted upon the Prophets;—

1. The psychical principle, the human and limited soul, the unassisted soul.

2. The *spiritualization of this* ψυχη, which is derived from the Demiurgos working upon it.

3. The unassisted πνευματικον.

4. The pneumatical spiritualization, which is derived from the influence of the Sophia [2].

Thus Valentinus, in reference to these four principles, could distinguish in the writings of the prophets, different promises of a higher and lower character and meaning, and a higher and lower sense, which differed from each other, in the same passage.

1. The mere human sayings.

2. The *single* prophecies of future events, which the Demiurgos, who, although not Omniscient, yet looked into a wider circle of the future, was able to communicate; and the prophecies of a Messiah, which came also from the same source, but were still enveloped in a temporal and Jewish form; the prophecies of a Messiah, such as the Demiurgos would send,—a Psychical

[1] Comp. Aristot. de Anima, lib. iii. c. 5.

[2] See Iren. lib. i. c. 16. §. 3, 4.

Messiah for the Psychical world, the ruler of a kingdom of this world.

3. The ideas which verged upon the Christian economy, and pointed to it, the enlightened Messianic notions, brought forward in more or less purity, according as they proceeded purely from the higher spiritual natures, or the immediate influence of the Sophia. This view might lead to remarkable investigations as to the mixture of the Divine and human in the prophets, and introduce conclusions which would be fruitful towards the interpretation of the prophets themselves. The Valentinian view was opposed to the determination of those, who, in spite of the words of Christ in Matt. xi. 9, &c., and in spite of 1 Pet. i. 12. attributed a perfect and Christian knowledge to the prophets. It may be asked, whether Valentinus recognized the beams of higher truth only among the Jews; whether he allowed the existence of spiritual natures only among the Jews, or whether he acknowledged that they were spread abroad also among the heathen. According to Heracleon[1], he held the Jews to be the kingdom of the Demiurgos,—the Heathen the kingdom of Matter, or of Satan,—and the Christians the people of the Supreme God; but this does not prove that he excluded from the heathen all that belongs to the superior race; because, although he expressly assigned Judaism to the Demiurgos, he supposed that it contained some scattered seeds of the higher pneumatical system; and although he assigned Christianity to the Supreme God, he saw also, even among the Christians, a large class of Psychical persons. He, therefore, only speaks of the *prevailing ingredients;* and therefore, notwithstanding the prevailing state of the ὑλη among the heathen, he might recognize scattered seeds of the Pneumatical. He was in fact obliged to confess this according to his own principles, according to which the higher spiritual principle of life (the πνευματικον) was to pervade all grades of being even to the very limits of matter, in order to prepare the universal annihilation of the ὑλη. What Valentinus says, in the passage above quoted, of the power of art, which turns itself to the formation of idols, allows us to conclude that he judged the polytheistic system more mildly than the common Jews, to whom the idols were only evil spirits, and that he, supporting himself by Acts xvii. 23. believed that even in this system, although it was

[1] Origen, in Joh. t. xiii. §. 16.

sullied by the prevalence of the hylic principle, there might be observed traces of an unknown God, who spread his unrecognized influence over all things. Thus Valentinus, in a still-extant fragment of a homily [1], actually hints at the traces of truth spread about even in the writings of the heathen, in which the inward being of the spiritual people of God, or of the πνευματικοι, who are spread abroad in the whole world, reveals itself. "Much of that which is written in the books of the heathen, is found written in the Church of God; this common part is the voice out of the heart, the law written in the heart; this is that people of the beloved (*i. e.* this higher consciousness which is found in common, is the mark of the scattered community of the Soter, of the πνευματικοι), which is beloved by him, and loves him in return."

The *Soter*, who from the beginning had conducted *the whole process of the development* of the spiritual seed of life, which had fallen down from out of the Pleroma for the formation of a new world, the *invisible Fashioner* and *Ruler* of this new world,—was now obliged at last, himself, to act upon the course of the world, *without any intermediate agency*, in order to spread forth the act of redemption, which he had originally perfected in the mother of all spiritual life, the soul of the world, or the Sophia,—upon all the spiritual life which had flowed forth from her, and thus to bring the whole work to completion. All being, even down to the very hylic matter that struggles against all being, was capable of ennoblement, *each after its own degree*. The Soter must therefore enter into connection with all these stages of being, in order to fashion all, both the lower (the Psychical) as well as the higher (the Pneumatical), into the degree of the higher life, of which each is capable. Except for this, according to the usual course of nature, the Soter could enter into connection only with the spiritual nature, which is akin to him, and such a nature could enter into this temporal world only in connection with a ψυχη.

Valentinus might here coincide with the doctrine of Basilides, only with this difference, that with the first of them, the human part in the person and in the life of the Redeemer received a somewhat higher character, although not the right and becoming one; the Christ, composed and decomposed by him, according to *his own* notions, was always very different from the *historical* Christ.

[1] Clem. Strom. lib. vi. p. 641. [Sylb. p. 272; Potter, p. 792; Klotz, vol. iii. p. 128.]

The Demiurgos had promised to his own people a Redeemer, a Messiah, who would release them from the dominion of the hylical, introduce the annihilation of every thing which opposed itself to his empire,—rule over every thing in his name,—and rejoice all that obeyed him with all kinds of earthly happiness. He sent down this Messiah, who represented the very image of the Demiurgos, out of his own heaven; but this elevated Being could not enter into any connection with matter; nay, as it was to introduce the annihilation of every thing material, how could it receive any thing whatever from matter? There would then have been joined with the material body, a material spirit[1] of life, akin to it, and the source of every thing evil; and how could he have been the Redeemer, if the principle of evil had been present in his own nature. The Demiurgos also formed a body for the psychical Messiah out of the finer etherial matter of heaven, out of which he sent him down into this world. This body was so formed, by some wonderful contrivance[2], that he appeared visibly, and could subject himself to all sensuous actions and affections, and yet do this in a manner entirely different from the usual kind of bodies[3]. But the miracle of the birth of Jesus consisted in this, that the psychical nature which came down from the heaven of the Demiurgos, together with the etherial body brought from thence, came into the light of the world through the body of Mary only as through a canal[4]. But yet this psychical Messiah would never have been able to complete the work laid upon him by the Demiurgos: there was need of a higher power for the conquest of the empire of the ὑλη; the Demiurgos acted as well here as in every thing as the unconscious instrument of the Soter. This latter had appointed the moment in which he would unite himself with this psychical Messiah as his instrument, in order to fulfil the work which had been prepared and promised by the Demiurgos in a far higher sense than he himself anticipated, and to found a Messianic kingdom of a far higher kind, to the real circumstances of which only the most elevated predictions of the prophets, and those not understood by the Demiurgos himself, had pointed.

The psychical Messiah, who did not perceive the destination which was to fall to his lot through his union with the Soter, in

[1] The ψυχη ἁλογος.
[2] Ἐξ οἰκονομιας.
[3] Σωμα ἐκ της ἀφανους ψυχικης οὐσιας. Theodot. didascal. Anatol.
[4] Ὡς δια σωληνος.

the mean time laid before man the Ideal of ascetic holiness. He was able to exert an extraordinary dominion over matter from the peculiar nature of his body. He let himself down indeed to man, so as to eat and drink; but still without being subject to the same affections as other men: he carried on every thing after a divine manner[1].

At the baptism in the Jordan, where he was to receive his solemn consecration to his calling as the Messiah from John the Baptist, the representative of the Demiurgos, the Soter, who had thus conducted every thing through his invisible guidance, united himself with him, descending under the symbol of the dove. On this question, *whether the psychical Messiah from the first bore a spiritual nature within him*, which, descending with the vehiculum of a soul, was to develop itself to maturity in this world, that it might then first become capable of redemption; or whether it was only *at his descent into this world* that the Soter first received from the Sophia a spiritual nature as a vehicle, in order to be able to unite himself with the human nature, and that also the higher pneumatical nature was communicated to the Messiah of the Demiurgos during baptism: on this point there might be a diversity of opinions even in the Valentinian school itself[2].

[1] Clem. Strom. Lib. iii. 451.

[2] The latter view is apparently found in a passage of Heracleon; Origen, t. vi. § 23.; Grabe Spicileg. t. ii. p. 89, where I once (see my Genetische Entwickelung, &c. p. 149) erroneously supposed that I could recognize the doctrine that the Soter himself became man, and that of his union with the human nature from its first development. He explains John i. 27, in his manner, first justly, according to the sense expressed by the words, "John avows that he is not worthy to render the smallest service to the Redeemer;" and then afterwards he arbitrarily introduces a higher sense into the simple words, according to his own theosophic ideas: *οὐκ ἐγω εἰμι ἱκανος, ἵνα δι' ἐμε κατελθῃ ἀπο μεγεθους και σαρκα λαβῃ, ὡς ὑποδημα, περι ἡς ἐγω λογον ἀποδουναι οὐ δυναμαι, οὐδε διηγησασθαι ἡ ἐπιλυσαι την περι αὐτης οἰκονομιαν.* We can hardly here, under the term "the flesh," which the Soter, who came down out of the higher region from the bounds of the Pleroma and the *τοπος μεσοτητος*, had received, understand the body of the psychical Messiah, formed by some peculiar *οἰκονομια*; for he is certainly here speaking of the Soter, who revealed himself to John at the baptism, and at all events, according to the Valentinian doctrine, he did not unite himself with the *body*, but with the *psychical Messiah who bore this body*. And then John, who here represented the person of the Demiurgos himself, would never have uttered his astonishment thus at this wonderful body formed by the latter person himself (the Demiurgos). But the Valentinians called *every covering every vehicle* for a higher being, which lets himself down into a lower region, a *σαρξ*. The Sophia gave a *σπερμα πνευματικον*, in order that he might let himself down to the earth in this as a vehicle for his appearance, and

According to the doctrine of Valentinus, as well as that of Basilides, the appearance of the redeeming Spirit in human nature, and its union with the psychical Messiah would be the chief business in the work of redemption. He also agreed with Basilides in this, that the Soter had left the psychical Messiah to himself at his passion, but he ascribed more importance than Basilides to the passion of the Messiah, although a theosophy, which sought peculiar mysteries, everywhere despised a simple explanation, and in consequence of its multitude of mystical and speculative relations and meanings would not allow the feelings of the heart to show themselves; although this theosophy was too contemplative and superhuman to be able rightly to comprehend the passion of Christ in its human and moral aspect. As the psychical Messiah spread himself upon the cross, and with the cross spread himself over the lower world, this was an image of that first act of redemption by which the Soter (see above) had extended himself over the Sophia with the σταυρος. Just as in the higher region this effected the freeing of the Sophia from that which is foreign to her, so also it effected in the lower the freeing of the psychical from the material, which is the groundwork of all that is evil, even to the final annihilation of it altogether, after it has become dissolved in itself[1]. By the words "Into thy hands, O Father, I commend my *spirit*," he commended the πνευματικον σπερμα which was then leaving him, in order that it might not be detained in the dominion of the Demiurgos, but that it might raise itself up free into the higher region, and that all those spiritual natures, whose representative this spiritual nature united with him was, might also be raised up with it. The psychical Messiah raises himself up to the Demiurgos, who transfers to him in his name the sovereign might and rule, and the pneumatical Messiah raises himself up to the Soter, whither all freed spiritual natures are to follow him.

The most important matter, the chief concern for the pneumatical natures in the work of redemption, is still the redemption,

might thereby enter into union with the ψυχη. The opening words of the Didascal. Anatol. give us the proof of this, for it is said, ὁ προεβαλεν σαρκιον τῳ λογῳ (as well as to the Soter) ἡ σοφια το πνευματικον σπερμα, τουτο στολισαμενος κατηλθεν ὁ σωτηρ. It was also of this wonderful apparatus that Heracleon spoke.

[1] The declaration of Heracleon in Origen, t. vi. § 23, τῳ σταυρῳ ἀνηλωσθαι και ἠφανισθαι πασαν την κακιαν, must be understood in connexion with the whole Valentinian system.

which was imparted to human nature by its union with the Soter at the baptism in the Jordan. This must be repeated in every individual case. Valentinus speaks thus of the sanctifying effects of inward communion with the Redeemer. "But there is one Good, (whose free appearance is the revelation through the Son,) and through *him alone* can the heart become pure after all evil spirits have been banished out of the heart, for many spirits inhabiting it will not allow it to be pure. Each one of these fully performs its own work, while they defile it in manifold ways by unseemly desires. And it appears to me to be with such a heart as with an inn, which is trampled upon and trodden down and often filled with dirt, while men dwell within it without restraint, and take no care whatever about the place, as one in which they have no concern. Thus also the heart, until it attains heavenly grace, remains unclean, as being the abode of many evil spirits. But where the Father, the only one that is good, takes possession of it, then is it sanctified and it shines with light; and thus he who possesses such a heart, is declared to be blessed (*μακαριζεται*) because he will see God[1]."

He who is thus united with God is already a member of the heavenly community, is already incorporated by the power of the Redeemer into the host of blessed spirits, which is thus expressed in the language of the Valentinian school: "As every pneumatical soul has its other half in the higher world of spirits (the *angel* which belongs to it) for union with which it is destined, so does it receive through the Soter the power to enter at once into this syzygy in regard to its spiritual life[2]."

As the psychical and pneumatical beings are different from one another in their nature and their destination, so they remain different also in Christianity. There is a *χριστιανισμος ψυχικος* and a *χριστιανισμος πνευματικος*. St. Paul declares to the psychical, that for them he has known nothing and could preach nothing but Christ crucified[3]; that he could not preach to them that wisdom of the perfect which is hidden even to the Demiurgos and his angels. The Valentinians distinguish also, according to their system, *a twofold signification of redemption* and of bap-

[1] Strom. lib. ii. p. 409. [Ed. Par. 1629.] [Sylburg, p. 176; Potter, p. 488—9; Klotz, vol. ii. p. 191.]

[2] Heracleon ap. Origen, t. 13, § 11. *κομιζεσθαι παρ' αὐτου την δυναμιν και την ἑνωσιν και την ἀνακρασιν προς το πληρωμα αὐτης.*

[3] Didascal. Anatol. Of a twofold mode of preaching of St. Paul. In regard to the *Psychici*, *ἐκηρυξε τον σωτηρα γενητον και παθητόν.*

tism, in regard to the psychici and the pneumatici. The psychici must be led to believe by means of miracles and other acts that strike the senses[1]; they are only capable *of a belief upon authority*, and not capable *of a persuasion which proceeds from the inward essence of truth*, nor of the intuitive perception (anschauung) *of truth itself*. To such men Christ speaks in John iv. 48. The spiritual men, on the contrary, need no such outward means of instruction: in virtue of their kindred nature they are attracted by truth itself without any intermediate means[2]. When truth reveals itself to them, there follows instantly in them a confident belief, such as could not be effected from without, and could only proceed from the immediate influence of truth upon their kindred spiritual nature[3]. Their worship of God founded on their knowledge of the truth is the true "reasonable service of God."

That seed of the spiritual nature is that by which men are attracted by the Redeemer, and led to him, the men of the Spirit; therefore, they who possess that seed are the salt and the soul of the outward Church, those through whom Christianity is farther propagated as the forming principle of human nature[4]. By these spiritual men the illumination of all this earthly universe, the final annihilation of all that is material and evil, is to be prepared, after matter has been deprived of all the life which it has seized upon for itself. Valentinus thus addresses these pretended spiritual men: "Ye are, from the beginning, immortal, and children of eternal life, and ye have been desirous to divide death among yourselves[5], in order that ye may exhaust and expend it, and that death may die in you and through you; for when ye dissolve the world (prepare the dissolution of the material world), but ye yourselves will not be dissolved, ye are lords over the creation, and over all that is corruptible[6]." Although at the bottom of these high-sounding words, as far as

[1] Δι' ἐργων φυσιν ἐχοντες και δι' αἰσθησεως πειθεσθαι και οὐχι λογῳ πιστευειν. Orig. t. xiii. § 59.

[2] Heracleon in Joann. t. xiii. c. 20, the δεκτικη ζωης διαθεσις.

[3] Ἡ ἀδιακριτος και καταλληλος τῃ φυσει.

[4] See the proof of this in Heracleon, to be given almost immediately.

[5] While they were sent down into the midst of the material world.

[6] Strom. lib. iv. p. 509. B. [Ed. Paris, 1629.] Ἀπ' ἀρχης ἀθανατου ἐστε και τεκνα ζωης ἐστε αἰωνιας. Και τον θανατον ἠθελετε μερισασθαι εἰς ἑαυτους, ἱνα δαπανησητε αὐτον και ἀναλωσητε και ἀποθανῃ ὁ θανατος ἐν ὑμιν και δι' ὑμων. Ὁταν γαρ τον μεν κοσμον λυητε, ὑμεις δε μη καταλυησθε, κυριευετε της κτισεως και της φθορας ἀπασης. [Sylb. p. 218; Potter, p. 603; Klotz, vol. ii. p. 326.]

they were applied to the calling of Christians, as instruments for the revelation and extension of God's kingdom, there is something of truth; yet this truth is here mixed with a pride, which, in the case of certain peculiarities, might easily introduce the most mischievous excesses of fanaticism. If the Valentinians had been able to found a Church according to their own notions, the Pneumatici would have been the Christian *Brahmins*.

Now, when the end prepared by these spiritual men should have been attained, then, after the dissolution of the whole material world, the Soter, united into a syzygy with the Sophia, and under him the matured spiritual natures in pairs with the angels, were to enter into the Pleroma, and the last (lowest) stage of the spiritual world [1] was to receive the psychici under the Demiurgos; *and they also* were to receive that measure of happiness which was suited to their peculiar nature. The Demiurgos rejoices himself in the appearance of the Soter, through which a higher world, to which he had hitherto been a stranger, is revealed to him, and through which also he, being freed from his harassing service, is enabled to enter into rest, and receive an echo of the glory of the Pleroma. He is the friend of the Bridegroom (the Soter) who stands there and belongs to him, and delights himself in the voice of the bridegroom, and delights himself in the fulfilment of the marriage [2]. John the Baptist spoke those words, John iii. 29, as the representative of the Demiurgos.

§ *Distinguished Men of the School of Valentinus.*

Among the men of the Valentinian school the Alexandrian Heracleon is distinguished by more learning and profoundness than the others. He composed a commentary on the gospel of St. John, from which Origen [3] has preserved some fragments of importance, perhaps also a commentary on that of St. Luke, from which (if such be the case), Clement of Alexandria [4] has handed down to us a fragment,—the explanation of Luke xii. 8.

[1] The τοπος μεσοτητος.

[2] The union of the Soter with the Sophia, and of the angels with the spiritual natures in the Pleroma.

[3] In his *Tomi* upon John, in which he frequently refers to the explanations of Heracleon.

[4] Strom. iv. 503. [Sylburg, p. 215; Potter, p. 595—6; Klotz² vol. ii. p. 316—8.]

It is easy to understand that the deep and inward spirit of St. John's writings would be attractive to the Gnostics. Heracleon brought to the explanation of this gospel a deep religious feeling directed to interior things, together with an understanding which was clear, whenever he was not led into error by theosophical speculations; but that which *was wanting in him* was a feeling for the simplicity of St. John, and a knowledge or a recognition of the principles of grammatical and logical interpretation in general, without which free room is given to every caprice, even in the interpretation of the Scriptural writers, inasmuch as they, as men, although inspired men, obeyed the laws which regulate the modes of speech and thought among men. Although as far as we can see, Heracleon intended honestly to deduce his theology out of St. John, yet he was altogether taken possession of by his own system, and so thoroughly entangled in it in all his modes of thought and conception, that he could not stir a step free from it, and involuntarily introduced its views and ideas into the Holy Scriptures, which he considered as the source of divine truth. As a proof of what is here said, we will take a closer view of Heracleon's explanation of the glorious *conversation of our Saviour with the woman of Samaria.* He could not stand by the simple historical narrative, nor content himself with the profound, psychological consideration of this Samaritan woman in her relation to the Saviour. Immediately in this Samaritan woman, who was attracted by the words and the appearance of Christ, an image is presented to his mind *of all* spiritual natures, which are attracted by that which is divine; and therefore in this narrative the whole relation of the πνευματικοι to the Soter, and to the higher spiritual world, must be represented. And therefore, the words of the Samaritan woman must bear a double sense; one, a sense of which she herself was conscious, and the other that higher sense, which she uttered as the representative of the whole class of πνευματικοι, without being conscious of it; and therefore also the words of the Saviour in reference to these things must also bear a two-fold sense, a higher and a lower, a notion which involves the unnatural supposition of a double conversation going on at the same time. And yet he had seized upon the fundamental idea of the words of the Redeemer in a very understanding spirit, if he could only have prevented himself from being drawn away from the main matter by seeking too much in subordinate particulars. He explains justly the words of Christ (John iv. 10.

13. 14.) which are to be understood spiritually[1]: "The water, which the Saviour gives, is from his spirit and his power. . . . . His grace and his gift are something which can never be taken away, nor corrupted, nor consume away in him who partakes of it. . . . . They who receive *that* which is abundantly given to them from above, themselves also let that which is given to them bubble over for the eternal life of others." But then he draws the false conclusion, that because Christ meant the water, which he wished to give, to be taken in a symbolical sense, that consequently also the water of the well of Jacob must be understood in a symbolical sense. It was to be a symbol of Judaism, which satisfies not the desires of the spiritual nature, and of its perishable earthly glory. When the Samaritan woman says, "Give me this water, that I may not thirst, that I may not come hither to draw;" then the burdensomeness of Judaism was to be betokened by this, the difficulty of finding in it (Judaism) the nourishment of the inward life, and its unsatisfactoriness[2]. When the Redeemer desired the woman to call her husband, he meant her other half in the world of spirits, the angel which belonged to her, in order that she, coming with him to the Saviour, might receive power from him to bind herself with this her other half, and thus unite with him. The ground for this arbitrary interpretation was this: "He could not speak of her earthly husband, *because he* was well aware that she had no lawful husband. . . . According to the *spiritual* meaning[4] the Samaritan woman did not know her husband; she knew nothing of the angel, that belonged to her: according to the literal meaning[5], she was ashamed to say that she was living in an unlawful connection." Heracleon further concluded, that as the water is the symbol of the divine life bestowed by the Redeemer, so is the pitcher a symbol of the *capacity in the disposition of the Samaritan woman for this Divine life. She left the pitcher behind with him;* that is to say, as she had such a vessel with the Saviour, as was fitted to receive the living water, she returned into the world, in order to announce the coming of Christ to the psychical[6].

[1] [This passage is quoted, Grab. Spicileg. vol. ii. p. 94—5. H. R.]

[2] Το ἐπιμοχθον, και δυσποριστον και ἀτροφον ἐκεινου του ὑδατος.

[3] Το πληρωμα αὐτης. See above.

[4] Κατα το νοουμενον.

[5] Κατα το ἁπλουν.

[6] The thought of Heracleon is here a just one, that only he who is in union with

Heracleon properly opposed the habit of prizing martyrdom as an *opus operatum*. "The multitude," he says [1], "hold confession before the civil power to be the only thing: but this is wrong, for even the hypocrite might make this confession. *This* is a particular confession; it is not the *common* confession, which ought to be made by all Christians, of which he is here speaking; it is the confession through works and conduct, which answer to a belief in him [2]. This common confession is followed by that peculiar one, if it be needful, and if reason enjoins it. . . . . Those persons who confess him with their mouth, may deny him through their works. Those only can truly confess him, who live in the confession of him, among whom he himself confesses, because he has received them into himself, and they have received him into themselves [3]. Therefore can he never deny himself [4]."

We next make mention of PTOLEMÆUS, who, to judge from the work of Irenæus, (which was specially levelled against the party of *this man*,) must have laboured much for the propagation of Valentinian principles. One is led to inquire whether it be true, as Tertullian asserts [5], that Ptolemæus was distinguished from Valentinus, because he imagined the Æons rather under the form of Hypostases, while Valentinus conceived them to be powers in-dwelling in the being of God; or at least one inquires, whether this difference was of so much importance; because, in fact, the representation of the Æons by the Gnostics, far from being mere abstract notions of attributes, always must have bordered on hypostatizing.

the Saviour by his feelings can preach him properly to others,—although this just thought is introduced into this place by an arbitrary interpretation of that which is historical. We must here do Heracleon the justice to acknowledge, that Origen, here as well as in many other places, attacks him unjustly, as if he contradicted himself; "for how could the Samaritan," says he, "preach to others, when she had left behind her, with the Redeemer, from whom she departed, her organ for the reception of the Divine life." But Heracleon was here quite consistent in his application of the allegory; he did not think of *any local leaving behind*.

[1] In the fragment of his Commentary on St. Luke, quoted above.

[2] Here again, what Heracleon says is in itself quite just; and yet his explanation, which has no reference whatever to the context, is quite false.

[3] Ἐνειλημμενος αὐτους και ἐχομενος ὑπο τουτων.

[4] Which would necessarily happen, if those who are in connection with him were to deny him.

[5] Nominibus et numeris Æonum distinctis in personales substantias, quas Valentinus in ipsa summa divinitatis, ut sensus et affectus et motus, incluserat. Adv. Valentinian. c. 4.

A very important piece of Ptolemæus, which has been preserved—his letter to one Flora, whom he endeavoured to gain over to the Valentinian principles[1]—shows that he was extremely skilful in presenting his views to others in a manner likely to recommend them. As he was apparently writing to a Christian lady of the Catholic Church, he had particularly to remove *the objection*, which she would make on the contradiction *between his doctrines and those of the Church*, and against the supposition that the *Old Testament, and the creation of the world, did not proceed from the Supreme God.* In regard to the first, he appeals to an apostolical tradition, which had come down to him through a series of hands, as well as to *the words of our Saviour*, according to which men must determine every thing. By tradition he probably means an *Esoteric* tradition, which he, *being self-deceived*, doubtless deduced from some pretended disciple of the apostles; and as to the words of our Saviour, he could easily bring them into accordance with his own system by the *Gnostic exegesis.* In regard to the second point, we may well conceive that he has represented his principles under the mildest possible form, in order to obtain acceptance for them with one who was uninitiated; but still we find in his conclusions nothing which contradicts the Valentinian principles. He combats two opposite errors, the error of those who held that the creation of the world, and the Old Testament, were the work of an evil Being, and the error of those who attributed them to the Supreme God; in *his* opinion, the one party was in error, because it knew *only* the Demiurgos, and not *the Universal Father*, whom Christ, who alone knew him, had been the first to reveal: the other, because it knew nothing of an intermediate Being, like the Demiurgos. Ptolemæus, also, would probably say,—the first view is that of men, who remain Jews even in Christianity; the other that of men, who, without any intermediate state of transition from the service of Matter and Satan, in heathenism, had attained at once to the recognition and knowledge of the Supreme God; and who believed, because they had made this sudden spring in their religion and knowledge, that a similar sudden transition took place in nature. "How can a law," he justly inquires, "which forbids all evil, proceed from an evil Being, who wars against all morality?" And he adds, "They who do

[1] Epiphan. Hæres. xxxiii. §. 3.

not recognize the providence of the Creator in the world, must be blind not only in the eyes of the soul, but even in those of the body."

He throws the Mosaic religious code into a threefold division:—

1. That which proceeds from the Demiurgos;

2. That which Moses settled after the dictates of his own unassisted reason [1];

3. The oldest additions to the Mosaic law [2].

The Saviour clearly distinguishes the law of Moses from the law of God (*i. e.* of the Demiurgos) in Matt. xix. 6, &c. He, however, exculpates Moses again, and seeks to shew, that he gave way to the weakness of the people only *when forced*, in order to avoid a greater evil. That which proceeded from the Demiurgos he divided again into a threefold division;

1. The purely moral enactments, disturbed by nothing extraneous, which are properly called "The Law," in reference to which, our Saviour says that he is not come to destroy the Law, but to fulfil it; for as it contained nothing alien to the nature of the Saviour, it required only fulfilment; as, for instance, the commandments, *Thou shalt do no murder,—Thou shalt not commit adultery,*—were fulfilled in the commands *neither to be angry, nor to lust.*

2. The Law, disturbed by the intermixture of evil, as that part, which permits of revenge, Levit. xxiv. 20. xx. 9. "He who recompences evil for evil, does no less evil, because he repeats the same conduct, but in a different order."

The Gnostic has here only one measure for all cases; he could not discover the distinction of the politico-juridical from the purely moral, nor the necessary connection between the two, from the very nature of the economy of the Old Testament. And yet he recognizes here, as well as in Moses, an element of instruction. "This command," says he, "was, and remains still, in other respects a *just one*, given on account of the weakness of those who receive the Law, though it transgresses *the pure*

[1] This distinction of different agents (factors) who worked together in the composition of the Holy Scriptures, is quite conformable to the Valentinian notion of Inspiration.

[2] According to the theory of the Clementine, viz. that when the Law was written down from the oral tradition of it, many foreign additions were mingled with the oldest part of it.

Law; but it is foreign to the nature and goodness of the Father of all, perhaps not consonant to the nature even of the Demiurgos[1], but probably only forced upon him; for while *he* who *forbade one murder*, commanded a second, he suffered himself to be surprised *by necessity*, without being aware of it." He means to say, that the Demiurgos was wanting, not in the will, but in the power, to overcome evil; and this part of the Law is entirely abolished by the Saviour, as contrary to the nature of the Supreme God.

3. The typical ceremonial Law, which (see above) contains the type of the higher spiritual things, the Law of Sacrifices, of Circumcision, of the Sabbath, of the Passover, and of Fasts. "All this, which was merely type and symbol, was changed after the truth had appeared. The sensuous and outward observance is removed, but it is transferred to the spiritual: the names remain the same, but the things are changed. For the Saviour has commanded us also to offer sacrifices; but not sacrifices by means of irrational animals, nor such incense, but through spiritual praise and thanksgiving, and through charity, and doing good to our neighbour. He wills also, that we should be circumcised; not, however, by the circumcision of the foreskin of the body, but the spiritual circumcision of the heart. He wills also, that we should observe the Sabbath, because he wishes us to rest from doing evil. Also, that we should fast; but not with a bodily fast, but a spiritual, in which abstinence from all evil consists. Our people, however, do observe the external fast, because it may be of some service even to the soul, if reasonably used, and neither used in imitation of any one, nor out of habit, nor on some particular day, as if some one day were appointed for that purpose,—but where it is used also with remembrance of the *real* fast, that those who are unable to keep that fast, may be reminded of it by outward fasting." And yet what true insight into the spirit of the system of religion proposed in the New Testament; what thoughtfulness and mildness of judgment does he show here!

Marcus and Bardesanes[2] are distinguished persons among

[1] I have translated after an emendation of the text, l. c. c. 3. which I consider necessary: *ἴσως οὐδὲ τουτῳ*, or *τῃ τουτου καταλληλον*.

[2] We can only mention Secundus in a cursory manner; for the only thing worth remarking about him is his modification of the ideas of Valentinus, by which he made a distinction in the first *ogdoad* between a *τετρας δεξια* and a *τετρας ἀριστερα*, naming the first, *light*, and the second, *darkness:* this is remarkable, because it

those who are called the disciples of Valentinus; we say, "*who are called the disciples*," because it would probably be more correct to state that both of them drew from the same sources in Syria, the native land of Gnosticism, which Valentinus had used. Marcus apparently came from Palestine in the latter half of the second century. His coming from Palestine appears probable, from the aramaic liturgical formulæ, of which he made use. While in an Heracleon and a Ptolemæus the Alexandrian *style of knowledge and learning* formed rather the characteristic of their theosophy, so on the contrary, in Marcus the *poetic* and *symbolic* was the prevailing character. He brought forward his doctrines in a *poem*, in which he introduced the Æons speaking in liturgical formulæ, and in imposing symbols of worship. (We shall hereafter introduce specimens of these latter.) After the Jewish cabalistic method, he hunted after mysteries in the number and the position of letters. The idea of a λογος του ὀντος, of a word as the revelation of the hidden Divine Being in creation, was spun out by him with the greatest subtilty; he made the whole creation a progressive expression of the inexpressible. As the divine seeds of life, which lie enclosed in the Æons, continually unfold themselves wider and individualize themselves, this represents, that these *names* of the unnameable being divide themselves into their separate sounds. An echo of the Pleroma falls down into the ὑλη, and becomes the formative principle of a new inferior creation [3].

shows that, like most mystics, in the pride of his speculation he placed *the original foundation of evil* in God, while he elevated God above the opposition of good and evil, but supposed that the seed of the division took its rise when the development of life began to proceed from God. Irenæus, l. i. c. 11, § 2. A similar view is found with those magi among the Parses, who taught, after Scharistani, that "Yezdan cogitasse secum; nisi fuerint mihi controversiæ, quomodo erit? Hancque cogitationem pravam, naturæ lucis minus analogam, produxisse tenebras, dictas Ahriman." (Hyde, Hist. Relig. Vet. Pers. p. 295.)

[1] Το ἀῤῥητον ῥητον γενηθηναι. [2] The σπερματα πνευματικα.

[3] In general, it is a peculiarly *Gnostic* idea, to conceive that the hidden Divinity *expressed himself aloud* till it was re-echoed, and *died away*, and then again that the *echo* fashioned itself into *a clear* note [*or tone*, TON] and into a *clear word*, for the revelation of the Divinity; and this idea they could apply under a variety of different relations. Thus Heracleon says. The Saviour is the *Word*, as the revelation of the Divinity, all the body of prophecy, which predicted him, without being justly aware of the idea of the Messiah, in its spiritual sense was only one note [ton], which preceded the revealing word: John the Baptist, standing in the middle between the economy of the Old and of the New Testament, is the *voice* [or *tone*, *stimme*], which is akin to the word, as the word expresses thoughts, with a con-

The second of these, Bardesanes, who is still less to be reckoned as a proper disciple of Valentinus, lived at Edessa in Mesopotamia, as we learn from his name, "the son of Daisan," derived from a river of this name in the town of Edessa: he made himself known by his extensive learning; many among the older writings give notices of changes in the system of Bardesanes. According to the account of Eusebius, he was at first devoted to the system of Valentinus; but when he had seen, after accurate inquiry, how untenable much of it was, he went over to the orthodox Church; and yet at the same time retained much of his old doctrines, so that he became the founder of a peculiar sect. According to Epiphanius he went over from the orthodox Church to the Valentinians. But Ephraim Syrus, the learned Syrian writer, in the fourth century, who lived in the land of Bardesanes, and wrote in his language, and who had read his writings, gives us absolutely no notice whatever of these changes in the doctrinal notions of Bardesanes, and it is easy enough to explain how those false reports arose. Bardesanes, when he spoke publicly in the Church, like the rest of the Gnostics (see above), made the *prevailing* doctrinal notions his starting point: he let himself down after his own fashion to the capacities of the *psychici*. On many simgle points he really coincided with those notions more than other Gnostics, and he might also, from sincere conviction, unite against many other Gnostic sects, at that time prevailing in Syria, as against those who denied the connexion between the Old and the New Testament, or those who derived the visible world from an *evil* being, or those who held the doctrine of fate to the prejudice of moral freedom; just as the Gnostic Ptolemæus (see above) notwithstanding his Gnosticism, had also written against such people.

It was in entire accordance with the Valentinian system, that Bardesanes acknowledged something in the nature of man, incomprehensible to itself, and elevated above the whole world,

sciousness of their meaning. The *voice* [stimme, voice, note, or tune] becomes a *word*, when John becomes the disciple of Christ, and the note [or sound, *ton*] becomes a *voice* [*stimme*] when the prophets of the Demiurgos, together with the Demiurgos himself, arrive at a consciousness of the higher world-system, which the Messiah reveals, and serve that system knowingly and willingly. Origen, t. vi. Joh. § 12. Ὁ λογος μεν ὁ Σωτηρ ἐστιν, φωνη δε ἡ ἐν τῃ ἐρημῳ πασα προφητικη ταξις, την φωνην οἰκειοτεραν οὐσαν τῳ λογῳ λογον γενεσθαι. τῳ ἠχῳ φησιν ἐσεσθαι την εἰς φωνην μεταβολην, μαθητου μεν χωραν διδους τῃ μεταβαλλουσῃ εἰς λογον φωνῃ ἡ (it ought rather to be την) δουλου δε τῃ ἀπο ἠχου εἰς φωνην.

in which the temporal consciousness of man developes itself; the human soul being a seed shed abroad from out of the Pleroma; its essence and its powers, which are derived from higher regions, remain, therefore, hidden even from itself, until it shall have arrived at a full consciousness and use of them in the Pleroma[1]. *This*, however, according to *the Gnostic system*, could only be true about the *spiritual natures;* but according to that system he must have ascribed to the *psychici* also, *a moral freedom, elevated above the power of the influences of nature, or the power of the* ὑλη. He, therefore, although like many of those inclined to Gnosticism, he busied himself with astrology, contended against the doctrine of such an influence of the stars (an εἱμαρμενη) as should be supposed to settle the life and affairs of man *by necessity*. Eusebius in his great literary treasure-house, the προπαρασκευη εὐαγγελικη, has preserved a large fragment of this remarkable work; he here introduces among other things the Christians dispersed over so many countries[2], as an example of the absurdity of supposing that the stars irresistibly influence the character of a people. "*Where they are*," he says of the Christians, "they are neither overcome by abominable laws and customs, nor does their nativity, deduced from their prevailing stars, compel them to practise the wickedness which is forbidden by their Lord. But they are subject to sickness, to poverty, to pain, and to that which is accounted shame by men. For as our freeman does not suffer himself to be compelled to slavery, and if he is compelled resists those who compel him, so on the other hand, the man who appears to us a slave[3], does not easily escape from subjection. For, if every thing was in our own power, we should be το παν (the universe), as, if we were not able to do anything, we should be the *mere instruments of others*, and not of ourselves. But when God helps, every thing is possible, and no obstacle can exist, because nothing can resist his will. And even if anything does appear to oppose him, it then happens so because he is the *Good, and suffers every nature to retain its peculiarities and its free will*[4]." In accordance with his system he searched for traces of

[1] See Ephraem. Syr. Opp. Sys. Lat. t. ii. p. 553—5.

[2] See Part i. p. 74. (Euseb. Præp. Evang. b. vi. c. 10.)

[3] ["Unser Erscheinungsmensch als ein dienstbarer," &c. The original is thus: Ὡσπερ γαρ ὁ ἐλευθερος ἡμων ἀνθρωπος δουλευειν οὐκ ἀναγκαζεται, κἀν ἀναγκασθη ἀνθισταται τοις ἀναγκαζουσιν, οὑτως οὐδε ὁ φαινομενος ἡμων δουλος ἀνθρωπος της ὑποταγης ἐκφευγειν ῥᾳδιως δυναται. H. R.]

[4] [The passage which Neander has here selected is so limited that it does not give

truth among all nations, and he remarked in the East Indies a class of sages (the Brahmins, Sanialis) who lived a rigid ascetic life, and amidst idolaters preserved themselves free from idolatry, and worshipped only the one God.

2. *The Gnostic sects, which denied the connection between the Old and New Testaments, and between the visible and the invisible worlds.*

(a.) *The Ophites.*

As Cerinthus formed the most natural point of transition from the *Judaising* sects to the *Gnostics*,—so the *Ophites* make the most natural point of transition from the Valentinians to this second class of Gnostics; for it is here shown how the same ideas, by a slightly different turn, may lead to entirely different propositions.

In the system of *this sect*, as well as in that of the Valentinians, the notion of a soul of the world prevailed, of a weak reflection of light from the Pleroma, which falling down into matter, animated the dead mass, and yet was itself affected by matter also; this soul of the world, the source of all spiritual life, which attracts again to itself all which has once flowed from it, this Pantheistic doctrine, of which the seed had already been sown in the Valentinian system, in the Ophitic scheme only comes forward in greater prominence, as the essential doctrines of Christianity are driven further into the back ground; and even in this respect again, different modifications appear to have found place in different branches of the Ophitic sects. The *same fundamental principle might, at the same time*, be conceived and applied in different modes, just according as the *Christian*, the *purely oriental and theosophic*, or *the Jewish* element happened to predominate in each case.

The *Ophitic* system represented the origin of the Demiurgos, who is here called *Jaldabaoth*, exactly in the same way as the Valentinian; and even in the doctrine of his relation to the

an adequate view of the meaning of Bardesanes. The argument of Bardesanes appears to be of this kind: Some things are *αὐτεξουσια*, and these things are changed sometimes in nations, others are not. The things that are in our own power are not bound down in stern laws of necessity by climate. Such things may be instanced, as circumcision and keeping of the Sabbath; these the Jews celebrate every where. H. R.]

higher order of the world, the point of transition (*i. e.* from one system to another) may be easily recognized. The Valentinian Demiurgos is a limited Being, who imagines, in his finite faculties, that he acts independently. The higher order of the world is a thing altogether strange to him; he serves it without being conscious of it. In the phenomena which proceeded from it, he was at first entirely at a loss, he was surprised; but this is not the fault of a wicked disposition in him, only of his ignorance. At length he is attracted by the Divine nature, and out of a condition of unconsciousness, attains at length to a state of consciousness, and he now serves the higher order of the world with delight. According to the Ophitic scheme, on the contrary, he is a being not merely finite, but entirely at enmity with the higher order of the world, and obstinate in his hatred of it. Whatever of higher light he derived, in virtue of his descent from the Sophia, he only misused, that he might set himself up against the higher world, and make himself an independent Lord. Thence came the desire of the Sophia to detach him from the spiritual being which had accrued to him, and to draw this latter again to herself, in order that Jaldabaoth, with his whole creation, deprived of all reasonable being, might be destroyed. On the contrary, according to the Valentinian scheme, the Demiurgos forms, for all eternity, a subordinate grade of rational and moral existence; subordinate indeed, but required for the harmonious development of the whole. And yet, here again, *kindred ideas* are found in the two systems, in the circumstance that the Demiurgos is obliged, without knowing it or wishing it, to serve the Sophia, and to bring to pass the fulfilment of her intentions, and in the end, even *his own fall and annihilation*. This, however, is here no distinction for the Demiurgos, as in the Valentinian system; but in this very circumstance he is placed exactly on the same footing with the Absolute Evil (the evil principle itself). It flows not from the excellence of his nature, but from the omnipotence of the higher system of the world. Even the Evil Spirit, the *serpent-spirit*, ὀφιομορφος, whose existence arose from the circumstance that Jaldabaoth, full of hatred and envy against man, looked down into the ὑλη, and formed a reflection and image of himself there, even this being was obliged, against his will, to become only an instrument for the accomplishment of her designs. The doctrine of the origin and of the destination of man, in this system, has, however, much

in common with the Valentinian, but at the same time, also, much which belongs to another branch of the Gnostic systems.

In order to establish himself as an independent Creator and Lord, and to hold in subjection the six angels[1] begotten by him, and to distract them, so that they should not look up to and observe the higher Light of the world, Jaldabaoth required his six angels to create man, as their common form, that such a work might set the stamp upon their independent Divine power[2]. They now create man, who is, however, as their likeness, a monstrous mass of matter, but without a soul; he crawls upon the earth, and is unable to hold himself upright. They bring, therefore, this helpless being, man, to their father, that he may bestow upon him a soul. Jaldabaoth communicated to him a living spirit[3]; and by that means the spiritual seed proceeded, without his being aware of it, from out of his being into the nature of man, whereby he himself became deprived of this higher principle of life: the Sophia had so decreed it. In man (*i. e.* in those men who have received any portion of the spiritual seed), the light, the soul, the reason of the whole creation, concentres itself. Jaldabaoth is now seized with surprise and anger, because he sees a being, created by himself, and dwelling within the limits of his dominion, on the point of raising himself above him and his kingdom. Thence arose his endeavour, not to allow him to come to a consciousness of his higher nature, and of the higher world to which he is allied in virtue of that nature, and to keep him in a state of dull unconsciousness, and thereby of slavish servitude. It was from the jealousy of Jaldabaoth, who was thus limited, that there proceeded that command to the first man; but the soul of the world made use of the *serpent-spirit* (of the ὀφιομορφος) as an instrument, in order to frustrate the design of Jaldabaoth, while through it she enticed the first man to disobedience. According to another view, the *serpent* was itself a symbol, or a veiled appearance of the soul of the world[4]; and those Ophites who held this doctrine are the persons, who, pro-

[1] It must be observed, that according to the Ophitic system, Jaldabaoth and his six angels are the spirits of the seven stars,—the sun, the moon, Mars, Venus, Jupiter, Mercury, and Saturn: the same from which, in the books of the Zabians, and in many systems of Jewish Theosophists, a variety of delusions and seductions of mankind have proceeded.

[2] Thus they explain the words of Genesis i. 26.

[3] This they thought they found in Genesis ii. 7.

[4] The serpent, an image of the Ζωογονος σοφια; the form of the intestines wind-

perly, bear the name of *Ophites*, because they worshipped the serpent as an holy symbol, to which a kindred notion of the Egyptian religion might have led them, because in that the serpent is considered as the symbol of Kneph, or the ἀγαθοδαιμων, which was similar to the σοφια of the Ophites. At all events it was the soul of the world, by which, either mediately or immediately, the eyes of the first man were opened.

The fall by sin (which gives us a characteristic trait in the Ophitic system) was the point of transition from a condition of unconscious restriction to a condition of conscious knowledge. Man, become a being of knowledge, now renounces his allegiance to Jaldabaoth, who, being irritated at his disobedience, pushes him out of the ethereal region, where he had hitherto existed in an ethereal body, down into the dark earth, and banishes him into a dark body. Man finds himself now in such a condition, that on the one hand the seven star-spirits attempt to keep him in imprisonment, and to overwhelm the higher principle of consciousness within him,—while, on the other, the *evil* spirits of a purely material nature, endeavour to seduce him to sin and to idolatry, in order that he may become liable to the punishments of the severe Jaldabaoth. But yet the Sophia constantly strengthens anew the men who were of kindred nature with herself, by new communications of that higher spiritual nature; and she was able, during all the destructions and storms, to preserve a race of people belonging to herself from the time of Seth, whom all Gnostics look upon as the representative of the πνευματικοι, the men of a contemplative character, in which race she preserves the seed of the spiritual nature.

The doctrines of the Ophites corresponded with those of Basilides and the Valentinians, as to the relation of the *psychical Christ*, or Jesus, to the *Christ* of the *world* of Æons, who united himself to the former at his baptism. This only is peculiar to them (the Ophites), that while the higher Christ descended through the seven heavens of the seven angels, or traversed the seven stars, in order to arrive at the earth, he appeared in each heaven, in a form akin to that heaven, as an angel allied to it, and that he concealed from them his higher nature, and attract-

ing itself represents the image of a serpent, a symbol of that wisdom of nature, that soul of the world, which winds itself concealed through all the grades of life found in nature. Theodoret. hæret. fab. vol. i. 14. One sees how far more the pantheistic principle here shines through these notions.

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ing to himself all which they still possessed of the spiritual seed, he thus weakened their power. But now, when Jaldabaoth, the God of the Jews, saw his expectations frustrated by his Messiah, and when this Messiah did not further his kingdom as he had wished and expected him to do, but announced the unknown father as the instrument of the higher Christ, and destroyed the law of Jaldabaoth, or rather Judaism, Jaldabaoth then brought about his crucifixion. Jesus remained eighteen months on earth after his resurrection, obtained through the inspiration of the Sophia a clear knowledge of the higher truth, and then communicated it only to a few of his disciples, whom he knew competent to receive such mysteries. Jesus is now raised by the heavenly Christ into heaven, and sits at the right hand of Jaldabaoth, without the latter being conscious of it, in order that he may attract to himself, and receive into himself, all the spiritual substance, which is set free and purified by the operation of redemption among mankind, as soon as that substance has been detached from its covering of flesh. The more Jesus, by this drawing to himself all that is akin to him, is enriched in his own spiritual nature, so much the more is Jaldabaoth denuded of all higher qualities. The object of all this is to set free all the spiritual life which is held captive in nature, and to re-conduct it to its original source,—to the soul of the world from which all proceeded: Jesus is the channel through which this happens. The *stars* also must at last be deprived of all being gifted with reason which is found in them.

In this family of Gnostics there were some who maintained even a more consistent pantheism, and supposed that *the same soul* was extended throughout the whole of nature, *animate* and *inanimate*, and that, in consequence, all the life which was scattered abroad and held in imprisonment by the bonds of matter in the limited state of individual existence, would at last be attracted by the original source, the soul of the world, the Sophia, from which it had flowed forth, and thus flow back again into it through this channel. Such persons would say, when we use the objects of nature to our sustenance, we draw to ourselves seed which are scattered over them, and we raise them with us to the original source of all things [1]. Therefore, in an *apocryphal* gospel of this sect, the soul of the world, or the supreme Being himself,

[1] Epiphan. hæres. 26. c. 9.

spoke to the initiated thus: "Thou art I, and I am thou; and where thou art, there am I, and I am spread over every thing. Where thou wilt thou canst collect me, and where thou collectest me, there thou collectest thyself." (Chap. iii.)

Pantheism, and the intermixture of the natural and the Divine which flowed from it, by their very nature could not be very exacting in a moral point of view, although in *those men* who had embraced Pantheism, their *previously-existing* moral sentiments might communicate even to the system itself a moral spirit which was foreign to its own nature. Pantheism, and a wild enthusiastic spirit of defiance towards Jaldabaoth, and his pretended restrictive statutes, appear in fact to have misled a part of these Ophites into the most unnatural excesses [1].

It is of great importance towards the history of the Gnostic sects to inquire, although the inquiry be difficult of solution, whether these Ophites sprouted forth from a religious sect, which originally had no connexion at all with Christianity, and whether, on that account, as a part of this sect had already appropriated to itself much which was Christian, a party existed also of those Ophites, who were quite out of the pale of Christianity, and who rather set themselves in hostility to it? The *latter* appears to be attested by an account given by Origen, who says, that the Ophites were *no Christians*, and that they suffered no one who did not curse Christ to enter into their assemblies. He names a certain Euphrates, who may have lived before the birth of Christ, as the founder of their sect [2]. The *Ophitic pantheism* may very

[1] As the accounts of Epiphanius in this matter agree with those of Clement of Alexandria, a person more worthy of credit, and of Porphyry, about similar Gnostic sects, and as they bear an entirely characteristic stamp upon them, we are by no means justified in calling their *correctness* into question. Nor can the fact alleged here be considered a thing to astonish us at all; similar excesses, arising from a pantheistic mysticism, have been often found, not only in the east, but in the west also, as the history of the sects of the middle ages and of modern times will prove. The latest examples may be found in De Potter's Vie de Ricci. v. i.

The instances are too well-known to readers of any general information to require specification. No references will, therefore, be given. It is enough to state the fact as illustrating a mental and spiritual phenomenon, but it is unfit to dwell upon.

[Other instances might be found in modern days where what was originally, perhaps, only a highly-wrought speculative doctrine, became subject to this dreadful perversion. They could easily be cited, but it is needless, and perhaps improper, as it might lead to enquiry on a subject, which could end only in disgust. It is enough to state the fact as a mental phenomenon, and to leave any specification till the assertion is called in question. H. R.]

[2] Origen c. Cels. lib. vi. c. 28, &c. The obscure and uncritical Philaster, who sets the Ophites at the head of the anti-Christian sects, cannot be valid as an authority.

probably have been borrowed from an older Oriental system of religion, and have been set in opposition to Christianity only by some, while it may have been clothed in a *Christian* garb by the others. The remarkable likeness between the *Ophitic* system, those of the *Sabians*, and the *Manicheans* may indicate an older and a common source in an anti-Christian Gnosis. But, on the other hand, it cannot be denied, that the Ophitic formulæ of adjuration, which Origen quotes immediately after this declaration, plainly contain allusions to Christian notions. And it may still be the case, that although the Ophitic sect appeared from the very first as a Christian sect, yet the contrast to the nature of Christianity which lay in its peculiar constitution also constantly became outwardly more prominent; and that, as the contrast between the Demiurgos and the Supreme God was so strongly brought forward by them, so also, in consequence of the distinction between the *psychical* and the *pneumatical* Christ, there arose at last in some portion of the Ophites, a hostile opposition to the former[1] (the *psychical*); so that, to curse the finite Messiah of the psychici, became in the end a token to show that men were disciples of the higher Christ. Something similar is found in the sect of the *Sabians*, who referred *much* which they took out of the history of Christ *to a heavenly genius, the angel of life*, Mando di Chaje, whom they worshipped as the proper Christ, from whom *the true baptism* proceeded, while they referred *the rest* to the anti-Christ Jesus, (who had counterfeited the baptism of John), who was sent by the star-spirits for the seduction of mankind.

(b.) *Pseudo-basilidians.*

As we see in the Ophitic system how entirely different a direction the principles allied to the Valentinian system may receive by a slightly different modification and application, so we find a similar circumstance in the relations borne by a *variety of the Basilidian scheme*, the doctrines of which are often confused with those of *the genuine Basilidians*. The calm and moderate spirit of the Basilidian system[2] was here entirely extinguished, and the

[1] I am indebted for this observation to the profound critique on my work about the Gnostics, written by Dr. Gieseler.

[2] Were it not that Clement of Alexandria spoke of practical errors in pretended followers of Basilides, similar to those found in this sect, we might be led to suspect that those whom Irenæus calls Basilidians had nothing whatever to do with Basilides.

direct opposition to the Demiurgos and the Antinomianism, which was connected with it, degenerated here into a wild dreaminess that made light of all that is most holy. According to their theory, the redeeming Spirit[1] could enter into no connexion with the detested dominions of the Demiurgos, and he took upon himself only the semblance of a corporeal form. When the Jews were minded to crucify him, he, as a highly-gifted Spirit, knowing how to clothe himself in every kind of corporeal appearance, and to cast every sort of illusion before the eyes of the gross-minded multitude, caused Simon of Cyrene (Mark xv.) to appear to the Jews in *his likeness;* he himself took the form of this Simon, and raised himself up unencumbered into the invisible world, making a mockery of the deluded Jews. To these men the doctrine of the Cross was foolishness; and in the conceit of their theosophic pride, they mocked those who confessed it as the confessors of a mere illusory phantom. "Such men," they would say, "are no Jews; neither are they Christians." They despised the martyrs as men who gave up their life merely to confess in the name of a phantom. "Those who are initiated into the true mysteries know well, that only one out of thousands can understand them: as your νους was able to make himself invisible to all men, so could they[2] also, like this your νους, hide themselves in all kinds of phantoms, and pretend to take a part in every thing, in order to deceive the gross multitude, and to withdraw from their persecutions[3]."

(c.) *Sethites and Cainites.*

The example of the *Sethites* and *Cainites*, who most probably are derived from the same source as the Ophites, teaches us how the same Gnostic principles, by being differently applied, may produce an opposite kind of Gnosis. The *first* of these two sects maintained, that from the beginning *two* human pairs were created, the one by the angels of darkness, from which the race of

[1] The νους. See above, on the system of Basilides.

[2] This art of becoming invisible is among the Cabbalistic arts also. A very remarkable instance of this fancy is to be found in Maimonides' history of his own life; and there are generally many interesting echoes of Gnosticism to be found in the later Jewish sects, which *Beer* has delineated in his instructive history of the Jewish sects. (Brünn, 1822.)

[3] Irenæus i. 24.

χοικοι or ὑλικοι arose, the other, by the angels of the Demiurgos, from which the race of ψυχικοι was derived; that Cain sprung from the first, Abel from the second; and, the two opposite natures contending together, that the weaker psychical nature was overborne; but that then *Sophia* allowed Seth to be born in his stead, in whom (viz. Seth) she had implanted the higher spiritual seed, by which he was rendered capable of overcoming the hylic principle. From Seth the πνευματικοι derived their origin; but, the opposing powers now seeking constantly to defile the propagation of this spiritual race by the intermixture of ungodly natures, *Sophia*, on this account, produced the deluge, in order again to purify the degenerated race; but her adversaries contrived to suffer a *Ham* to insinuate himself among those who were saved out of the mass of mankind that was destroyed, and by him their dominion was again to be set up and extended. Thence came new mixtures and disorders, and again *Sophia* had to endeavour to produce new purifications: Seth appeared at last in the person of the Messiah [1].

The *Cainites*, on the contrary, were abominable Antinomians; they went to such a length in their hatred to the Demiurgos and to the Old Testament, that they made all those whom they found represented in the latter (the Old Testament) in the worst colours, their Coryphæi, as being sons of *Sophia* and enemies of the Demiurgos; and hence they claimed Cain for their party. It was these persons who, while they considered the rest of the Apostles as narrow-minded men, ascribed the higher Gnosis to Judas Iscariot, who effected the death of Jesus, because he knew, in virtue of his superior illumination, that the destruction of the dominion of the Demiurgos would by this means be brought about.

(d.) *Saturninus.*

We recognize a peculiar branch of the Gnostic systems in the doctrines of Saturninus, who lived at Antioch in the reign of Hadrian; but we have, it must be confessed, in both the principal sources of information [2], too imperfect data, to be able to recognize this system in its whole connexion. (We pass over without mention whatever he has in common with the Gnostics,

[1] See above the representation of the doctrines of the Clementine.
[2] Epiphanius and Irenæus.

whom we have already described, as to the emanation-doctrines, and as to those of dualism.)

In the lowest grade of the emanation-world, on the very borders between the domain of light and the region of darkness, or of (Hyle) ὑλη, stood the seven lowest angels, those star-spirits; they unite together in order to win from the region of darkness a land on which they may carry on an independent kingdom. Thus arose our world, the earth, into different parts of which these star-spirits apportioned themselves, the God of the Jews being *at their head:* they carry on a constant war against the reign of darkness and Satan its prince, who will not suffer their dominion to be extended at the expense of *his*, and who constantly attempts to destroy that which they construct. Only a faint gleam from the higher regions of light shone down upon them here. This gleam of light filled them with desire of it, and they wished to possess themselves of it, but were too weak to do so: it constantly recedes again, just as they desire to lay hold of it. They unite, therefore, in order to drive these higher beams of light into their dominion by means of a form cast after the image of that form of light which played before them. But the form of the angel is unable to raise himself into heaven; he cannot stand upright[1]; he is a lump of matter without a soul. The supreme Father, from the kingdom of light, at last takes compassion on man, being thus helpless, although made in *his* likeness; he communicates a spark of his own divine nature to him, and man, now for the first time, becomes a being endued with a soul, and can lift himself up to heaven. *In the human natures*, into which it is transplanted, this divine seed of life is to develope itself till it arrives at independence, and after a certain time to return to its original source. Those men who, bearing this Divine seed within them, are destined to reveal the Supreme God on earth, are constantly opposed to those who bear within them only the hylic principle, as being the instruments of the kingdom of darkness. The Supreme God, therefore,—in order to destroy both the kingdom of the star-spirits, of the God of the Jews, which endeavoured to render itself independent, and that of darkness also, and in order to set free those men who were akin to him (the Supreme God), by means of the Divine seed of life, from the imprisonment of the star-spirits, and to procure them a victory over the kingdom of darkness,—the Supreme God

[1] See above, in the history of the Ophites.

sent his Æon νους down; this Æon being unable to enter into union in any way with the kingdom of the stars, or with the material world, could hence only show himself in the phantom (or semblance) of a corporeal form. The doctrines of Saturninus led to a strict system of asceticism, and to the precept of celibacy, which was possibly, however, observed only in its strictness by those who were *peculiarly initiated* into the sect, and not by its ordinary members.

(e.) *Tatian, and the Eucratites.*

Tatian, of Assyria, lived in Rome as a rhetorician, and was there converted to Christianity by Justin Martyr, who had much in common with him, in virtue of the similar mental education he had undergone, as having formerly been a Platonist. As long as Justin lived he adhered to the doctrines of the Church. And even farther, after the death of Justin, he composed an apologetic writing[1] conceived in the same tone of thought, in which, however, there was much which might afterwards afford an opening for Gnosticism. Tatian in this writing, as his master Justin had done, received, after Philo, the Platonic doctrine about matter, in its whole extent, into his system, little calculated as that doctrine was to suit his system, as he at the same time maintained the notion of a creation out of nothing. This Platonic theory also prevailed upon him to maintain the notion of an undivine spirit of life, united with and akin to matter, a reason-counteracting soul; and hence he deduced evil spirits, whom he represents as πνευματα ὑλικα, little as this theory was in accordance with the Christian doctrine of the nature of the evil spirit, and of the origin of evil. Even in this writing he already maintained a proposition which was elsewhere transplanted by many of the first Christian Fathers from the Jewish theology; viz., that the souls of men, like every thing else, are formed out of matter, and are akin to it[2], and therefore, by their nature, mortal; that the first man, living in communion with God, had within himself a *principle of divine life*, of a more elevated nature than this soul, sprung from matter, and that this principle was properly the image of God[3], whereby he was immortal. By losing this through sin, he fell under the power of matter, and was subject to mortality.

[1] His Λογος προς Ἑλληνας.

[2] Α πνευμα ὑλικον.

[3] Θεου εἰκων και ὁμοιωσις.

It is easy to see how these opinions, which, according to Tatian's system, were not very consistent with each other, might serve as a means of introduction to the Gnostic ideas of the ὑλη, and of the difference between the ψυχικον and the πνευματικον; and a system of asceticism, which strove after a complete detachment from the things of sense [1], might be the result [2]. According to the account of Irenæus [3] he formed for himself a system of Æons, like that of the Valentinians; but this is not a sufficient ground to conclude with certainty that *his* system was connected with the Valentinian. According to Clement of Alexandria [4] he belonged to the class of anti-Jewish Gnostics; he referred the contrast made by St. Paul between the old and the new man to the relation between the Old and the New Testaments; but this also he might express according to the Valentinian Gnosis, which sets by no means an absolute opposition between the two systems of religion. A remark of Tatian, which has been preserved, appears to indicate, that he by no means so entirely detached the Demiurgos, the God of the Old Testament, from connexion with the higher world [5]. The words of Genesis, "Let there be light," he considered an instance, by the way, of his arbitrary mode of Scriptural interpretation; not as the words of a commandment given by the Creator, but as the words of prayer. The Demiurgos, sitting in dark chaos, prays that light may shine down from above. His wild, ascetic turn, however, may have arisen from the following circumstance, namely, that he made a more direct opposition between the creation of the Demiurgos and the higher world, and hence, also, between the Old and the New Testaments, than could find place according to the principles of the Valentinian school; for that practical opposition to the creation of the Demiurgos was usually founded in a theoretical one. Tatian wrote a book on Christian *perfection after the example of our Saviour* [6], in which he sets forth Christ as the *ideal* of a single

[1] [Entsinnlichung. H. R.]

[2] According to Irenæus, i. 28. he maintained *at first* the condemnation of the first man, which would harmonize well enough with the difference we have remarked between the ψυχικον and the πνευματικον in the nature of the first man, which latter [*i. e.* the πνευματικον] he lost by sin.

[3] Comp. Clem. Strom. iii. 465. C. [Sylb. p. 200. Pott. p. 553. Klotz. vol. ii. p. 265.]

[4] Stromat. lib. iii. 460. D. [Sylb. p. 197—8. Potter, p. 548. Klotz. vol. ii. p. 259.]

[5] Theodot. didascal. anatol. fol. 806. Origines de Oratione, c. 24.

[6] Περι του κατα τον σωτηρα καταρτισμου.

and abstinent life. If in this he kept simply to our canonical gospels, and used no apocryphal narratives[1], in which the picture of Christ had already been drawn after a theosophico-ascetic model, much must have met him here in such direct opposition, that it might have removed him from this mode of thinking. But we see by an example how Tatian was able, by means of his illogical mode of interpretation, to explain into an accordance with his opinions the passages of Scripture the most unfavourable to him, since he could find in the passage in 1 Cor. vii. 5, that St. Paul sets marriage and incontinency on the same footing, and calls them both a service of Satan[2]. As the disposition for such a theosophic asceticism was then, having arisen in the east, widely diffused, it cannot surprise us to find that there were different sects of such *continentes*[3], who had no immediate connexion with Tatian.

To these belonged Julius Cassianus, who considered Adam as the symbol of souls sunk down out of a heavenly condition into the world of bodies, and he, therefore, made it a chief point that man should detach himself from matter by a strict asceticism, and on that very account also would not allow any appearance of Christ in the world of bodies; he was, therefore, one of the *Docetæ*. He may probably have been an *Alexandrian Jew*; his peculiar opinions, his *doctrines* of the materialization[4] of souls and about

[1] We should know more of this matter, if the εὐαγγελιον δια τεσσαρων had been preserved. This writing appeared to the ancients to be a short harmony of the four Gospels, Euseb. iv. 29; but it is a question whether Tatian did not use, for that work, many apocryphal Gospels at least; as, according to the notice of Epiphanius, p. 26.—which is, however, very indefinite—this collection appears to have had some similarity to the εὐαγγελιον καθ' Ἑβραιους. Theodoret found more than two hundred copies of this writing in use in his *Syrian* diocese, and he found a necessity for sending them out of use, because, probably, he found much that was heretical in them. Theodoret. hæret. fab. i. 20. Tatian.

[2] St. Paul gives permission in that passage only apparently; he withdraws again instantly from that which he permits, by saying, that those who follow his permission serve two masters. By their mutual abstinence united with prayer they would serve God; by the opposite conduct they would serve immodesty, lust, and Satan. Strom. iii. p. 460. (See note to p. 109.) According to Eusebius iv. iv. 29, he was accused of having made many changes in St. Paul's expressions; but from the words of Eusebius, τινας αὐτον μεταφρασαι φωνας, ὡς ἐπιδιορθουμενον αὐτων την της φρασεως συνταξιν, we cannot see plainly whether they were changes in favour of his own doctrinal and ethical principles, or changes from Hebraistic expressions into purer Greek; and then one is led to inquire whether Tatian really allowed himself to use such licence as a critic (which may have been the case), or whether he had only different readings.

[3] Ἐγκρατιται, ἀποτακτικοι.

[4] Einkörperung; Lit. *Embodying, Incorporation*..

matter, and his docetism, which last theory Philo had already applied to the Theophaniæ (appearances of God) of the Old Testament[1], fitted on remarkably well to notions which had long been current among the Alexandrian Jews; and in his ἐξηγητικα[2] he endeavoured apparently to introduce these notions into the Old Testament by an allegorizing mode of interpretation, an example of which is to be found in his explanation of Gen. iii. 21, by applying it to the material bodies in which fallen souls are clothed.

Such also were the persons who, after a certain Severus, called themselves Severiani, of whom we know nothing more than that they rejected the epistles of St. Paul and the acts of the Apostles. The first of these circumstances might lead us to *suppose* that they were derived from the Jewish Christians; but this cannot be considered as a proof, because it is also possible that, instead of taking refuge in forced and arbitrary interpretations, in order to bring the authority of those writings into harmony with their own principles, they found it an easier plan to throw away those writings entirely and at once[3].

(*f.*) *Eclectic Antinomian Gnostics; Carpocrates and Epiphanes, Prodicians, Antitacti, Nicolaitans, Simonians.*

As, on the one hand, we observe a tendency of Gnosis to *a strict asceticism*, which opposes itself to Judaism as to a sensuous and carnal religion,—so we remark, on the other, that it has also a tendency to a wicked antinomianism, which, confusing Christian freedom and unbridled licence, set Christianity in opposition not only to the killing letter of a law, whose commands are outwardly, but to the very inward nature of the law itself, and which therefore contended against Judaism, and with Judaism also against all moral law, as a thing too limiting for the inward life, and as proceeding from the limited and limiting Demiurgos. This was a misunderstanding against which St. Paul had given warning, when he developed the doctrine of Christian freedom[4]. We recognise in this a pantheistic mysticism, which opposed

[1] See Philo on Exod. xxiv. 13. Opp. Ed. Mang. t. ii. p. 679. 656. de Abrahamo, 366. Ed. Francof.

[2] Clem. Strom. lib. i. 320. [Sylb. p. 138. Potter, p. 378. Klotz, vol. ii. p. 71.]

[3] Theodoret. hæret. fab. i. 21.

[4] Galat. v. 13. et alibi.

itself under various forms to the popular religions of the East, which had now mingled itself with the doctrines of the Greek philosophers at Alexandria, in consequence of the then intermixture of Oriental and western modes of thought, and which imagined that, in Christianity, as a common religion for all mankind, which destroyed the Jewish exclusiveness, and the old popular religions, it could find a point on which it might engraft itself. *Such an antinomian* GNOSIS is shown in the system of Carpocrates and his son Epiphanes. The first probably lived in the reign of the emperor Hadrian, at Alexandria, where, at that time, there was a religious eclecticism which had struck the emperor himself[1]. He laid out a system of religion, which was propagated and extended by his son Epiphanes, a young man, who, by the perverse turn of mind given to him by his father, had abused great talents, but who died in the seventeenth year of his age. As Clement of Alexandria says, Carpocrates had busied himself much with the Platonic philosophy, and had instructed his son in it. The Platonic notions of the pre-existence of souls of higher knowledge, as being the remembrance brought from a former existence in heaven, are prominent parts in this system; and the originators of this system seem to have appropriated to themselves much out of the Phædrus of Plato. They made their Gnosis to consist in the recognition of one supreme first existence[2], from which all being proceeds, and to which all being strives to return. The finite spirits, which had rule over the individual places of the earth, endeavoured to counteract this universal endeavour after unity; and from their influence, their laws, and their institutions, proceeded every thing which restrains, every thing which destroys and checks, the original and fundamental connection[3], which is found in nature, considered as the revelation of that Supreme Unity. These spirits endeavour to retain under their subjection those souls, which, having flowed from out of the Supreme Unity are akin to it, but have sunk down into the material world, and are imprisoned in the body, so as to compel them, after death, to enter into new bodies, and to

[1] See his Letter to the consul Servianus in Flavii Vopisci Vita Saturnini, c. ii. Illi, qui Serapin colunt, Christiani sunt et devoti sunt Serapi, qui se *Christi Episcopos* dicunt.

[2] Hence comes the phrase γνωσις μοναδικη, which occurs in Clement of Alexandria.

[3] [Gemeinschaft, communion, common nature.]

render them unable to raise themselves up in freedom to their original source. From these limiting spirits of the world proceed all popular religions. But those souls, which, by the remembrance they retain of their former higher condition, elevate themselves to the contemplation of that Supreme Unity, attain the true freedom and tranquillity, which nothing again can limit or destroy, and such souls raise themselves above the popular gods and popular religions. They considered a Pythagoras, a Plato, and an Aristotle, among the heathen, to belong to this class of men, and Jesus among the Jews. To him they ascribed only a peculiarly pure and powerful soul, by means of which, through reminiscences brought from his former existence, he raised himself up to the loftiest contemplation, freed himself from the limiting laws of the Jewish God, and destroyed the religion which had been established by that God, although he himself was brought up in it. By his union with the μονας he obtained Divine power, in virtue of which he was able to triumph over the spirits of the world, and the laws which they had imposed on nature, to perform miracles, and to endure suffering in undisturbed tranquillity. By this divine power he was afterwards enabled in freedom to raise himself up again to the Supreme Unity, beyond the power of the spirits of the world. Thus this sect put *no difference* between Christ and other sages of all nations; they taught that every other soul also which could elevate itself to the same height of contemplation, was to be put on the same level with Christ. This sect hardly deserved the name of a *Christian* sect, since they only appropriated to themselves some propositions, taken at their own will and pleasure, out of Christianity, and then connected them with other ideas totally foreign to them. They perverted, after their own Pantheistic mysticism, the assertions made by St. Paul of the nothingness of the merit of works, and about justification, not by works, but by faith; for under the name of faith they understood nothing but that mystical brooding over the absorption of the spirit into the original Unity. It needs only faith and love, they said; all outward things are indifferent; he who introduces a moral meaning into outward things, makes himself dependent upon them, and remains subject to the dominion of the spirits of the world, from whom all religious, moral, and political ordinances are derived, he cannot raise himself up after his death, out of the mere

circle of Metempsychosis. But he who gives himself up to all kinds of pleasure, without being affected by it, and so despises the laws of those spirits of the world, he raises himself up to *union* with the One *First Being*, with whom, being already united here below, he has made himself free from all that can limit his nature [1]. Epiphanes wrote a book on righteousness, wherein he carries out the principle, that universal nature reveals a struggle after unity and communion; and that the laws of men, which are against this law of nature, but which are unable to conquer the desires planted by the Creator himself in the heart of man, first produced sin. Thus did he pervert what St. Paul had said of the insufficiency of the law to make man holy, and of its object, viz. to call forth the consciousness of guilt, in order that, with profligate pride, he might despise the ten commandments. These sects used to traffic much in magical arts, which they deduced from the power of their union with the First One, who is victorious over all the world-spirits; they worshipped an image of Christ, which was said to have come from Pilate, together with the images of heathen philosophers, who, like Christ, had raised themselves above the popular religion; and they worshipped it with heathen ceremonies, which latter certainly were not in accordance with the system of Carpocrates and Epiphanes, but proceeded from the superstition of their followers. At Same, the chief town of the island of Cephalonia, in the Ionian sea, from which the maternal ancestors of Epiphanes were sprung, this young man is supposed to have made so great an impression on the multitude, that they erected a temple, a museum, and altars to him, and offered him *Divine worship*. As Clement of Alexandria [2], a writer by no means of great credulity, relates this circumstance, which appears by no means incredible, if we take into account the circumstances of those times, we have no reason to doubt the fact. But perhaps it was only some members of this sect, which might have found peculiar success on the island, who offered this honour to him, as one of the greatest sages [3].

[1] Iren. i. 25.

[2] Strom. iii. 428. [Sylb. p. 183—4. Potter, p. 511. Klotz, vol. ii. p. 214—15.]

[3] The spirit of these antinomian, eclectic Gnostics, who arbitrarily jumbled together all religions, and all systems of philosophy, in which they could find a point whereon to fix their own system, as they might do in separate tenets detached from that with which they are connected, is shown in a marked manner in *two inscriptions* which were found very lately in the territory of Cyrene, and which prove the propaga-

To these unbridled *Antinomians* belongs the sect of the Antitacti (whose fundamental principle it was to set themselves in opposition to the Demiurgos, or the God of the Jews, who had sown evil, imperfection, and weeds, among the works of the Father of good [1],) and the Prodicians, the followers of a certain Prodicus. These last maintained that they, as sons of the Supreme God, and as the royal race, were bound to no law, because for the king there was no written law; and hence they were lords of the Sabbath, lords over all ordinances. They apparently placed the worship of God only in the inward contemplation of the Divine nature; they rejected prayer, and probably all external worship, as fit only for puny spirits, who were still under the dominion of the Demiurgos; and they appealed to apocryphal writings that went under the name of *Zoroaster* [2].

tion of this sect to have lasted till the sixth century. They were published and explained by Gesenius in his Christmas thesis, 1825 [in dem Weihnachtsprogramm).

The first of them, in which the sect conceals itself under general expressions, which may, however, be taken in an innocent sense, ascribes the following words to Simon of Cyrene, whom the pseudo-Basilidians, who had the same sentiments, made a subject of their fictions: Θωθ (Hermes Trismegistus, under whose name there exist spurious writings containing much Gnosticism), Κρονος, Ζωροαστρης, Πυθαγορας, Επικουρος, Μασδακης. (Masdek, the founder of a Persian sect in the time of the Emperor Justinian, who appears, like Prodicus, to have drawn from Apocryphal writings that went under Zoroaster's name. See Gesenius, l. c. p. 17.) Ἰωαννης, Χριστος τε και οἱ ἡμετεροι Κουραναικοι καθηγηται (with which last Clement l. c. p. 722, also classes Prodicus) συμφωνως ἐντελλωσιν ἡμιν, μηδεν οἰκειοποιεισθαι, τοις δε νομοις ἀρηγειν, (*they understood* by these words, according to *their sense* of them, the νομος ἀγραφος, which is derived from the Supreme, is implanted in nature, and strives after communion and unity, with which (i. e. the νομος ἀγραφος) the separating and limiting ordinances of the Demiurgos, the spirits of the world and of men, are at variance,) και την παρανομιαν καταπολεμειν. τουτο γαρ ἡ της δικαιοσυνης πηγη (δικαιοσυνη here has the meaning of the divine natural justice, founded on that νομος θειος, on which Epiphanes wrote a treatise), τουτο το μακαριως ἐν κοινῃ ζῃν.

The other inscription, in which the sect comes forward without disguise, is in the following terms: ἡ πασων οὐσιων και γυναικων κοινοτης πηγη της θειας ἐστι δικαιοσυνης, εἰρηνη τε τελεια τοις του τυφλου ὀχλου ἐκλεκτοις ἀγαθοις ἀνδρασιν, οὐς Ζαραδης τε και Πυθαγορας, των ἱεροφαντων ἀριστοι, κοινῃ συμβιωτειν συνιεντο. We cannot, however, exactly maintain more decidedly, that these inscriptions proceed from the sect of Carpocratians, because so many similar sects, as the Prodicians, the pseudo-Basilidians, the Nicolaitans, &c., had the same principles.

[1] Το ἀντιτασσεσθαι.

[2] Clem. Strom. i. 304. [Sylb. p. 131. Potter, p. 357. Klotz, vol. ii. p. 50.] iii. 438. [see Sylb. p. 189, et seq. Potter, p. 526, et seq. Klotz, vol. ii. p. 230.] vii. 722. [Sylb. p. 306—7. Potter, p. 854—5. Klotz, vol. ii. p. 236.]

To this family of Gnostics belong also the Nicolaitans, if the existence of any such sect can be proved. Irenæus, indeed, names such a sect as existing in his time, deducing them from Nicolaus the deacon mentioned in the Acts, and he believed that he found their portraiture in the second chapter of the Revelations[1]. But it may be doubted whether Irenæus has really penetrated the meaning of the Revelations in this case, and whether the name of Nicolaitans is the proper name of a sect, and still farther, whether it is the name of a Gnostic sect. The passage relates to such persons as seduced the Christians to partake in the heathen feasts at a sacrifice, and the excesses consequent upon them, as the Jews had formerly suffered themselves to be seduced by the Moabites. (Num. xxv.) The name of Nicolaitans might also be a merely *symbolical* name, as such an usage of it would suit very well with the whole character of the Revelations: "destroyer of the people," "seducer of the people," like Balaam, and thus Nicolaitans might mean Balaamites in this sense[2]. Now it was a favourite idea with Irenæus, that the Apostle St. John had actually contended with many different sorts of Gnostics; and he was in the habit of searching for remarks which were meant to oppose the Gnostics, in the writings of St. John. As he found several of those errors, which are blamed in the Revelations, among the Gnostics of his own day, he concluded that the practical errors contended against by the Apostle had also had their foundation in a theoretical Gnosticism, and the name induced him to deduce them from the well-known Nicolaus. But, in fact, we find in Irenæus only such *indefinite expressions* in regard to this sect, that it by no means follows necessarily that he wrote from any decided view of them. If we had only the account given by Irenæus, we must acknowledge it as possible that the story of this sect may have arisen solely out of a misunderstanding of the Revelations. Although it might then surprise us that Irenæus, without any external evidence to induce him, should have made a man, distinguished by having a public office conferred on him by the Apostles, the founder of a

[1] Irenæus i. 26. This refers to their practical errors: qui indiscrete (ἀδιαφορως) vivunt.—In loc. cit. iii. 11. he speaks of their speculative errors, but he does not altogether separate them from other Gnostics, in order to bring forward what is peculiar to them.

[2] Balaam, that is, νικολαος; according to the etymology which deduces this name from בָּלַע and עַם.

heretical sect. But such a mistake could never be laid to the charge of that learned Alexandrian Clement, an unprejudiced man, and one accustomed to historical criticism; and he appeals to facts which could not have been invented. There were people who had the corrupt principles which we have mentioned before, viz. that man must conquer his desires by giving himself up to them and not allowing himself to be affected by them, and that he must abuse his flesh and annihilate it by its own instrumentality, in order to show his contempt for it: their motto was words to this effect, which they ascribed to the deacon Nicolaus [1]. The same Clement afterwards, in another passage, quotes another trait out of the life of this Nicolaus, which this sect used in order to justify their own excesses [2]. The Apostles, it would seem, had reproached him with his jealousy about his wife, and in order to show how little this reproof would attach to him he brought her forward and said, "Let him that will, marry her." But Clement was far from holding Nicolaus to be the founder of this sect, although the sect itself claimed him. He clears the character of that man of the Apostolic Church, and quotes the tradition, that this Nicolaus lived in unspotted wedlock to the end of his days, and left children, whose conduct was irreproachable, behind him. We see, therefore, that Irenæus did not err in *supposing the existence of such a sect, but only in not examining more carefully its pretences.* It was the fashion for such sects, as we have often before remarked, to engraft themselves to some great man or other of antiquity, in their choice of whom they were often guided by accidental circumstances. Thus the Nicolaitans made Nicolaus, the deacon, their founder, without any fault of his. Clement thought that they had only corrupted his words and actions in a perverted manner, and he endeavours to explain both one and the other in a more favourable mode; but one is led to inquire whether Clement has viewed it in a sufficiently critical manner. All which is here ascribed to Nicolaus bears a very apocryphal stamp upon it; and perhaps that sect had a life of that Nicolaus, in which all this was found, put together by themselves or by others from fictions and unauthentic traditions. If this sect be not the same which was in existence in the Apostolic times, a point which cannot be decided with certainty [3], the name

[1] Το δειν παραχρησασθαι τῃ σαρκι. Strom. ii. p. 411.

[2] Strom. iii. p. 436.

[3] Even supposing that the name Nicolaitans in the Apocalypse should be really

of the Nicolaitans in the Apocalypse may have induced the later sect to name itself after Nicolaus. But as they probably belonged to the party of anti-Judaizers, and therefore acknowledge only St. Paul as an Apostle, they would also be induced by what they read in the Apocalypse to maintain the antiquity of their sect, as one which the Judaizing St. John had opposed; and the name induced them naturally to deduce it (i. e. the sect) from that Nicolaus. We have before found instances in which the Gnostics chose for their founders persons who appear in an unfavourable light either in the Old or the New Testament.

The Simonians are also to be mentioned here, an eclectic sect, which it is difficult to bring into any *one* definite class, because they appear to have attached themselves, sometimes to heathenism, sometimes to Judaism, or to the religious opinions of the Samaritans; and appear to have been sometimes strict ascetics, sometimes wild despisers of all moral laws (the Entychites). Simon Magus was their Christ, or at least a form assumed by the redeeming spirit which had appeared also in Christ, whether it was that in their first origin they had really proceeded from the party founded by that Goeta (magician) mentioned in the Acts, or whether the sect which arose later, merely to please their own fancies, had made Simon Magus, whom the Christians abominated, their Coryphæus, and had forged under his name pretended books relating to the higher wisdom. What some learned men have supposed, viz. that another Simon, distinct from that old Simon Magus, founded their sect, and that he was confused with that older Simon Magus, is too arbitrary a supposition, and is by no means required for the elucidation of the historical phenomenon presented to us [1].

the proper name of a party founded by a person named Nicolaus, and that the mere existence of the name there had given occasion for allusions to Balaam, it would still not be a necessary deduction from these premises that this party which was then in existence was a *Gnostic* sect.

[1] This Simon Magus, to whom properly no place belongs among the founders of *Christian* sects, has obtained an undeserved importance in the Old Church, by being made the father of the Gnostic sects. As the representative of the whole theosophico-goetic character, in opposition to the simple faith in revelation, he has become in the same manner a *mythical* personage, and given rise to many fables; as, for instance, that of his disputation with St. Peter, and his unhappy attempt at the art of flying; and the *Clementine* is the place where the fable is most ingeniously conducted. But it was an extraordinary circumstance that Justin Martyr, in his second apology before the Roman Emperor, should appeal to the fact, that there was a statue at Rome to this Simon Magus on an island in the Tiber (ἐν τῷ Τιβέρι ποτα-

(g.) *Marcion and his School.*

MARCION forms the most natural close to the series of the Gnostics, because he belongs to the Gnostics only *on one side*, and, on another, rather forms a contrast to them: he stands on the boundary between the Gnostic turn of mind, where speculation was the prevailing characteristic, and a character of mind thoroughly opposed to speculative Gnosticism. Christian feeling is far more appealed to by him than by other Gnostics, because his whole being was far more deeply rooted in Christianity, because Christian feeling was the keynote of his whole inward life, and his whole religious and theological character, while among the rest of the Gnostics this (although sometimes the prevailing turn of mind) formed only *one* of the dispositions belonging to them, and was intermixed with much of a different character. It is instructive to mark how an endeavour, which proceeded from the very depths of Christianity, could receive an un-Christian turn by means of a gross partiality; it is a warning and a startling circumstance to see a man, whose errors themselves were connected

μῳ μεταξυ των δυο γεφυρων) with the inscription Simoni Deo Sancto. Although such Goetæ at that time found much acceptance even with the highest classes, yet one can hardly believe that it could have amounted to the erection of such a statue and to a decree of the senate, by which Simon Magus was received into the number of the Dii Romani. We should be obliged to question the correctness of Justin's assertion, even if we were not able to explain the cause of his error. But this seems now to be ascertained, as in the year 1574, at the place designated by Justin Martyr, a stone was dug up, which seemed to have been the pedestal of a statue, and it bore the inscription "Semoni Sango Deo Fidio Sacrum." Now certainly this statue was not erected by the Roman senate or Emperor, but by one Sextus Pompeius; but Justin, full of the histories then current about Simon Magus, overlooked this, and confused the Semo Sancus (a Sabine Roman Deity, which might have remained unknown to Justin, well acquainted with the Greek, but not with the Roman mythology) with Simo Sanctus, especially as in the surname of that deity Sanctus was sometimes written instead of Sancus. Tertullian, indeed, as better acquainted with the Roman antiquities, might have been able to form a better judgment on the matter, but in such cases he was too prejudiced, and too little inclined to the critical art, to investigate any farther an account which was to his own taste, and came also from a man of reputation. The more critical *Alexandrians* do not mention the circumstance, and Origen, lib. i. contr. Cels. c. 57, by saying that the name of Simon Magus was known beyond Palestine only to the Christians, who knew him from the Acts of the Apostles, seems himself to stamp the story of a statue erected to him at Rome as a fiction. The Samaritan Goetæ and founders of sects, *Dositheus* and *Menander* (who is made out to be a disciple of Simon Magus) are even less deserving still of any particular mention in a history of Christian sects.

with a spirit of love, only that it was a mistaken spirit, and a man, to whom the Christ who filled his heart was one and all, misunderstood and called a heretic by most of the Christians of his own day, because they were unable to understand *his* mode of conception, and indeed chiefly by those who might have dwelt in the most intimate communion with him, in virtue of that which they bore within their hearts, if any other mode of communication had existed besides those of words and definite ideas (begriff): any other mode than by that which is only a dim reflection of the inward life,—a source of so many misunderstandings and mutual mistakes among men, which would be removed if one man could read the inward life and conscience of another! What Marcion had in common with the Gnostics, and particularly in common with the Gnostics of this class, was partly the distinction which he made between the God of nature and of the Old Testament, and the God of the Gospel, and the distinction between the Divine and the human generally, as well as many speculative elements, which he connected with his system of religion. And yet he had evidently arrived at that which he had in common with them by an entirely different road. It was in Christ that he first found his God; and that glory of God which had revealed itself to him in Christ, he was never able to find again in nature and in history. The speculative elements, which he borrowed from other Gnostics, were to him only necessary aids to fill up the gaps which his system, being founded on an entirely different and a *wholly practical* plan, would necessarily have. It was evidently not his intention, like that of other Gnostics, that Christianity should be completed by means of the speculative conclusions of other doctrinal systems, but he wished originally only to restore again to its purity Christianity, which had, in his opinion, been adulterated by admixtures foreign to its nature. The partial point of view, from which he set out with this disposition, was the occasion of most of his errors.

He did not make a secret doctrine the source of the knowledge of this genuine Christianity; but he would not suffer himself to be bound by *a general Church tradition*, because, in his opinion, foreign matter had already mixed itself in such a tradition with pure Apostolic Christianity. As a genuine Protestant (if we may transfer to an ancient day this appellation which arose indeed later, but denoted a genuine primitive Christian turn of mind) he wished to consider the word of Christ and of his genuine dis-

ciples [i. e. original Apostles, Tr.] the only valid source of a knowledge of the true Gospel. He certainly, instead of recognizing the many-sidedness of Christianity from the variety of the instruments selected for its propagation, allowed himself to make an arbitrary division between them, founded on a one-sided view. His endeavour to find the genuine documents of pure original Christianity, led him into historical and critical investigations, which were far removed from the *contemplative* disposition of the other Gnostics. But he gives us here a warning example, how such inquiries, as soon as they are swayed by the pre-conceived doctrinal opinions, in which the thoughts are fettered, must lead to unhappy results, and how easily an arbitrary hypercriticism is formed in opposition to an uncritical credulity; how easily, in short, man, in struggling against *one* class of doctrinal prejudices, falls into another.

The other Gnostics united a mystical allegorizing interpretation of Scripture with their theosophic idealism. The single-hearted Marcion was a zealous enemy of this artificial mode of interpretation. He was, on the contrary, a warm adherent of the *literal interpretation* which was in vogue among the opponents of the Gnostics; and it was shown in his case, how even this mode of interpretation, if it is not combined with other hermeneutic principles, and if it is carried to the extreme, must lead to arbitrary results.

The opposition between πιστις and γνωσις, between an exoteric and an esoteric Christianity, belonged to the essential attributes of the other Gnostic systems; but it was impossible that such an opposition could be recognized by Marcion, whose attachment was chiefly to the practical St. Paul. With him πιστις was the common source of Divine life for *all* Christians; he knew nothing higher than *the illumination which all Christians* ought to have: that which he recognized as true Christianity was to be known and recognized as such by all who were generally capable of receiving Christianity; and the only difference he could make was that between mature Christians, and those who still needed further instruction in Christianity (i. e. Catechumens). This characteristic of Marcion's doctrine, so wholly unlike the usual spirit of Gnosticism, leads us to conclude that it received its development also in a wholly different mode. But, alas, we have no authentic accounts of the life of Marcion, so as to enable us

to inquire into that point satisfactorily. Many gaps in that life can only be filled up by conjecture.

He was born in Pontus in the first half of the second century. If the account of Epiphanius is founded in fact, his father was bishop of that Church; but even then, if it be true, it is still most probable that he was elected to that office when Marcion was already a youth or arrived at the age of manhood; for it is most probable, if we may judge from the development of his system, that Marcion lived the early part of his life as a Heathen, and afterwards turned to Christianity from the free impulse of his own heart. Like many others, he felt himself, in the first glow of faith and love, impelled to renounce every thing earthly; he bestowed his goods or a part of them on the Church, and began to live[1] as a *continens* or ἀσκητης[2] in strict self-denial. His contempt of nature, which was at first only of a *practical* and *ascetic* kind, proceeding from a falsely-conceived opposition between the natural and the Divine, might now, under a variety of different influences, lead a man of a soul so impetuous in its apprehensions and so abrupt in its determinations as his, to a theoretically-conceived separation between the God of nature and the God of the Gospel. Nature appeared so cold and stiff to his heart, filled and glowing with the image of the God of love and mercy, as he appeared in Christ. He was, doubtless, right in the belief that the contemplation of nature cannot lead to the knowledge of that Father of love and mercy; he was right in his opposition against the *Deist*, who sets the preaching of nature on the same level with that of the Gospel, and who finds in nature alone and by itself a temple of eternal love; but Marcion was always inclined to push matters to the extreme. Even in history, Marcion, full of the glory of the Gospel, thought that he could find no trace of the God who had revealed himself to him there (i. e. in the Gospel); he, like many other zealous Christians, would look back into the Heathen world only with horror, and it appeared to him nothing *but the kingdom of Satan;* but even in the Old Testament he could not find again

[1] Pecuniam in primo calore fidei Ecclesiæ contulit. Tertull. adv. Marcion. lib. iv. c. 4. When Epiphanius calls Marcion a μοναζων, he is only making a confusion between the circumstances of his own and of earlier times; and by the word μοναζων we must understand an ἀσκητης. Ephraem Syrus blames Marcion for acquiring a delusive reputation through his asceticism. Opp. Ed. Lat. Sermo i. p. 438, and seq.

[2] See above.

his God and his Christ: his fiery and impatient spirit, which was too deficient in calmness and reflection, to be able properly to investigate the relation between the Old and New Testament, was now at once struck with the contrast between the two forms of religion. He had no notion of a gradual (literally pædagogical) development of the Divine revelation, and Judaism appeared to him too carnal to have proceeded from the same source as the spiritual religion of Christianity; and he believed that that same God of love, of mercy, and compassion, whom he knew from the Gospel, was not to be recognized here (i. e. in the Old Testament). It is easy to see that (after this notion of the contrast between the Old and the New Testament had once become the prevailing idea in his soul), if he, standing in this position, considered the Old Testament, he would be able to find many points on which he could rest this opinion. We must add also, that, according to his principles of a thoroughly literal interpretation of the Bible, he believed that all the anthropomorphical and anthropopathical expressions of the Old Testament must be maintained *to the very letter*, without distinguishing the idea from the dress in which it is clothed.

A man of Marcion's character would naturally be induced by opposition only to develope himself more strikingly in his partial views, and to harden himself in them. In reality he had to contend with such an opposition, and this contention had, no doubt, a remarkable influence on the formation of his religious and doctrinal views. There was, in existence, to say the truth, at that time, particularly in Asia Minor, a false turn of mind, which interpreted the Old Testament without sufficient spirituality, which did not sufficiently distinguish between the different positions taken in the two dispensations, and which in many doctrines (as, for example, the doctrine of Christ's kingdom, the idea of a millenarian kingdom,) mixed up a carnal Judaism with Christianity. This disposition he combated with violent zeal, and blamed, not wholly without foundation, those who were its slaves with adulterating the Gospel, and hence there might easily arise in his mind a suspicion of the genuineness of the whole traditional system of the Church (παραδοσις), and of the Biblical documents which he had received from that tradition; and hence, also, he may have been induced to endeavour, by his own inquiries, to form for himself a Christianity, purified from all that was foreign to its nature. His contention with this too Jewish disposition then drove him

also constantly to conceive the contrast between the Old and the New Testament more and more sharply, and in many things to suppose unjustly that Christianity had been adulterated by Judaism. This enmity of his towards the Old Testament, and many of his opinions connected with it, were, probably, the cause of his being excommunicated at Sinope. On this he travelled to Rome, with a view of seeking whether he could not, in the Church of the metropolis of the world, discover friends to his opinions, which, he was fully persuaded, were the principles of genuine Christianity; and the number of anti-Jewish feelings then prevailing in the Roman Church[1] might give him hopes of success. If the account of Epiphanius is to be relied on, Marcion must have inquired of the Roman clergy how they explained the passage in Matt. ix. 17, in order to elicit from their own mouth the avowal that the new wine of Christianity cannot be poured into the old bottles of Judaism without destroying them. But in Rome also his Dualism in the doctrine of the revelation of God could meet with nothing but contradiction, because the acknowledgment of the one same God and of the one same Revelation in the Old and in the New Testament was a portion of the Catholic doctrine of the Church. Rejected here also by the Church, he was driven into forming his anti-Church dispositions into a firm determinate system, and founding an independent community. Up to this time his system had been only founded on practical considerations: the conviction that Christianity had appeared in human nature as something wholly new, unexpected, and unforeseen; that it had communicated to human nature a Divine life, to which there had hitherto been nothing akin in man; that the God, who appeared in Christ, had never before revealed himself, either by nature, by reason, or by the Old Testament, and that nothing bore witness to him, nothing was his work but Christianity;—this was the conviction from which Marcion set out. (It may be a question, whether he had at that time carried out his system farther than this.) But these persuasions, proceeding from his inward Christian life, must have led a thinking man to many inquiries which he could not answer. A Gnostic system would be able to fill up these gaps in his doctrinal views: he might there learn to acknowledge a Demiurgos, different from the perfect God, as the God of nature and of the Old

[1] See above, in the history of the Cultus.

Testament; and a contempt for nature, and a hatred towards matter, as the source of evil, would correspond to his ascetic dispositions. The *Syrian* Gnosis, which, as we have remarked, maintained these points very definitely, would naturally suit him exactly. And thus it happened that he joined himself to one Cerdo, a teacher of this Gnosis, who came from Antiochia, and he borrowed from him the principles needed for the completion of his dogmatical system.

The very nature of Marcion's opinions necessarily implied that he would labour for the propagation of his principles with more zeal and activity than other Gnostics; for, while others believed that they could impart their higher knowledge only to a small portion of Christians, to *the spiritual*, Marcion, on the contrary, was persuaded that his was no other than the original Christian doctrine, which ought to belong to all mankind; and he would therefore feel himself impelled to communicate to all Christians the light of truth which had been imparted to him. He therefore made several voyages; he spent his life in many struggles both with Heathens and with Christians; to be hated and to suffer he considered as the destination of Christians. "My fellows in being hated, my fellow-sufferers," (*συμμισουμενοι και συνταλαιπωροι*) was his usual address to his disciples[1]. Perhaps he was at Rome, when Polycarp, the aged bishop of Smyrna, visited Anicetus, bishop of Rome[2]. Marcion, who, in his youth, apparently had lived on terms of friendly intercourse with the former, and saw him again now after a long lapse of years, went up to him and addressed him thus, "Dost thou remember me, Polycarp?" But this old man, otherwise so full of charity, refused to receive none but the enemies of the Gospel into his kindly affections; and such Marcion appeared to him, for he was unable to recognize in him the Christian character, which was in fact the very foundation of his errors. He answered him therefore, "Yes; I know the first-born of Satan!" Tertullian[3] relates that Marcion at length testified his regret at the schism which had arisen in the Church; that he had prayed to be again received into the communion of the Church, and that this prayer had been granted, on the condition that he should bring back to the Church those who had been seduced away by him, a condi-

[1] Tertullian, c. M. iv. 36. iv. 9.
[2] See above.
[3] Præscript. c. 30.

tion which his too early death prevented him from fulfilling. It must be avowed that we cannot implicitly trust this account, nor are we able to say whether there be any foundation for it in truth; nor even in that case, *what foundation* there is. Since with Marcion every thing proceeded from the heart, it might easily happen that while he sighed after Christian communion and perceived the evil consequences of schisms, he should at last be softened as his age increased, and should seek again to attain peace with the majority of Christians.

It still remains for us to consider somewhat more closely the system formed by an union between the *practical* disposition of Marcion, and the Gnostic principles of Cerdo. In its fundamental principles this system harmonized with the other Gnostic systems of this second class, only with the distinction, that it was always made pre-eminently clear, that *he* conceived every thing more from a *practical* than from a *speculative* point of view, and that he was not so deeply interested in what was merely speculative. He assumed three fundamental principles:—

1. A ὕλη, which had existed from all eternity.

2. The *perfect*, almighty, holy God; the God who is Eternal Love, the Good, ὁ ἀγαθος, who alone is to be called God in any proper sense; who, in virtue of his holy essence, cannot come into any contact whatever with matter; who forms only through communication of himself a life akin to himself, and does not act on that which is without.

3. The Demiurgos, a subordinate Being, of limited power, standing between good and evil, who is named a God only in an improper sense (as the name of God is transferred also to other beings, Ps. lxii.[1]), who is in avowed enmity with matter, and endeavours to bring it into subjection to himself, and to form it, but is never able wholly to subdue its opposition[2]. The ungodly Being of matter, which resists all fashioning and forming, is the source of all evil; and this ungodly Being, concentrated in that power of blind impulse which is associated with matter, is Satan. The distinction he draws between true moral perfection, which consists in holiness and love, whose essence it is only to impart itself, only to bless, to make happy, to redeem—and bare righteousness, justice, or uprightness, which weighs every one accord-

[1] Clem. Strom. lib. iii. p. 425. Tertull. c. M. lib. i. c. 7—15.
[2] Ephr. Syr. Orat. 14. p. 468, D.

ing to merit—rewards and punishes, recompenses good with good, and evil with evil, and which brings forth only outward propriety of conduct,—this was the fundamental practical notion, on which all Marcion's other notions rested. Whilst some[1] formed to themselves assuredly too gross anthropopathical representations of the retributive justice of God, which could not well be reconciled with the idea of a God, who is Love. Marcion, in combating these representations, (as he was generally, from his impetuous and rugged nature, inclined, in controversy, to carry matters to the utmost extremity,) made out an absolute contradiction between justice and holiness, so that it was impossible, in his opinion, that both attributes should exist side by side in the same being. It must be confessed, that while he opposed *justice* to *holiness*, and under the former name collected together all the marks which he believed that he could find in the Old Testament (when interpreted and considered in his own prejudiced views), as characteristic of the Demiurgos, he made to himself a conception of *justice*, which was by no means consistent or tenable; intimate consistency, with him, always depended more on the *heart* than on *abstract conceptions*.

As far as our present means of information extend, the mode in which Marcion considered the relation of the Demiurgos to the perfect God, in reference to the origin of the latter, appears very indefinite. As we find elsewhere, among the Gnostics, nothing but Dualistic systems, and none in which *three* principles, wholly *independent on each other as to their origin*, were acknowledged, it seems most natural to look on the matter in the following light, viz. that Marcion also deduced the origin of the imperfect Demiurgos, according to a certain line of development, from the perfect God—and certainly it is the notion which comes most readily into the human mind, to deduce that which is imperfect from that which is perfect. There is nothing to contradict this supposition; for, even if we grant that no passage is found in ancient authors, from which it can strictly be proved that Marcion derived the origin of the Demiurgos from the Supreme God[2], yet, at any rate, there is no passage, in any writer worthy of credit, on such a point, from which the contrary can be

[1] See Part I.

[2] And yet one of the Fathers, Rhodon ap. Euseb. v. 13. says that Marcion acknowledged only δυο ἀρχας.

proved. We can only say, that the indefiniteness in the accounts of ancient writers arises from the circumstance that Marcion, interested only in the practical view of these subjects, has not declared himself with sufficient definiteness, in a speculative point of view, on the relation of the Demiurgos to the Supreme God.

The point, then, which Marcion deemed of practical importance, was to maintain the doctrine of *a wholly new creation*, by means of Christianity, and to cut in sunder that thread, by which Christianity might be connected with the world, as it was in its earlier condition. The Demiurgos, therefore, of Marcion, did not act in obedience to more lofty ideas, to which he was subservient, as an instrument, although unconsciously, or even against his own will, but he was an entirely independent, self-existent, Creator of an imperfect world, which corresponded to his own limited nature. On this account Marcion did not assume, with the other Gnostics, that to man, as the image of the Demiurgos, a still higher principle of life was imparted by the Supreme God; but he recognized in the whole nature of man, as a work of the Demiurgos, only such elements as could proceed from such a Creator. The Demiurgos created man, as the highest work of his creation, after his own image, to represent and to reveal it. The body of man he formed out of matter, whence its evil desires; to this body he imparted, out of his being, a soul akin to himself. He gave him a law, in order to prove his obedience, and to reward or to punish him according to his desert. But the limited Demiurgos could never have imparted to man a Divine principle of life, capable of triumphing over evil. Man yielded to the temptations of sensual pleasure, and thereby was subjected, with his whole race, to the dominion of matter, and the evil spirits, which were its offspring. Out of the whole race of degraded man, the Demiurgos chose only one people for his own especial guidance. He revealed himself peculiarly to this people, the Jews, and gave them a religious code, consisting—as it corresponded to his own nature and character—*on the one hand* of a ceremonial religion, which busied itself only in externals, and *on the other* of a positive (literally, commanding,) imperfect morality, without an inward Divine life, without any power to produce a true inward sanctification, without the spirit of love. He rewarded those who faithfully observed this law, with a happy condition

after death, adapted to their limited nature, in company with their pious forefathers [1].

The Demiurgos was not powerful enough to make his people the ruling nation, and to extend his dominion over the whole earth; but he promised to those who were devoted to him, a Redeemer, a Messiah, through whom he would at last obtain this object in a contention with the hostile powers of the ὑλη, and through whom he would gather together the scattered Jews, exercise a severe judgment over the heathen and sinners, and lead his people to an undisturbed enjoyment of all earthly happiness, in a kingdom that should rule over the whole earth. But the perfect God, whose nature is compassion and love, could not allow this severe sentence, upon men who were overcome by their own weakness, to take effect. It is consistent with his character not to look to merit, like the Demiurgos, but out of free love to take care of those who are altogether alien to him, of the lost; and not to begin with proposing a law, on the observance or non-observance of which the fate of man should depend, but to reveal and impart himself, as the source of all holiness and blessedness, to those who are but willing to receive him. The appearance of Christ was *the self-revelation* [2] of the Supreme God hitherto wholly hidden from this lower creation. Perhaps before Marcion became a Gnostic, he had, in his own country, embraced that form of the so-called *Patripassianism* [3] which was current in Asia Minor, which maintained that the same Divine subject was betokened by different names only as spoken of under different relations; as the Father, when spoken of as hidden,—as the Son, or the Logos, when self-revealing; and that it was only this self-revealing God who had united himself with a human body. At all events this view was the most suited to the system and the mind of Marcion. It was a welcome thing to him, to remove the distinction which the Church doctrine acknowledged between Christ and the Supreme Being; he was thoroughly imbued with the conviction, that Christ and Christianity are nothing but a communication of the Supreme God himself to man in his limited condition. (It is well to remark, generally, that among the

[1] Apud inferos in sinu Abrahami. Tertull. c. M. lib. iii. c. 24. Clem. Strom. lib. v. f. 546. [Sylb. 233. Potter, 645. Klotz, vol. iii. p. 4.]

[2] Tertullian, c. M. lib. i. c. 11.

[3] Of which we shall speak more at large in our section relative to the formation of the Church doctrines.

Patripassians the *practical view* of Christianity was especially the predominant one.) As now Marcion, in the character of a Patripassian, would admit of no perfect human personality in Christ, it was the more easy for *Docetism* to insinuate itself into his views. This Docetism was not only founded in his view of matter, but it was thoroughly suited to the whole nature and spirit of his dogmatic views in every respect. Christianity, according to him, was to appear as a fragmentary thing, entirely without preparations for it, and not to be attached to any thing else; as Tertullian excellently said, with Marcion every thing is to be *sudden*. His Gospel, therefore, began with the journey of Christ to Capernaum in the 15th year of the reign of Tiberius, and his sudden appearance as a teacher [1].

According also to the theory of Marcion, Jesus *was not the Messiah promised by the Demiurgos* through the prophets, as many of the tokens of the Messiah contained in them are wanting in him; and, on the contrary, that which is peculiar in *his* character, and in *his* operations, is by no means to be found among the Messianic traits delivered to us in the prophets. Marcion endeavoured to go through with the contrast between Christ, as the history of the Gospel represents him, and the Christ of the Old Testament: even in this we see how deeply the image of Christ had stamped itself upon his warm heart; but even that very circumstance rendered him unjust, by leading him to expect that the fore-type, which was given to the prophetic view under a veil, which was to be for a time, should fully equal the reality that appeared. It was then to be considered only as an *accommodation*, when Jesus called himself the Messiah, in order to find a point by which the Jews might unite themselves to him; to win their confidence through a form which was familiar to them, and then to insinuate the higher things into this form [2]. It was natural enough that Christ, who pre-supposed only a sense of the needfulness of that which had hitherto been wanting to man, a feeling of the need in which man stands of help and redemption, and required only an acceptance, in childlike faith, of the divine source of life which he communicated to man; it was natural, according to these views, that he should find no acceptance with the self-righteous servants of the Demiurgos, self-contented in their own limited

[1] Tertull. iv. 17.

[2] Ut per solenne apud eos et familiare nomen irreperet in Judæorum fidem. l. c. iii. 15.

nature, and should find a more ready entrance into the hearts of the heathen, who had abandoned themselves to the feeling of their misery. The Demiurgos would of course necessarily attack him, as one that wished to destroy his kingdom, under the pretence of being the Messiah promised by him. He wished to bring about his death through the Jews, who were devoted to him, [i. e. the *Demiurgos*, Tr.] but he could effect nothing against the surpassing power of the supreme God. The passion of Christ would serve only for the fulfilment of his [i. e. *Marcion's*, Tr.] benevolent designs, in respect to human nature: the heart of Marcion must have been interested in a love, that suffered, and obtained the victory through suffering; in him, whom alone he acknowledged as our apostle, he found a great deal about the sufferings of Christ for human nature, —and yet this did not well consist with his Docetism. Marcion appropriated to himself the doctrine which already existed in the tradition of the Church about the descent of Christ into the world below[1]; but one is inclined to enquire whether he can have taken a doctrine on the mere authority of the tradition of the Church; and it will surely prove to be the case, that he has been willing to overlook that which would not otherwise be satisfactory to him in this authority, for the sake of its value in a dogmatical point of view, because its doctrine suited so well with his whole system. This doctrine is, indeed, distinctly proclaimed in the first Epistle of St. Peter; but with the ultra-Pauline Marcion, St. Peter was no genuine apostle. Still, he might think perhaps that he found this doctrine in an Epistle of St. Paul himself, namely, in Ephes. iv. 9. Other Gnostics gave it a different application, because with them this earth itself was the lower world [unterwelt, underworld] into which Christ descended, in order to set free the captives. Marcion understood the expression, lower world, in the sense given to it by the Church doctrine, namely, the general abode of departed spirits. Only he did not receive the common opinion, that Christ descended, in order to place the saints of the Old Testament in connection with himself. These were, like the Jews on earth, incapable of enjoying the blessings of a redeeming, eternal love, in consequence of their self-righteousness, and the enjoyment of a happiness which satisfied their limited nature. But Marcion, the friend of the heathen, could never have adopted the notion, that so many heathens who had died previously should

[1] The Descensus Christi ad inferos.

be given up to the power of the Demiurgos, and be excluded from the benefits of redemption; Christ, therefore, descended below, in order to preach the Gospel to the heathen, who were dead, and to bless them [1].

It would seem, although it cannot be decided upon with absolute certainty, that Marcion taught that the Messianic prophecies of the Old Testament would still be fulfilled with reference to the believers in the Demiurgos. The Messiah promised by the Demiurgos was to appear, and would execute a severe penal sentence against those who were not freed from his power by faith in the higher Christ, would raise up the dead saints of the Old Testament, and unite all in a millennial reign of earthly happiness. The eternal *heavenly kingdom*, to which Christians belonged, would then form the proper contrast to the transitory *earthly kingdom*. The souls of the Christians would lay aside their gross bodies, as the chicken raises itself out of the egg, as the kernel throws away the shell, or leaves the outer covering in the earth, and raises itself up free into the light of day; as the ripe fruit falls away from the stalk [2].

A doctrinal system like that of Marcion, in which the contrast between the Law and the Gospel was thus declared, could be followed only by a holy, moral system; for he made out the difference between the two to consist in this, that the *first* (the Law) could communicate to man no true inward sanctification, no power for victory over evil; but the *second* (the Gospel) brought man, through faith, into connection with a divine source of life; which connection would necessarily reveal itself through the conquest of evil, and through the sanctification of the life. Even the most zealous opponents of Marcion, who were glad to rake together all the evil they could possibly accuse him of, and who did not recognise the essential difference between the system of Marcion and all other Gnostic systems, could not deny that the Marcionites were entirely distinguished by their conduct from those Gnostic antinomians, who preached up a life of lawlessness after man's own fancies; they could not deny, for instance, that they (the Marcionites) were on a par with the strictest Christians in their abhorrence of the heathen theatres and public pleasures [3]. While many Gnostics, through their doctrine, that an accommo-

[1] See Irenæus, i. c. 27. § 2. c. i. 24.

[2] Tertullian, iii. 3, 4. & 24; iv. 29; iii. 29. Eph. Syr. Orat. 52. 6. p. 551, 552.

[3] Tertull. c. M. i. 28.

dation to the predominant errors of the times is allowable, or through the principle, that outward things are a matter of no consequence, made it a very easy thing to escape the duty of martyrdom; the Marcionites, on the contrary, certainly believed themselves bound to give their witness to Christianity[1], which was deeply engrafted in their hearts. But how all that belongs to our nature is sanctified and ennobled by Christianity, was a truth which Marcion could not acknowledge, because he did not recognize the God in Christ as the God of Nature. In this point of view, the teachers of the Church might justly make this reproach against him, that his Dualism, in union with Christianity, which always pursues the view of an ennoblement of nature through a divine principle of life, is practically illogical; as, for example, in the celebration of the Sacraments. The ascetic turn which Marcion had, even when he was a member of the Catholic Church, and in which, as we have before observed, his system had found a natural point to engraft itself upon, was now again still more furthered and strengthened by his more fully formed views of nature, and of the creation of the Demiurgos. He reckoned a mode of life, such as was led in the Catholic Church only by certain classes of ascetics, to be an essential part of Christianity: Christians were, even here below, to lead a heavenly life, entirely freed from all defilement through matter; he who was incapable of leading such a life, must remain in the class of Catechumens, and could not yet be admitted to Baptism[2].

Whether Marcion recognized only St. Paul as a genuine apostle, and condemned, after the fashion of ultra-Paulites, all the rest of the apostles, as Judaizing adulterators of Christianity; or whether he only declared *the writings that were published under their names to be spurious documents, counterfeited by Judaizing Christians,* cannot be decided with certainty from the unsatisfactory nature of the existing accounts; but the first is the most probable. This supposition suits best with the character of the abrupt and violent Marcion, who was more ready to make points of contrast than to look for means of accommodation. It is certain that he acknowledged as the genuine sources of Christian knowledge nothing but the Epistles of St. Paul, and an original Gospel, which, by

[1] See, for example, Euseb. iv. 15; vii. 12. De Martyr. Palæstinæ, c. 10.

[2] Tertull. c. M. lib. iv. c. 34. Quomodo nuptias dirimis? nec conjungens marem et feminam, nec alibi conjunctos ad sacramentum baptismatis et eucharistiæ admittens, nisi inter se conjuraverint adversus fructum nuptiarum.

mistaking a passage, he supposed to have been cited by St. Paul. But as he set out from the settled opinion, that these documents were no longer found in their original condition, but had been adulterated by the Judaizers, whose form seems to have haunted him like a spectre, he allowed himself to use criticism *ad libitum*, in order to restore them to their original form. His pretended original Gospel, used (as he fancied) by St. Paul, had arisen from a mutilation of the Gospel of St. Luke [1]. Certainly his criticism was by no means logical; for much remained, which nothing but a forced system of exegesis, through ignorance of right hermeneutic principles, could possibly bring into harmony with the system of Marcion.

Marcionite Sects.

While among other Gnostics the caprice and the multifariousness of their speculations and fictions caused the later disciples, in many respects, to depart from the doctrines of their Master; on the contrary, in the system of Marcion, the predominance of a practical turn, and the meagreness of the speculative part in comparison of the other Gnostic systems, were the cause of the changes which his disciples, among whom a practical disposition was not so predominant as with him, made in his doctrines. Many appropriated to themselves the elements of other Gnostic systems, which did not suit that of Marcion, in order to fill up the gaps which they believed they found in it. Many, like the Marcionite Marcus [2], received the doctrines of the Syrian Gnosis, relative to the creation of man [3]; namely, that the supreme God had communicated to man something of his own Divine Life (the πνευμα), but that man had lost it by sin,—a view which was repugnant to the whole character of the Marcionitish system; for, according to the ideas of Marcion, until the appearance of Christ, *nothing whatever* that was akin to the supreme God could have been in existence in this world. While Marcion would not make any further conclusions relative to the ultimate fate of the Demiurgos

[1] An elaborate discussion of Marcion's Canon of the New Testament would be out of place here, but on this subject see more in the learned and acute investigations of my friends Hahn and Olshausen, and in my Genetic Development of the Gnostic systems

[2] In the Dialog. de Recta Fide. See the Opp. Origen. T. i.

[3] See above, in the account of the Ophites and Saturninus.

and of the Psychici; on the contrary, Lucanus the Marcionite determined that all which is Psychical, is perishable, and that nothing but the πνευματικον, which has become participative of the Divine nature, is immortal [1].

Apelles had for a season withdrawn himself from the predominant practical turn of Marcion, and had indulged in many speculations, entirely foreign to the original Marcionite system; but at length the original practical disposition broke forth again, and became prominent in him in a remarkable manner. Tertullian [2] gives an unfavourable account of the morals of this man; but a teacher of the Catholic Church, at the beginning of the third century, named Rhodon, whose testimony is unsuspicious as being that of an enemy, defends him against this reproach, for he represents him as a man generally respected on account of his conduct [3]. Probably there was no other origin to these accusations, than the entirely innocent intercourse of Apelles with a female philosopher, named *Philumene*, as people were always ready to lay every thing that is evil to the charge of a person who has once been branded as a heretic. Philumene can only be reproached with having forgotten her calling as a woman, and having, in consequence, fallen into a sort of dreamy enthusiasm, and Apelles, with having encouraged her in this, and looking on her fantastic essays, which proceeded from an unhealthy condition, as *revelations*, which he took the trouble to interpret [4]. But the notice which Tertullian gives us is of considerable use, *viz.* that his long sojourn at Alexandria superinduced a change in his *originally Marcionitish* views; for all which we can deduce from the scattered accounts in Tertullian, Origen, Epiphanius, and in the treatise of Ambrose de Paradiso, indicates the remodelling of his system through the influence of the Alexandrian Gnosis. And hence it arises, that he set the visible and the invisible order of the world, the Demiurgos and the supreme God, and the Old and New Testaments, in more connection with each other than the system of Marcion permitted. While he set out from the principle, that the Old Testament comes from different origins,—partly from the inspiration of the Soter, partly from that of the Demiurgos, and partly from that of the evil spirit, who has every where troubled and defiled the Revelations of the

[1] See Tertullian de Resurrect. Carn. c. 2. Orig. c. Cels. lib. iii. c. 27.
[2] Præscript. Hæret. c. 30.
[3] Euseb. v. 13.
[4] His book of φανερωσεις, which is no longer extant.

Divine [1],—he was desirous of culling out in all cases that which is good. I use all the writings of the Old Testament, he says, while I gather together that which is useful [2]. He appealed to that declaration, so often quoted by the ancients, and which is, perhaps, attributed to our Saviour, in the Ευαγγελιον καθ' Εβραιους, "Be ye trusty money-changers, who are able, universally, to distinguish between the genuine and the counterfeit gold, the true and the false." (Γινεσθε δοκιμοι τραπεζιται.) In age, Apelles, finding no satisfactory conclusion in his speculations upon the incomprehensible, took refuge in the faith which obeys an inward necessity without being able to solve every difficulty to itself (difficulties which, in his case, met him even in that which he could not choose but to recognize); he could do no other, he said; he felt himself obliged to *believe* in one eternal God, as the original cause of all existence, but he could not scientifically prove how all existence was necessarily to be traced back to the one original principle. The Church teacher, Rhodon, to whom he made these communications in confidence, laughed at him, as one who pretended to be a teacher, but only *believed* what he taught, and *acknowledged* that he could not prove it; but one is inclined to ask, whether the laugher in this case was wiser than the man whom he laughed at, and whether Rhodon himself, in the strict sense of the word, could prove that which Apelles avowed that he only believed. Apelles appeared to have no more taste for controversy on these subjects. "Every one," he said, "may keep to his own faith; for every one who places his confidence on him that was crucified, will come to the bliss of heaven, provided only he shows his faith by good works."

ADDITIONAL REMARKS.

On the Cultus of the Gnostics.

We have hitherto considered the Gnostic sects only in reference to their faith and moral systems; it will be instructive, however, just cursorily to compare their different dispositions in regard to their modes of worship (their *Cultus*). Even here also we find the differences, which were often repeated in after times.

[1] In a work which he called Conclusions (Συλλογισμοι), he endeavoured to indicate the contradictions to be found in the Old Testament.

[2] Χρω απο πασης γραφης, αναλεγων τα χρησιμα. Epiphan. Hæres. 44. § 2.

Many Gnostics—as, for example, Ptolemæus—in virtue of their more inward Christianity and their predominantly intellectual character, were able to conceive the relation of all exterior observances of religion to its real essence, more justly than other Church teachers, who could not separate the *outward* from the *inward*, in religion, with such clearness of conviction and view. There were, besides, some, who, like the Jewish religious idealists [1] at Alexandria, out of their theosophic idealism rejected all exterior worship, as only fit for the Psychici, who are still imprisoned in the bonds of their senses, and are unable to raise themselves up to the pure spiritual view [anschauung]; and these persons would allow nothing to be availing but a religion of the inward spiritual view [Geistesanschauung] raised above all that is outward and sensuous. These persons would say, that man cannot represent the overwhelming and divine mysteries by sensuous and transitory things, and that real redemption consists only in knowledge [2]. But the same theosophic disposition might also bring with it a symbolic *Cultus*, full of mystic pomp, as we see in the case of the *Marcosians* [3], from whom Irenæus traces those idealists, who threw aside all outward religious observances. In accordance with the distinction between a psychical and pneumatical Christianity, they made a distinction also of a *twofold baptism:*

1. The baptism into Jesus, the Messiah of the Psychici, through which the believing Psychici obtained remission of their sins, and the hope of an eternal life in the kingdom of the Demiurgos.

2. The *pneumatical* baptism, a baptism into the heavenly Christ who was united with Jesus, through whom spiritual natures attain to a self-consciousness, and to perfection, and enter into communion with the Pleroma. Their ceremonies, and the formulæ they used in baptism, were probably different, according as a person obtained the *first* or the *second* baptism, and was received into the class of *Psychici* or *Pneumatici*. The latter was apparently

[1] See Part I. p. 50.

[2] Iren. I. c. 24. § 4. Theodoret. Hæret. fab. i. c. 10. If the *Caians*, against whom Tertullian writes in his book *De Baptismo*, were identical with the Gnostic Cainites, with whom they are sometimes confounded, then we must place these latter in the same class, which well suits their whole character; but the grounds on which those Caians determined against the necessity of the external rite of baptism, do not look like the wild dreamy spirit of the Cainites; and besides, there is nothing peculiarly *Gnostic* in them [namely, the Caians].

[3] Followers of Mark.

accompanied with more pomp than the other. According to the Gnostic idea (see above), *viz.* that the baptized and redeemed pneumatical nature entered into a spiritual marriage (a syzygy) with its other half in the world of spirits, the *angel* which makes one whole with it;—according to this idea they celebrated baptism as a marriage feast, and adorned the chamber where it was to take place as a marriage chamber. One of the formulæ used in the baptism of a Pneumaticus, was this: [You are baptized] "Into the name which is hidden from all the Divinities and Powers (of the Demiurgos), the name of Truth [1], which Jesus of Nazareth hath drawn up into the Light-Zones of Christ, the living Christ through the Holy Spirit, for the angelic redemption [2],—that name through which all attains its perfection." The baptized person then said, "I am *confirmed* and redeemed [3]; I am redeemed in my soul from this world, and from all which proceeds from it, through the name of Jehovah, who has redeemed the soul of Jesus [4], through the living Christ." Then the assembled throng spoke thus: "Peace (or health) to all, over whom this name rests." Then also they imparted to the baptized the consecration to the Christian priesthood, which was used also in the Church, by means of anointing; but in this case it was performed with costly ointment (balsam), for the widely extending perfume of this was to be a symbol of the overpowering delight of the *Pleroma*, which the redeemed were destined to enjoy. Among these *Marcosians*, we find, at first, the use of extreme unction; they anointed the dying man with that ointment mixed with water, and used with it formulæ, to the purport that the souls of the departed must be able to raise themselves up free from the Demiurgos and all his powers, to their mother, the *Sophia* [5]. The

[1] The ἀληθεια, the self-revelation of the Bythos.

[2] Εἰς λυτρωσιν ἀγγελικην. For the redemption of that, of which this spiritual nature, as well as the angel which belonged to it, must become a partaker, in order that both together might become capable of entering into the Pleroma, which was only possible to them in their mutual union, and not in their state of separation.

[3] Ἐστηριγμαι και λελυτρωμαι. See above, about Horus.

[4] I think, that in that formula we must read του Ἰησου, instead of αὐτου.

[5] Iren. I. 21. Exorcism in baptism also, was well suited to the Gnostic theory of the in-dwelling of manifold πνευματα ὑλικα [spirits of a gross and sensuous nature, derived from their connexion with matter. H. R.], till the redemption [of the individual]. *Exorcism* (ὑδωρ ἐξορκιζομενον) makes its appearance at first, even earlier than in the North African Church (see above), in the Didascal. Anatol. p. 800, col. iv. D. But here it may be quoted as being a custom of the Alexandrian Church in general, and not as a custom peculiarly Gnostic.

Ophites, also, had these same forms of adjuration for the departed. And that mystical table of the same sect, which contains a symbolical representation of their system (their διαγραμμα), is well known.

As Marcion in his whole character and spirit was essentially different from the rest of the Gnostics, so also did he differ from them in respect to his principles about the ordinances of worship. By his simple and practical turn of mind, he was far removed from that mysticism that delighted in outward pomp; but then he was far removed, also, from that proud contemplative idealism. His endeavour was here also to bring back the original Christian simplicity of the service of God; and he combated many new ordinances, as corruptions of that original simplicity [1]. And thus, with respect to the practice which was then about in its commencement, of dividing divine service into two parts [2], the one, which the Catechumens were to stay out, and the other, at the commencement of which they were to be dismissed, he appears to have contended against it, as an innovation foreign to the spirit of Christianity. He said, Just as in any other good thing, let the mature Christians suffer those who are yet under instruction, such as the Catechumens, to take part in prayer also: they must not reserve anything from them on this account; nor exclude them on it from participation in the prayers of the Church [3].

We must, however, limit the praise which has been bestowed upon Marcion, if he was really the original author of the superstitious custom, founded on a misunderstanding of the passage in Scripture, 1 Cor. xv. 29, namely, the custom of bestowing baptism on a living person, which was to be availing to a Catechumen who had died without baptism; but it is altogether without foundation, that the introduction of such a mistaken baptism has

[1] Apparently Tertullian had the *Marcionites* especially in his view, when he says of the heretics, Præscript. c. 41, "*Simplicitatem* volunt esse prostrationem disciplinæ, cujus penes nos curam *lenocinium* vocant."

[2] Afterwards called the Missa Catechumenorum, and the Missa Fidelium.

[3] Marcion, according to Jerome, Comment. in Ep. ad Galat., appealed to Galat. vi. 6, while with a thorough disregard of the context in that passage, he understands κοινωνειν in an intransitive sense, and translates the verse; "Let the Catechumen partake of all that is good, together with his instructor." Hence, the notion of the Gnostics was also present to the mind of Tertullian, when he reproached the heretics, l. c. in this manner; "Imprimis quis catechumenus, quis fidelis incertum est. Pariter adeunt (ecclesiam), pariter audiunt, pariter orant."

been laid to the charge of Marcion, to whose simple evangelical spirit such superstition was entirely unsuited. If such a superstition prevailed afterwards among the Marcionites, who had spread themselves among the country people of Syria, in the fifth century, we can only say that it is not fair to charge the founder of the sect with that which is found among men, who are certainly very unlike him [1].

II. *Manes*[2] *and the Manichees.*

The power of the simple Gospel had by degrees triumphed over Gnosticism, although the remains of Gnostic sects maintained themselves in the East down to later centuries. Gnosticism had produced the effects it was calculated to produce; it had, by the struggle that took place, awakened the powers of the soul, and by the contrast it offered it had brought the meaning of the chief doctrines of Christianity into a clearer consciousness and acknowledgment[3]. But in the third century a new and remarkable phenomenon, thoroughly akin to Gnosticism, arose out of the intermixture of oriental theosophy with Christianity, namely, Manicheeism. No essential difference is to be found between this system and those of the Gnostics, especially of the second class, except that here the Christian element was far more crushed by the intermixture of strange materials than in most of the Gnostic systems, and Christianity was properly used only as a symbolical covering for ideas foreign to it, so that one might often throw away the Christian terms which are used, and find notions, which, in their application here, appear to resemble a mixture of Parsic, Brahminical, and Buddhist religious doctrines, more than Christianity. And further, the oriental element is not at all mixed, as it is in the Gnostic systems, with Jewish theo-

[1] Tertullian, De Resurr. Carnis, c. 48. & Adv. Marcion. lib. v. c. 10. by no means speaks as if, in his time, such a baptism, which violates the passage on which it is founded, had been actually in use in any place; only he supposes the possibility that such a custom may have existed in the time of the Apostle, who may have alluded to that; and in the latter passage he considers another explanation of 1 Cor. xv. 29. to be more probable. But what Chrysostom remarks upon this passage can only be applied to many ignorant Marcionites of *his* time, and not, by any means, to Marcion himself, and the older Gnostics.

[2] [Neander constantly uses the name Mani, but as I believe Manes is the form usually adopted in English, I have changed it. H. R.]

[3] See the section below on the development of the Church doctrine.

logy and Platonic philosophy. The comparison of the Manichean system with the Basilidian, the Saturninian, and the Ophitic, and with the religious system of the Zabians, hardly allows us to escape recognising one common source for all.

As far as relates to the history of Manes, the founder of this sect, we have two kinds of sources of information, which coincide with each other only in a very few circumstances, and in all besides are entirely different; these are the *Greek* and the *Oriental* sources. The accounts of Cyril of Jerusalem, of Epiphanius, and of the ecclesiastical historians of the fourth and fifth centuries, point our attention to one common source[1]. This source is the Acts of a disputation said to have been held with Manes by Archelaus, bishop of Cascar[2]. But these Acts are preserved to us in at least a very unsatisfactory form, as they have descended to us, with the exception of some fragments in Greek, only in the Latin translation from a Greek writing, which perhaps itself is only an unfaithful translation from a Syriac original[3]. These Acts plainly contain a narration, which hangs together ill enough, and bears a tolerably fabulous appearance. Even supposing there is some truth as a foundation for these Acts, which may well be as there is much in the mode of bringing forward the doctrines which bears marks of truth, and is confirmed by a comparison with other representations, yet still the Greek writer appears to have mixed with it much that is false, from ignorance of oriental languages and customs, by intermingling and confusion of different narrations, and by exaggeration and a deficiency in critical qualifications[4]. We are well aware how difficult it was to a Greek to

[1] Eusebius, who wrote before this document was promulgated, was unable to relate anything of the personal history of Manes.

[2] Kaskar; if the name be not a corruption. It may, perhaps, (although on the evidence of a very uncertain conjecture) be a corruption for Charra in Mesopotamia (חרן).

[3] Jerome, De Vir. Illustr. 72, informs us that these Acts were originally written in Syriac; but among the Orientals the first Father to whom these Acts were known is Severus, bishop of Asmonina, in Egypt, who wrote about the year A.D. 978. See Renaudot, Hist. Patriarch. Alexandr. p. 40. His relation of the matter differs in many respects from the edition of these Acts which has descended to us, and it is far simpler, which seems to indicate that the Acts of which he made use, were not ours, but another document akin to it, and that perhaps which furnished the foundation of ours. Heraclian, bishop of Chalcedon, in Photius cod. 95, says that a person named Hegemonius drew up these Greek Acts.

[4] Beausobre has properly discarded the Western accounts, which he was well

place himself in the condition of a people totally foreign to his own nation, and to conceive it altogether justly.

In some points, even from the scanty means which we have for the unravelling of this historical enigma, we are enabled to detect traces of the mistakes which have formed the foundation of these accounts. The first origin of the Manichean doctrines is derived from a Saracenic merchant, called Scythianus, who is represented, during long travels in Asia, Egypt, and Greece, to have acquired great riches, and procured himself an intimate acquaintance both with Oriental and Grecian philosophy. This Scythianus is represented to have lived near the Apostolic age; but this, even according to this narrative itself, appears to be an anachronism, for Manes himself is not made to live till some generations after that age. Still, in this Scythianus we recognize an historical personage really connected with Manes; we find letters of Manes addressed to a man of this name, who was also probably an oriental Theosophist[1]. The heir and disciple of this Scythianus appears to have been one Terebinth, who was afterwards called Buddas. The name Buddas[2] reminds us of the old system of religion, opposed to Brahminism, which took its origin from Eastern India, which is still prevalent in Ceylon, Thibet, and the Birman Empire, and has extended its influence even to the tribes of Tartary. The relation of the miraculous birth of Buddas reminds us of the similar accounts given of the birth of the Indian Buddha. The pantheistic portion of Manicheeism may be compared, in many respects, with the pantheistic parts of the old Buddhaism. Manes is represented, in fact, to have travelled to the East Indies and China, and many of the later Manichees appeal to the circumstance that Manes, Buddhas, Zoroaster, Christ, and the Sun (the higher Spirit which animated the Sun), are the same; that is to say, all these founders of a religion are only dif-

persuaded were untenable, and confined himself wholly to the Oriental. There is nothing striking in what Mosheim has advanced against him in this matter.

[1] See Fabricii Biblioth. Græc. vol. vii. 316.

[2] It has been justly remarked, that the Greek Τερεβινθος, is perhaps only a translation of the Chaldee בוטמא by which the Hebrew אלה is rendered in the Targum, and which the Alexandrian translators render by Τερεβινθος. And besides, Terebinth, or Buddas, like Scythianus, may have been an historical person, to whom much that belongs to the Indian Buddha may have been transferred.

ferent incarnations of the Sun[1], and, therefore, there is, in these different systems, only one religion under different forms.

In the Oriental accounts there is far more internal connexion; but these are found in writers very much later than the Greek documents. The Orientals have, however, without doubt, made use of earlier documents, and in their use of them they were not exposed to the same causes of error, as those which led the Greeks astray[2].

In order properly to appreciate the phenomenon presented by the appearance of a man like Manes, we must compare together the circumstances and the relations under which he was formed. Manes was born a Persian, but we are led to inquire whether this geographical term is to be used in its strictest limits, or whether we are only to understand by it some one province of the great Persian empire. The latter view is supported by the circumstance that Manes composed his *writings* in the Syriac language, from which we might be led to conclude that he derived his origin from one of those provinces of the Persian empire, where Syriac was the language of the country. But this argument is not entirely demonstrative; for without this supposition it may well be conceived, from the intimate connexion between the Persian Christians and the Syrian Church, the Syrian language might already by that time have become the language of theological books among the Persian religious teachers, and that Manes also might, in consequence, have been induced to make use of it, although it was not his mother tongue, more especially as he might thereby hope to further a more general reception of his doctrines in other districts. If these accounts, indeed, are to be relied on, Manes was born in a family of the class of Magi (the priests of the Persian religion), was converted to Christianity in the days of manhood, and became the presbyter of a Christian congregation at Ehvaz, or Ahvaz, the chief town of the Persian province Huzitis. At all events, it is most probable that Manes

[1] The later offsets of the Manichees, when they entered into the Catholic Church, were obliged to condemn the doctrines before maintained by them: τον Ζαραδαν και Βουδαν και τον Χριστον και τον Μανιχαιον ἑνα και τον αὐτον εἰναι. See Jacob. Tollii Insignia Italic. Traject. 1696. p. 134.

[2] The Oriental accounts are to be found in Herbelot, Bibliothèque Orientale, sub v. Mani; in the History of the Sassanidæ, by the Persian historian, Mirkhond, ap. Silvestre de Sacy, Mémoires sur diverses Antiquités de la Perse: Paris, 1793; in Abulpharage, and Pocock, Specimen Histor. Arab.

was brought up in the religion of Zoroaster, and afterwards embraced Christianity.

We do not know enough of the progress of his life to be able to decide whether he was at first fairly and thoroughly converted from the religion of his fathers to Christianity, but that afterwards being repulsed by the form in which the latter appeared to him in the doctrines of the Church, he freshened up the fundamental ideas of his earlier religious habits of thought again in his soul, and then believed that the true light could not be given to Christianity till it was united with them; . . . . . or whether from the very first he had been attracted by the analogy of Christianity to many Persian notions, without remarking the essential difference between similar ideas in Christianity and in the Persian religion according to their peculiar conception and connexion in each, so that from the very first he had only formed a peculiar religious system for himself by an amalgamation of the Persian and the Christian. It is easy to explain, in any case, how a man brought up in the Persian religion believed that he could observe a striking connexion between the ideas of a kingdom of Ormuzd and Ahriman, and those of a kingdom of Light and Darkness, of God and Satan; between the Persian doctrine which allows man to struggle for the kingdom of Ormuzd against the kingdom of Ahriman, and the Christian doctrine, which would make man struggle in the service of Christ against the kingdom of Satan. In the Persian religion, the centre-point of all was the idea of redemption out of the kingdom of Ahriman, and the final triumph of the kingdom of Ormuzd. In Christianity he found the tidings of a triumphant appearance of Ormuzd himself upon the earth, through which the complete triumph of the kingdom of Light, and the complete destruction of the kingdom of Darkness were prepared.

Exactly at the time in which Manes appeared, after the Persians had freed themselves from the Parthian dominion, and re-established their old kingdom under the dynasty of the Sassanidæ, the endeavour was again awakened among them to purify the old religion of Zoroaster from the foreign admixtures which had made their way into it during a foreign rule, and to restore it again to its original purity and glory. But contests had now arisen as to what the pure doctrine of Zoroaster was, especially on those points on which the Zend books contained only hints, (*e. g.* on the relation of the good and the evil principle to each

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other). Councils were held, in order to decide the disputes, at which pretended prophets appeared, who professed to decide everything according to Divine illumination[1]. The religion of Zoroaster, thus refreshed with new power, and setting itself up in hostility to all foreign religions, which had hitherto been tolerated, now also entered on a contest with Christianity, which under the Parthian domination had been able to propagate itself without obstruction. Under such circumstances, it was easy for a man of an ardent and bold spirit, like Manes, to indulge the thought of establishing the identity of Christianity, purified, as he would think, from all extraneous matter, with the pure doctrine of Zoroaster, and by this means to be the first to make clear the proper meaning of the Christian doctrine, and at the same time to further the extension of Christianity in the Persian empire; he wished to be looked upon as the Reformer, both of Christianity and Parsism, called and enlightened by God. Christianity appeared to Manes to be far more akin to the doctrine of Zoroaster than to Judaism. He derived the adulteration of the doctrine of Christ from the mixture of Christianity with Judaism, which was entirely foreign to its nature. He was shut out from the communion of the Christian Church, and turned himself now to Christians and believers in the religion of Zoroaster, with the desire that they should recognize him as an inspired (*lit.* enlightened) reformer of religion. He maintained, like Mahomet in later times, that he was the Paraclete[2] promised by Christ, and under this name he by no means understood the Holy Ghost, but a human person, an inspired teacher promised by Christ, who should carry on further the religion revealed by Christ in his Spirit (*i. e.* the Spirit of Christ), should purify it from the mixture made in it by Ahriman, especially from those corruptions which proceeded from its amalgamation with Judaism, and should make known those truths which mankind in earlier times had not been in a condition to understand. Through him Christianity was to be set free from all connexion with Judaism, which had proceeded from Ahriman; and that which the evil spirit, in order to adulterate Divine truth, had intermingled with the New Testament, which by no means contained the uncor-

[1] See Hyde, Hist. Relig. vet. Pers. p. 276; Mémoires sur diverses Antiquités de la Perse, par S. de Sacy, p. 42.

[2] See Mirkhond ap. Sacy, p. 294.—Tit. Bost. c. Manich. lib. iii. in Canisii Lection. antiq. ed. Basnage, and Bibl. Patr. Galland, t. v. p. 326.

rupted doctrine of Christ, was to be separated from it. Through him that *perfect* knowledge was to be given, of which St. Paul had spoken as of something reserved against a future season (1 Cor. xiii. 10)[1]. Thus Manes might name the promised Paraclete and the Apostle of Christ at the same time, as he began the letter in which he wished to develop the fundamental doctrines of his religion (the Epistola Fundamenti, so celebrated among the Manichees), with these words:—"Manes, chosen to be an Apostle of Jesus Christ, through the choice of God the Father. These are the words of salvation out of the living and eternal source[2]."

It was in the latter part of the reign of the Persian king Shapur I. (Sapores), about the year 270, that he first came forward with these pretensions. With an ardent and profound spirit, and with a lively imagination, he united varied knowledge and talents for the pursuits of art and science, which he used for the propagation of his doctrines. He is represented as having been distinguished among his contemporaries and countrymen as a mathematician and astronomer[3]; the fame of his skill in painting was long remembered in Persia. At first he succeeded in obtaining the favour of that prince; but when his doctrines which, in the opinion of the magi, were heretical, became known, he was obliged to seek safety from persecution by flight. He now made long journeys to the East Indies, as far as China, and probably used these journeys towards the enriching of his religious eclecticism. He remained for a time in the province of Turkistan, and prepared there a series of beautiful pictures, which contained a symbolical representation of his doctrine,—the book which was named by the Persians Ertenki-Mani. It may probably have happened that he withdrew into solitude in order to receive the revelations of God, as he declared that he devised these images (which represented his conceptions) amidst calm reflection in a cavern, and maintained that he received them in his mind[4] from

[1] See the Acta cum Felice Manichæo, lib. i. 9, opp. Augustin. t. viii.

[2] Augustin. c. Epistol. Fundamenti, c. 5.

[3] It must, however, be acknowledged that they possessed no great knowledge in these subjects. It is in the highest degree probable that much in his system, even if we cast away the mythical dress in which it is enveloped, was closely connected with an imperfect knowledge of these sciences.

[4] [In seinem Sinne . . This may be explained, as meaning impressions *on the sensorium*. I have used the word *mind*, taken a lax sense.—H. J. R.]

heaven. Whether it be true, as the Orientals relate, that in order to deceive the credulous populace, he gave out that he raised himself in the body up to heaven, and thence brought down those emblems with him[1], we must at least leave undecided. After the death of Sapor, in the year 272, he returned to Persia, and found a good reception for himself and his pictures at the hands of his successor, Hormuz (Hormisdes). This prince assigned him as a secure residence, a castle called Deskereth, at Khuzistan, in Susiana. But after this prince had reigned two years not quite complete, Behram succeeded him (Baranes). This prince showed himself favourable to him at first, but perhaps only out of dissimulation, in order to give him and his adherents a feeling of security. He caused a disputation to be held between him and the magi, of which the result was that Manes was declared a heretic. As he would not retract, he was[2] flayed alive in the year 277[3], and his skin stuffed and hung up before the gates of the town Djondischapur, in order to intimidate his followers.

The main point of dispute among the Persian theologians which was treated of at the restoration of the original religion by the founders of the dynasty of the Sassanidæ, was one which is most obscurely expressed in the documents of the Zoroastrian creed (the Zend-avesta), namely, the inquiry, whether we are to believe in an absolute Dualism, and consider Ormuzd and Ahriman as two self-existing beings from all eternity opposed to each other, or whether *one* original being is to be supposed[4], from whom Ormuzd and Ahriman received their existence, and that Ahriman is an originally-good being, but a fallen one. The former doctrine was that of the Magusaic sect[5], among the Persians, which Manes joined; for it was his object to represent the opposition of light and darkness as absolute and irreconcileable, although either consciously or inconsciously, a pantheism, which was enveloped in a mystical dress, might be at the bottom of this Dualism, in which the idea of evil was conceived more in a physical than in

[1] He must secretly have caused himself to be supplied with provisions in the cavern, where he remained, according to some, *four* years, according to others, *one* year.

[2] A cruel mode of putting criminals to death, common in the East.

[3] The chronology is, it must be confessed, very uncertain here.

[4] Zervan Akarene, the time that has neither beginning nor end, answering to the αἰων, βυθος.

[5] Schahristan. ap. Hyde, p. 295.

an ethical light[1]. He imagined, therefore, two principles absolutely opposed to each other together with their creations of an opposite character also: on the one hand, God, the original good, from whom nothing but good can proceed, from whom every idea of destroying, of punishing, and of corruption is far removed, the original Light, from which pure light flows; . . . . on the other hand, the original evil, which can only destroy and undo, and whose very being is wild confusion that fights against itself,—matter, darkness, from which powers strictly corresponding to itself proceed, a world full of smoke and vapour, and at the same time full of fire, which only burns and cannot give light[2]. These two kingdoms originally existed entirely separate from each other. The Supreme God, the King of the kingdom of Light, existed as the original source of the world of emanations akin to himself, and those Æons, the channels through which light was propagated from the original source of light, were most closely connected with him; and to these, as representatives of the Supreme God, his very name was transferred, which were thence called Divinities, without prejudice to the honour due only to the first of Beings[3]. In the epistle in which Manes brought forward the fundamental doctrines of his religion[4], he thus portrays this Supreme God at the head of his kingdom of Light[5]:—

"Over the kingdom of Light ruled God the Father, eternal in his holy nature (*geschlechte*, lit. *generation*, or *race*, or *kind*, *species*, *genus*), glorious in his power, the TRUE, by the very nature of his being, always holy in his own eternal existence, who carries within himself wisdom and the consciousness of his life, with which he comprehends the twelve members of his Light, that is to say, the overflowing riches of his own kingdom. In every one of these members there are hidden thousands of innumerable and immeasurable treasures. But the Father himself, who is splendid in his glory and incomprehensible in his greatness, has connected with him holy and glorious Æons, whose number and greatness cannot be reckoned, with whom this holy

[1] See above, the Introduction to the History of the Gnostic sects.

[2] The emblems under which Manes represented the kingdom of evil bear the most striking resemblance to those which we meet with in the religious system of the Sabians. It was said, and not badly, by Alexander of Lycopolis, in his treatise, πρὸς τας Μανιχαιου δοξας, c. ii., that Manes, under the word ὑλη, understood την ἐν ἑκαστῳ των ὀντων ἀτακτον κινησιν.

[3] As the Amschaspands, Ized of the Religion of the Parsees.

[4] The Epistola Fundamenti.

[5] Augustin. contra Epist. Fundamenti, c. 13.

all-glorious Father lives, for in his lofty kingdom none dwells subject either to want or to weakness. His resplendent kingdoms, however, are founded on the blessed earth of light in such a manner, that they can neither be rendered weak, nor shaken at all[1]." The powers of darkness fell together in wild confusion, until in their blind career of strife they came so close to the kingdom of light, that at length a gleam out of this kingdom, which had hitherto been entirely unknown to them, streamed upon them. They now left off their contention against one another, and, involuntarily attracted by the shining of the Light, they united together to force their way into the kingdom of Light, and to appropriate to themselves some portion of this Light[2]. It appears here somewhat inconsistent in Manes, who ascribes an imperturbable firmness to the kingdom of Light, to say, "But when the Father of the most blessed Light saw a great devastation arise from the darkness, and threaten his holy Æons, had he not sent a special Divine power[3] to conquer and annihilate the race of darkness at once, in order that after its annihilation peace might be the portion of the dwellers in the light[4]." Simplicius and Euodius have reproached him here with a contradiction to himself; but this accusation relates rather to the *mythical* or *symbolical mode of representation*, than to the train of thought which it envelopes. The fundamental notion of Manes, as of the Gnostics, was this, that the blind power of nature which opposed the Divine Being, being tamed and conquered by mixture with it, would be rendered utterly powerless.

The King of the kingdom of Light caused the Æon, *the Mother of Life*[5], to emanate from him to protect its borders. The

[1] This earth of light Manes did not conceive as anything distinct from the original Supreme Being, but all was only a different modification of the one Divine Being of Light.

[2] We recognise the idea which is the foundation of this, namely, that Evil is at enmity with itself, and unites only when it engages in a contest with Good, which is the attractive power with which Good acts upon Evil itself; a thing which certainly is a contradiction to the Dualistic dogma of an Absolute Evil.

[3] Aliquod nimium ac præclarum et virtute potens numen. In the system of Zoroaster also the Amschaspands is represented as an armed champion for the kingdom of light.

[4] The Epistola Fundamenti in the Book *de fide contra Manichæos*, c. 11., which, perhaps, proceeded from the pen of Euodius, bishop of Uzala in Numidia. (This is to be found in the Appendix to the viiith tome of the Benedictine edition of Augustine.)

[5] μητηρ της ζωης.

very name of this Genius shows that it represents '*the supreme soul of the world*,' that the Divine light giving up the unity of the kingdom of light, was now to divide itself into a multitude, and develope itself in the struggle against the ungodly into separate beings, each with a peculiar existence. The *Mother of Light*, like the ἀνω σοφια of the Valentinian system, may not have been affected as yet by the kingdom of darkness . . . . and herein would also lie the difference between the higher soul of the world, belonging to the kingdom of light, and a *reflection* of it, which had mingled itself with the kingdom of darkness[1]. This *Mother of Light* produced the First-man (original-man) in order to set him in opposition to the kingdom of darkness . . . . and here is the idea of the dignity of human nature, which we observed among the Gnostics[2]. The *First man* sets out upon the contest with the five pure elements, fire, light, air, water, and earth[3]. We here also recognise the character of Parsism, the veneration of an originally-pure nature, which was troubled only by being intermixed with Ahriman; and according to the Parsic doctrines, a life streaming forth from the kingdom of light is acknowledged among the original elements, and they are called forth through its fruitful and enlivening power, as fellow-champions against the destroying influence of Ahriman.

But that *First Man* was conquered in the contest, and became in danger of falling into the kingdom of Ahriman; he prays to the King of the kingdom of Light, who causes the *Living Spirit* to emanate in order to assist him[4]. This lifts him up again into the kingdom of Light; but the powers of darkness had already succeeded in destroying a portion of the armour of the First Man, and swallowing up a portion of his existence as a being of light;

[1] Simplicius in Epictet. p. 137. ed. Salmas. gives an excellent portraiture of the Manichæan doctrine in this respect; ουτε το πρωτον αγαθον κακυνεισθαι λεγουσιν, ουτε τα αλλα αγαθα τα προσεχως αυτῳ συνοντα, την μητερα της ζωης, και τον δημιουργον (the ζων πνευμα) και τους εκει αιωνας.

[2] The πρωτος ἀνθρωπος of Manes is to be compared with the προων ἀνθρωπος of the Valentinians, the Adam Kadmon, and especially the Kajomorts of the Zendavesta, about whom there are many points of resemblance. It is most highly probable that Manes received this Parsic idea into his system.

[3] According to the notion of Manes, everything which exists in the kingdom of Light has its counterpart in the kingdom of Darkness. The dark earth stands opposed to the *earth of light*, and the five elements of darkness are opposed to the five pure elements.

[4] The ζων πνευμα in the Gnostic Acta Thomæ, which contain much that resembles Manicheeism.

and thus we arrive at the notion of the *Soul of the World* mixed with matter[1]. Here we find also an affinity with the Gnostic notions, according to which the κατω σοφια was saved out of the kingdom of Hyle by means of the Soter sent to her assistance; but still it was, nevertheless, a seed of the Divine Life, fallen down into the matter, which (*i. e.* the seed) must be purified and developed[2]. This must necessarily happen; through the magical power of the Divine Life, of the Light of the Soul, the wild stormy kingdom of Darkness is to become involuntarily softened, and at last rendered powerless. The taming of that stormy, blind, power of Nature is just the very object of the formation of the world. Manes is said to have attempted to make his doctrine intelligible by the following parable:—A good shepherd sees a lion fall upon his flock, he digs a pit, and throws a he-goat into it; the lion runs up eagerly in order to devour the goat; but he falls into the pit and cannot get out of it again. The shepherd, however, succeeds in drawing up the goat again, while he leaves the lion shut up in the pit, and thereby renders him harmless to his flock[3];—just as the kingdom of Darkness becomes harmless, and the souls swallowed up by it are at last saved, and brought back again to their kindred habitation. But now after the *Living Spirit* had raised man again to the kingdom of Light, he began preparations for the process of purifying the *soul that is intermingled with the kingdom of Darkness*, and this is the cause of the whole creation of the world, and the object of all the whole course of the world[4]. That portion of the soul which had not been affected by connection with matter, or with the Being of Darkness, he raised up above the earth, so that it should have its place in the sun and in the moon, and thence should spread forth its influence, in order to free the souls which were akin to it, and which were held captive by the kingdom of Darkness, and spread abroad over all nature, through the purifying process of the development of the vegetative and animal life, and thus to attract them to itself again.

[1] The ψυχη ἀπαντων.

[2] Titus of Bostra, lib. i. c. Manich. c. 12. thus excellently portrays the Manicheean doctrine: ὁ ἀγαθος δυναμιν ἀποστελλει τινα, φυλαξουσαν μεν δηθεν τους ὁρους, το δ' ἀληθες δελεαρ ἐσομενην εἰς ἀκουσιον τῃ ὑλῃ σωφρονισμον, ἐδιθη τροπον τινα ὡσπερ θηριον.

[3] Disputat. cum Archelao, c. 25. This parable bears altogether the stamp of genuineness, at least it is in the spirit of Manicheeism.

[4] Just as in the Valentinian scheme, the *Soter* operates after he has first raised the *Sophia*.

Manes also, in a manner similar to the Parsic conception of the universe, beheld the same struggle between Ormuzd and Ahriman, and the same process of purification in the physical as well as in the moral world. In contradiction to the spirit of Christianity, he mixed the physical with the religious and ethic, founded doctrines of belief and morals on speculative cosmogonies, and a natural philosophy, which being deduced more from inward conceptions than from experimental knowledge, must often have been unintelligible. Such a mixture was alike prejudicial to religion, which became flooded by a multitude of things wholly foreign to it and to knowledge, which thus is compelled to lose that soberness of understanding which is necessary to her[1]. Just as in the Parsic system of religion, in the struggle between Ormuzd and Ahriman in the physical and the spiritual world, the sun and the moon perform an important part in the conduct of the general system of development and purification, so also was it in the system of Manes. Almost what the Zoroastric system taught of Mithras as the Genius (Ized) of the Sun, was attributed by Manes to his Christ, the pure soul, whose operations proceeded from out of the sun and the moon. As he derived this soul from the *original man*, he made this the explanation of the Bible-name, *the Son of Man* (υἱος ἀνθρωπου), and as he distinguished the *pure, free* soul, whose throne is in the sun, from the soul which is akin to it, and extendeth throughout all nature, but defiled and imprisoned by its mixture with matter; he also made a distinction between a Son of Man elevated above all connection with matter, and subject to no suffering, and a Son of Man crucified,

[1] How little Manicheeism understood the interests of religion and the nature of Christianity; how little it understood the one thing needful for man, is shown by the remarkable words in which Felix, the Manichee, endeavoured to prove that Manes was the reformer of religion (the Paraclete) promised by Christ. "Et quia venit Manichæus et per suam predicationem docuit nos initium, medium et finem; docuit nos de fabrica mundi, quare facta est et unde facta est, et qui fecerunt; docuit nos quare dies et quare nox; docuit nos de cursu solis et lunæ; quia hoc in Paulo nec in cæterorum apostolorum Scripturis, hoc credimus, quia (*dass, that*) ipse est Paracletus."—Augustin. Acta c. Felice Manichæo, lib. i. c. 9. In Alexander of Lycopolis, in Egypt, the opponent of Manicheeism in the beginning of the fourth century, we find the opposite error to this of a dilution of Christianity, which, mistaking its peculiar and essential features, refers it only to certain general religious and moral truths, torn away from that with which they are connected in Christianity. With him the chief matter of Christianity is the doctrine of an Eternal God, as Creator, and good morality for the people. See the beginning of his treatise against the Manichees.

as it were, in matter, and subject to suffering[1]. Where the seed sown burst forth out of the dark bosom of the earth, and developed itself into plants, blossoms, and fruit, there Manes saw the victorious development of the principle of Light freeing itself by degrees from the fetters of matter; and he saw here that the living soul, as it were, which is kept bound in the limbs of the *Princes of Darkness*, being released from them, soars up aloft in freedom, and mingles in the *pure atmosphere*[2], where the souls, which are perfectly purified, ascend the *Ships of Light* (of the sun and of the moon), which are prepared to conduct them to their native place. But that which bears upon it multifarious stains is by degrees and in small quantities distilled from them[3] by the power of heat, and mingles itself with all trees, plants, and vegetables.

These were samples of his mystical philosophy of nature, which were brought forward sometimes in singular myths, which, although occasionally indecent, were nothing very remarkable to the imagination of Oriental people, and sometimes under the covering of Christian expressions. Thus the Manichees could speak of a suffering Son of Man who hangs on every tree, of a Christ crucified in every soul and in the whole world, and they could explain the symbols of the suffering Son of Man in the Last Supper according to their own sense. Just as well, also, or rather with greater justice—for this intermixture of religion with the knowledge of nature was more heathen than Christian—the Manichees might use heathen myths as a covering for their ideas; and thus the boy, Dionysos, torn to pieces by the Titans, as celebrated in the Bacchic mysteries, is nothing but the soul swallowed up by the powers of darkness, the Divine life divided into pieces by matter[4].

[1] The *υἱος ἀνθρωπου ἐμπαθης*, and the *υἱος ἀνθρωπου ἀπαθης*.

[2] The pure holy air, which is exactly in accordance with the Parsic worship of Nature, and a common term in the Zend-avesta.

[3] [I have some doubt as to the construction of the original sentence. But I conceive the 'ihnen,' '*from them*,' to refer to the purified souls,—that these stains are separated from them. H. J. R.]

[4] See Alexand. Lycopol. c. 5. The following are a few peculiarly characteristic Manichecan passages, as proofs of the exposé given above. In the Thesaurus of Manes the following passage occurs: "Viva anima, quæ earundem (adversarum potestatum) membris tenebatur, hac occasione lunata evadit, et suo purissimo aeri miscetur: ubi penitus ablutæ animæ ædcendunt ad lucidas naves, quæ sibi ad evectionem atque ad suæ patriæ transfretationem sunt præparatæ. Id vero quod adhuc adversi generis maculas portat, per æstum atque calores particulatum descendit, atque arboribus, cæterisque plantationibus ac satis omnibus miscetur." Euodius de

The Powers of Darkness were now threatened by the danger, that by means of the operation of the Spirit of the Sun upon the purifying process of Nature, all the Light and Life kept prisoners in their members would be by degrees withdrawn from them, namely, the soul which had been seized upon by them, which struggles after a release, and which is always attracted by the kindred spirit of the Sun, constantly frees itself more and more and flees away, so that at last the kingdom of Darkness, robbed of all its stolen Light, should be wholly abandoned to its own inward hatefulness and to its death. What then was to be done? A Being was to be produced, into which the Soul of Nature, that struggles to free itself, should be driven and fast bound, in which all the scattered Light and Life of Nature, all which the Powers of Darkness kept imprisoned in their members, and which was constantly more and more enticed away from them by the power of the Sun, is concentrated; this is The Man, the image of the Original Man, and therefore already destined through his form to rule over Nature[1]. The matter stands thus. The Lofty Light-Form of the original Man (which was also apparently peculiar to the Son of Man dwelling in the Sun[2]) sends down light from the Sun into the kingdom of Darkness, or the Material World; the Powers of Darkness are seized with desire after the Light-Form, but with confusion also. Their Prince now speaks to them: "What think ye that great Light to be which rises up yonder? Behold! how it shakes the pole, how it strikes to earth many of our

Fide, c. 14. From the Letter of Manes to the maiden Menoch, we have this passage: "agnoscendo ex quo genere animarum emanaveris, quod est confusum omnibus corporibus, et saporibus et speciebus variis cohæret." Augustin. opus imperfectum contra Julian. lib. iii. § 172. There is also a passage of Faustus, the Manichee, who lived in the first half of the fifth century, in which the Holy Ghost is represented as the enlivening and sanctifying power of God, working through the air towards the purifying process of Nature; and the doctrine of the birth of Christ from the Virgin (which the Manichees, being Docetæ, cannot agree to in its proper sense) is represented as a symbol of the birth of that patibilis Jesus from the virgin bosom of the earth through the operation of the power of the Holy Ghost: "Spiritus sancti, qui est majestas tertia, aeris hunc omnem ambitum sedem fatemur ac diversorium, cujus ex viribus ac spiritali profusione terram quoque concipientem gignere patibilem Jesum, qui est vita ac salus hominum, omni suspensus ex ligno. Quapropter et nobis circa universam (*i. e.* all productions of Nature, considered as revelations of the same Divine *principle of life*, suffering under the imprisonment of matter, revelations of the same Jesus patibilis) et vobis similiter erga panem et calicem par religio est." August. c. Faust. c. xx.

[1] Compare the parallel doctrines of the Ophites.

[2] Alexand. Lycopolit. c. 4. εἰκονα δε ἐν ἡλιῳ ἑωρασθαι τοιαυτην, οἱον ἐστι το του ἀνθρωπου εἰδος.

Powers! Therefore is it fitting, that ye should rather bestow on me whatsoever ye have of Light in your powers; and then I will make an image of that Great One, which appears full of glory, through which we may rule, and may hereafter free ourselves from our abode in Darkness." Thus human nature is the image, in this dark world, of higher existence, through which the higher (everything of a higher nature) may be attracted hither and held fast. After they had heard this, and had consulted together for a long time, they thought it best to fulfil his desire, *for they did not believe that this Light could long maintain itself among them*[1], and therefore they considered it best to offer it to their Prince, because they did not doubt that by this means they should obtain the predominance. The Powers of Darkness now paired themselves, and begat children, in whom their common natures and powers were again represented, and in whom everything which they had of the essence of Light and Darkness in them reproduced itself. All these children of theirs the Prince of Darkness devours, and by this means concentrates in himself all the Light-Existence which was spread abroad among the individual Powers of Darkness, and he produced Man, in whom all the powers of the kingdoms of Darkness and of Light, which had here intermingled with each other, assembled together. Hence Man is considered as a microcosm,—a reflection of the whole world of Light and of Darkness, a mirror of all the Powers of the Heaven and of the Earth[2].

[1] This is the most important matter.

[2] Manes, Ep. Fundamenti; Augustin. de Natura Boni, c. 46. Construebantur et continebantur omnium imagines, cœlestium ac terrenarum virtutum: ut pleni videlicet orbis, id quod formabatur, similitudinem obtineret. We must not here suppress the fact, that in respect to the main matter of the formation of man, *a somewhat different* construction of the Manicheean system is possible, which Mosheim, with his peculiar acuteness, has thoroughly worked out, and for which certainly something of weight may be advanced. Unfortunately, the gaps which have been left in the extant fragments of Manes, which are the most secure foundation for any account of his system, are too great to allow us to decide the inquiry by his own words. We have followed that *mode of construction* by which man was supposed to be created later than the rest of Nature, in order to keep fast in Nature the soul whose tendency was to escape. The last-quoted words of Manes appear to support this representation. So also does the Disputat. Archelai, § 7., as well as the words of Alexander of Lycopolis, about the form of man shedding down light from the sun. It would then be the same Spirit of the Sun, who, after the first separation of Light from Darkness, operating upon the purifying process of Nature, had put the Powers of Darkness (who feared to be thereby robbed of all their spiritual being which constantly escaped from them) into confusion, and which afterwards appeared in Christ as the

That which is here described, is repeated constantly in the course of Nature, when at the birth of a man, the wild powers of Matter, the Powers of Darkness, pairing themselves together, produce a human Nature, in which they mingle together whatsoever they have both of the higher and of the lower Life, and in which they endeavour to fetter the Soul of Nature, which, while it struggles after freedom, is held prisoner by them[1].

Also, according to the Manicheean scheme, the Powers of Darkness are involuntarily subservient to a higher law, and by their machinations against the kingdom of Light, prepare destruction for themselves. The Light, (*lit.* Light Nature, or particles partaking of the essential attributes of Light) or the Soul, concentrated in man's nature, thereby only arrives the sooner at a consciousness of itself, and at the development of its own peculiar nature. As the common Soul of the World endeavours to subject to itself all existing Matter, *i. e.* the great Body of the World, so

Redeemer. To this the passage of Alexand. Lycop. appears to point, c. 4. τον δη Χριστον εἰναι νουν, οὐ δη και αφικομενον ποτε (then, when the Powers of Darkness endeavoured, by the formation of man, to retain the soul which threatened to escape from them, and thus to frustrate the work of the Spirit of the Sun) πλειστον τι της δυναμεως ταυτης προς τον Θεον λελυκεναι και δη το τελευταιον, &c. The fragments also of a Manichee in the preface to the IIIrd Division of Titus of Bostra, may be conveniently explained in the same manner.

But we might also, with Mosheim, set the formation of man in the system of Manes *before the whole creation of the world.* The Powers of Darkness were disturbed at the appearance of the ζωνπνευμα, which threatened to tear away from them all the souls they had seized upon. Hence they now united themselves in order to form Man, after the image of that original Man, whom they saw shining from afar (this was that 'ille magnus qui gloriosus apparuit'), in order that they might through him enchant and hold fast the souls which the Living Spirit threatened to rob them of. It was, then, after the intention of the Living Spirit, to free at once the imprisoned souls, had been frustrated by these machinations, that he for the first time thought of the creation of the world, in order to effect *by degrees, what he had been prevented from accomplishing at once.* The words of Alexander of Lycopolis, who, however, did not find himself quite at home in the train of thought belonging to the Manichean system, appear to support this view, when he accuses the Manicheean system of inconsistency (Inconsequenz): c. 23. ἐν ἡλιῳ δε την εἰκονα (του ἀνθρωπου) ἑωρασθαι λεγουσιν, ὡς ἐγενετο κατ' αὐτους ἀπο της προς την ὑλην ὑστερον διακρισεως, for, according to these words, (if Alexander has understood Manes properly, or the Manichee whose works he read, has properly represented the doctrines of his master) Manes must have imagined the separation of the soul unaffected by Matter, or of the Spirit of the Sun, to have taken place before the rest and after the formation of man.

[1] The words of Manes, l. c., are these, "sicuti etiam nunc fieri videmus, corporum formatricem naturam mali inde vires sumentem figurare." These words seem important as a hint, which indicates the symbolical meaning of the whole narration.

must this Soul, derived as it is from the same origin as that, govern this miniature material world. "The first soul," says Manes[1], "which flowed forth from the God of Light, received this form of the body, in order that it might govern the body by its restraints (*lit.* bridle)." The soul of the First Man[2], as standing nearer to the Original Source of the kingdom of Light, was therefore endued with pre-eminent powers. But yet, in consequence of its double descent, the Nature of the First Man consisted of two opposite parts; the one a soul akin to the kingdom of Light, already in possession of the fulness of its power, and the other a body akin to the kingdom of Darkness, together with a blind matter-born capability of desire, which it derived from the same kingdom[3].

Under these circumstances, all depended, with the Powers of Darkness, on their being able to oppress the Light-Nature which had been superinduced on man, and to retain it in a condition of unconsciousness. They invited man to eat of all the trees of Paradise, that is, to enjoy all earthly desires, while they only wished to restrain him from eating of the tree of the knowledge of Good and Evil, that is, from attaining to a consciousness of the opposition between Light and Darkness, or between the Divine and the Ungodly in his own nature, and in the whole world[4]. But an angel of Light, or rather the Spirit of the Sun himself, persuaded man to transgress the commandment, that is, he led him to that consciousness which the Powers of Darkness wished to withhold from him, and thereby secured him the victory over them. This is the truth, which is the foundation of that narrative of Genesis, only we must change the persons engaged in the transaction, and instead of *God* we must put the *Prince of Darkness*, and instead of the *Serpent* we must put the *Spirit of the Sun*[5].

[1] In the letter quoted above, 186.

[2] "Quasi de primæ facta flore substantiæ," says Manes, l. c.

[3] The ψυχη ἀλογος.

[4] See Disputat. Archelai, c. 10.

[5] This would be the explanation of the doctrine of Manes, if the representation given by the Manichee in Titus of Bostra (at the end of the preface to the third book) be the original one; and it may be said that it suits the Manicheean system extremely well, and dovetails in with the account given of it in the Disputation of Archelaus. It may, perhaps, surprise us, that Manes, who was brought up in the Parsic religion, should have made *the serpent*, which among the Parses is the symbol of Ahriman, into the symbol of the Good Spirit; but according to the view given above this consideration forms no difficulty. As he saw in the religious documents of the Jews so many corruptions derived from the Spirit of Darkness, he saw his

As now the kingdom of Light had triumphed over the Powers of Darkness, the latter made use of a new means, in order to take prisoner the Light-Nature, which had now attained to self-consciousness, and to detach it from its connexion with its original Source. They seduced the First Man, by means of the Eva bestowed upon him as a companion, into giving himself up to fleshly desires, and thereby, becoming untrue to his nature as a Being of Light, to make himself the servant of a foreign domination[1]. The consequence which flowed thence was, that the Soul, which by its original power ought to raise itself into the kingdom of Light, divided itself by propagation, and became enclosed anew in material bodies, so that the Powers of Darkness could for ever repeat what they had done at the production of the First Man.

Every man also has now the same destination as the first, namely, to rule by means of the power of the Spirit over matter. Every one consists of the same two parts, of which the nature of the first man consisted, and, therefore, all depends upon this, that man, remembering his origin, should know how to separate these two parts properly from each other. He who thinks that he has received his sensuous nature, (sinnlichkeit) together with its appetites, from God,—he who does not know from the very first origin of human nature, that it (viz. this sinnlichkeit, or his corporeal and sensuous endowments,) proceeds from the kingdom of Darkness, will easily allow himself to be seduced into serving his senses, and thereby lose his higher Light-Nature, and become unfaithful to the kingdom of Light. Therefore does Manes say in his Letter of Principles (Epistola Fundamenti), "If it had been given to man to know clearly the whole condition of Adam's and Eve's origin, they would never have been subjected to decay and death." And hence, also, he writes to the virgin Menoch[2] thus: "May our God himself enlighten thy soul, and reveal to thee

corruptions and falsifying influence exerted also in a wilful corruption of this narrative, by changing the places of those engaged in the transaction.

[1] As we have no accounts of the arrangement of these events in the Manichean system as to the time of their occurrence, we may also place their relations to each other in a different manner. It may be supposed that Adam first allowed himself to be seduced into sin, but afterwards being brought by the influence of the Sun-Spirit to a consciousness of the opposition between the flesh and the Spirit, and Light and Darkness, that he began a more holy life. See Augustin. de Moribus Manichæorum, lib. ii. c. 19.

[2] Augustin. op. imperfect. c. Julian., lib. iii. § 172.

thy righteousness, because thou art the fruit of a godly stem[1]. Thou also hast become Light, by recognising what thou wast before, and from what race of Souls thou art sprung, which being intermingled with all bodies is connected with various forms; for as souls are engendered by souls, so is the form of the body composed of the nature of the body. That also, which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the spirit is spirit. But know that the spirit is the soul, soul of soul, flesh of flesh[2]." He then appealed to the *custom of infant baptism, which was even then prevalent in the Parsic Church*, as a proof that Christians themselves, by their mode of proceeding, took for granted such an original defilement of man's nature. "I inquire," he says, in the Letter[3] we have quoted, "whether all evil is *actual* evil? Wherefore, then, does any one receive purification by means of water, before he has done any evil, as he cannot possibly have been obnoxious to evil *in his own person?* But inasmuch as he has been the subject of no evil, and yet must be purified, *they* point out *ipso facto*, a descent from an evil race; even they themselves, whose fancy will not allow them to understand what they say, nor what they assume."

The particle of Light (*literally*, the Light-Nature) which from its removal from the source of that concentrated Existence-of-Light (literally, Light-Being) in the person of Adam, from which all souls emanated, was constantly becoming more and more defiled through its continued connexion with matter,—so that it now remained no longer in possession of the original power which it had, when it first flowed forth fresh from the original source of the kingdom of Light. The Law, however, presupposes the original power of the Light-Nature, to be still in existence, in order that it (the Law) may be put in practice. "The Law is holy," says Manes, "but it is holy for *holy souls*, the commandment is upright and good, but for *upright and good souls*[4]." He says in another passage[5], "If we do good, it is not the work of the flesh, for the works of the flesh are manifest (Gal. v. 19); or

[1] The Revelation consists in man's being brought to a consciousness of his Light-Nature.

[2] According to the Light-Emanation System adopted by Manes, he could not make any difference between the Spirit of God and the spirit of man, between *spirit* and *soul*.

[3] Augustin. op. c. Julian. imperfect., lib. iii. § 187.

[4] L. c. c. Julian., iii. 186.

[5] L. c. 177.

if we do evil, then it is not the work of the soul, for the fruit of the Spirit is peace, joy. And the Apostle exclaims, in the Epistle to the Romans, "The good which I would I do not, but the evil which I would not that I do." Ye perceive therefore the voice of the contending soul, which defends its freedom against lust, for it was distressed, because Sin, that is, Satan, had worked all lust in it. The reverence for the Law discovers all its evil, because the Law blames all its practices, which the flesh admires and esteems; for all bitterness in the renunciation of lust is sweet for the soul, which is nourished thereby and thereby attains to strength. At last the Soul of him who withdraws himself from every gratification of lust, is awake, it becomes mature, and increases; but the gratification of lust is usually the means of loss to the soul[1]. And now, in order at last to free the souls which are akin to him from the power of Darkness, to animate them anew, to give them a perfect victory over it, and to attract them to himself, the same Spirit of the Sun, who has hitherto conducted the whole process of purification for Nature and for the spiritual world, (which two, according to the principles of Manes here laid down, make up only one whole) must reveal himself in human nature[2].

But between Light and Darkness no communion is possible. "The Light shines in Darkness," said Manes, using the words of St. John, after *his own interpretation*, "but the Darkness cannot comprehend it." The Son of the Original Light, the Spirit of the Sun, could not ally himself with any material body; he could only envelop himself in a phantomic form, perceptible by the senses, in order that he might be perceived by man as a creature of sense. "While the Supreme Light," Manes writes[3], "put himself on a footing with his own people as to his nature, he assumed a body among material bodies, although he himself is every thing, and only one whole nature." By an arbitrary mode of interpretation, he appealed for a proof of his Docetism,

[1] L. c. 177.

[2] On the Incarnations of the Sun in the old Oriental religions, see Kreuzer's Symbolik, (New edition, 2nd Part, 53. 207.) It was quite consistent, according to the Manichean System, for the Manichees to say, (ap. Alexander of Lycopolis, c. 24.) that Christ, as the νους, was τα ὀντα παντα. So also in the Acts of Thomas, p. 10, κυριε, ὁ ἐν πασιν ὠν και διερχομενος διαπαντων και ἐγκειμενος πασι τοις ἐργοις σου και δια της παντων ἐνεργειας φανερουμενος.

[3] In the Letter to one Adas or Addas. Fabricii Biblioth. Græca, ed. nov. vol. vii. p. 316.

to the circumstance, that Christ once, (John viii. 59.) when the Jews wished to stone him, escaped through the midst of them without their being able to lay hold on him, and also that Christ at his transfiguration appeared to his disciples in his true Light-Form[1]. He assumed improperly the name Christ or Messias, in accommodating himself to the notions of the Jews[2]. The Prince of Darkness endeavoured to effect the crucifixion of Jesus, because he did not know him as the being elevated above all suffering; and this crucifixion was, of course, nothing but an apparent one. This appearance represented the crucifixion of the Soul overwhelmed with matter, which the Spirit of the Sun desired to elevate to himself. As the crucifixion of that soul which was spread over all matter only served to facilitate the annihilation of the Kingdom of Darkness, so also still more did that *apparent crucifixion of the Supreme Soul.* Therefore Manes said, "The adversary, who hoped that he had crucified the Saviour, the Father of the righteous, was crucified himself; that *which happened*, and that which seemed to happen in this case, were two different things[3]." The Manicheean view, which made the doctrine of Christ crucified merely symbolical, is clearly displayed in an apocryphal *writing about the travels of the Apostles*[4]. While John is in anxiety during the passion of Christ, the latter appears to him and tells him, that all this happens only for the lower multitude in Jerusalem[5]. The human person of Christ now disappears, and instead of him there appears a cross of pure light, surrounded by various other forms, which, nevertheless, represented only *one form* and *one image* (as a symbol of the various forms under which the *one Soul* appears). From above the cross there proceeded a divine and cheering voice, which said to him, "The Cross of Light will, for your sake, be called, sometimes the Logos, sometimes Christ, sometimes the Door, sometimes the

[1] See the Fragment from the Epistles of Manes, l. c.

[2] ἡ του Χριστου προσηγορια ὀνομα ἐστι καταχρηστικον. l. c.

[3] From the Epistola Fundamenti, Euod. de fid. c. 28. την δυναμιν την θειαν ἐνηρμοσθαι, ἐνεσταυρωσθαι τῃ ὑλῃ. Alex. Lycopolit. c. 4. Christus in omni mundo et omni anima crucifixus. Secundin. Ep. ad Augustin. The words of Faustus the Manichee are these: Augustin. c. Faustum, lib. xxxii. Crucis ejus mystica fixio, qua nostræ animæ passionis monstrantur vulnera.

[4] περιοδοι ἀποστολων. Concil. Nic. II. actio v. ed. Mansi, t. xiii. p. 167.

[5] τῳ κατω ὀλῳ.

Way, sometimes Jesus, sometimes the Father, sometimes the Spirit, sometimes Life, sometimes the Truth, sometimes Faith, and sometimes Grace."

As Manes joined those among the Parses who maintained an absolute dualism, he did not propose as the object of the whole course of the world a reconciliation between the good and the evil principle, which would not have suited his theory, but an entire separation of Light from Darkness, and an utter annihilation of the power of the latter. After matter had been deprived of all Light and Life, which did not belong to her, she was to be burnt up into a dead mass [1]. All souls might become partakers of redemption in virtue of their Light-Nature; but if they voluntarily gave themselves up to the service of evil or of Darkness, by way of punishment, after the general separation of the two kingdoms, they were to be driven into the dead mass of matter, and set to keep watch over it. Manes in his *Epistola Fundamenti* expressed himself thus on this point: those souls which have allowed themselves to be seduced from their original Light-Nature through love of the World, and have become enemies of the holy Light, that is, which have armed themselves openly for the destruction of the Holy Element, which serve the fiery Spirit, and have oppressed by hostile persecution the Holy Church [2] and the elect to be found in it [3], that is, the observers of the commandments of heaven—these souls will be detained far from the blessedness and the glory of the Holy Earth. And because they have suffered themselves to be conquered by evil, they will remain in company with this family of evil, so that *that Earth* of peace and those regions of immortality are closed against them. That will happen to them for this reason, that, because they gave themselves up to evil works, they became estranged from the Life and Freedom of the Holy Light. Thus, they cannot be received into that kingdom of peace, but are chained down into that terrible mass (of matter left to itself, or Darkness) for which a guard is necessary. These Souls will thus remain entangled among those things, which they have loved, for they

[1] Tit. Bostr. l. c. 30. Alex. Lycopol. c. 5.

[2] That is, the Manicheean sect.

[3] A persecution of the *Brahmins* of the Manichees, or the Electi, which was a special crime; all this was in full accordance with the oriental ideas of the priesthood.

did not separate themselves from them, while they had the opportunity [1].

In regard to the Manicheean view of the *sources of knowledge* of religion, the revelations of the *Paraclete or Manes*, were the highest, the only *infallible* sources, by which all others must be judged. They set out from the principle that the doctrines of Manes include the absolute truths, which are evident to our reason; whatever does not accord with them, is contrary to reason, and false, wherever it may be found. But they now accepted also the writings of the New Testament in part; but, while they judged of them according to the paramount principle stated above, they allowed themselves a very arbitrary line of criticism in respect to their dogmatical and ethical use [2]. Partly, they maintained that the original documents of religion had been adulterated by various interpolations of the Prince of Darkness [3] (the tares amidst the good wheat); partly, Jesus and the Apostles were supposed to accommodate themselves to the opinions prevalent among the Jews, in order, gradually, to render men capable of receiving truth in its purity; and partly, the Apostles themselves were supposed on their first entrance upon the office of teachers, to have been under the influence of many Jewish errors. Thence they gathered that it was only by the instruction of the Paraclete, that men could learn to separate the true from the false in the New Testament. Faustus, the Manichee, thus brings forward the principles of Manicheeism in this respect [4]: "We only receive that part of the New Testament, which was spoken to the honour of the Son of Glory, either by himself or by the Apostles, and even then, only that which was spoken when they were already *Perfect* or *Believers*. We will take no account of the rest, neither what was spoken by the Apostles in simplicity and ignorance, while they were as yet unacquainted with the truth, nor of that which was attributed to them with evil intentions by their enemies, nor of that which was imprudently maintained by their writers [5], and handed down to their successors. I think,

[1] De Fide, c. 4.

[2] Titus of Bostra says this of them in the very beginning of his third book.

[3] See above, the similar principles used in the Clementine in regard to the Old Testament.

[4] Ap. Augustin. lib. 32.

[5] Namely the Evangelists, who were not Apostles.

however, that HE was born of a woman in sin, was circumcised as a Jew, that he sacrificed as an Heathen, that he was baptized in an inferior manner, and was carried about the wilderness by the Devil, and exposed to the most painful trials." The same Manichees who were content that their reason should be fettered by all the decisions of Manes as divine revelations, were zealous for the rights of reason, and wished to be looked upon as the *only reasonable* men, when they employed themselves in separating what is conformable to reason in the New Testament from that which contradicts it. Faustus, the Manichee, speaks to one, who believes without critical discrimination in *all* which is contained in the New Testament, "*Thou, that believest all blindly; thou, that dost banish reason, the gift of nature, out of mankind; thou, that makest it a scruple to yourself to judge between truth and falsehood! and thou, that art not less afraid to separate good from its contrary, than children are afraid of ghosts*[1]!"

The Manichees had a *composition of their religious society*, entirely peculiar to themselves, in which the character of Oriental Mysticism may be recognized. Manes separated himself wholly, as it follows from what is said above, from the greater number of the Gnostic founders of sects, as these latter wished to change nothing in the existing Christian Church, but only to introduce a secret doctrine of the πνευματικοι, to run parallel with the Church-belief of the ψυχικοι. Manes, on the contrary, wished to be looked upon as a Reformer of the whole Church, sent from God and endued with Divine authority; he wished to give a new form to the Church, which he thought entirely dislocated by the intermixture of Judaism and Christianity[2]; there was to be only *one true Christian Church*, which was to be moulded after the doctrines and principles of Manes. In this, only two orders were to exist, according to the distinction between an *exoteric* and an *esoteric* doctrine, which was a fundamental feature of the Oriental systems of religion. The *auditores* were to form the great mass of the exoterics; the writings of Manes were read to these, and the doctrines laid before them in their symbolical and mystical clothing, but they received no explanation as to their interior and

[1] Augustin. c. Faust. lib. xviii. and also lib. xi.

[2] Hence he called other Christians, not Christians, but Galileans. Fabric. Bibl. Gr. vol. vii. p. 316.

hidden meaning [1]. We can easily imagine how the expectation of the *auditores* was put to the stretch, when they heard these enigmatical and mysterious high-sounding things laid before them, and, as it often happens, hoped that they should find lofty wisdom in what was enigmatical and unintelligible! The *esoterics* were the *Electi*, or *Perfecti* [2], the *Caste of Priests*,—the *Brahmins* of the Manichees [3]. They were to lead, in celibacy, a strictly ascetic and wholly contemplative life; they were to refrain from all strong liquors, and from all animal food; they were to be distinguished by a holy innocence, which injures no living creature, and a religious veneration for the Divine Life which is spread abroad throughout all nature; and, hence, they were not only, neither to kill nor wound any animal, but not even to pull any vegetable, nor to pluck any fruit or flower. They were to be provided with all that was needful for their subsistence by the *auditores*, by whom they were to be honoured as beings of a superior kind. From this caste of priests the leaders of the whole religious society were chosen. As Manes wished to be looked upon as the Paraclete, promised by Christ, he chose twelve apostles also after the example of Christ. And this arrangement was to be constantly maintained, that twelve such persons, under the name of *Magistri*, should lead the whole sect. Above these twelve stood a thirteenth, who, as the head of the whole sect, represented Manes. Under these stood seventy-two bishops, who were to answer to the seventy or seventy-two [4] disciples of Jesus, and then below these, presbyters and deacons, and lastly, roving missionaries of the faith [5].

There is considerable obscurity about the question, what the Manichees held as to the *celebration of the sacraments*. This arises from the circumstance, that, naturally enough, no authentic account could be known of that which took place in the assemblies of the *Electi*, which were held very secretly; and as the *auditores* might be supposed to answer to the catechumens, and

[1] It certainly follows from this, that the writings of Manes must contain a certain interior meaning, understood only by the *electi*.

[2] τελειοι, according to Theodoret, an appellation which re-appeared again among the Gnostic-Manicheean sects of the middle ages.

[3] Faustus, as quoted by Augustine, calls them the "Sacerdotale Genus."

[4] According to the well known *varia lectio*.

[5] Augustin. de Hæres. c. 46.

the *Electi* to the *Fideles* of the general Church, it may at once be imagined that the sacrament could only be celebrated among the *Electi*. The belief, that we are justified, in consequence of the inference, which has been quoted, as made by Manes from the prevailing custom of infant-baptism, in supposing that infant-baptism prevailed among the Manichees, is unsound, as Mosheim has already shown; in that passage, Manes intended to controvert his adversaries out of their own conduct in respect to principles, which that conduct necessarily pre-supposed, without intending to convey any approbation of that conduct. And besides the use of baptism might appear to the Manichees, according to their own theory of the pure and holy Elements, as a suitable ceremony for initiation into the interior of the sect, or for reception into the number of the *electi*. And yet it may also be thought that they were not favourable to this symbol, as being a Jewish one, which came from John the Baptist; perhaps from the very beginning no other kind of initiation was practised among them, than that which we find afterwards among the offsets of the Manichees in the middle ages; and perhaps the use of baptism had only proceeded in certain parts of the sect from an adherence to the prevailing custom of the Church[1]. The *celebration of the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper* might be perfectly well interpreted according

[1] From the words of Felix the Manichee, lib. i. c. 19. ut quid baptizati sumus? we cannot prove that the Manichees considered baptism as a necessary initiatory ceremony, for here also the Manichee is rather using an argumentum *ad hominem*, and he may have received baptism *before* his conversion to Manicheeism. From the passages in the Commonitorium, quo modo sit agendum cum Manichæis (to be found in the Appendix to the 8th vol. of the Benedictine edition of St. Augustine) where a distinction is made between those Manichees, who had been received, at their conversion to the Catholic Church among the *Catechumens*, and those who were received, as *being already baptized*, into the number of the *Pœnitentes*, it is also entirely impossible to draw the conclusion, that baptism was in use among the Manichees; and still less does it follow, because such a distinction is made between baptized and unbaptized among the *electi* themselves, who transgressed, that baptism was voluntarily received only by a *certain part* of the *electi*; for here also the author may be speaking only of such persons as had received baptism in the Catholic Church before their conversion to the Manicheean sect. The passage in Augustin. de Moribus Ecclesiæ Catholicæ, c. 35, where he makes the Manichees offer it as a reproach to Catholic Christians, that even fideles et jam baptizati lived in marriage and in the various relations of family life, and possessed and administered earthly property, by no means proves that among the *electi* there was a class of persons, who, having voluntarily submitted to baptism, were the only persons who, through an inviolable engagement

to the mystical natural philosophy [1] of the Manichees. Augustine, as one of the *auditores* among the Manichees, had heard that the *electi* celebrated the Lord's Supper; but he knew nothing of the mode in which it was done [2]. It is only certain, that the *electi* could drink no wine, but whether they used water like the Encratites, the so-called ὑδροπαραστατοι, or what other measures they took, we have no means of determining. *The sign of recognition* among the Manichees was the giving of the right hand to each other when they met, as a symbol of their common redemption from the kingdom of Darkness through the freeing power of the Spirit of the Sun; while that was repeated in them, which had taken place in their Heavenly Father the Original Man, when he was in danger of sinking down into the kingdom of Darkness, and was again lifted up through the right hand of the Living Spirit [3].

In regard to the *festivals of the Manichees*, we may observe that they celebrated Sunday, not as commemorating the resurrection of Christ, which did not suit their Docetism, but as the day consecrated to the Sun [4], who was in fact their Christ. In contradiction to the prevailing usage of the Church, they fasted on this day. The festivals in honour of Christ, of course, did not suit the Docetism of the Manichees. While, indeed, according to the account of Augustine, they sometimes celebrated the festival of *Easter* in accordance with the prevailing usage of the Church, yet the lukewarmness with which this celebration took place, may be explained from the circumstance that they could not be touched by any of those feelings, which gave so much holiness to this festival in the eyes of other Christians. On this account they celebrated the more solemnly the martyrdom of their founder, Manes, which took place in the month of March. It was called Βημα (suggestus, Cathedra) the festival of the Chair

were bound to a strict ascetic life; for the FIDELES and the BAPTIZATI, two exactly equivalent expressions, here have a general correspondence with the *electi* of the Manichees. Mosheim's distinction, therefore, between baptized and unbaptized *electi*, however natural it may appear when abstractedly considered, seems altogether arbitrary.

[1] In accordance with the notion that the fruits of nature represented the Son of Man crucified in nature.

[2] Augustin. contra Fortunatum, lib. i. in the addendum.

[3] Disputat. Archelai, c. 7.

[4] Besides many other passages, see Augustin. c. Faustum, lib. xviii. c. 5. "Vos in die, quem dicunt solis, solem colitis."

of the Teacher, the festival dedicated to the memory of the teacher illuminated by God. A teacher's chair gaily ornamented and enveloped in costly cloths, was placed in the room where their assemblies were held, and five steps, apparently as a symbol of the five pure Elements, led the way to this chair. All the Manichees testified their reverence for this chair, by falling down before it to the earth, after the Oriental fashion [1].

As far as the *moral character* of the Manicheean sect is concerned, since it is necessary on this point accurately to distinguish between the different periods in the history of a sect, we have too scanty notices of the *first adherents* to it, to allow us to pronounce any definite opinion on the point. Thus much only may be asserted, that Manes intended to maintain a severity of morals in his doctrine; but it must be acknowledged, that the mystical language in which it was conveyed, which was occasionally indecent, might introduce among uneducated and unrefined men the intermixture of a sensuous extravagance, likely to prove dangerous to purity of morals.

Almost immediately that the Manichees began to spread in the Roman empire, a violent *persecution broke out against them.* They were peculiarly obnoxious to the Roman government as a sect, which drew its origin from the Persian empire, then at war with the Roman, and which was connected with the religion of the Parses. The Emperor Diocletian (A.D. 296.) issued a law (which has been quoted in vol. i. p. 146.) against this sect, by which the leaders of it were condemned to be burnt, and their other associates, if they were of an ordinary rank of life, were to be beheaded and suffer a forfeiture of their estates [2].

[1] Augustin. contra Epist. Fundamenti, c. 8. c. Faustum, lib. xviii. c. 5.

[2] In regard to the train of thought and the language, in which the edict is composed, it contains all the internal marks of genuineness. It is difficult to conjecture by whom and with what intention such an edict could have been invented *in this form.* A Christian, who might have been inclined to palm such an edict upon the world, in order to drive the emperors to a persecution of the Manicheean sect, would not exactly have chosen Diocletian, and still less have attributed such language to him. Although the later Christians, in their notions of a dominant religion, transmitted traditionally to them through the Fathers, had much that was analogous to the thoughts of the Heathen, yet a Christian would never have expressed himself *altogether in this fashion.*

Why should not the Manicheean sect *already* have been able *by that time* to extend itself towards Proconsular Africa; for the Gnostics had been preparing the way there, the Manichees certainly were *at an early period* spread abroad in these dis-

SECTION V.

THE HISTORY OF THE FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIANITY AS A SYSTEM OF DOCTRINES IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, WHICH FORMED ITSELF IN OPPOSITION TO THE SECTS.

(1.) *The genetic development of Church Theology in general, and the characteristic of the individual religious and dogmatical dispositions which have peculiarly influenced it.*

LIFE in religion, as elsewhere, precedes understanding, and this latter forms itself out of the former. Christianity had at first taken root in the inward life, and had here become the ruling principle; but then the full import of the doctrines of that faith, into which man had been at first led through a new life within, and the power of which he had first experienced in his spiritual life, was necessarily to be brought out into a full and clear consciousness, by means of a form of thought corresponding to this inward life, and expressed in definite ideas, with constantly increasing clearness and distinctness. As we have before observed, this end was peculiarly furthered by the struggle against those tendencies of the religious spirit, which, although they were in some degree touched by the influence of Christianity, yet constantly adulte-

tricts, and the chronological data relative to the first history of this sect are so uncertain? It is said in the law, "si qui sane etiam honorati aut cujuslibet dignitatis vel majoris personæ ad hanc sectam se transtulerunt," but it does not necessarily follow from this, that the emperor had any certain account of the propagation of this sect among the *first* classes, and it would not be surprising in the then attachment of persons of distinction, (who are always glad enough, besides, to have something that implies distinction in religion,) to Theurgical studies, and to endeavours after sublime determination relative to the World of Spirits, if a mysterious religion of this kind, with such lofty pretensions, found a ready acceptance with them. Besides, the *argumentum e silentio*, in historical criticism, is very uncertain; if no particular circumstances conspire to give it greater weight, and the fact that the ancient Fathers of the Church did not quote a decree of Diocletian against the Manichees, easily admits of a satisfactory explanation. And yet this decree is quoted as early as Hilarius, who wrote a commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul, in the comment. on 2 Tim. iii. 7.

rated real Christianity on one side or the other; and which, therefore, by means of their opposition, still more called forth the endeavour to set this (*i. e.* pure Christianity) in a clear light, and to hold it steady.

The opposition against Judaism and Heathenism, from the very nature of things, could influence only the *most general* development of Christian knowledge; but the opposition against those Judaizing, Orientalizing, and Hellenizing tendencies, which laid hold even of the inward life of the Church, and threatened to corrupt it, had this effect, that the import of the peculiarly Christian doctrines were unfolded and brought before the mind of man with more clear and distinct consciousness. But yet, as Christianity was constantly limiting its propagation more and more to the territory of heathenism, and passing out of the circle of Judaism, the connection of the Catholic Church, as it formed itself with Judaism, must have become less and less, while its connection with Gnosticism, the more Christianity was spread among the educated heathens, to whose views the more free Gnostic conception of it would be most consonant, would become constantly more predominant, and of itself, the influence of the deep and comprehensive Gnosticism, would be more important, more prolific, and more lasting, than that of the meagre and dry Judaism. No phenomenon of this age had so general an influence on the development of the Christian Faith and Theology, as Gnosticism had, by means of the opposition which it excited.

As far as regards this influence in general, without reference, however, to the most important doctrines, (of which we shall hereafter speak more at large,) men were necessarily induced, through their opposition to the Gnostics, to give an account to themselves of the sources from which a knowledge of the Christian faith was to be obtained, for the Gnostics denied the authenticity, or at least the sufficiency of the documents, which alone had hitherto been silently received in the Catholic Church, namely, the received body of Scripture, as well as of the traditions of the Church, and in opposition to these they set up a different source of knowledge in a pretended secret doctrine, transmitted down from Christ and his Apostles, or from a chosen number among the Apostles. And since, besides, the Gnostics, by means of a capricious and allegorizing mode of interpretation, or by a literal one, which was just as capricious,

and which did not regard the context in ascertaining the sense of words, and which set at nought all laws of thought and speech, made it easy for themselves by these means to introduce all their unbiblical meanings into the Holy Scriptures, and to deceive the unwary who heard them adduce so many passages of Holy Writ; so their adversaries were obliged to oppose this capricious mode of interpretation, by establishing the objective grounds of a logical and grammatical interpretation. and thus the first seeds of a biblical hermeneutic proceeded from these controversies. When the Gnostics transferred to the Christian religion that contrast between a religion of the people and a religion of the initiated[1], which had been removed by Christianity, and which was contrary to its very nature, the opposition to this error was the first cause that an essential religious faith, independent of philosophy, and not interwoven into any mythology, but clear in itself and self-sufficient, was brought before the light as the foundation of a higher life for all mankind, and more distinctly defined. While the Gnostics were here applying the position of the earlier religions to Christianity, their opponents were obliged on that very account to bring the peculiar religious position of the latter more clearly before their own minds.

And yet, while on the *one* side an opposition to Gnosticism would naturally arise here, yet on the other, this struggle, which was right in itself, and quite in union with the spirit of Christianity, would present a point on which Gnosis might engraft itself. This was a struggle after a deeper knowledge of the inward connection of the doctrines of the Christian faith, a struggle to proceed forth from the position which Christianity takes up, and thence attain to a mode of viewing human and divine things, which should form one systematic whole. Gnosis of itself was not necessarily false, but that false pride of Gnosis was so, which, instead of going forth from the foundation of faith, and unfolding thus the import and the connection of that which had been acquired in a lively manner through faith, thought to be able to raise itself above a life in faith; and considering this life in faith as valid only for a subordinate position, thought that it could bestow something of a higher kind. Abrupt contradiction can never persuade the erring, and never effectually stem the progress of any false views which happen to exist in any particular

[1] [Literally "the perfect." H. J. R.]

age. Abrupt contradiction, which condemns the true together with the false, is more likely to provoke more fiercely an erroneous opposition party which is conscious of having some grounds founded in truth; and therefore such a contradiction furthers the propagation of these errors, inasmuch as it lends them an appearance of justice, and a point on which to attach themselves in the real wants of human nature; and this was also shown then in the propagation of the Gnostic sects. The best means of successfully combating errors, which arise from a fundamental disposition of human nature which has only been led astray, is always to recognise this disposition with its just rights, and to satisfy its demands in the mode that nature dictates. This would have happened in regard to the Gnostics if men, while they maintained the dignity and the independence of faith, had yet acknowledged the just and right feeling on which that struggle after a Gnosis was founded, and if they had endeavoured to set forth such a Gnosis as proceeded from faith, and was only the natural production of faith in human reason enlightened by that faith. Thus the germ of a Christian Dogmatic (system of doctrines) systematically hanging together, and of a Christian philosophy, would be formed; and these two, like many other dissimilar elements of the new spiritual world of Christianity, which was first conceived in its chaotic stage of development, might by and by be separated from each other.

The establishment of a faith independent of speculation, of the practical nature and the practical tendency of Christianity, on one hand, and on the other, the development of a Gnosis built on the foundation of faith, these were the two corner-stones from which the formation of the Churchly theology proceeded, and here its two proper chief divisions may be recognised. Here also the progress of the development of human nature brought this consequence with it, that these two dispositions did not immediately work together harmoniously, and did not immediately fall into the just and natural relations which ought to exist between them, but that by mutual departure from the just harmonious mean, and by a partial love of dominion in both of them, those two tendencies of the Christian spirit, the one, a predominantly realistic, the other, a predominantly idealistic turn, fell into collision with each other; as well in the development of the Church doctrine, as in opposition to it; only with this difference, that here both dispositions set out from the self-same

foundation of Christianity, and were united together by the one spirit of that Christianity. Thus was Christianity to prepare the way for its own development in the midst of the contradictions of human nature, which find in it their reconciliation.

The *first* of these was originally the prevailing tendency in the development of Churchly theology, for this theology originally formed itself from a realistic and practically Christian spirit, the desire of defending the unchangeable ground-work of the Christian faith against the caprice of Gnostic speculation. We find this disposition among the first Fathers of Asia Minor, in Polycarp of Smyrna, Papias of Hierapolis in Phrygia, Melito of Sardis, and in Irenæus, who was formed in the school of Asia Minor, and having transferred the sphere of his activity to Lyons and the western Church in the latter half of his life, transplanted that disposition thither also. These Fathers of Asia Minor acted as pastors of these Churches, in which they endeavoured to maintain the pure and simple apostolic doctrine, and to defend it against corruption. They were, hence, compelled to enter into controversy with the Gnostic sects which were spreading around them in Asia Minor. A truly Christian consciousness animated them in their struggle against the idealism of Gnosticism; but yet they often opposed to it only a grossly sensuous, anthropomorphic, anthropopathical apprehension of spiritual matters, which arose from a deficient and ignorant cast of mind, not sufficiently penetrated and illuminated by the Spirit of Christianity. Although there were among them men of a variety of isolated literary acquirements, yet they were deficient in the essentials of a learned and systematic training of the mind. We further find this disposition in the Western or Romish Church, under which we reckon all those countries in which the Latin language prevailed. Although the peculiar character of the Romish people received a different modification under the influence of different climates, and according to the nature of the original inhabitants on which it was engrafted [1], as, for instance, among the Carthaginian people in the hot part of Africa; yet we may look upon the peculiar character of the Romans as the generally prevailing character here, and in the influence it had upon the conception of Christian

[1] Although we must take far less account of these circumstances in the case of Christian churches in large towns, because in them fewer traces of the old inhabitants remained.

doctrine, we cannot but recognise the prevailing realism of the less variable Romish spirit, which stiffly holds fast what it has once received.

We may consider Irenæus as a representative of that first practical Christian disposition which opposed itself to Gnosticism. He is distinguished as a partaker in all the ecclesiastical events of his days, and, as a dogmatic writer, by his sobriety and his moderation in holding fast the essential foundations of the Christian faith, as well as by maintaining what is practically important in his treatment of all individual Christian doctrines. In his chief work against the Gnostics, he says of the one unchangeable essential fundamental doctrine of Christianity, to which the agreement of all Churches gives witness, and which every unprejudiced person could himself adduce from Scripture [1], "Although scattered over the whole world, the Church as carefully maintains this faith as if it inhabited only one house. It believes these things as if it had one soul and the same heart, and it preaches [2] them as harmoniously as if it had only one mouth. . . . . As the Sun, the creature of God, is one and the same over all the world, so also the preaching of the truth shines everywhere, and illuminates all men who are willing to come to the knowledge of the truth. He among the presidents of the Churches, who is mighty in eloquence, can preach nothing else but this (for no one is above the teacher); nor does he that is weak in preaching diminish the doctrine delivered to him; for as the faith is one and the same, he who is able to speak much concerning it, can add nothing to it, and he who is able to say but little, cannot diminish it [3]." He thus opposes the speculative sophistry of this principle [4]. "Sound [5], unsuspecting, pious reason, that loves the truth, will with joy meditate on what God has given into the power of man, and subjected to our knowledge,

[1] Lib. i. 3. [I. c. x. § 2. Ed. Massuet. p. 49. The previous section, which contains this universal creed, is one of very great value, as it sets forth one of the most ancient confessions of faith in language very closely resembling the Apostles' Creed.—H. J. R.]

[2] ["It preaches, it teaches, and it hands down" is the exact translation of the Greek phrase.—H. J. R.]

[3] [This is evidently an allusion to the manna, Exod. xvi. 18. See Massuet's note.—H. J. R.]

[4] Lib. ii. c. 45. [c. xxvii. Ed. Massuet.]

[5] [ἀκινδύνος, sicher ihres Weges gehende.]

and he will advance in it, rendering the learning of it easy to himself by daily exercise. Now this consists of those things that fall under our own eyes, and those things that are expressly said in the Holy Scriptures openly and unambiguously." "It is better and more advantageous," says the same writer [1], "to be ignorant and to come near to God by love, than for a man, who seems to be a man of great learning and knowledge, to be found blaspheming against his own Master. Therefore did Paul exclaim, 'knowledge puffeth up, but charity edifieth.' Not as if he had blamed the real knowledge that comes from God, for then he would have accused himself the first; but because he knew that many, elated by the pretence of knowledge, departed from the love of God. . . . . It is better, therefore, that a man should know nothing, should not know the cause of any one of created things, why it was created, but believe in God and persevere in love of him, than [2] that being puffed up by this kind of knowledge, he should fall away from the love that makes man living, it is better to wish to know nothing else than Jesus Christ, the Son of God, who was crucified for us, than [3] to fall into impiety by subtile questions and petty cavillings at words." "It is no wonder," says Irenæus [4], "if we find many difficulties which we cannot remove, in spiritual and heavenly things, in those which are known to us only by revelation, when in that which lies before our feet, I mean in that which we perceive by the senses, much escapes our knowledge, and these things we leave to God, who must be elevated above every thing. But if in the things of the creation, something is within the reach of our knowledge, and other things are reserved for the knowledge of God, how can we think it a difficulty, that out of those things that are sought in the Holy Scripture, the whole of which is spiritual, we should be able to unravel some by the grace of God, while others are still reserved to the knowledge of God, and that too, not only in the present world, but in that which is to come; in order that God may always teach, and man may always learn from God." "They complain," says Irenæus of the Gnostics,

[1] Lib. ii. c. 45. [c. 26. Ed. Massuet, p. 154.]

[2] [This part has unfortunately only come down to us in a Latin translation, where the translator has evidently rendered ἤ by *aut* instead of *quam*. Neander has very properly translated it as if it were *quam*.—H. J. R.]

[3] See last note.

[4] Lib. ii. c. 47. [c. 28. Ed. Massuet, p. 156.]

" of the ignorance of the holy presbyters [1], because they do not consider of how much greater value a pious common man is, than a blaspheming and impudent sophist [2]."

We may consider Montanism as one of the forms of error which this anti-Gnostic religious realism assumed, because, where it was carried to the extreme, it opposed the predominance of extravagant speculation by the predominance of extravagant feelings. It was a system, which, while it professed to have a source of illumination besides the Holy Scripture, and the reason, as enlightened by those Scriptures, became, in a different way, a prey to the self-deceptions of a caprice which confused what belongs to man with what belongs to God.

With regard to Montanus himself, from whom it arose, we have, alas, too slender documents to allow us satisfactorily to explain psychologically the course of his religious development, and the origin of his peculiar religious opinions. But the personal history of this man cannot be here of the same importance, as the scandal which he brought upon a habit of mind then prevalent, in consequence of the effects which it produced. The idea proclaimed by Montanus was no new idea; it was one, which had in many persons arisen from a one-sided turn of mind in regard to Christianity, and had become to them the centre-point of their inward life, without their being aware of it. It was only by means of Montanus that this idea became the centre of a compact and separate set of opinions, and the point of union for a Church party which formed itself upon that set of opinions. What had probably been brought forward by Montanus only in a fragmentary manner in the language of feeling, was conceived by the spirit of a Tertullian with a more clear consciousness, and was worked up into a systematic whole. We must, therefore, in order to characterize the opinions of Montanus, use also the writings of Tertullian, although we should not be justified in attributing to the less formed and cultivated mind of Montanus all the thoughts expressed by one like Tertullian, whose more advanced development of mind renders his views more definite and of more importance.

[1] Irenæus uses the word "holy" here in the sense in which the New Testament applies it to all true Christians.

[2] Lib. v. c. 20. [Neander has translated "Idiota" by Idiot, which may answer in German, but would lead to a wrong notion in English.—H. J. R.]

The one side of Christianity, the idea of a communication of a Divine life to human nature as a means of reforming it; the idea of a new Divine creation, which should reform everything, and of an overpowering dominion of the Divinity in man's nature; this idea, which forms a key-note to Christianity, was predominant in Montanism, and made its centerpoint; but the other side of Christianity, the idea of the harmonious amalgamation of the Divine and the human[1] in man's nature when renewed by the Divine principle of life, the idea of the free and independent development of the ennobled faculties of man's nature as a necessary consequence of this amalgamation, this idea and the other key-note of Christianity which flows from it, were thrown into the back ground. In this system (Montanism) the influence of the Divine power appears as a magical power, taking an irresistible hold on man, and overwhelming all his human qualities; while that which is human appears to be only a blind instrument involuntarily borne on. Montanism, when carried to the extreme, would necessarily lead men to set Christianity in hostile array against all knowledge and art, as if either were an adulteration of that which is Divine by man's inter-mingling his own activity with it.

Montanus was a new convert in a village of Mysia, called Andaban (Ardabau) on the confines of Phrygia. What happens to individual men, happened here with provinces in a body, that their way of conceiving Christianity bears the stamp of their previous national peculiarities, just as with individual peculiarities, whether it be that these subordinate themselves to the spirit of Christianity and rise up again in it in an ennobled form, or whether they mingle themselves in a disturbing manner with the energies of Christianity, and that the former iniquities break out again, only covered with a Christian garb. Of the latter process many traces are to be found in regard to the Phrygian national peculiarities. In the old national religion of the Phrygians we recognize the character of this mountain-people, inclined to fanaticism and superstition, and easily induced to believe in magic and enchantment; nor can we wonder if in the ecstasies and somnambulism of the Montanists we find again the Phrygian spirit, which showed itself in the ecstasies of the Priests of Cybele and Bacchus.

As many in the first ardent zeal of conversion gave up all their

[1 Durchdringung. Literally penetration—interpenetration. H. J. R.]

earthly goods, and devoted themselves to a strict ascetic life, such an ascetic zeal also seized Montanus as a new convert. We must remember, that he was living in a country where there was a widely extended expectation, that the Church on the scene of its sufferings, and on earth itself before the end of all earthly things would enjoy a thousand years of triumphant empire—the expectation of a final reign of Christ upon the earth for a thousand years (chiliasm as it was called)—and where many images of an enthusiastic imagination about the nature of this expected kingdom, were then current[1]. The time at which he lived—either during those calamitous natural events of which we have spoken above, (vol. i. p. 100 and seq.) and the persecutions of the Christians which followed upon them, or during the bloody persecutions of Marcus Aurelius[2], was altogether calculated peculiarly to promote such an excitement of feeling, and such a turn of the imagination. There was just at that season a violent contest in Asia Minor, between the speculative Gnostics, and the defenders of the old simple doctrines, and men were speaking much of impending corruptions of Christianity. All this might work upon the mind of the newly converted Phrygian, inclined, as he was, to fantastic excitement of the feelings. The transition was then just taking place from the time of the first preternatural influences of the Divine Spirit on the nature of man, to the season in which the new Divine principle of life was to be developed by the natural channels and in a

[1] Papias, of Hierapolis, having lived in Phrygia, had already been active there, and many passages of the Pseudo-Sibyllines point to Phrygia also. There are certainly no grounds for supposing, with Longuerue and Blondel, that these passages came from Montanus or the Montanists, for there are no ideas whatever peculiar to Montanism in those Pseudo-Sibylline oracles. We should rather here recognize that selfsame peculiar Phrygian spirit, which is also reflected in Montanism. If Mount Ararat be supposed transplanted to Phrygia, we should recognize here the same prejudice among the Phrygians in favour of their native land, for which they claimed the credit of being the oldest country on earth, as when Montanus makes the village *Pepuza* in Phrygia the seat of the Millenarian empire.

[2] We are without sufficient and trustworthy data, to determine with precision, anything certain with regard to the time, in which Montanus first appeared; but from the very nature of the thing, the beginning of a matter like this is always difficult to be determined. Eusebius, in his Chronicon, places the first appearance of Montanus in the year 171. But if we suppose that the Roman Bishop, whom Praxeas induced to excommunicate Montanus, was not *Victor*, but *Eleutheros*, (for which opinion I have stated the reasons in my work on Tertullian, p. 486) it would follow, that Montanus had appeared in the time of the Roman Bishop Anicetus, who died in the year 161. Apollonius (ap. Euseb. v. 18) and Epiphanius, who place the appearance of Montanus in the year 157, are both in favour of the earlier date.

quiet harmonious manner, in man's nature sanctified by that very principle of life as an instrument affecting it; and it was natural that this transition should be accompanied by many disturbing circumstances, and that a disposition should arise, which, opposing the development of Christianity in man's nature in a manner consonant to its usual course, should wish to keep that first season of the appearance of Christianity as an abiding condition of things, and then to the genuine working of the Divine Spirit there would be joined an overheated excitement of the mind which imitated that working, but was in fact a violent excitement of the imagination. All this must be taken into the account in order to explain the rise of a character like Montanus.

We do not desire to deny, that Montanus had experienced something of the more spiritual (literally higher) life of Christianity; that mixture of truth and error could hardly have existed without this in the soul of Montanus, but in individuals as well as in whole masses the old proverb is sure to be found true; "where God builds himself a temple, the Devil builds himself a chapel near it." The old *Phrygian* nature crept in unperceived so as to trouble the pure Christian feelings, and Montanus took for an inspiration of the Spirit, what really was from the flesh: while no one of sound judgment with a Christian care for his soul warned him against the mixture of light and darkness, and brought him back to sobriety; or perhaps, if they did, the admiration of the multitude, who reverenced him as a Prophet, made a greater impression upon him; and thus apparently the most dangerous source of all self-deception and all enthusiasm, *vanity*, was added to these disadvantages. He used to fall into a kind of transport, during which, without consciousness, but as the passive instrument, as he thought, of a higher power, he announced new persecutions in enigmatical and mystical expressions[1]; he exhorted Christians to a more strict ascetic life, and to an undaunted confession of their faith; he praised the blessedness of martyrdom, and incited Christians to use their utmost endeavours to obtain it; and during

[1] ξενοφωνιαι is the expression of a contemporary, ap. Euseb. v. 16. γλωσσαι. See Plutarch on the ancient oracular responses, de Pyth. Orac. c. 24. [I find only the verb ξενοφωνειν, not the word ξενοφωνιαι applied here to Montanus. The word Entzückungen, which I have translated *transports*, expresses any kind of ecstasy, transport, or trance, the Greek phrase in Euseb. v. 16. παρεκστασις is used here for a state of excitement, in which a person is beside himself. See Valesius in loc. H. J. R.]

these transports he also announced the near approach of God's judicial punishment of the Persecutors of the Church, as well as of the second coming of Christ, and the establishment of the Millenarian kingdom, the blessedness of which he painted in attractive colours. At last he desired to be looked upon as a prophet sent from God for the whole Church, as an enlightened reformer of the whole religious life of the Church—the Christian Church was through him to be raised to a higher degree of perfection in conduct, and a higher moral doctrine was to be revealed through him for the manhood of the Church in its state of maturity—and he referred to himself the promise of Christ, that through the Holy Ghost he would reveal things, which the men of that time were unable to comprehend. He also believed himself called to communicate new decisions with respect to doctrinal points, in order to clear up the doctrinal controversies then particularly common in those regions, and to preserve the doctrines of the Faith against the attacks of Heretics.

It is likely enough that Montanus did not aspire to all this *at once*, but that his views with regard to his own person and calling, and his claims in regard to what he was to be to the Church, were gradually formed and extended under the influence of circumstances, in consequence of the acceptance which his pretended oracles obtained; but the information we have is not sufficient to enable us to deduce from it a genetic development of the history of Montanus. Two women, Prisca or Priscilla, and Maximilla, who also desired to be looked upon as prophetesses, joined themselves to Montanus [1].

Montanism maintained the doctrine of *a gradual advance of the Church according to a general law of the development of the kingdom of God.* In the works of Grace, say the Montanists, as well as in the works of nature, both of which come from the same Creator, everything developes itself according to a certain gradation: from the seed first comes a shrub, which gradually increases to a tree; the tree first obtains leaves, then follows the bloom, and out of this comes the fruit, which also attains to ripeness only by degrees.

[1] All the doctrines which the Montanistic party brought forward, were not altogether peculiar to it; they were often only ideas which had been in existence for a long time, and were current in the Church just at that time, and which, being carried to the extreme by the Montanists, called forth also an opposition to them.

Thus also the kingdom of righteousness developes itself by certain degrees; first came the fear of God in accordance with the voice of nature without a revealed law (the Patriarchal Religion); then came its infancy under the Law and the Prophets, then its youth under the Gospel, then its development to the maturity of manhood through the new outpouring of the Holy Ghost, together with the appearance of Montanus, and through the new teaching of the promised Paraclete [1]. How could the work of God stand still, and not develop itself progressively, when the kingdom of the wicked one was always extending itself in all directions, and always acquiring new powers? They maintained, therefore, a progressively advancing action of the Holy Ghost in redeemed man; the progressive revelation of the Divine opposed to the progressive revelation of the Evil one. They opposed those who would place arbitrary limits to the operation of the Holy Ghost, as if his extraordinary operations had been confined entirely to the time of the Apostles, as it is said in a Montanistic writing [2], "lest any weakness or want of faith should lead us to believe that the Grace of God was efficacious only among the ancients, for God always works what He has promised, as a sign to the unbelieving, and as a mercy to believers." They appealed to the promise made by Christ himself, that He would give to the faithful the Revelations through the Paraclete, as the perfecter of his Church, through whom He would reveal what men at that time were unable to comprehend. They did not, however, by any means, wish to maintain, that this promise did not refer to the case of the Apostles, to whom all others referred it; but merely that it did not refer to the case of the Apostles *alone*, in whom it was not fulfilled in its whole extent, and that it had reference also to the new revelations through the Prophets, who were now raised up, and that these last were necessary, in order to the completion and advancement of the first revelation [3]. They declared expressly that the new Prophets must distinguish themselves from false teachers, and certify their Divine calling by their agreement with the doctrines preached by the Apostles, as they

[1] Tertullian de Virgg. Velandis, c. 1.

[2] Acta Perpetuæ et Felicitatis, Præf.

[Ruinart, in his preliminary observations, endeavours to show that this is not a Montanistic writing, and to explain this passage, as merely comparing the then workings of God with former ones, but not with those recorded in Scripture.—H. J. R.]

[3] Tertullian de Pudicit. c. 12.

had been disseminated in all Churches. The essential fundamental doctrines recognized in the whole Church, they recognized also as unalterable foundations of the development of the Church; but the whole system of Christian morality, and the whole religious life connected with the Church system, was to be farther advanced by these new revelations; for men who were just converted from heathenism, and only just emerging from an entirely carnal state, were unable to receive the whole demands of Christian perfection. And further also, the Christian doctrines which were attacked by the heretics, who were now extending themselves in every direction, were to be firmly established by these new revelations. While these heretics, by means of arbitrary and false explanations, made the Holy Scriptures, out of which they might have been best confuted, speak their language, these new revelations were to offer the means of opposing them with settled authority. Lastly, these new revelations were to communicate decisions and determinations respecting those matters of doctrine and practice which were then made the subject of controversy [1]. The Montanist Tertullian, therefore, at the conclusion of his treatise, concerning the Resurrection, calls thus to those who desire to draw from the well of these new revelations, "ye shall not thirst after any instruction; no inquiries shall torment you."

This notion of a progressive development of the Church led the Montanists, *on the one hand* [2], to a genuine *evangelical opposition against a narrow-hearted and stiff Church view, which clung only to outward things;* a view which was unable to distinguish between what is changeable and what is unchangeable in the Church (*churchly life* literally), and which looked upon those of its forms, its outward ordinances and usages, which might properly change with time and circumstances, as grounded upon apostolical tradition, and settled irrevocably for all ages. The Montanists, on the contrary, were better able to distinguish between the changeable and the unchangeable in the development of the Church, because they would allow of nothing but the *immutability of the dogmatic* tradition; they maintained, that *the arrangements and ordinances of the Church* might be changed and improved, *accord-*

[1] Tertullian de Virgg. Velandis, as the administratio Paracleti, quod disciplina dirigitur, quod Scripturæ revelantur, quod intellectus reformatur.

[2] [See the counterbalancing error a page or two further on.—H. J. R.]

ing to the necessities of the times, by means of the progressive instruction of the Paraclete[1]. * And further, while the ecclesiastical view considered the bishops as the only organs for the shedding abroad of the Holy Spirit in the Church, as the successors of the Apostles, and the heirs of their spiritual power, Montanism, on the contrary, although, upon the whole, it acknowledged the existing order in the Church as one founded by God, yet maintained that there are still higher organs to conduct the development of the Church than these ordinary ones, namely, the extraordinary organs, *the prophets inspired by the Holy Ghost.* These alone, according to the Montanistic view, were the successors of the Apostles in the highest sense, the heirs of their perfect spiritual power. Tertullian, therefore, sets the *Church of the Spirit, which reveals itself by means of men enlightened by the Holy Spirit,* in opposition to *the Church, which consists in its number of bishops*[2]. Thus those who followed the voice of the Holy Ghost, speaking through the new Prophets, as being the spiritually-minded, the genuine Christians, were considered to make up the Church; while, on the contrary, they called the opponents of the new revelations, the carnally-minded (Psychici). Montanism, therefore, which made the inward fact of the operation of the Holy Ghost the mark of the true Church, when contrasted with Catholicism[3*], whose characters are too external[3*], leads to a more spiritual conception of the notion of the Church, and one whose view was more directed to inward things. Tertullian says[4], "The Church, in the peculiar and the most excellent sense, is the Holy Ghost, in which the Three are One, and therefore the whole union of those who agree in this belief

[1] Tertull. de Corona Mil. c. 3.

[2] De Pudicit. c. 21. Ecclesia spiritus per spiritalem hominem, non ecclesia numerus episcoporum.

[3*] [Literally, "*contrasted with the too outward Catholicism.*" H. J. R.]

[4] [Nam et Ecclesia proprie et principaliter ipse est Spiritus in quo est trinitas unius divinitatis Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus. Illam Ecclesiam congregat, quam Dominus in tribus posuit. Atque ita exinde etiam numerus omnis qui in hanc fidem conspiraverint, Ecclesia ab auctore et consecratore censetur. Test. de Pudicit. § xxi. Comp. also de Baptismo, vi.; where, after mentioning the Church, Tertullian adds, "quoniam ubi tres, id est, Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, ibi Ecclesia, quæ trium corpus est." Tertullian himself, in another passage, supplies an excellent antidote to the heretical notion of an appeal to any inward gifts being of themselves sufficient marks of the true Church. His rule, though directed against other heresies, applies to this notion also. See the well-known passage de Præscript. Hæret. "Edant origines suas," &c. H. J. R.]

(viz. that God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are one), is named the Church, after its founder and sanctifier (the Holy Ghost)."

As further, according to the Montanistic theory, Prophets might be raised up out of *every* class of Christians,—as the Montanists looked upon it expressly as something characteristic of this last epoch of the development of the kingdom of God, that, according to the prophecies of Joel, ch. iii. [ch. ii.] then in course of fulfilment[1], the gifts of the Spirit should indifferently be shed abroad over all classes of Christians of both sexes,—and as those requirements, with respect to Christian conduct, which had till then been limited to the Clergy, were extended by these new revelations to all Christians as such, they were induced by these circumstances to bring forward the idea of the "dignity of the Christian calling in general, and of the dignity of the Priesthood as belonging to all Christians[2]."

But although, on *one side*, the idea of the Church was conceived here in a more free and spiritual manner, although Montanism opposed the idea of a progressive development of the Church to that form-bound system, which was more Jewish than Evangelical, yet, *on another side*, this *idea fell, even still more than the Catholicism of the Church, into a confusion between the theocratic views of the Old and New Testaments;* for, according to the Montanistic notions, that progressive development was not, as the nature of the Gospel would require, to proceed from within outwards, by the development of the self-sufficient principle of Christianity in the nature of man, in virtue of the Divine power indwelling in it, but they (*i. e.* the Montanists) maintained that this progressive development of the Church must be promoted by new outward additional and extraordinary communications of God; they maintained that *the Church must be further fashioned and completed by means of a completion of the Apostolical instruction, through Prophets, who would be excited and enlightened in an extraordinary manner by the Holy Ghost*, and they ascribed to the declarations of these Prophets a positive authority, which bound men to obey them. In fact, they transferred the prophetical government of the Old Testament to the Christian Church. And it is worthy of observation, that by the Catholic Church, which

[1] Præfat. act. Felicit.

[2] As, e. g. Tertullian de Monogamia.

afterwards in a general way received much which it had at first justly and on right evangelical principles blamed in the Montanists, much of what the Montanists maintained, about the relations of the new revelations through their Prophets to the foundation of scriptural tradition and scriptural doctrine, was applied to the relation of the doctrinal decrees of General Councils to both these particulars (*i. e.* tradition and scripture).

The Montanistic view of this new prophetic gift [Prophetenthum], *and of the mode of the operation of the Holy Ghost in it*, was also peculiar. It was in accordance with this whole cast of thought, that the Montanists should altogether exclude from the true prophetic gift [Prophetenthum] the co-operation of any human faculty, endowed with self-consciousness, and serving as a free instrument for a Divine communication, and that they should assume an operation of the Holy Ghost, which entirely destroyed all individual agency on the part of man; the condition of a complete ecstasy was reckoned by them as an indispensable mark of a true prophet. Therefore, in the Montanistic oracles, it is not man speaking in the name of God, but God speaking through the voice of man. Thus, the Holy Ghost says through Montanus[1], "Behold! man is like a lyre, and I flutter over him like the instrument which sets the lyre in motion. The man sleeps, but I awake. See, it is the Lord who sets the hearts of men out of themselves, and gives the heart to man;" and in another oracle he says, "No angel comes, no messenger, but I the Lord, God the Father, am come[2]." This idea of inspiration was certainly nothing new in the Church, it was the oldest conception of the idea of inspiration which existed in the theological schools of the Jews, and which we find in Philo, in the legend of the origin of the Septuagint version, and it passed from the Jews to the Christian fathers (teachers), just as they received with the Old Testament the idea of inspiration also first from the Jews. But this whole view of the matter came under suspicion, in consequence of the manner in which the Montanists pushed their notion of ecstatic possession (*lit.* ecstasy) to extremes. The con-

[1] Epiphan. Hæres. 48. § 4.

[2] The definition of such an ecstasy in the Montanistic spirit is to be found in Tertullian c. Marcion. IV. 22. "In spiritu homo constitutus, præsertim *cum gloriam Dei conspicit, vel cum per ipsum Deus loquitur*, necesse est excidat sensu, obumbratus scilicet virtute divina."

troversies with them introduced more accurate investigations, concerning the idea of Divine inspiration, and concerning the difference between a genuine and a counterfeit inspiration (or as it was then called an inspiration by evil spirits). Unhappily, none of the writings, in which these controversies were handled, have come down to us. The Montanists might justly be accused of having prized beyond their value these unusual conditions of the mind during an extraordinary inward excitement, in which the common consciousness of man is set aside, the same accusation which St. Paul makes against the Corinthians, in 1 Cor. xii. where he speaks against overprizing the πνευματι or γλωσσῃ λαλειν (the speaking in the spirit, or with tongues); it might justly be said, that these conditions of mind belonged more to the economy of the Old Testament, in which the influence of the Divine Spirit on the mind was rather of a transient and a fragmentary nature, than to that of the New Testament, in which the Divine life enters as an enlivening, and leavening (*lit.* penetrating) spirit into the natural development of man's nature; or it might be said that such conditions of mind belonged peculiarly to those epochs of the Christian Church, in which the new life, which Christianity brings with it, is *for the first time* communicated to an entirely unprepared (lit. *rough*) portion of mankind; or when a new era of the outpouring of the Holy Ghost follows upon a long reign of ungodliness and worldliness. But the violent opponents of the Montanists[1] appear to have fallen just into the opposite extreme, by condemning altogether every thing, which bore the appearance of an ecstasy in the Montanistic sense, and by wishing to limit to one form all the operations of the Holy Ghost. They rejected at once the whole Montanistic idea of a prophet, and on the contrary, they afterwards maintained with regard to the prophets of the Old Testament, that they had already possessed a clear knowledge of the Christian economy predicted by them[2].

It appears also to have been the doctrine of the Montanists, that *the season of the last and richest outpouring of the Holy Ghost would form the last age of the Church, and precede the second coming of Christ*, and be the fulfilment of the prophecy of

[1] As Miltiades in the book περι του μη δειν προφητην εν εκστασει λαλειν.

[2] *E. g.* Origen. in Joh. T. VI. § 2. προπετως ἀποφηνασθαι περι προφητων, ὡς οὐ σοφων, εἰ μη νενοηκασι τα ἀπο ἰδιου στοματος.

Joel, ch. iii. [1] [ch. ii.]; the only doubtful point is, whether according to the Montanistic doctrine, this last outpouring of the Holy Ghost was to be closed by the appearance of Montanus, and his prophetesses, or whether other prophets were to succeed after him. Maximilla indeed, as quoted in Epiphanius, says, "that no other prophetess would follow after her, but that the end of the world would immediately take place;" but a question arises, as to whether the Montanistic oracles were always exactly in harmony with themselves, and with one another, unless perhaps Montanus and his two prophetesses were looked upon pre-eminently as *oracles for the whole Church.* It is besides certain from the writings of Tertullian, as we may also infer from the use made by the Montanists of the prophetic passage quoted above, that they supposed that all Christians would be partakers in those extraordinary spiritual gifts. In the Montanistic congregations, it was chiefly among females, a circumstance easily explained, that people expected to find in these preternatural communications, such a knowledge of Divine things, as no sound practical Christian feeling would ever induce men to expect at all, or at least to look for any where else than in Scripture, or in the Reason, enlightened by Scripture. It was a punishment for despising the just limits of that-which-naturally-belongs-to-man (*lit.* the Naturally-Human), which will assert its own rights and be recognized and cultivated in its own place,—it was a punishment for such contempt, that this latter (the Naturally-Human) should thrust itself into a higher region and trouble it, and that the symptoms of a morbidly excited nature should be promoted, and should be honoured, as the inspiration of the Spirit[2]. In this manner the heathen system of oracles and auguries might be introduced under a Christian garb into the Christian Church.

As the *attainment of perfection* in Christian conduct, of which Montanism was inclined to lay the foundation, was not deduced

[1] Præfat. in acta Perpetuæ: majora reputanda, nobiliora quæque ut novissimiora, secundum exuberationem gratia in ultima sæculi spatia decretam.

[2] Thus in a Montanistic congregation at Carthage in the case of a Christian female, who during the service had fallen into an ecstasy, which resembled those described as the effect of Magnetic Somnambulism, they expected to obtain from her, not only the healing of diseases, as the Heathens did in their incubations in the Temple of Esculapius, but also information concerning the invisible world. See Tertullian de Anima, c. 9.

from the nature of Christianity, working outwardly from a principle within, but was to repose on new commands, which were added to Christianity through a pretended Divine authority, and were first delivered outwardly; so this pretended perfecting of the moral doctrine of Christianity might in fact be only an error, deduced from *the essential nature of Christianity itself*, according to which all is contained in Love, and Love is the fulfilling of the Law; it might become only a counterfeit of that by means of a new legal *opus operatum*. Even on this side, Montanism joined itself to an already existing tendency of Christianity, which it only carried to the extreme. That ascetic tendency, which attributed a merit to certain outward works of abstinence, and which would make the essence of humility, whose foundations are *within*, consist in certain outward gestures, by which humility would easily be feigned (was also taken up by Montanism [1]). The Montanistic prophets, wished to prescribe as binding on all Christians, the fasting on the *dies Stationum*, which up to that time (see above), had been considered as left to their free choice, and they commanded this fast to be extended to three o'clock in the afternoon. For two weeks in the year they prescribed for all Christians, as a compulsory ordinance, such a spare diet as the *continentes*, or ἀσκηται observed from free inclination [2]. Against these Montanistic positions the spirit of evangelical freedom expressly and becomingly remonstrated; but in later times, in this respect also the spirit, which then gave utterance to its sentiments in Montanism, passed over into the Catholic Church.

That enthusiatic tendency, which induced many Christians to give themselves up to martyrdom, was carried by Montanism to

[1] [The words in a parenthesis have been added to the original in which the sense is left quite incomplete. The sentence stands thus: "Jene ascetische Richtung, welche gewissen äusserlichen Werken der Enthaltung ein Verdienst beilegte, welche das Wesen der im Innern begründeten Demuth an gewisse äusserliche Gebärden, wodurch leicht die Demuth erheuchelt werden konnte, binden wollte." H. J. R.]

[2] The Xerophagia, as they were called, Sunday and Saturday, were exempted from this fast. The Montanists were also in controversy (see above) with the Romish Church, about not fasting on the Saturday. In the time of Jerome, in which, however, the Montanists appear to have departed considerably from their original views (*e. g.* in the matter of the constitution of the Church), they had three weeks of Xerophagiæ. These may be compared with the Quadragesimal Fasts of the later church, a name, indeed, which Jerome applies to them. Ep. 27. ad Marcellum, "illi tres in anno faciunt quadragesimas."

its farthest height. The Montanists condemned flight in seasons of persecution, and other innocent means of saving life, while they laid down a principle, which, if consistently carried out, would have overwhelmed every social constitution, and destroyed all activity on the part of man, viz., that man giving himself up wholly to the will of God, must use no means in order to avoid the persecutions which the will of God has permitted to impend over Christians, for the trial of their faith [1]. The Montanistic prophetic spirit incited men to strive to win the martyr's crown for themselves. We recognize that morbidly-excited, overwrought state of feeling, which was altogether deficient in Christian reverence for all that is pure in human nature, and in Christian tenderness of feeling, in this expression of Montanus: "Desire not to die upon your beds, or in childbirth, or in the debility of a fever, but desire to die as martyrs, that he may be glorified who died for you." Thus Montanism went to the very farthest point in an abrupt rejection of all customs, which, though they were to be looked upon as mere civil institutions, could in no wise be deduced from an heathen origin, and in a neglect of all the prudential measures by which the jealousy of heathen rulers might be obviated [2]. It appears to have been objected, among other things, to the Montanists, that, by their frequent assemblies for prayer, combined with their fasts, they violated the law of the state against secret assemblies [3].

Although the ascetic spirit of Montanism promoted a false over-estimate of celibacy [4], we must still acknowledge that Montanism expressly brought prominently forward the Christian view of marriage as a spiritual union, sanctified by Christ. The Montanists considered it essential to a genuine Christian marriage, that it should be accompanied by a religious sanction, and

[1] See Tertullian de Fugâ in Persecutione.

[2] [We may observe from the History of St. Paul, that he did not sanction this disregard of prudence, as on more than one occasion he asserted his privileges as a Roman citizen: see e. g. Acts xxii. 25; xxv. 11, yet no man can accuse him of shrinking from persecution, or fearing Martyrdom. H. J. R.]

[3] De Jejuniis, c. 13.

[4] Priscilla expressly declares in an oracular response, (which is to be found in Tertullian de Exhortatione Castitatis, c. 11, but only in the edition of Rigault,) that the genuine servant of the Temple, who is an instrument of the Holy Ghost, must live in celibacy. In this also Montanism led the way for the Catholic Church. [I have searched this treatise in Rigault's edition of 1695, but am unable to verify the quotation. H. J. R.]

that it should be celebrated in the Church in the name of Christ: a marriage celebrated in any other manner they looked upon as an unpermitted union[1]. From this view of marriage it would follow also, that *Montanism would admit of no second marriage after the death of the first husband or wife;* for marriage, as an *indissoluble* union in the spirit, and not in the flesh only, was to endure beyond the grave[2]. Here also the Montanists only carried a view to which others were inclined, to the extreme, in consequence of their legal spirit[3], [i. e. their inclination to bind down everything by compulsory rules.] The Montanists also belonged to the *zealots for the strict principles of penance*, as were afterwards the Novatianists (see above), and there was here shown by the Montanistic teachers an ardent zeal for sanctification, and an honest apprehension, lest men should make themselves secure in their sins by a false reliance on priestly absolution; but it must be confessed that the Montanists might easily have come to an explanation with their opponents[4] by means of candid discussions on what is objective in the forgiveness of sin, and on the relation of absolution to that (see above). The zeal for sanctification, as opposed to a false reliance on the forgiveness of sins, without any entrance into an inward Spiritual communion [*Literally*, Life-communion, or communion of the Life] with Christ, is beautifully expressed in those words with which the Montanist Tertullian opposes those who appealed to 1 John i. 7, in their opposition to the severer doctrines of penance. John says, "so we walk in the Light, as he is in the Light; so have we communion one with the other, and the Blood

[1] Tertullian de Pudicitia, c. 4. Penes nos occultæ quoque conjunctiones, id est non prius apud ecclesiam professæ, juxta mœchiam et fornicationem judicari periclitantur, nec inde consertæ obtentu matrimonii crimen eludunt. According to the principles of Montanism, the essence of a true marriage in a Christian sense would consist in this, (Tertullian de Monogamia, c. 20): "Cum Deus jungit duos in unam carnem aut junctos deprehendens in eadem conjunctionem signavit." (Where to a marriage concluded between two parties while they were yet heathens, the sanctifying consecration of Christianity was added.) Montanism prepared the way for the notion of considering Matrimony as a sacrament.

[2] See Tertullian de Monogamia, and his Exhortat. Castitatis.

[3] Athenagoras Legat. pro Christian. p. 37, ed. Colon. calls γαμος δευτερὸς εὐπρεπης μοιχεια. Origen, Hom. in Matt. fol. 363, says that Paul had given the permission for a second marriage after the death of the first husband, or the first wife, προς την σκληροκαρδιαν ἡ ἀσθηνειαν.

[4] The book of Tertullian de Pudicitia treats of this controversy.

of Jesus Christ, his Son, makes us free from all sin. But do we sin also, while we walk in the Light, and shall we be purified, if we sin in the Light? By no means. For he who sins, is not in the Light, but in darkness. He shows also, how we may become purified from all sin, if we walk in the *Light*, in which no sin can take place . . . for *such is the efficacy of the blood of Christ*, that those whom it has purified from sin, and thus raised to the Light, it thenceforth preserves from sin, if they continue to walk in the Light[1]." It is true, that Montanism, as we observed above, promoted a wild enthusiasm for martyrdom, and honoured the over-estimate of martyrdom as an *opus operatum*, for, according to the Montanistic doctrines, martyrs were to have the advantage of attaining immediately after death to a higher state of blessedness[2], to which other believers had no access; but nevertheless, the struggle for the severity of penitential discipline led the Montanist Tertullian to contend against an exaggerated reverence for the martyrs. For while many, to whom Montanism refused absolution, could obtain it in the Catholic Church by the interposition of the confessors[3], Tertullian thus expressed himself against a false reliance on the sentence pronounced in their favour by these confessors, and against their spiritual presumption. "Let it be sufficient for the martyrs to have cleansed themselves from their own sins. It is unthankfulness or pride, to lavish upon others also what a man must think it a great thing to have obtained for himself. Who has atoned for the death of another by his own, except the Son of God alone. . . . . For it was for this purpose that He came, that He himself being pure from sin, and perfectly holy, might die for sinners. Thou, therefore, who endeavourest to rival Him in the forgiveness of sins, suffer for me, if thou hast never sinned thyself! But, if thou art a sinner thyself, how can the oil of thy little lamp be sufficient for me and for thyself too[4]?"

If the Montanists laid especial stress upon the doctrine of an approaching Millenarian reign of Christ upon the earth, in this part of their faith they agreed with a large portion of the rest of the Christian world.

What promoted the spread of Montanism, was partly this cir-

[1] De Pudicitia, c. 19.
[2] That is to Paradise. See Tertullian de Anima, c. 56.
[3] See vol. i. p. 246.
[4] De Pudicitia, c. 22.

cumstance, that it only carried to extremes such dispositions and views as had already long been in existence with multitudes, and partly that impulse of enthusiasm, which carries every thing along with it, and the manner in which it nourished spiritual pride, because all those who acknowledged the new prophets seemed entitled to look upon themselves as really regenerated, and as members of the elect assembly of the spiritually-minded, and to despise all other Christians, as carnally-minded, and not yet regenerated. Montanistic congregations were at first formed in Asia Minor, but there arose up violent opponents to it among the Church teachers of weight, authority, and influence, who placed the Montanistic prophets in the same class with the Energumeni (or possessed), and called attention to the danger which threatened pure Christianity and the order of the Church, if this unclean spirit should gain ground. It must be confessed that these teachers, by their blind condemnation of Montanism altogether, as a possession of the Evil Spirit, without separating what is false from what is true in it, contributed exactly to this result, that the enthusiastic spirit should harden itself more and more, and spread still further. Synods were held for the investigation of these matters, in which many declared themselves against Montanism: the transactions of these synods were transmitted to more distant Churches, and thus these latter were also implicated in the controversy. But, unhappily, from the want of sufficient information, great obscurity prevails with respect to these transactions, and thence also with respect to the gradual formation of the Montanistic party in the Church, and its relation to the rest of the Church. Although the Montanists looked upon themselves alone as the genuine Christians, and their adversaries only as imperfect ones, who occupied a lower grade, and believed themselves raised up above the rest of the Church, yet it does not appear that they directly separated themselves from these latter, and renounced communion with them; they only desired to be the *ecclesia spiritus*, the *spiritalis ecclesia* in the *carnalis*. But it must be acknowledged, certainly, that they could not be permitted to remain in this relation to the rest of the Church, in which they were continually endeavouring to extend themselves further, without great danger to the Churchly life, for they claimed only toleration at the first, in order to attain afterwards gradually to domination.

As the Church at Lyons (see above), when it was visited by the sanguinary persecution under Marcus Aurelius, had at that season many members of the Churches in Asia Minor, among which the Montanistic movements had chiefly taken place, they were induced thereby to take a lively sympathy in these circumstances. It wrote a letter to Rome to the Bishop Eleutheros, and the Presbyter Irenæus was the bearer of the letter. Much light would be thrown on the transaction, if we had a more distinct account of the contents of this letter, but Eusebius[1] says merely, that their judgment in this matter was very pious and orthodox. Now, as Eusebius decidedly looked upon the Montanistic views as heretical, we may conclude, from this expression, that the judgment delivered in the letter was against the Montanists. But in this case the letter could not have had the object which Eusebius attributes to it, of adjusting the controversies. It suits this object better, to suppose that in this letter the prevalent sentiment was a spirit of Christian moderation, which endeavoured to lower the importance of the differences, to rebut many exaggerated accusations against the Montanistic Churches, and also to maintain Christian unity while they differed in their estimation of the value of the new prophetic gifts. If we suppose this, it can easily be explained how Eusebius came to pass so favourable a judgment on the contents of the letter, which could not have happened, if the letter had spoken a *decidedly* Montanistic language. This coincides best also with the character of Irenæus, which we know to have been peaceful and moderate, as well as with his habits of thought, which, though by no means decidedly Montanistic, were not so entirely opposed to the Montanists. Eleutheros was probably induced by this ambassage to conclude on terms of peace with those Churches, but afterwards there came from Asia Minor to Rome a violent opponent of Montanism, named Praxeas, and he induced the Roman bishop, partly by representing to him the opposite conduct of his two predecessors, Anicetus and Soter, and partly by prejudicial representations of the condition of the Montanistic Churches, to revoke all that he had done. The Montanists now propagated themselves as a schismatical party (literally, a separated Church party): they were called *Cataphrygians*, from the country of their origin, and also *Pepuzians*,

[1] Lib. v. c. 3.

because Montanus taught that a place called *Pepuza*, in Phrygia, which was perhaps the first locality of a Montanistic Church, was selected as the spot from which the Millenarian kingdom of Christ was to proceed.

We must distinguish between the moderate and the violent opponents of Montanism, who carried their opposition against it to the very highest pitch. There were some who, in their opposition to it, not only condemned all Chiliasm as something altogether unchristian, and as one of the unchristian doctrines which proceeded from the detested Cerinthus, but also maintained that the gifts of prophecy, to which the Montanists attached so great importance, were altogether foreign to the Christian economy, inasmuch as the line of Prophets had necessarily been closed by John the Baptist, after whom, the end and aim of all prophecy had appeared. The words, that the Law and the Prophets should only last till John (Matt. xi. 13[1]) were for ever in their mouths; and certainly they were thus far in the right, that Prophecy in the economy of the New Testament cannot be looked upon as something essential and necessarily belonging to the development of the whole, and that by the prophetic office of Christ every other prophetic office is altogether done away with as a necessary means for the formation and maintenance of the Church. They therefore declared the Apocalypse, with which the Montanists occupied themselves a great deal, and from which they endeavoured to demonstrate the truth of their Chiliasm, to be a spurious book, forged by Cerinthus, which was at variance with the very nature of the Christian economy. They also considered the first season of the foundation of the Church, the time of the Apostles, as the limit of those especial and extraordinary operations of the Holy Ghost in the gifts of grace. To the one-sided state of feeling predominant among the Montanists, these overwrought opponents of Montanism opposed a predominant one-sided and cold state of mind, deficient in warmth of inward Christian feelings; and in virtue of this they rejected much which was of a genuine Christian character, from too great fear of fall-

[1] Tertullian makes frequent allusion to this watch-word of the anti-Montanistic party; but we must confess that it would not be used by all in the same sense: many would intend by it only in a general way to oppose that intermixture of Law and Gospel, of that which belongs to the Old with that which belongs to the New Testament, which they found in Montanism.

ing into something mystical[1]. But this last disposition was too strange to the prevailing spirit of the Christian Church, in its youthful life, to allow of its finding much acceptance.

The *second principal direction of the theological spirit* proceeded from the school of Alexandria. The peculiar spiritual life in this city, then of so great importance as a middle point of union between the East and the West, communicated then, as it had done formerly to the Jewish, a peculiar character to the Christian theology, which formed itself there. The Christian theology which proceeded from Alexandria, bore the same relation to the different directions of the Christian religious and theological spirit, that the Jewish-Alexandrian theology had borne to the different directions of the Jewish religious and theological spirit[2]. But a peculiar institution of the Alexandrian Church had an especial influence on the formation of this Christian-Alexandrian theology, I mean the *Alexandrian Catechetical School*, about the early rise of which, however, and its gradual completion, we are without authentic information. It is natural to inquire, whether the original destination of this School was *merely* to give instruction to those heathens who were converted to Christianity, or who desired to become better acquainted with it, or whether a sort of school for the education of Christian ministers, a kind of spiritual theological seminary, existed there from the very first. The accounts of Eusebius[3] and Jerome[4] are too indefinite to decide this inquiry; and, indeed, both these fathers were scarcely in a condition to be able to distinguish accurately between the state of this School *in their own days* and that which it had *originally*. We must therefore confine ourselves to the consideration of that which is known of

[1] See the account of the *Alogi*, given hereafter.

[2] See vol. i. p. 40, &c.

[3] Lib. vi. c. 10. It appears that from ancient times there had existed there a διδασκαλειον ιερων λογων, which would, according to the ecclesiastical usage of terms, most naturally be explained as "a School for the interpretation of Scripture," and this is certainly insufficient to determine the nature and kind of the Alexandrian School; but when once one is acquainted with the nature and character of that school, these words may be made to contain all that belongs to its theological studies. For its *Gnosis* was intended to give the key to the proper understanding of Scripture, and would be deduced out of Scripture by allegorical interpretation. We cannot, in this age of the Church, which as yet jumbled every thing together in a chaotic fashion, expect to find any division of theological discipline into various classes, such as *Exegesis*, *dogmatics*, &c. as Professor Hasselbach of Stettin has justly observed in the explanation of these words in his treatise, "de Schola, quæ Alexandriæ floruit, Catechetica, Particul. i. p. 15."

[4] De Viris Illustr. c. 36.

the operations of individual catechists, as presidents of this school, in order thence to gather some conclusions as to the general circumstances of the school itself. We find, then, originally at Alexandria only one person appointed as a catechist by the bishop, whose business it was to communicate religious instruction to the heathens, as well as to instruct the children of the Christians of the place in their religion also [1]. Origen was the first who, as catechist, divided with another person the duties of his calling, which had become too much for him, while he was desirous of prosecuting at the same time his learned labours in theology; and on that account he formed his catechumens into two classes. But although in other places the catechist might not need to possess very high spiritual qualities and peculiar knowledge, the case was different in Alexandria, where they often had to instruct men of a literary and philosophical cast of mind, who had already investigated a variety of systems, in order to find out a system of religious truth adapted to their wants, and where they were often obliged to converse with such men on religious subjects, and philosophical matters which are connected with them.

In that place men were required who possessed a learned acquaintance with the Hellenic religion, and the philosophical systems then peculiarly in vogue in the educated classes, among which the Platonic-eclectic was chiefly predominant, and who would thence be in a condition to set forth the insufficiency of these things to meet the religious requirements of the heathens; to counteract the prejudices against Christianity which arose out of their philosophical habits of thought, in a manner suitable to them; to compare Christianity with the prevalent religious and philosophical systems; to seek and to point out the part of their philosophically-developed religious knowledge [2], on which Christianity might be engrafted; and generally to set before them the Christian doctrines in a manner suited to their learning and cultivation of mind. It was not sufficient here, as it was in other Churches, to bring forward the main doctrines of Christianity, according to the so-called παραδοσις, but it was necessary with the better informed catechumens to trace things up to the original source of religion in Scripture itself, and to endeavour to

[1] Eusebius says, lib. vi. c. 6, that Origen, when a boy, had been the scholar of Clement.

[2] Bewusstseyn *consciousness* or *knowledge;* is the word in the German. H. J. R.]

lead them to the understanding of Scripture; they desired a creed which would bear a learned and enlightened investigation. One of these very catechists, Clement, gives a hint of what is required for the successful discharge of the duties of the catechist office, when he says [1]; "He who desires generally to select that which is useful for the advantage of the catechumens, and more especially when there are Hellenists [2], (but the earth is the Lord's and all that therein is,) he must not, like the beasts devoid of reason, refuse to learn much; but he must seek to gather together as many aids as possible for his hearers." He shortly afterwards adds [3]. "All cultivation is useful, and especially the study of the Holy Scriptures is necessary, in order to be able to prove that which we bring forward, and also, where the auditors are persons of Hellenic education [4]." It was therefore necessary that great care should be used in the choice of these Alexandrian catechists, and the office was assigned to men of literary and philosophical attainments, who had themselves come over to Christianity after a learned investigation of it, such as Pantænus (Παντ*αι*νος) who is the first Alexandrian catechist, who is known to us; and such also his disciple Clement.

Now, as these men formed the successors to their office out of the circle of their scholars among the converted Heathens, and as many of their scholars, incited by their lectures and conversation, devoted their learning, as well as all they had besides, only to the service of Christianity, and became afterwards zealous ministers of the Church, and as many young Christians also joined them and endeavoured to attain a learned well-grounded Christian knowledge, as well as an aptitude to instil the same into others, it happened of itself without endeavours for that object, that their sphere of exertion enlarged itself, and a kind of theological school, a learned seminary for ministers of the Church, was formed around them.

In order properly to understand the development of the pecu-

[1] Stromat. lib. vi. 659 B. [Pott. 785. Sylb. 279. Klotz, iii. 152.]

[2] We may thus supply what is requisite to complete the sense: he need not fear to seek even in Heathen literature the traces of truth, and appropriate to himself what is useful there, for all comes from God, and as such is pure.

[3] Strom. vi. 660 C. [See above, note 1.]

[4] We must here compare together generally, what Clement says of those with whom the faith must receive a demonstration after the Hellenistic fashion.

liar theological spirit of this school, we must fully enter into its elations with regard to the three different parties, in connection with which, and in opposition to which, it was formed, and the different spiritual dispositions of which it hoped to be able to reconcile, and to unite together by means of a higher principle, which would smooth down the contradictions between them.

These relations were,

1. Their relation to the *Greeks*, who sought after wisdom, who despised Christianity as a blind, reason-hating belief, and who were only strengthened in their contempt of it, by the sensuous conceptions of the uninformed and abruptly repulsive Christians by which they were met.

2. Their relation to the Gnostics, then very common in Alexandria, who at the same time spoke with contempt of the blind belief of the sensuous multitude, and by the promise of a higher exoteric religious creed, attracted to themselves the Heathens who were inquiring after wisdom, and the Christians who were unsatisfied with the common instruction in religion.

3. Their relation to that first class of pastors of the Church, whose views were of a *Practical-realistic nature*, and particularly those among them who were very *zealous*, to whom from the speculative pride and presumption of the Gnostics, all speculation and philosophizing, and every attempt at anything like a Gnosis, were objects of suspicion, and were always fearful of the intermixture of foreign philosophical elements with Christianity.

By means of a Gnosis [1], proceeding from faith, and engrafting itself on that faith in harmony with it, the Alexandrians expected to avoid the onesided and false views of these three dispositions, and to appropriate to themselves whatever there was of truth in each of them, nay, even to be able to reconcile them to each other.

In their theory of the relation of γνωσις to πιστις they differed from the Gnostics in this respect, that they recognized πιστις as the foundation of the higher life for *all* Christians, as the common bond, by which all, however they might differ from each other in intellectual culture, might be united into one Divine community. They even also opposed the unity of the Catholic Church, founded on this faith, to the discrepancies of the Gnostic schools (διατριβαι),

[1] γνωσις ἀληθινη opposed to the ψευδωνυμος.

the one with the other, and they did not assume different sources of knowledge for πιστις and γνωσις, but the same for both; namely, the tradition of the main doctrines of Christianity, existing in all Churches, and Holy Scripture; they ascribed to Gnosis only the work, of bringing into full consciousness, that which was first acquired by faith and received into the inward life, of developing it according to its full extent and its internal connection, of grounding it upon knowledge, and presenting it to others with knowledge, of proving that this is the genuine doctrine, which came from Christ, of giving a reason for it, and of defending it against the reproaches of its adversaries among the heathen philosophers and heretics. They used here for their motto the *passage of Isaiah*, which appears already to have been used as a motto in more ancient days, and which afterwards was the motto to designate the relation between faith and knowledge from the days of Augustine to those of the scholastic theology formed upon Augustine—the passage found in Isaiah vii. 9. This passage, indeed, if taken only in the Alexandrian version, and without reference to the context, may bear this meaning[1]: ἐαν μη πιστευσητε, οὐδε μη συνητε, if ye believe not, neither will you attain to knowledge—which words they first took in this sense: whosoever does not believe in the Gospel, cannot attain to an insight into the spirit of the nature of the Old Testament; and *then* in the sense which is akin to it: without faith in Christianity man cannot penetrate into the deeper knowledge of the nature of the Christian doctrines[2]. Thus Clement says, "Faith is as necessary for the spiritual life of the Gnostic, as breath is for the animal life[3]." They endeavoured to make good the substantial nature, the dignity and power of Faith against the heathen and heretics. Clement combats the notion, that Faith is a mere arbitrary opinion. Faith with

[1] Just as in later times, many passagess of the translation of the Bible by Luther have become current, as proofs, for some proposition which had reference to Christian faith, or Christian life, although this application of them was not in conformity with the meaning of the original.

[How often *e. g.* have the words 'search the Scriptures,' been cited as a *command*, by persons who did not dream that the original would bear a very different sense, 'Ye search the Scriptures;' and that some distinguished critics have maintained that the latter sense is the more appropriate.—See Bp. Jebb's Sermon on this text. H. J. R.]

[2] Stromat. lib. ii. 362 A; lib. i. 273 A; lib. iv. 528 B; and Origenes in Matth. Ed. Huet. p. 424. [The passages of Clement are in Pott. p. 432. 320. 625; in Sylb. 156. 117. 226.]

[3] Stromat. lib. ii. 373.

him is a free apprehension of the Divine, preceding all demonstration[1], a practical assent, in virtue of the feeling of truth implanted in the nature of man, and in virtue of the natural disposition to a belief in the truth that reveals itself to man; unbelief is therefore, in his opinion, a *deficiency* on the part of man[2]; and he says in another passage, "He who believes on the Son, has eternal life. Since then the believers have life, what higher thing remains for them, than the possession of eternal life? But nothing is deficient in Faith, which is perfect and self-sufficient in itself[3]." Clement here sets forth as the characteristic of Faith, that it brings with it the pledge of the future, that it takes beforehand the future as a present possession[4]. How a deeper knowledge of that which is believed proceeds, by means of the enlightenment of the reason, from a Faith, which passes into the interior life, while that which is believed is enacted in life (lit. *becomes lived*), is beautifully explained by Origen in the passage quoted above[5], where he says, after quoting a narrative from the Gospel, "He who believes and understands what is written in Isaiah vii. 9, will have received understanding, from his faith; according to the measure of his faith, and when he has received this, let him say what he has a right to say after the foundation of his faith, in the spirit of these words: *I believe and therefore I speak*, ψ. cxvi. 10; Rom. x. 10[6]. Let such an one believe not merely in Jesus, and on that which is written in this place, but let him recognize the sense that is included in it; for he who remains in the truth of faith, and lives in the word by works corresponding to the word, learns the truth, as Jesus promised, and is made free by the truth." What Clement also says about the new powers of per-

[1] Προληψις εὐγνωμονος προκαταληψεως. Stromat. lib. ii. 371. [Pott. 444. Sylb. 159.]

[2] Stromat. lib. ii. 384. [Pott. 459. Sylb. 165.]

[3] Pædagog. lib. i. c. 6.

[4] ἐκεινο δε το (τῳ) πιστευσαι ἠδη προειληφοτες ἐσομενον, μετα την ἀναστασιν ἀπολαμβανομεν γενομενον.

[5] Compare also Stromat. vii. 731. [Pott. 864. Sylb. 310.] Faith is a good indwelling in the soul (ἐνδιαθετον τε [τι] ἀγαθον), while it acknowledges God, and values Him, without an effort, and therefore must man, proceeding from this faith, and increasing in it, by the grace of God attain as far as possible the knowledge of him (God).

[6] These words also are not used properly, according to the Alexandrian version, and in conformity with the context; but the sense which Origen attaches to them, and the theory built upon them, are clear; All deeper development of the sense of Holy Scripture, or of the doctrines of the faith, must proceed from a life in faith.

ception for Divine things, proceeding from this inward life of faith, is beautiful: "See, says the Logos (Isaiah xliii. 9), I will make a new thing, which no eye hath seen, and no ear hath heard, and hath not entered into the heart of any man, 1 Cor. ii. 9. Which may be beheld, received, and comprehended with a new eye, with a new ear, with a new heart, by faith and understanding, in as much as the disciples of the Lord speak, understand, and act spiritually[1]."

This is exactly the peculiar Christian feature in this Alexandrian theory, that they do not conceive Gnosis to be a matter of mere speculation, but as something proceeding from a new inward living power, produced by faith, and shown in conduct, as a *habitus practicus animi;* and thus Clement says[2]: "As the doctrines, so must the conduct also be, for the tree is known by the fruits, not by the blossoms and leaves; and Gnosis comes also from the fruits and the conduct, not from the doctrine and the blossoms; for we say that Gnosis is not only doctrine, but a Divine knowledge, that light, which arises in the soul out of obedience to the commandment, which makes all things clear, and teaches man to know what there is in creation and himself, and how he can stand in communion with God, for what the eye is to the body, that Gnosis is in the soul." No knowledge of Divine things can exist, without a life in them, which comes from faith; *here knowledge and life become one*[3].

This is therefore in the Alexandrian theory, the *subjective* condition and the *subjective* nature of Gnosis; as far as regards the *objective* sources of knowledge, from which the 'Gnostikos' was to endeavour constantly to learn with greater clearness and

[1] Clem. Stromat. lib. ii. 365 B. [Pott. 436. Sylb. 156.]

[2] Stromat. lib. iii. 444. [Pott. 531. Sylb. 191.]

[3] Clem. Stromat. lib. iv. 490: ὡς μηκετι ἐπιστημην ἐχειν και γνωσιν κεκτησθαι (τον γνωστικον) ἐπιστημην δε εἰναι και γνωσιν. [Pott. 581. Sylb. 210.]

He might certainly have obtained this idea from what the Neo-Platonic philosophy, which is older than Plotinus, taught, concerning the identity of *subject* and *object* in the case of the highest condition of intuitive perception; but he might have drawn *the thing* itself from his inward Christian experience and conceptions, without our assuming any other hypothesis to explain the circumstance, and he need not be supposed to have borrowed anything from the Neo-Platonic philosophy, except the *form* in which he represented his notions. And besides, since the influence of spiritual phenomena, which lay hold deeply of the life of their age, extends far wider than is immediately perceptible, and cannot be mechanically reckoned, who can determine how far Christianity had already influenced the spiritual atmosphere, in which certain ideas became current?

depth the truths received through faith by him into his inward life: these were, according to Clement—*the Holy Scriptures.* Although many who were deficient in the education requisite for the purpose of investigating Scripture for themselves, only held fast the essential fundamental truths, which had been communicated to them at their first instruction, in accordance with tradition; the Gnostikos was to distinguish himself from the common race of believers, by proving these truths by a comparison of Scripture with itself, and supplying all that was needful to them, by knowing how to combat from the same Scriptures the errors which opposed them, and thus a faith grounded on much Biblical knowledge, was in his case to take the place of a belief on the authority of the Church. Clement uses the following language [1]. "Faith is, then, the shortly-expressed knowledge of that which is essential, but *Gnosis* is the strong and firm demonstration of the things received by faith, grounded on faith by means of the teaching of our Lord, by which faith is raised to an enlightened belief not to be shaken [2]." And, in opposing the proofs grounded on the undeceiving touchstone of Scripture to the reproach of the Heathens and Jews, that it is impossible, from the many sects among the Christians to know where truth may be found; the same writer says, "We do not confide on men, who only proclaim their own judgment, to whom we might, in like manner, oppose our own judgment. But since it is not enough, merely to express our own opinion, but we must support what we say, we do not wait for the witness of men, but we support what we say, by the word of the Lord, which is the most worthy of confidence of all modes of proof, or rather which is the only one, by the knowledge of which, those who have only just tasted the Scriptures, are *Believers*—those who have gone further and are more accurately acquainted with the truth, are '*Gnostics*' [3]!

Hence Clement calls the *Gnosis*, which proceeds from a comparison of different passages of Scripture with one another, and developes the consequences which flow from the recognized doc-

[1] Stromat. vii. 732. [Pott. 865–6. Sylb. 311.]

[2] ἡ μεν οὐν πιστις συντομος ἐστιν, ὡς ἐπος εἰπειν, των κατεπειγοντων γνωσις, ἡ γνωσις δε ἀποδειξις των δια πιστεως παρειλημμενων ἰσχυρα και βεβαιος, δια της κυριακης διδασκαλιας ἐποικοδομουμενη τῃ πιστει, εἰς το ἀμεταπτωτον και μετ' ἐπιστημης καταληπτον παραπεμπουσα.

[3] Stromat. vii. 757. [Pott. 891. Sylb. 322.]

trines of faith, a faith according to knowledge (literally a knowing faith) [1]. With him therefore, the *Gnostic* is one, who has grown grey in the study of the Holy Scriptures, and whose life is nothing else than works and words, which correspond to the Divine truths received traditionally [2]. But is only to the *Gnostic* that the Holy Scripture brings such a knowledge of Divine things, because it is he only, who brings to it a believing sense (or capacity)—a sense capable of receiving that which is Divine. Where a man wants this sense, Scripture appears unfruitful [3]. This inward sense is nevertheless not sufficient to deduce out of the Scriptures the truths contained in them, to develope their whole extent, and to unite them into a systematized whole, so as to defend them against Heathens and Heretics, and to apply them to all which had hitherto been objects of human knowledge. For this there was needed a previous learned preparation, and such could not have been created anew at once by Christianity; but Christianity was obliged to engraft itself here on the class of learning and cultivation of mind here in vogue, just as it had grown up into existence and was ready for it, in order that Christianity, as the leaven for all mankind [4], might by degrees penetrate it, and give its own peculiar turn to this cultivation of mind.

The Alexandrian Gnosis by this, now attracted to itself a multitude of reproaches from the other party, which compelled it thoroughly to justify its method of proceeding. This contest, which has often been repeated in history, is an interesting one. It was objected to the Alexandrian party, that the Prophets and the Apostles had no philosophical education and attainments. Clement answered— "The Apostles and Prophets spoke certainly as disciples of the Spirit, what it inspired them to say; but we cannot reckon on a guidance of the Holy Spirit that stands in the place of all human means of information, in order to unravel the

[1] *ἐπιστημονικη πιστις.* Stromat. ii. 381. [Pott. 454. Sylb. 164.]

[2] Stromat. vii. 762, 63. [Pott. 896. Sylb. 323.]

[3] Stromat. vii. 756. *τοις γνωστικοις κεκυηκασιν αἱ γραφαι.*

[4] Clement has beautifully alluded to this parable of the leaven. "The power of the word, given to us, which does much with small means, which attracts every one, who receives it unto him, to itself in a secret and invisible manner, and conducts his whole nature to an unity (literally a one-ness)." *ἡ ἰσχυς του λογου, ἡ δοθεισα ἡμιν, συντομος οὐσα και δυνατη, παντα τον δεξαμενον και ἐντος ἑαυτου κτησαμενον αὐτην, ἐπικεκρυμμενως τε και ἀφανως προς ἑαυτην ἑλκει και το παν αὐτου συστημα εἰς ἑνοτητα συναγει.* Stromat. lib. v. p. 587. [Pott. 694. Sylb. 249.]

hidden sense of their words. The training of the mind by learning, must make us capable of developing the whole intention of the sense communicated to them by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. He who wishes to become enlightened in his thought by the power of God, must already be accustomed to philosophize on spiritual matters; he must already have attained for himself the proper frame of thought, which may be then illuminated by a higher Spirit. He needs a dialectic education of the mind, in order to be able sufficiently to distinguish the ambiguous and synonymous terms of Holy Scripture [1]." Against those who maintain that man ought to content himself with faith, and who cast away all the knowledge, which men wish to use in the service of faith, he says—" As if, without even using any care towards the culture of the vine, they expected at once to obtain the grapes. The Lord is represented to us under the image of a vine, from whom we must harvest fruit with the reasonable carefulness and the skill of the husbandman. He must cut, dig, bind up, and do everything of that kind, he needs the hook, the axe, and other tools of husbandry for the care of the Vine, in order that it may preserve fruit that we may enjoy [2]." He had to defend the Alexandrian Gnosis against the reproach, that Divine revelation is not allowed to be the self-sufficing source of truth; that it is made to need completion and support from foreign sources; and that those who are not well informed and highly educated, are excluded from a knowledge of it. He says in reply [3]—" If we are to make a distinction for the sake *of those*, who are always ready to complain, we should call philosophy something, which co-operates towards the knowledge of truth: an endeavour after truth—a preparatory training of the Gnostic, and we do not make the co-operating principle the original cause, nor the chief. Not as if that last could not exist without philosophy, for certainly *all of us*, without a general and encyclopædical instruction [4], and without the Hellenic philosophy, but many also, even without being able to read and write, being laid hold of by the Divine philosophy, which comes from the Barbarians, have received by the power of God through faith, the doctrine concerning the being and attri-

[1] Stromat. i. 292. [Pott. 342. Sylb. 126. N.B.—This passage is not exactly translated from Clement, but paraphrased and a little altered. H. J. R.]

[2] L. c. p. 291. [3] Stromat. i. 316. [Pott. 376. Sylb. 138.]

[4] ἀνευ της ἐγκυκλιου παιδειας.

butes of God, (literally the doctrine about God). The doctrine also of our Saviour is perfect in itself and self-sufficing, as the power and wisdom of God; but the Hellenic philosophy which is added to it, does not make the truth more powerful, it only renders ineffectual the sophistical attacks against it; and as it wards off delusive machinations against the truth, it is called the proper ward and fence of the vineyard [1]. The truth of the faith is as it were the bread necessary for life; the form under which it is represented to us, is to be compared with that which is eaten with the bread, and is like the dessert."

While, on the whole, Clement is distinguished by the mildness and moderation with which he opposed the adversaries of the Alexandrian Gnosis, he himself was well aware how much their anxiety was awakened by the adulterations of simple Christianity among so many sects, who mixed with the Gospel elements the most uncongenial to its nature; and he well knew, also, how natural it is for men to confound the abuse and the right use of the same thing with each other. The zeal, however, of his adversaries, which was certainly often a blind zeal, and the persuasion, that this too sensuous, and one-sided disposition stood much in the way of the Spirit of Christianity, which endeavoured to ennoble all human things, and that many were thereby deterred from Christianity, led him to speak somewhat too sharply against their opponents, and did not suffer him to do becoming justice to their pious zeal, as when he says [2], "It is not unknown to me, what many ignorant and clamorous persons [3] constantly say, that our faith must confine itself to the most necessary and essential points, and must let go all foreign and superfluous matters, whereby we are detained with things that do not contribute towards our object." And in another passage [4] where he says: "The multitude in their anxiety lest they should be carried away by the Hellenic philosophy [5], dread it, as children dread masks. But

[1] What the ancients said generally of Dialectics in relation to philosophy, that they were its fence, was applied by the Alexandrians to the relation of philosophy itself to the Christian Gnosis.

[2] Stromat. i. 278. [Pott. 326. Sylb. 120.] [3] ἀμαθως ψοφωδεις.

[4] vi. 655. [Pott. 780. Sylb. 278.]

[5] In Stromat. vi. 659, Clement, in a manner full of spirit, says: "Most Christians handle the doctrines after a clownish manner, like the companions of Ulysses, who got out of the way, not of the Sirens, but of their music and song, by shutting their ears out of ignorance; because they knew, that if they have once given their ear to the Hellenistic knowledge, there is no chance of their turning again from them." [See above, p. 197.]

if their faith is of such a kind (for I cannot call that knowledge) as to be overturned by plausible discourses, then it may just as well be overturned, in regard to these people, for they themselves confess, that they have not the truth; for the truth cannot be overturned, false opinions may." Now this is dealing out a hard and unjust sentence, if we refer it to persons; for all worth was not to be denied to the faith of these persons, although they did not feel confidence in their own ability, to enter into a contest with a spirit of understanding prejudiced against the faith, and although they were afraid of being constantly disquieted in the enjoyment of that, which was to them their dearest possession. But if we look at it objectively, it is a great and an instructive truth for all ages, which the free spirit of Clement here proclaimed; that Christianity need fear nothing from any opposition, but that the truth, when placed in opposition to that which is false, only shines forth the brighter. In conformity with that declaration, which is ascribed to our Saviour in the Apocryphal Gospels, γινεσθε δοκιμοι τραπεζιται (be ye skilful money-changers), the Gnosticos, according to Clement, ought to be able universally to distinguish mere appearances from the truth, as he would false money from genuine; and hence, to fear no might of false appearances. He needed an acquaintance with the Grecian philosophy, just to be able to point out to the philosophically educated Heathens, its errors and unsatisfactoriness, to battle with them on their own ground, and thence to lead them to the knowledge of the truth. Clement says[1]— "Thus much I say to those who are desirous of finding fault, that even if philosophy be useless, yet the study of it is useful, because it is useful fully to prove that it (philosophy) is useless. For we cannot condemn the Heathens by a mere prejudice against their doctrines, unless we go into the development of particulars with them, until we compel them to accede to our sentence: for a refutation combined with a knowledge of the matter before us, is the most likely mode of obtaining their confidence." And in another passage he says[2]—"For we must give to the Greeks who ask for that wisdom, which is in esteem among them, such things as they are accustomed to, in order that they may be brought to a belief in the truth by the

[1] I. 278. [i. e. Ed. Paris. In Sylburg. ed. p. 120. in. Potter, vol. i. p. 327. Klotz, vol. ii. p. 15.]

[2] V. 554. [Pott. 656. Sylb. 237.]

most easy way, through their own proper method. 'For I became', says the Apostle, 'all things to all men, that I might win all.'"

The most eager antagonists of this free spirit, in order wholly to condemn the occupying ourselves with the Grecian philosophy, appealed to the Jewish tale related in the Apocryphal Book of Enoch, that all the higher branches of knowledge had come to the Heathens in an unlawful manner, through the communications of fallen spirits, and they looked upon all heathen philosophers without distinction, as instruments of the evil Spirit. They either considered the whole ante-Christian world only in stern opposition to Christianity; they confounded that which is heathen with that original and divine system, without which the heathenism that only adulterated and troubled this original system, could never even have existed at all; they would not so much as hear of any point through which Christianity could be engrafted on a nature and qualities in man, which are akin to the Divinity, and which beam through it constantly even in its worst corruption; and yet without such a point, Christianity could never have propagated itself upon the heathen soil;—Or else, like the impetuous, fiery Tertullian—the friend of nature, and of all the original revelations of life, the enemy of art, and of all perversion (of such revelation)—they saw in philosophy only the hand of Satan, that adulterates and mutilates the original nature of man. Clement endeavoured to refute this party also on their own principles. "Even if this view were just," he says, "yet could Satan deceive men only when he clothed himself as an angel of light: he must attract man by the appearance of truth, and by the intermixture of truth and falsehood; and man must always seek the truth, and acknowledge it, let it come from whom it may. And even this communication can only take place in accordance with God's will, and therefore must have been contemplated in the plan of education proposed for humanity by God[1]."

But this view, however, which was so exceedingly contradictory to the natural development and progress of human nature, was thoroughly repugnant to his own sentiments; and he expresses himself very strongly against it, when he speaks in

[1] This is the substance of passages found in vi. 647. [Potter. 773. Sylb. 274.] and i. 310. [Potter. 367. Sylb. 134.]

conformity with his own views. "Is it not then absurd," he says, "while we attribute disorder and sin to Satan, to make him the giver of a good thing, i. e. philosophy? for he appears, under this point of view, to have been more benevolent towards good men among the Greeks than Divine Providence[1]."

Clement was inclined rather to seek in the progress of the Greek philosophy the work of God in his care for the improvement of man, and a preparation for Christianity adapted to the peculiarities of the Greek character; as it is impossible to deny[2] that the philosophical development of the human mind, which proceeded from the Greeks, tended both negatively and positively to render the soil capable of the reception of the Gospel. The idea of the Divine education of man as a great whole, was Clement's favourite idea, and he conceived the object of this great scheme to be Christianity; and to this he attributed the dealings of God, not only with the Jewish people, but also those with the heathen world, although not in the same manner. The Alexandrians combated that confined view [lit. particularism] which would limit the government of God, in whom we live, and move, and are, only to the narrow limits of the Jewish people. Thus Clement says, "Every good impulse comes from God; he uses those men who are fit to lead and to instruct other men[3], as instruments for [the improvement of] the greater mass of mankind. Such men were the better class of Greek philosophers. Philosophy, which forms man to virtue, cannot be a work of evil; it can only be a work of God, whose work every impulse to good is. And all, which is given by God, must be given and received with advantage. Philosophy is not found in the hands of the wicked, but it was given to the best among the Greeks; and it is therefore evident, whence it was given,—it must have been given by *Providence*, which gives to every man that which is adapted to his peculiar condition. It is clear also that the law was given to the Jews, and philosophers to the Greeks, till the appearance of our Lord; and hence proceeds the universal call to a peculiar people of righteousness, in virtue of the doctrine which we receive by faith, as the one God of both, the

[1] L. c. vi. 693. [Potter, vol. ii. p. 822. Sylburg, 294. Ed. Klotz, vol. iii. p. 198.]
[2] See above, in the general introduction, vol. i.
[3] The ἡγεμονικοι and παιδευτικοι.

Greeks and the barbarians, or rather of the whole race of man, brought all together through the one Lord[1]." "Before the appearance of our Lord, philosophy among the Greeks was *necessary for righteousness*, but now it is *useful* for the furtherance of holiness, as a kind of preparation for the demonstration of the faith; for thy foot will not stumble, if thou trace up every good thing, whether it belongs to the heathen, or to us—to Providence; for God is the cause of every good thing, but partly in an especial manner, as (he is the cause) of the Old and the New Testament, and partly in a more remote (or derivative) manner, as he is of philosophy. But, perhaps, even this was also given in an especial manner to the Greeks at that time, before the Lord called the heathen also, for it educated the heathen as the law did the Jews for Christianity, and thus philosophy was a degree of preparation for him, who was to be brought to perfection by Christ[2]." When Clement speaks here of a righteousness to be attained by philosophy, he does not mean to say that philosophy can impart to man the disposition requisite to the fulfilment of his moral destination, and the attainment of the happiness of heaven; he makes a distinction between a doctrine justifying man, which with him can be only the Gospel, and such a one as can merely prepare him for that[3]. He makes a distinction between a certain degree of awakenment in the moral and religious conscience, as well as of excitement to moral endeavours, and of moral preparation; and between the universal perfect righteousness, which is the object of the whole nature of man[4], and is opposed to that cultivation of man's nature which is only partially adapted for a certain condition of human develop-

[1] vi. 393, 4, [Potter. vol. ii. p. 822, 823. Ed. Sylb p. 294. Ed. Par. 693, 694. Ed. Klotz. § 158, 159, vol. iii. p. 197, 198. The passage is abridged. I have followed the German.—H. J. R.]

[2] Strom. i. 282. [i. e ed. Paris, vol. i. p. 331. Ed. Pott. p. 121, 122. Ed. Sylburg. vol. ii. p. 20. Ed. Klotz.]

[3] Διδασκαλια ἡ τε δικαιουσα, ἡ τε εις τουτο χειραγωγουσα και συλλαμβανουσα, vi. 844.

[The context is here important. Clement says, that as every relation (πατρια) ultimately ascends to God the Creator, so also to the Lord must be referred, ἡ των καλων διδασκαλια, ἡ τε, &c. Potter's edit. vol. ii. p. 770. Sylburg. p. 274. Klotz, vol. iii. p. 134.—H. J. R.]

[4] ἡ καθολου δικαιοσυνη, Strom. i. 319. [Potter. vol. i. p. 377. Sylb. p. 137. Klotz, vol. ii. p. 70.]

ment: he himself says of the Greek philosophy [1], that it is too weak to practise the commandments of God, and that it makes men capable of receiving the most majestic doctrines only by ennobling their morals, and by furthering their belief in the superintendence of Providence [2]. "As God," says Clemens, "willed the salvation of the Jews, by giving them Prophets, so also he separated the most pre-eminent among the Greeks from the mass of ordinary men, by making them come forward as their own Prophets in their own language, inasmuch as they were capable of receiving the blessing of God..... As now the preaching of the Gospel has come at a convenient season [3], so also were the law and the Prophets bestowed upon the Jews, and philosophy upon the Greeks at the proper time, in order to accustom their ears to the Gospel message [4]."

Clemens had observed, from intercourse with many who had received a philosophical education, and perhaps had learned also from his own experience, that previous philosophical culture might become a means of facilitating conversion (*lit.* a transition-point) to Christianity, as he appeals for proof of what has been alleged to the circumstance, that those who received the faith, whether prepared for it by the Greek philosophy, or by the Jewish law, were both led to the *one* race of the redeemed people [5]. As the Pharisees, who had mixed the law of God with human traditions, by Christianity attained to a right knowledge of the law; so the philosophers, who had defiled the revelation of Divine truth to the soul of man by the partial and imperfect views to which human nature is liable (*lit.* by human *one-sidedness*) attained to true philosophy by means of Christianity [6]. Clement, in order to represent the ennoblement of philosophy

[1] i. 309. [Pott. i. p. 366. Sylb. p. 133. Klotz, vol. ii. p. 57.]

[2] Ἀμηγεπη σωφρονιζουσα το ἠθος και (al. και το ἠθος) προτυπουσα και προστυφουσα εἰς παραδοχην της ἀληθειας την προνοιαν δοξαζουσα. [Ita ap. Neand. δοξαζοντα Potter, Klotz, &c., which seems the right reading.—H. J. R.]

[3] κατα καιρον, i. e. after human nature had been prepared for it by the previous dealings of God.

[4] τας ἀκοας ἐθιζουσα προς το κηρυγμα. Strom. vi. 636. [Potter, vol. ii. p. 761—2. Sylb. p. 270. Klotz, vol. iii. p. 123.]

[5] vi. 636, 637. [Potter, vol. ii. p. 761—763. Sylb. p. 270. Klotz, vol. iii. p. 122, 123.]

[6] vi. 644. [Potter, vol. ii. p. 769, 770. Sylb. p. 273. Klotz, vol. iii. p. 133.]

afforded by Christianity, uses the simile of a graft which had been used by the Apostle in a kindred sense, and was very expressive and well adapted to denote the ennoblement of human nature by Christianity. The wild olive-tree [1] is not deficient in sap, but in the power of properly concocting the juices which circulate through it. Now, when the germ of garden olive is ingrafted upon the wild stem, the former obtains more sap, which it appropriates to itself, and the latter the power to assimilate (or digest) it. Thus also the philosopher, who is compared to the wild olive-tree, has much which is undigested, because he is full of the versatile spirit of inquiry, and longs after the noble nourishment of truth; and if he now receives Divine power through faith, then he will be able to digest the nourishment imparted to him, and becomes a garden olive-tree." He beautifully illustrates the difference between the pure revelation of truth in Christianity, and those individual beams of truth which are dimmed by an intermixture of human imperfection, by a comparison drawn from the light artificially imprisoned in a burning lens, as contrasted with the pure and clear sunshine [2]. The Alexandrians were full of the great idea, which now, when Christianity *began to unfold* its essential nature to the thinking mind, for the first time revealed itself in a passing manner, and was unable as yet to become the principle which, carried out into every individual application, should be the life-giving principle of Christian theology and of a Christian consideration of history, the idea which alone gives the right key to the contemplation of

[1] vi. 671. [vi. 672. Potter. vol. ii. p. 799. Sylb. p. 285. Klotz, vol. iii. p. 170. The German is hardly an exact translation of the Greek. It is rather a condensation of the text of Clement. I have therefore followed the German. The word *verdauen*, to *digest* or *concoct*, I have translated by *assimilate*, which is equally applicable to vegetable and animal functions. (See Prout's Bridgewater Treatise, part iii. especially p. 469.) —H. J. R.]

[2] ἡ μεν ἑλληνικη φιλοσοφια τῃ ἐκ της θρυαλλιδος ἐοικε λαμπηδονι, v. 560, vi. 688. [Potter, vol. ii. p. 663. Sylb. p. 239. Klotz, vol. iii. p. 22. Now, I do not see any mention in this passage of *Brennglas*, though the part of the sentence which follows should be given also; it is this ἡν ἀναπτουσιν ἀνθρωποι, παρα ἡλιον κλεπτοντες ἐντεχνως το φως. It seems to me only a comparison of the artificial *and feeble light of a lamp*, which is, in fact, *originally stolen from the sun*, to the full clear light of day. The *Brennglas* is taken from vi. 688, (Potter, vol. ii. p. 817. Sylb. p. 292. Klotz, vol. iii. p. 191.) where a different simile is used, ὡς γαρ που το ἀπο του ἡλιου φως δι' ὑελου σκευους πληρους ὑδατος μεθοδευει ἡ τεχνη εἰς πυρ, οὑτω και ἡ φιλοσοφια ἐκ της θειας γραφης το ἐμπυρευμα λαβουσα ἐν ὀλιγοις φανταζεται. H. J. R.]

human nature and of history; namely, that Christianity is, as it were, the centre to all the rays of human imperfection [1] (literally, *one-sidedness*); that it proves itself the religion of human nature, inasmuch as it reconciles with each other all the contending dispositions which meet each other in human nature; that it divides truth from falsehood in all human and imperfect systems, that treat of Divine matters; and that it teaches us to recognise in errors the truth, which being misunderstood, has formed the foundation of them. Such a light of the Spirit, *according to the idea of Clement*, ought Christianity to have lighted for the Gnostic, and thus ought he, standing on the ground of Christianity, through which he has attained the true centre for the religious nature of man, to be able freely and securely to separate truth and falsehood from each other in all the systems of Grecian philosophers and Christian heretics. Thus Clement says [2], "As truth is one, for falsehood only has a thousand paths of error, in which truth is dismembered, just as the Bacchæ dismembered the body of Pentheus, thus the sects of the philosophy derived from the barbarians (*the Christian*) and of the Hellenic philosophy pride themselves upon that portion of truth which each happens to possess, as if it were the whole truth, but all is enlightened at the rising of the dawn. As," he says, "eternal existence [3] represents that in *one* moment, which is broken by means of time into past, present, and future, so also is truth able to collect together the seeds which belong to her, even if they may have fallen into a strange soil. The Hellenic and the barbarian philosophy have in some sort received portions of eternal truth; they have received, not Dionysus, as in that mystical legend, but the divine revelation of the eternal Logos, dismembered and divided into fragments. But he who gathers together again that which was torn asunder by them, and reinstates the Word in its per-

[1] [I understand by this a point in which all human dispositions which are apt to run into excess, each in one direction, and thus some in directions exactly opposite to each other, may meet and be reconciled and united; *e.g.* extreme liberality tends to prodigality, extreme prudence to inhumanity; Christianity alone gives the right direction of the heart which shall unite the two properly. I have thought it necessary to add this explanation, because I do not choose to incorporate a *paraphrase* with the text, and the literal translation hardly gives an adequate notion of the meaning to the English reader.—H. J. R.]

[2] i. 298. [Potter, i. p. 348. Sylb. p. 128. Klotz, vol. ii. p. 43.—H J. R.]

[3] 'Das ewige Seyn.' In the Greek it is ὁ *αἰων*.—H. J. R.

fection and unity, will without doubt learn the truth [1]." This mode of view peculiarly distinguished the Alexandrians, as compared with the partial polemical views of other divines, and therefore they alone were in a condition to appreciate, with less prejudice, the opinions of heretics, to judge about them with more justice, and in considering their systems, to separate not only the truth from the falsehood which appeared in them, but the important errors also from the unimportant [2].

On the one side it may indeed also appear that Clement, far from supporting the Gnostic distinction between an *esoteric* and an *exoteric* Christianity made *one* life of faith in all Christians, and understood by Gnosis nothing but a well-informed knowledge and capacity of explaining the *one* faith, which was to belong to all Christians. It is certain, in accordance with the connected theory, which has been laid down above, and which may be proved by many passages of Clement, that this alone was his impression on the one side, but on the other side we find also indications, that he had no clear view of the bearing which different forms of religious belief and knowledge had to the essential character of the Christian life. Beautifully as he speaks in many passages of the *nature* and the *power of faith*, yet he was not always clearly conscious to himself of the full meaning of these declarations, and they did not become principles, logically carried out, of his dogmatical (doctrinal) opinions. There was mixed up with that idea of faith which Clement had deduced from the essential nature of Christianity, the idea which adhered to Clement from his former Platonism, namely, the idea of a mythical

[1] Strom. i. 298, as above. [Potter punctuates and explains the latter part of the sentence somewhat differently. It is thus: ὁ δὲ τα διηρημενα συνθεις, και ἑνοποιησας, τελειον τον Λογον ἀκινδυνως εὐ ἰσθ' ὁτι κατοψεται, την ἀληθειαν. He therefore makes την ἀληθειαν in apposition with τελειον τον Λ., but I apprehend Neander's is probably the more correct construction, for I think in the other case we should have τον τελειον Λογον. Τελειον is the predicate of a clause of the sentence.—H. J. R.]

[2] Hist. as in Strom. vi. 675. [Pott. vol. ii. p. 802. Sylb. p. 287. Klotz, vol. iii. p. 195.] The important distinction is made between οἱ περι τινα των ἐν μερει σφαλλομενοι and those οἱ εἰς τὰ κυριοτατα παραπιπτοντες. Clement also in vi. 647. [Pott. vol. ii. p. 773. Sylb. p. 275. Klotz, vol. iii. p. 138.] argues against the blind condemnation of all, which is said by heretical teachers, merely on account of the person by whom it is said, without weighing the matter itself, and this he does particularly with reference to the Montanistic prophets. "Nor must we, on account of the person who speaks ignorantly, condemn before hand that which he says, which observation is applicable to those who now pass as prophets, but we must prove that which is said, whether it is conformable to the truth."

popular faith[1], in which fancy and truth are intermixed, as contrasted with the pure religious knowledge of the philosophically educated, and this notion would have a close affinity with the Gnostic ideas of the relation of γνωσις to πιστις. By many explanations, which he gives, he appears to understand by πιστις only a very subordinate stage of subjective Christianity, and of the Christian life, a carnal faith, received upon authority and clinging to the letter, a faith which is still far removed from the true spirit and essence of Christianity, and which, as Clement represents it, is essentially more able to repress the external outbreaks of evil, than to produce true inward sanctification of the heart (although he well knew that on this latter the very essence of practical Christianity depends); but γνωσις, on the contrary, is in his language, an inward, living, spiritual Christianity, a Divine life. If the mere *Believer* is impelled towards good by fear of punishment and hope of future happiness, the *Gnostic*, on the contrary, is animated toward all good by the inward, free impulse of love, he needs no outward grounds to persuade him of the Divine origin of Christianity, he lives in the consciousness and in the perception[2] of Divine truth and even already feels himself blessed by its means. If the mere *Believer* (πιστικος) acts on the dictates of uncertain feelings, and therefore at times fails in doing that which is right, or does it, but not in the right way, the *Gnostic*, on the contrary, acts always under the guidance of an enlightened reason with clear Christian views and with a consciousness of their clearness[3]. Where Clement speaks of the progressive

[1] δοξα των πολλων.

[2] [Anschauung. This word is variously used. It sometimes means merely contemplation, sometimes intuitive perception, sometimes the object of our perception. It is here applied to the *act*, and therefore may be rendered *perception*, as showing that the Gnostic has (in the view of Clement) as clear perceptions of Divine truth, as men usually have of those ideas, which we call ideas of sensation. See the Edinb. Rev. for Oct. 1832.—H. J. R.]

[3] Clement, Stromat. 518, 519. [Pott. vol. i. p. 612, 615. Sylb. p. 222, 223. Klotz, vol. ii. p. 338, 341.] 645. [Pott. vol. ii. p. 770—1. Sylb. p. 274. Klotz, vol. iii. p. 133—4.] 652. [Pott. vol. ii. p. 777—8. Sylb. p. 277. Klotz, vol. iii. p. 143.] where he says that the πιστις γνωστικη has already received in anticipation, what to others is still something future; through love, the future is to him already present; ἐστιν αὐτῳ δι' ἀγαπην ἐνεστος ἠδη το μελλον; vi. 663. [Pott. vol. ii. p. 789. Sylb. p. 281. Klotz, vol. iii. p. 158.] where he divides *good* into that which is worthy of being pursued for its own sake, and that which is only a means to something higher. *Gnosis* belongs to the first class, because we shall attain nothing else by means of it, when it is attained, but only obtain the possession of itself, and be in the enjoyment of an unin-

enlargement of the Divine scheme for the education of man, and represents the Logos as the Θειος παιδαγωγος, he says [1], "All men belong to him, some of them with a consciousness of what he is to them, (κατ' ἐπιγνωσιν) others without that consciousness; some as friends, some as faithful *servants*, and others merely as *servants;* it is the teacher, who leads the *Gnostic* by the revelation of mysteries (the inward perception of truth), the believer *by good hopes*, and the hardhearted by corrective discipline, by appeals to the senses." Now here Clement's γνωστικος appears in many respects to resemble the πνευματικος of the Gnostics, and his πιστικος their ψυχικος, and in regard to their interior life they both appear to bear the same relation to each other, but there is nevertheless this great distinction, that amidst all the differences which they held to exist in the subjective Christianity of the two conditions, the Alexandrians maintained that there was the self same foundation of objective Christianity, of which they only admitted different conceptions, the one more spiritual and the other more sensuous, nor did they, like the Gnostics, make these two different subjective conditions dependant on an original and ineffacable difference of human dispositions. It may, indeed, be said, that, nevertheless, the two different conditions of subjective Christianity which Clement distinguishes from each other, were really in existence in his day, and are again found in other times, inasmuch as they are founded in the very nature of man; and therefore that it cannot be of so much consequence, by what name we distinguish the two conditions, nor can it make so great a difference whether we consider them as two different stages in the development of faith, and of the life under the influence of faith, or whether we accord the true Spiritual life of faith only to Gnosis,

terrupted immediate knowledge*, and we shall make our way to this and through this, [*i. e.* a state to which we attain through itself.—H. J. R.] *Faith* belongs to the second class, on account of the fear of punishment which arises from it, and on account of advantages, and the hope of reward; fear being a motive to the multitude to abstain from sinning, and the promises a motive to strive after obedience, through which the happiness of heaven is to be obtained.

[1] viii. 702. [Potter, vol. ii. p. 831—2. Sylb. p. 298. Klotz, iii. 209, and seqq.]

* Anschauung. See note above, p. 214. The last clause of the sentence is thus in the German: dass wir uns in ununterbrochenen Anschauung befinden, und zu dieser und durch diese uns durchkämpfen; by which I only understand that *this state* becomes a means only to its own continuance, and not an introduction to a higher state.—H. J. R.

as Clement has done in many passages. And yet this difference is by no means so unimportant, as it may seem at first view, but its foundations lie deeper and its consequences are more important. The cause that the Alexandrians conceived the thing in this way, lay partly in their own predominant turn of mind, and partly in the manner, in which they viewed the faith of a large class of Christian people.

As far as the first is concerned, the contemplative and speculative turn of mind was far too predominant among the Alexandrians, and this prevented them from recognising in its full extent the independent practical power of faith in the reformation of the interior life, and they were still under the influence of that view, which proceeded from the Platonic School, and was natural indeed generally to the whole of the ancient world, namely, that the inward, spiritual, and religious life, in short, maturity in religion, could not exist without philosophical culture of the mind [1].

As far as the second point is concerned, we must take into the account the manner in which they (the Alexandrians) were often accustomed to meet with faith in a certain class of uneducated Christians, as a mere belief, received upon authority, united with a sensuous Eudæmonism [2], and a fear of hell, that presented to the mind only images of horror derived from the senses. They could not mistake the bettering influence of faith upon the life, even where it appeared to them under this form, when they compared what these men had become, as Christians, with what they had been as heathens; but they did not believe that they could perceive any traces of the ennobling influence of Christianity upon the whole inward nature of man, or of a divine spiritual life; and this sensuous Christianity was in contradiction to their spiritual-

[1] There is a remarkable passage in Clement, vi. 691. in which he distinguishes an inward perception, [Geistes-anschauung], a learned knowledge or Gnosis and faith, from one another. The first, or *νοησις*, consists in an immediate connection of the Spirit with the highest origin of things, the mere *ἐπιβαλλειν*; *γνωσις* is distinguished from *νοησις* by the addition of *βεβαιουν λογῳ ἀποδεικτικῳ*, the reception of the fundamental doctrines without the inward perception (anschauung) in regard to the practical exercise of them is Faith. (*ἡ φρονησις*) *ἐν τοις εἰς εὐλαβειαν συντεινουσι γενομενη, και ἀνευ θεωριας παραδεξαμενη τον ἀρχικον λογον κατα την ἐν αὐτῃ ἐξεργασιας τηρησιν πιστις λεγεται.*

[2] [Eudæmonism. The word in the original is Eudämonismus, which is a modern coinage. It expresses a notion of the Deity being pleased with man and rewarding him, especially in good that affects the body.—H. J. R.]

ized religious habits of thought. They might therefore be inclined to attribute a very low grade of the religious life to πιστις and to the κοινος πιστικος, and to consider the higher life of Christianity, of which they saw nothing in the κοινοι πιστικοι, as fruit due only to the γνωσις of the well-informed and highly cultivated. It must indeed be avowed that they were very likely in this case to do injustice to those, who were in an entirely different condition as regarded both the turn of their mind, and the extent of its development, if they passed judgment upon the more hidden spiritual life of faith from the impure reflection of it in an habit of thought, neither thoroughly formed, nor as yet thoroughly penetrated by the leaven of Christianity.

The prejudicial consequences of this predominance of the contemplative and speculative turn of mind, and of this extremely sharp division of γνωσις from πιστις, show themselves in Clement in a variety of ways. Instead of bringing forward the *Gnosticos*, under the image of an humble minded Christian, living in the constant conviction of the sinfulness that still adheres to him, and constantly advancing in holiness, he often appears in Clement under the form of a Neoplatonic Theosopher, living in contemplative self-sufficingness [1], and unmoved by passions [2], although, even hither the Christian element has again made its way, as may be seen by the circumstance, that the Gnostic cannot feel himself entirely blessed in contemplation alone, and living for himself, and shut up in himself alone; but is represented as actuated by the desire of working actively for the benefit of others [3].

Hence also it happened, that instead of contenting themselves with a mere systematic (*lit.* organic) development of that which is known in faith, the Alexandrians wished to transcend the bounds

[1] [The word "self-sufficiency" is so constantly used in English in an idiomatic sense, as implying merely conceit and vanity, that I have used a word which, if not a current word, may be perhaps allowed.—H. J. R.]

[2] See F. 748. [See Potter, vol. ii. pp. 881-2. Sylb. p. 318. Klotz, vol. iii. p. 268.]

[3] Clement says beautifully on this point: "The Gnostic, who sees his own salvation in the advantage of his neighbour, may justly be called a living image of the Lord; not with regard to the circumstances of his outward form, but from similarity to that which he was in power, and from a resemblance to his preaching." Ὁ γνωστικος ἰδιαν σωτηριαν ἡγουμενος την των πελας ὠφελειαν, ἀγαλμα ἐμψυχον εἰκοτως ἀν του Κυριου λεγοιτο, οὐ κατα την της μορφης ἰδιοτητα, ἀλλα κατα το της δυναμεως συμβολον και κατα το της κηρυξεως ὁμοιωμα.

of faith by their Gnosis, and lost themselves in the region of Theosophy, which desired to comprehend divine things; so that mistaking and overlooking the practical aim of Divine revelation for the improvement and salvation of human nature, they endeavoured to find the solution of speculative enquiries in Scripture. When many came forward and opposed the speculative Gnosis with this just argument: "The wise man is persuaded that there is much which is incomprehensible, and his wisdom even consists in the very acknowledgement of the incomprehensibleness of the incomprehensible[1]:" Clement answered, "This is also common to those, who are able to see only a little way before them; the Gnostic apprehends that which appears to be inapprehensible to the rest of men, for he is persuaded that there is nothing which cannot be apprehended by the Son of God; whence it follows that there is nothing which cannot be taught [by him], for he who suffered out of love to us, would debar us from nothing which could contribute to the instruction of Gnosis." One sees how indefiniteness here becomes the source and foundation of great error, for this declaration is true enough when understood of that only which it is necessary for man to know for his salvation, but not when applied to things, which serve only to the gratification of speculative and ill-directed curiosity.

The notions of Clement in these matters, are repeated in those of his great disciple Origen, only conceived in a peculiar manner full of deep thought, and systematically worked out, but there is the same connection of the ideas of Gnosis and Pistis in relation, as well to different conditions of subjective Christianity, as to the different operations of a Divine scheme for the general instruction of man, which lets itself down to the varied wants which arise from the variety of these conditions of man. In his controversies with the heathen, who reproached Christians with their blind faith, Origen often declares it to be a peculiarity of Christianity as a revelation of a God who came for the salvation of *all* men, that it is able to attract even the multitude which is incapable of scientific investigation and knowledge, and in virtue of mere faith[2], to work upon them to sanctification with divine power; and he appeals to the experience of very many, as a testimony to this

[1] vii. 649. [Potter, vol. ii. p. 775. Sylb. p. 276; Klotz, vol iii. p. 140. N.B. The reference in Neander should be vi. 649, not vii. 649.—H. J. R.]

[2] Ψιλη πιστις, πιστις ἀλογος.

efficacy of Christianity[1]. Those who had attained to faith at first only in this manner, might then become impelled of their own accord to penetrate constantly more and more also into the deeper sense of Scripture[2]. He makes πιστις the lowest stage of Christianity, which must nevertheless have an existence, in order, that "the simple, who give themselves up to holiness according to their power, may be able to attain salvation;" and above faith he places both *Gnosis* and *Sophia*. This last is that Divine Wisdom, which is imparted to the souls, who are, by God's grace, capable of receiving it, and who have sought to obtain it from God, by study of the Scriptures, and by prayer. Human wisdom, the wisdom that belongs to our world, is only a preparatory exercise of the soul, in order that it may become capable of attaining that which is the real aim and object of its existence, by means of cultivating its intellectual faculties[3].

Origen, as well as Clement, in many places declares expressly in reference to the nature of faith, that it is a fact of the inward life, through which man enters into a real communion with divine things, and he distinguishes this living faith from a belief, resting on authority, which clings only to outward things. Thus, in explanation of John viii. 24[4], he says, "That faith brings with it a spiritual communion with that on which we believe, and hence there is generated a kindred condition of the heart[5], which must show itself in works. The object of our belief is received into the inward life, and becomes a forming and fashioning principle for it. In all the relations (επινοιαι), under which Christ becomes an object of faith, according to all these, the believer receives Christ into his inward life; thus, for example, since Christ is called the power of God, power to all good actions cannot be wanting to him, who believes on Christ, as the source of divine power." Thus, in tom. xx. in Joh. c. xxv. he makes a distinction

[1] Compare *e. g.* c. Celsum, lib. i. c. 10.

[2] C. Celsum, lib. vi. Philocal. c. 15. *μετα την ἁπαξ γενομενην εἰσαγωγην φιλοτιμησασθαι προς το και βαθυτερα των κεκρυμμενων νοηματων ἐν ταις γραφαις καταλαβειν.*

[3] C. Cels. vi. 13. [Ed. Spencer, p. 283.] Origen maintains that St. Paul sets those graces, which are connected with knowledge, higher than the gift of working miracles. *ἐπει τον λογον προετιμα των τεραστιων ἐνεργειων, δια τουτο ἐνεργηματα δυναμεων και χαρισματα ἰαματων ἐν τῃ κατωτερω τιθησι χωρᾳ παρα τα λογικα χαρισματα.* c. Cels. iii. 46. [Ed. Spenc. p. 139.]

[4] Tom. xix. Joh. § 6. [See Origen. ed. Huet. vol. ii. pp. 284, 285.—H. J. R.]

[5] *διακεισθαι κατα τον λογον και συμπεφυκεναι αὐτῳ.*

between a sensuous belief in miracles, and a faith in the truth. He compares John viii. 43, and 45, and says, that those sensuous Jews were impressed by the miracles, and would have believed on Jesus as a worker of miracles, but they were incapable of receiving Divine truth[1], and never would have believed on Jesus as a preacher of deep truth; and he adds, "This may also be seen in many, who look with wonder on Jesus, when they consider his history, but who cannot have any further faith in him, when a deep doctrine, which surpasses their comprehension, is unfolded, but begin to cavil at it, and say that it is false. Therefore let us take heed, lest he say to us also, 'ye believe not me, because I declare the truth.'" Nevertheless, the relation to what is dependent on historical grounds, and the practical influence, which is inherent in the idea of faith, as conceived by St. Paul, is clearly thrown more into the background by Origen. That higher condition of faith was, in his notions, at the same time a condition in which Christianity was applied and conceived in a more spiritual manner—a condition in which truth was more immediately the object of interior perception; and this condition of faith so exactly accorded with his notion of the condition of Gnosis, that he often contrasts Gnosis with a mere historical belief. "Faith may exist without a definite conception of the thing believed[2]." He ascribes this Gnosis to those who devote themselves wholly to the contemplation of Divine matters, who after they have cleared their spirit from foreign elements, behold God with more godlike eyes. He finds also that such a Gnosis is contrasted with mere faith, in John viii. 31, 32[3]. For this distinction between Gnosis and Pistis he appeals also to 1 Cor. xii. 9; where, however, faith being represented as a gift of grace, cannot be that historical belief of which Origen speaks as opposed to Gnosis, but where it is rather the designation of a peculiarly practical power of faith. Origen places the condition of Gnosis so far above that of faith, that he represents it, in speaking of this contrast, as a life of sight. "Those," he says, "who have received the charisma of Gnosis and Sophia, no longer live in

[1] As if our Saviour had intended to say, καθ' ὁ μεν τερατα ποιω, πιστευετε μοι, καθ' ὁ δε την ἀληθειαν λεγω, οὐ πιστευετε μοι. [The reference in the text has not enabled me to consult the original passage.—H. J. R.]

[2] [Erkenntnisse is the German word here used, which I have translated "definite conception." See the Conversations Lexicon in verbo.—H. J. R.]

[3] See t. xix. in Joh. c. 1.

faith, but in sight; the spiritually minded, who already dwell no longer in the body, but even here below are already present with the Lord. But those do still dwell in the body, and are not yet present with the Lord, who do not understand the spiritual Sense of Scripture, but cling wholly to its body (*i. e.* the letter, see below). For how, since the Lord is the Spirit, should he not be far from the Lord, who does not understand the life-giving spirit and the spiritual sense of Scripture; such an one lives in faith[1]." He busies himself here very diligently in endeavouring to explain, after his own notions, what St. Paul says in utter contradiction to this view in 2 Cor. v. about the relation of faith to sight; and not without sophistical arguments involving a confusion of ideas, he contends against the just interpretation of most of the fathers, who maintain that even Paul speaks of himself, as one who still lived in faith, and had not yet arrived at living in sight. He makes the expression, "to dwell in the body," entirely equivalent to "living in the flesh, and according to the flesh;" and thus obtains as a result, that St. Paul said this, not in reference to himself and all spiritually-minded persons, but only in reference to those believers, who were still carnally-minded. He applies also (and in him the application is consistent) what St. Paul says (1 Cor. xiii.) of the perfect, to the genuine Gnostics, as contrasted with the mere believers, who are still in childhood, and still have only the mere partial knowledge[2]. This twofold condition, according to the notion of Origen, corresponds with the twofold condition of a spiritual and a fleshly Christianity[3]. He who is in the position afforded by a fleshly Christianity, abides only by the letter of Scripture, and by the historical account of Christ; he clings only to the outward appearance of the Divine, without raising himself up in Spirit to the inward essence, which is revealed in it; he confines himself wholly to the earthly, temporal, and historical appearance of the Divine Logos; he does not raise himself up to the actual perception of the latter (the Logos) itself; he contents himself with the mere shell of the Christian doctrines, without penetrating to the interior kernel contained in them; he clings

[1] Origen. t. xiii. Joh. c. 52.

[2] In Matt. ed. Huet. frag. 213. He does not always remain consistent in this respect; in another passage (in Matt. 271.), he properly refers τελειον to eternal life.

[3] A χριστιανισμος πνευματικος and a χριστιανισμος σωματικος, a πνευματικως and a σωματικως χριστιανιζειν.

solely to the letter of Scripture, in which the spirit lies bound. The spiritual Christian on the contrary, in the temporal appearance and operations of Christ, sees the revelation and the representation of the eternal government and operations of the Divine Logos; with him, the letter of Scripture is only the covering of the spirit, and he knows how to detach the spirit from this covering. With him, all that is temporal in the form, under which Divine things are presented to us, is elevated into the inward perceptions of the Spirit; with him the sensuous Gospel of the letter [1], becomes spiritualized into the revelation of the eternal spiritual gospel [2], and it is the highest question to which his soul applies itself, to find the latter in the former, and to turn the former into the latter; and to understand Holy Scripture as the revelation of a continuous scheme of education, provided by the Logos for human nature, and of his uninterrupted activity for the salvation of man, a scheme of which the center-point is his appearance among men (which is the sensuous representation of his eternal and spiritual operation [3]), and the aim of which is to bring back all fallen Being to God. While he refers everything to this one view, the whole volume of Holy Scripture becomes to him, by means of the Gospel, elevated and refined into Gospel. Hence, Origen believes by means of spiritual communion with the Logos, by the reception of the Spirit of Christ into the inward life alone [4], can any one attain to the true spiritual Christianity, and to the right spiritual understanding of the whole Scripture. Just then as the prophets *before the temporal advent of Christ* were partakers in spiritual communion with the Divine Logos, and in virtue of that communion were enabled to foretell that advent, and the whole of Christianity beforehand, just as they therefore had the spiritual understanding of the Old Testament, and in some degree were Christians before the coming of Christ; so after the temporal appearance of Christ, there are among Christians, persons also, by whom this spiritual communion with the Divine Logos has not been obtained, and they, like the Jews of old, still cling to the outward covering; and the saying of St. Paul about the Jews before the appearance of Christianity (Gal. iv.); *viz.* "That they were still children, that the time appointed by the Father for them, had not yet arrived, and that they were still

[1] το εὐαγγελιον αἰσθητον. [2] του εὐαγγελιου πνευματικου, αἰωνιου.
[3] The ἐπιδημια αἰσθητη, an image of the ἐπιδημια νοητη του λογου.
[4] The ἐπιδημια νοητη του Χριστου.

under guardians and governors," is still applicable to them, as being in a condition through which they must necessarily pass, in order to be prepared and made capable of receiving the true spiritual Christianity. "Every soul," says Origen, "which enters upon childhood, and proceeds on the road towards perfection, until the time destined for its perfection shall arrive, requires a teacher, and guardians, and stewards [1]."

Whatever portion of truth there may be in this expression of Origen, and however applicable it may be to the progress of the development of the Christian Church, yet it cannot be denied, that the meaning of historical Christianity, the intimate connection between historical and inward Christianity, appear to be obscured in his representation. We will now hear him speak in his own words [2], "We must know, that the spiritual appearance of Christ, was communicated before his personal advent to the perfect and to those who were not in the condition of infants,—to those, who were no longer under schoolmasters and guardians, and to whom the spiritual fulness of time had appeared, namely, the Patriarchs, Moses, the Servants of God, and the Prophets, who had seen the glory of Christ. Now just as he himself, before his visible and bodily appearance, appeared to the perfect, thus also after his incarnation has been preached to those who are still in a state of childhood, because they are under guardians and stewards, and have not yet reached the fulness of time, to them have the harbingers of Christ appeared, namely, the ideas proper for the souls of children, of which (the ideas or notions) it may be justly said, that they are advantageous for the instructions of such souls. But the Son himself, the Divine Logos, in his majesty has never yet appeared to them, because he awaits that preparation which must take place beforehand among the men of God, who are to be capable of receiving his Godhead. We must also know, that as there is a law, which contains the shadow of good things to come, which good things are revealed (in Christianity) by the preaching of the true law; so also the shadow of the Christian mysteries is represented by that Gospel, which all, who read it, think they understand. *The* Gospel,

[1] Comm. in Matt. 213. *πασα ψυχη ἐρχομενη εἰς νηπιοτητα και ὀδευουσα ἐπι την τελειοτητα, δειναι μεχρις ἑνστῃ αὐτῃ το πληρωμα του χρονου, παιδαγωγου και οἰκονομων και ἐπιτροπων.*

[2] Origen in Joh. tom. i. p. ix. [p. 8, 9. Ed. Huet, in which however the last sentence of this quotation is imperfect.—H. J. R.]

on the contrary, which St. John calls an eternal Gospel, and which ought properly to be called the spiritual Gospel, sets clearly before the eyes of those, who understand it, every thing which regards the Son of God himself; the mysteries which were shadowed forth in his language, and the things of which his actions were the symbols. In conformity with what is here said, we must also suppose that, as there is an outward Jew, and an outward circumcision, so also there is an outward Christian and an outward baptism." Origen here scripturally points to spiritual communion with Jesus Christ, as the source of systematic and lively perception of that, which is only hinted at in Scripture; and what he said, was certainly just when taken as said in opposition to a blind and narrow-hearted zeal for an orthodoxy which adhered merely to the letter, and a conceited, unprofitable acquaintance with Scripture; but such declarations, if they were not sufficiently defined and limited, might easily favour a speculative habit of dealing arbitrarily with Scripture, which, under the pretence of a higher truth, mystified the simplicity of the Gospel, and did not recognise the depth which was united with that simplicity. As for instance when he says, "I believe, that the whole body of Holy Writ, even when understood very accurately, contains only a very small part of the elements of Gnosis, and a very brief introduction to it." Thus in his allegorical explanations of the conversation with the Samaritan woman, the well of Jacob is the symbol of the Holy Scripture, and the living water which Jesus gives, is the symbol of that, which transcends Scripture. "Scripture is then," he says, "the introduction, and after we have sufficiently understood that, we must raise ourselves up to Jesus in order that he may bestow upon us the fountain of water that bubbleth up into eternal life [1]."

In his mind this theory of two different stages of Christianity was closely connected with the theory of different forms of the Revelation of Christ, or of the Divine Logos, in relation to these two different conditions. The Gnostics indeed, according to the different conditions of the spiritual world, by reason of the difference in the natures of men, were accustomed to divide [2] the revealing and the redeeming power of God among different hy-

[1] Tom. 13. Joh. p. 5 & 6. [Ed. Huet. vol. ii. p. 201, 202.—H. J. R.]
[2] See Part II.

postases; they acknowledged a Monogenes, a Logos, a Soter, an ἀνω and a κατω Χριστος, a spiritual and a natural [1] Christ, but, on the contrary, Origen the unity of the being of Christ and of his Divine-human appearance; the one Christ is everything to him, he only appears under different predicates, in different modes of conception, and in different relations to those, to whom he reveals himself, according to their different capacities, their different requirements; and hence he appears either in his heavenly dignity, or his human state of abasement. The thought often occurs in Origen, "that the Redeemer became all-things to all men in a more Divine sense than St. Paul, in order to win all men[2]." "The Redeemer," he says, "becomes much, or rather perhaps everything, according as the whole creation, which is to be released by him, happens to require him[3]." We must separate those predicates, which belong to the Divine word, in virtue of his nature, as the eternal Revealer of God for the whole spiritual world, and the source of all truth and goodness, from those, which he has taken upon him for the advantage of the fallen natures, which are to be redeemed by him, in relation to the different conditions in which those natures are found. "Happy are they," says Origen[4], "who have made such progress, that they need the Son of God no longer as their physician that heals their sick, nor as the shepherd, nor as their redemption, but require him only as truth, as the Logos, as righteousness, and whatsoever he is besides to those, who from their own perfection are able to conceive him in the utmost splendour." Christianity in its historical and practical form, the preaching of Christ crucified, was reckoned by Origen only a subordinate condition, above which he placed the wisdom of the perfect, which acknowledged Christ no longer in the condition of a servant, but in his dignity as the Divine Logos, although he recognised the former condition as a necessary pre-

[1] [*Pneumatischen* and *psychischen* are the German terms, which are here opposed as in St. Paul: the pneumatical meaning spiritual as belonging to the soul, and *psychical* meaning *natural* as required only to the *animal* soul or life of man.

The difference between the Gnostic view and that of Origen, may be shortly stated in one sentence. They believed in an *objective* difference in Christ's nature, and he only in a subjective. H. J. R.]

[2] Tom. 20. Joh. 28.

[3] Tom. 1. Joh. 22. Where, I think, instead of καθαριζει, we must read καθ' ὰ χρηζει αὐτου ἡ ἐλευθερουσθαι δυναμενη πασα κτισις.

[4] Joh. i. 22.

paratory stage, in order to ascend from the temporal to the eternal Revelation of God, in order that a man being purified through faith in the crucified Redeemer, and sanctified by the following after the Son of God who appeared in human form, should be rendered capable of receiving the spiritual communications of his Divine Being. "If thou canst understand," says Origen [1], "the differences in the Divine word, according as it is announced in the foolishness of preaching, or brought forward in wisdom to the perfect, then you will see in what manner the Divine word has the form of a servant to novices in Christianity . . . . . but it comes in the glory of the Father to the perfect, who are able to say, 'we have seen his glory, the glory as of the only begotten Son of the Father, full of grace and truth;' for to the perfect the glory of the Word appears, as well as his being the only begotten Son of the Father, and his being full of grace and truth also, which they are unable to comprehend, who require the foolishness of preaching to induce them to believe." In another passage [2], he says, "To those, who live in the flesh, he becomes flesh; but to those who walk no longer after the flesh, he appears as the Divine Logos, who was in the beginning with the Father, and he reveals the Father to them." He says of that preparatory stage of belief [3], "If any one also belongs to the class of the Corinthians, among whom Paul will know nothing except the crucified Jesus, and whom he teaches to acknowledge only him who became man for our sakes, yet he may by means of the man Jesus become a man of God, by the consequences of his death may die to sin, and by consequences of his resurrection may rise up to a Divine life." So that Origen reverenced even that subordinate condition, and he denied that the Gnostics would let themselves down [4] to the weakness of those who were placed in it, and avoid giving them offence and occasions of bitterness. "Just as Paul," he says, "could not be of service to those who were Jews according to the flesh, if he had not, when he had good reasons for his conduct, caused Timothy to be circumcised, shorn his own hair, offered sacrifices, and became a Jew to Jews, in order to gain the Jews; so also he, who is inclined to

[1] In Matt. p. 290. Ed. Huet. [2] Commentar. in Matt. p. 268.

[3] In Joh. i. c. 11. [?]

[4] Thus also Clement on the οἰκονομια of the Gnostic. Stromat. vii. p. 730. [Potter, p. 863. 864. Sylb. p. 310. Klotz, vol. iii. p. 246, 247.] Comp. the notions of Philo given above, vol. i. p. 73, &c.

be useful to many, cannot improve those who are still in the school of sensuous Christianity, by spiritual Christianity alone, nor lead them thus to a higher and better state, and he must therefore unite spiritual and sensuous Christianity together [1]. And where it is necessary to preach the sensuous Gospel, in virtue of which among carnal men he can know nothing [2], but Christ crucified, he must also do this. But when they are grounded in the faith and continue to bring forth fruit in the Spirit, then must we bring forward to them the word, which, having appeared among men, has raised itself again to that, which it was with God in the beginning [3]." Thus too, in his allegorical interpretation and application of Matt. xiv. 10 [4]. after he has deduced from the passage, that a man must become a child to children, in order to gain children to the kingdom of Heaven, just as Christ, though he was in a Divine form, became a child, he says beautifully, "We must be well aware of this, in order that we may not, out of a presumption of wisdom and advancement, as great ones in the Church, despise the little ones, and children, but inasmuch as we know that it is said, 'Of such is the kingdom of Heaven,' we ought to become such men, that through us the salvation of children may be promoted. We must not only not hinder such from being brought to Christ, but we must do his will by becoming children with children, so that when those children arrive at salvation, through us, who have become children, we may be exalted by God, as men who have abased themselves." Origen here blames those, who, like the Gnostics, despised ordinary preachers and teachers, who were destitute of spiritual culture of the higher order, and who presented the simple Gospel in an unattractive form, just as if such persons did something unworthy of so great a Saviour and master [5]. "Even if we were arrived at the very highest and clearest perception [anschauung] of the Logos and of truth," says Origen [6], "yet still we must not wholly forget the

[1] πνευματικως και σωματικως χριστιανιζειν.

[2] [It is difficult to imagine a text more tortured in its application than this passage. It was written to show that the knowledge of Christ crucified, whereby we are led to righteousness and to heaven, transcends all other knowledge, which St. Paul casts away in comparison of it—it is applied to degrade that doctrine of Christ crucified, in comparison of other doctrines and revelations of the same Christianity. H. J. R.]

[3] Tom. i. in Joh. p. 9. [4] In Matt. l. c. 374. 375.

[5] βλεπετω οὐν τις τινας των ἐπαγγελλομενων κατηχησιν ἐκκλησιαστικην και διδασκαλιαν, προσφεροντα τα μωρα του κοσμου και τα ἐξουδενωμενα και τα ἀγενη.

[6] Tom. ii. Joh. p. 4. [?]

passion of Christ, for it is to that we owe our introduction into this higher life during our abode on earth."

With this twofold condition, namely, that of spiritual, and that of sensuous Christianity, the theory of a two-fold condition of Scriptural interpretation and the theory of different senses of Holy Writ were closely connected, for spiritual Christianity brought with it a penetration into the spirit of Scripture, and an understanding of the eternal, spiritual Gospel, just as, on the contrary, sensuous Christianity abided by the letter of Scripture alone. The highest problem of Scripture interpretation was in his estimation the changing of the sensuous Gospel into the spiritual [1], just as the highest aim of Christianity was to elevate itself from the earthly appearance of the incarnate Logos to communion with him and to the contemplation of his Divine nature. Thus he saw also in the whole body of Scripture a letting-down of the overwhelming heavenly Spirit to the human form, which was incapable of containing it; a letting-down of the Divine Teacher of man to the weakness and the wants of men, and all Scripture was in like manner a revelation of the incarnation of the Logos. Thus he says [2], "All which is here called Word of God, is a revelation of the Divine Word, which became flesh and emptied itself in relation to its heavenly nature, and hence we see the Word of God on earth when he became man, as a human Word, for the Word constantly becomes flesh in Scripture, in order to dwell among us [3]. But when we have lien on the breast of the Word that became man, and are enabled to follow him as he climbs up the high hill, (Matt. xvii.) then we may say, 'we have seen his glory [4].'" He sets out from the principle of an analogy between the Holy Scripture as a work of God, and the whole creation which proceeds from the same God; a principle, which carried out in his lively and spiritual manner, would at once become fruitful for the right consideration of the two-fold revelation of God. Thus he says, and the saying shows at once how thoroughly im-

[1] το μεταλαβειν το αἰσθητον εὐαγγελιον εἰς το πνευματικον.

[2] See Philocal. c. 15.

[3] Similarly also Clement says, that the character of the Holy Scripture is a parabolical one, as also the whole appearance of Christ is a parabolical one also—viz. the Divine in an earthly garb. παραβολικος γαρ ὁ χαρακτηρ ὑπαρχει των γραφων, διοτι και ὁ Κυριος οὐκ ὠν κοσμικος, ὡς κοσμικος εἰς ἀνθρωπους ἠλθεν. Stromat. vi. 677.

[4] The ennobling of Scripture for him, who learns to understand its spirit by a living communion with Christ.

bued he was with the notion that the Holy Scripture is the Word of God[1]: "We need not think it strange, if in every passage of Holy Writ the super-human nature of the thought does not strike the unlearned, for in the works of Providence, which extend over the whole universe, some of them show manifestly, that they are the works of Providence, while others are so concealed, as to give occasion to incredulity in respect to God who governs all things with inexpressible skill and power. . . . . But just as we do not dispute the doctrine of a Providence[2], on account of those things of which we are ignorant, when once we are justly persuaded of his existence, so we cannot doubt of the Divine authority of the Holy Scriptures, which extends to every portion of them, because our weakness is unable in every case to come up to the hidden glory of their doctrines, which is clothed in inadequate language, for we have the treasure in earthen vessels." And in another passage he says[3]: "He who once admits that these Scriptures are the work of the Creator of the world, must be persuaded, that whatsoever phenomena in regard to the creation present themselves to those who attempt to give an account of it, the same will also occur to him who inquires about the Scriptures. There are now, for instance, in Scripture many things which human nature may find difficult, or be unable to explain, but we are not on that account, to accuse the Creator of the Universe; as for example, when we are unable to explain the cause why basilisks and other poisonous animals were created; for here it is the duty of a pious mind, taking into consideration the weakness of man, and how it is impossible fully to understand the creating wisdom of God, to reserve to God the knowledge of such things, and he will afterwards, when we are considered worthy of it, reveal to us that, about which we have doubted in reverence." How full he was of the belief in a Divine Spirit which breathed throughout the whole of Scripture, and how thoroughly persuaded he was that this could be received only with an humble and a believing heart, is beautifully expressed in the following words of Origen[4]: "We must believe that no tittle of Holy Scripture is deficient in the wisdom of God,

[1] Philocal. c. i. p. 10. [p. 5. Ed. Spencer, 1658. H. J. R.]
[2] ου χρεοκοπειται ἡ προνοια.
[3] Philocal. c. ii. p. 61. [p. 23. Ed. Spencer. H. J. R.]
[4] L. c. c. i. p. 51. [p. 19, 20. Ed. Spencer. H. J. R.]

for He, who proclaimed to man, '*Thou shalt not appear empty before me*' (Exod. xxxiv.), will himself far less utter any empty word; for the prophets take what they say, out of his fulness; therefore all parts are animated (*lit.* breathe) by this fulness, and there is nothing in the Prophets, the Law, or the Gospel, or the Apostolic Epistles, which does not proceed from this fulness. The breath therefore of this fulness (πληρωμα, Pleroma), descends on those who have eyes, to see the revelations of the Divine fulness, ears to hear it, and a sense to catch the sweet-smelling savour, which proceeds from this fulness. But if, in reading Scripture, you meet with a thought which, so to speak, is a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence, blame yourself, for be assured, that this stone of stumbling contains thoughts, by which that saying shall come to pass, '*He that believeth, shall not be put to shame*' (Rom. x. 11). Believe first, and you shall then find much holy assistance and support under that which appeared to you an offence."

But however just this principle of Origen might be, yet in the application of it he was led astray by means of the false position, from which he viewed the spirit and the object of Holy Scripture, and of all Divine revelation through the Word; and this false position was intimately connected with his false conception of the relation between *faith* and Gnosis (πιστις and γνωσις). In both respects he was led astray by the speculative point of view, which was too prevalent, inasmuch as he did not sufficiently distinguish the nature of a Christian system of faith, and a Christian philosophy from each other, and he did not keep sufficiently before his sight the essentially practical object of all Divine revelations, and especially of Christianity. He did not refer every thing to the one object, that affects all mankind—redemption, regeneration, sanctification, and the blessings resulting from them; but the practical object of man's improvement was, in his estimation, only a subordinate one, which was chiefly of use to the great mass of believers, who were incapable of receiving anything of higher character. In his estimation, the highest object was the speculative, the communicating the most elevated truths to spiritual men who were capable of understanding them, *i. e.* to the Gnostics. These higher truths have reference chiefly to the following points[1]: "About God—about the

[1] Philocal. i. 28. [p. 11. Ed. Spencer. H. J. R.]

nature of his only-begotten Son, and the mode in which he is the Son of God—about the cause which impelled him to come down and take upon him the nature of man—about the effects of this incarnation, whom it affects—about the higher kinds of reasonable beings who have fallen from a state of happiness, and the causes of their fall—about the difference of souls, and whence this difference arises—what the world is, and wherefore it was created—why there is so much evil in the earth, and whether evil is found only there, or elsewhere also." As Origen made it the chief object to find explanations and answers to these inquiries; many parts of Scripture, if he abided by their natural interpretation, would naturally appear to him to be unfruitful towards that which he considered its essential object. All narratives embracing only earthly occurrences, all legislation bearing only on earthly relations, he explained as being only the symbolical guise of a higher history of the world of Spirits; and of higher laws which related also to that world. Thus the higher and the subordinate object of Scripture would be united together, and the revelation of the higher class of truth would be hidden in a literal form, adapted to the improvement of the general mass of mankind. "The multitude of genuine and simple believers," says Origen, "bears testimony to the usefulness, even of this inferior understanding of the Scriptures." Between these two kind of senses included in Scripture, Origen imagined an intermediate kind, an allegorical sense adapted for those who had not yet arrived at that higher state of spiritual perception; this was a general, moral, and instructive application of those passages of Scripture, which relate to individual cases, though this application was not of that elevated and profound class[1]; and he adduces as examples of this, the explanation of 1 Cor. ix. 9; and most of the allegorical interpretations of Scripture then commonly used, even in the instruction of the people. Thus, the triple sense of Scripture corresponded to the three parts of man's nature, which the theory of Origen acknowledged: that which is really Divine in man, the *Spirit* which is directed towards the Eternal, and finds its proper life in the perception and contemplation of Divine things; the *Soul*, whose sphere of action is the temporal and the finite; and the *Body*. While Philo agreed with Origen in the

[1] [As in the higher class of interpretation, which he imagined. H. J. R.]

essential and fundamental features of his view, he (Origen) sought also on the whole to preserve the objective truth of the literal and historical contents of the Scriptures [1], which are given as the dress in which the spiritual revelations are communicated. And yet, he formed passages where the letter could not, in his opinion be defended; because he was destitute of right hermeneutic principles, and of other necessary helps and aids; or because he did not know how to separate the divine from the human in the Holy Scriptures [2]; or else, because (which is connected with the remark we have just made), proceeding from an exaggerated notion of inspiration, he could not entertain the supposition of any contradiction in Scripture, even in unimportant things; and then, he thought the only way to clear up the difficulties was by a spiritual interpretation [3]. And, like Philo, he united the supposition with his reverence for the Holy Scripture in such a manner, as to induce him to say, that these things, the literal acceptation of which cannot be maintained—this mythical guise in which the higher wisdom is clothed—were strewed purposely about as a stone of stumbling [4], in order to excite deeper enquiry.

These principles Origen applied not only to the Old Testament, but expressly to the New; and expressly to the Gospel history [5]. Thus he imagined that he was able to clear up many difficulties, by supposing, that the Apostles represented [6] under the outward form of various matters of fact, what they had to say of a difference in the operations of the Divine Logos [7]. This prin-

[1] *το σωματικον των γραφων, το ἐνδυμα των πνευματικων.*

[2] As, for example, where he found it impossible to maintain the literal truth of the history of Uriah, because in David he saw only the man inspired by the Spirit of God, and not a *frail and sinful* man.

[3] *ἀναγωγη εἰς το νοητον.*

[4] *σκανδαλα, προσκομματα.*

[5] See the passage of the Philocalia quoted above; and also c. xv. p. 139.

[6] T. x. Joh. p. 4. *προεκειτο αὐτους, ὁπου μεν ἐνεχωρει ἀληθευειν πνευματικως ἁμα και σωματικως, ὁπου μη ἐνεδεχετο ἀμφοτερως προκρινειν το πνευματικον του σωματικου, σωζομενου πολλαχις του ἀληθους πνευματικου ἐν τῳ σωματικῳ, ὡς ἀν εἰποι τις, ψευδει.*

[7] Of different communications of the *ἐπιδημια νοητη του* Χριστου.

[N.B. In a passage requiring some delicacy of touch in translating. I have used the word *outward* as *sinnlich*, as I thought it gave the nearest idea to the English reader. The *ἐπιδημια αἰσθητη*, or *the abode of the Logos with us which could be perceived by the senses*, was only the type of the *ἐπιδημια νοητη the sojourn of the Logos or of Christ in the spirit of man.* This was explained above, p. 222, a reference to which will be of service in considering this passage. H. J. R.]

ciple of interpretation, it must be avowed, gave an opportunity for the exercise of every kind of subjective caprice, and was liable to make historical Christianity entirely a thing of nought; as every one could thus place whatever did not suit his subjective ideas and feelings, in the class of those things which were not to be taken literally. Origen felt with much force, what danger might arise from this to objective Christianity; and he therefore always declared, that for the most part the spirit and the letter were both alike to be maintained, and that the letter was to be abandoned only after careful examination. But where were there any certain limits?

And yet, we cannot but acknowledge, that in Origen the caprice so prejudicial to objective Christianity, which might proceed from these principles, was softened down by the intimately pious and believing feeling, which animated him, and the thorough sense of the historical truth of Christianity with which he was impressed. And we must also take care to remark, how truth and error here were mingled together in a manner, which must be explained by taking into consideration the peculiarities of his own character, and his relation to his own times, which were then agitated by a variety of contradictory opinions. He saw how carnally-minded Jews, cleaving to the letter of the Old Testament, were unable to attain to a faith in the Gospel; how carnally-minded Christians by that disposition too were led to rude conceptions (*lit.* representations) of God and divine things. He saw how Anti-Jewish Gnostics, in consequence of this very mode of conception of the Old Testament, fell into the other error; so that they would not recognize this God, who appeared thus carnally represented (*i. e.* in the Old Testament), as the God of the Gospel; which circumstance was an introduction for their whole system of Dualism. Now Origen believed that he should be able, by means of this spiritualizing mode of interpretation, to tear up all these contradictory errors by the very roots[1]. He had not in this the smallest intention of degrading that which is Divine in Scripture into something human; but he was more inclined to go too far on the other side, by not recognizing in that which was

[1] After mentioning all these errors, he says, Philocalia, c. i. p. 17. *αἰτια δε πασι τοις προειρημενοις ψευδοδοξιων και ἀσεβειων ἡ ἰδιωτικων περι Θεον λογων οὐκ ἀλλη τις εἰναι δοκει ἡ ἡ γραφη κατα τα πνευματικα μη νενοημενη, ἀλλ' ὡς προς το ψιλον γραμμα ἐξειλημμενη.*

Divine, that which was *properly and peculiarly human* in the mode in which it was brought forward; because, in accordance with the general notions of that time, he deduced throughout Scripture both form and matter from the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. The Divine Spirit—such was the belief of Origen—had so completely acted in reference to the higher wisdom, that in many passages the spirit was given without the letter.

It must, however, be confessed, that the Alexandrian turn of mind, if carried to the extreme, without any counter action, and without the spirit of piety which imbued an Origen and a Clemens, might lead to an Idealism, entirely subversive of all that is historical and objective in Christianity; and then, as the struggles which the Origenian school had to undergo at the end of this period indicate, we must look especially to the realistic tendency, which proceeded from the Western Church, for a counterbalancing power to meet that idealism; just as the Origenian school was calculated to be efficacious in spiritualizing that Church. Such is the general picture of the relation which existed between the most remarkable and differing dispositions of mind; a picture, which we shall be sure to find again in the different modes of treating the chief points of Christian doctrine singly, just as this consideration will give us a proof, that, even in the fundamental truths of Christianity, these two dispositions, notwithstanding their opposite nature, must touch each other and join together.

II. *The Development of the great doctrines of Christianity considered separately.*

We must always bear in mind, that Christianity did not deliver to man isolated *speculative ideas*[1] of God and Divine things, nor a ready-made dogmatic system in a settled form, but announced *the facts* of a communication made by God to man, through which man became placed in a new relation to his Creator, by the recog-

[1] [*Erkenntnisse.* Like other words belonging to the metaphysical vocabulary of Germany, this word is almost untranslatable. 'Cognitions' would be the nearest if we had the word. It expresses rather the *acknowledgment* of an idea to our own consciousness than the ideas themselves. The *representations* of the mind (vorstellungen) are its ideas, our *erkenntnisse* are our knowledge of these ideas. See the Conversations-lexicon on the word.—See Edinburgh Review, Oct. 1832, p. 173. H. J. R.]

nition and application [1] of which an entirely new direction and formation of the religious feelings might be produced, through which all that was before contained in it would receive an alteration and modification. The fact of the redemption of sinful man by Christ, forms the central point of Christianity, and from the influence which the application of this fact to the heart must produce on the inward life of man, this new form or condition of the religious conscience arises, and from this again there results a new state of thought about Divine things, which reflects the new world formed within. The characteristic by which the Christian nature of anything is determined, depends on its connection with this, which forms the essential and fundamental ground of Christianity, according to the manner in which dogmatic systems and individual opinions are in relation to this *one* doctrine, so will be their relation to Christianity in general, and in the same manner we must estimate the importance or non-importance of errors as far as their effects on Christian practice are concerned. If from the beginning men had clearly conceived this relation of insulated doctrines to the centre-point of Christianity, and maintained a full consciousness of it, it would have been more easy for them to come to an understanding as to unity in that, which forms the essential nature of Christianity, and this unity would not have been so easily destroyed by differences in speculative conceptions, to which they attached in early times too much weight, exactly because they were unacquainted with the true measure for estimating in what Christianity [2] consists.

Even the common God-consciousness, the consciousness of the God, in whom we live and move and have our being, received a new impulse from Christianity; the believer who lived in God became filled with a new feeling of the undeniableness of God, and even in Nature, he, on whom inward communion with God had been bestowed through Christ, felt the Omnipresence of a God, who filleth all things, with more liveliness and greater force. While those Fathers, who in early life had been devoted to the Platonic Philosophy, and had received through its influence the shape of their mind and the form of their knowledge, developed under *this form* their Christian God-consciousness, Tertullian, on

[1] [Aneignung. Literally *appropriation.—i.e.* application to the heart. H. J. R.]

[2] [*Literally* 'for the estimation of all which is Christian,' meaning, how far any doctrine is essentially Christian or not. As I am scrupulous about paraphrasing, I wish my readers to know exactly the force of the idioms which I cannot render literally. H. J. R.]

the contrary, expressed in the original but uncultivated form of his powerful and rugged peculiarity, that with which the animation of an inward deep Christian God-consciousness[1] inspired him. On the whole, although the Fathers had not to contend with *Atheists*, yet their controversial treatises against *superstitious* men and *idolaters* often took such a turn, as might have been directed against atheists also. Instead of endeavouring to prove the existence of God by logical inference[2], they appealed to that which is most immediate in the human spirit, and is antecedent to all proof, they appealed to the originally-implanted consciousness [of God] which human nature cannot deny: they appealed to an original revelation of the one God, made to the human spirit, on which every other revelation of God is founded. Clemens appealed to the fact, that every scientific proof presupposes something which is not proved, which can be conceived only through an immediate agency on the spirit of man. He says[3], "To the Supreme, the simple Being, and the Being elevated above all matter, faith alone can raise itself." Therefore, he says, there can be any knowledge or perception of God, only in as far as he himself has *revealed* himself to man. God cannot be conceived by means of demonstrative knowledge, for this proceeds only from things previously acknowledged, and more known [to other things which are less known] but nothing can be prior to the Eternal, and hence it results, that it is only by Divine grace, and by the revelation of his eternal word, that we can recognize the unknown; and then he introduces the words which Paul spoke at Athens, with reference to the knowledge of the unknown God[4]. And in another passage also[5], he says, "The First Cause is above space, and time, and name, and conception. Therefore Moses says to God, 'Reveal thyself to me' (Exod. xxxiii. 18.) most clearly pointing out, that no man can either teach or express what God is, but he can make himself known only by his own power." He recognizes also in all men an outpouring from God, a Divine seed[6], through which

[1] [Gottesbewusstseyn. God-consciousness. I have used this new word merely to express the German term, which conveys the idea of 'an inward recognition of God's existence, and a sense of his presence and operations;' a *consciousness* of his existence and agency. H. J. R.]

[2] [*i. e.* The à posteriori argument, or the argument of design. H. J. R.]

[3] ii. 364. [Sylb. 157. Pott. 435.]

[4] v. 588. [Ed. Potter, 696. Sylb. p. 251. Klotz, iii. p. 60. H. J. R.]

[5] v. 582. [Ed. Potter, p. 689. Sylb. p. 248. Klotz, iii. p. 52.]

[6] *ἀπορροια θεικη*. Protrept. p. 45.

they are impelled, even against their own will, to acknowledge the one Eternal God. As Origen reckoned the idea of the one God according to the language of philosophy, among the κοιναι ἰδεαι (the ideas common to the conscience (or mind) of all human nature), so he considers the consciousness of God in man's nature as a mark of his affinity to God [1]. Theophilus, of Antioch, recognizes a revelation of God in the whole of creation; but at the same time he lays down the position, that a capability and aptitude of the moral and religious nature of man is requisite for the perception of this revelation. Where this nature is dulled and dimmed, that revelation is unintelligible for man. To the common inquiry of the sensuous heathen, "Where then is your God? show him to us;" his answer was, "*Show me thy man, and I will show thee my God;* show me that the eyes of thy soul see, that the ears of thy heart hear; all have eyes to see the Sun, but the blind cannot see it. Just as the tarnished mirror will not receive an image, so the unclean soul cannot receive the image of God. But God has created all things in order that he may be known by his works, just as the invisible soul is known by its operation. All life reveals him, his breath animates all things; without him all would again sink back into nothingness; man cannot speak without revealing him, but in the darkening of his own soul lies the cause of his being unable to perceive this revelation. He says therefore to man, 'give thyself to the physician who is able to heal the eyes of thy soul; Give thyself to God [2].'"

While Clement, the friend of philosophy, sought the revelation of that seed of a nature akin to the Divine, in the philosophical development of that original belief-in-God [3], [literally God-consciousness] Tertullian, on the contrary, the friend of nature, the enemy of art, and of the wisdom of the schools, in which he saw not the developing handmaid, but the *falsifier* of that original religious belief that is founded in our very nature, appealed to the involuntary testimony of the soul, not as it is when trained in schools, but in its simple, rude, uncultivated condition [4]. He says, (Apologet. c. xvii.) "Although shut up in the prison-house of the body, although cramped by bad education, although enervated by lusts and desires, although serving false gods, yet the

[1] c. Cels. lib. i. c. 4.

[2] Theoph. ad Autolyc. lib. i. c. 2. [The *substance* of this passage is found in ch. iii. 11. (Ed. Wolf.) but the exact words are not taken from Theophilus. H. J. R.]

[3] ἐν τοις περι λογους ἐνδιατριβουσιν. [4] De Testimonio Animæ.

soul, when it awakes, as it were, from a debauch or a sleep, or some disease, and attains to its healthy condition, the soul calls on God as God, and with this name only, because it belongs to the true God; 'Great God! Good God! and what God hath given,' this is the outcry of all men [1]. They appeal to him also as Judge, when they say, 'God sees,' 'I commend it to God,' and 'God will repay it to me.' Oh! *the witness of the soul* which is by its nature Christian! In fact, when it makes this appeal it looks not to the Capitol, but up to Heaven, for it knows the seat of the living God; from him and from thence it came itself!" While others sought for testimonies to the truth which Christianity presupposes to exist in the religious conscience of man, among the treasures of ancient literature, and even in forged writings [2], Tertullian was more pleased to appeal to the clear testimony which was near at hand and accessible to all, and whose genuineness none could dispute, to those out-bursts of the soul (eruptiones animæ) the still and silent pledge of an innate persuasion and belief [3] [literally conscience or consciousness]. Marcion,

[1] [The reading of this passage varies considerably in the different editions of Tertullian. I subjoin two—that of Cambridge, 1686, which runs thus. "Deum nominat hoc solo quia proprie verus hic unus Deus, bonus et magnus. Et quod Deus dederit, omnium vox est"—and that of Havercamp, 1718. "Deum nominat, hoc solo nomine, quia proprius Dei veri. DEUS MAGNUS, DEUS BONUS, et quod DEUS DEDERIT, omnium vox est." Neander follows the reading of Havercamp's Edition. I must ask my readers to compare the treatise Adversus Marcion. I. 10. where nearly the same phrases occur, only '*si* Deus dederit' and *quod Deo placet*, are two of the colloquial phrases quoted there. The 'si Deus dederit' would rather indicate, If God hath so disposed matters, &c. but the appeal to *Deity* is the same in each phrase. H. J. R.]

[2] As especially in those under the name of *Hermes (Trismegistus)* of the *Egyptian Thoth*, of *Hystaspes* (the Persian Gushtaph) and of the Sibylls. Such writings originally sprung, partly from heathen Platonists, and partly from Alexandrian Jews, and were only interpolated with new additions with a view to Christianity. According to the principle promulgated among Platonists and Theophists of every class, that the delusion of the multitude is allowable for pious purposes, people thought themselves authorized to promote such fictions. But we should be doing an injustice, if we attributed this principle to the Fathers generally. As most of them, with the exception of the Alexandrians and particularly of ORIGEN, were entirely destitute of critical attainments, they might easily be deceived, especially where they were willing to be so. Besides, at the time in which the false Sibylline books first became current among the Christians, there was a party which did not approve of appealing to them, and gave to those, who favoured them, the party-name of Sibyllists—perhaps, because their critical taste discovered marks of spuriousness in the Pseudo-sibylline books, or rather, because on doctrinal grounds they would not allow of the existence of any Prophetesses among the heathen. See Origen. c. Cels. lib. v. §. 61.

[3] De Test. Animæ, c. 5.

was the only one, who through a truth (see above) which he misunderstood and conceived in a one-sided view, and through a turn of Christian feelings, actually proceeding from a foundation of truth, but only not sufficiently clear to himself, and carried to the extreme, suffered himself to be seduced into mistaking or overlooking that witness of the God of the Gospel in the creation and in the common conscience of mankind. (See above.) Therefore Tertullian makes this witness tell against him more forcibly [1], God never will be hidden, God never will fail to the human race, he will always be recognized, he will always be understood to exist, [he will always be heard,] yea, he will even be seen, if he wills it. God hath for a witness of himself, all that we are, and all in which we are. Thus he proves himself to be God, and to be the one God, even by his being known to all, *while another must first be proved to exist* [2]. The consciousness of God's existence is the original endowment of the soul, a gift the same and identical in Egypt, in Syria, and in Pontus, for souls proclaim the God of the Jews to be their God."

While, however, we find this inward and deep conviction of the universal acknowledgement of God by man's conscience among all the Fathers, we must not expect to find a spiritual mode of thought about the nature of God corresponding to it in all of them; for the former proceeded from the most profound depths of the inward life, on which the leaven of Christianity which was thrown into the mass of mankind, produced its influence at first and immediately, while, on the contrary, it was only gradually, and in proceeding from this [*i. e.* this first and immediate action on the interior life] as a centre point and origin, that the enlightening influence of Christianity could extend itself over the individual ramifications of the spiritual nature of man [3]. The saying of our Lord, "God is a Spirit," appears indeed to a reason, formed

[1] c. Marcion, lib. i. c. 10. comp. 18. 19.

[2] [Sic probatur et Deus et unus, dum non ignoratur; alio adhuc probari laborante. This sentence and the next are transposed in Neander's translation, at least if he follows Rigault's Edition. H. J. R.]

[3] [This is the same view which is often enforced throughout these volumes, viz. that Christianity first acted on the inward life of man, purifying his affections and dispositions &c., and then served to clear his intellectual conceptions of Divine things. The first was an *immediate* effect of Christianity; the second, an effect produced *by means* of the former. It is in this sense, as opposed to *secondary, i. e. consequent on other actions*, or *produced by mediate agency*, that the word immediate (unmittelbar) is used in the text. Our metaphysical vocabulary, slender as it is, has been so injured by the

under the guidance of Christianity, at once to suggest the notion of a pure Spirit, but a mode of thought, already spiritualized through the practical influence of Christianity, or by the praying to God in spirit and in truth, was in fact needed, in order to understand the meaning of this saying. Those men, the form and fashion of whose religious sentiments had been derived either from a sensuous Judaism, or a heathenism occupied in the contemplation of Nature, could not at once justly interpret and develope the idea contained in this saying, although their heart well understood what it is, to pray to God in spirit and in truth. According to their former habits of mind, they would understand by πνευμα nothing but a mere refined body of an etherial nature, as contrasted with a body composed of gross earthly materials [1], and they became therefore the rather confirmed in their error by that saying. The more lively their religious feeling, especially when joined to lively and fiery powers of imagination, the more they were imbued with the conviction that God is the most real of Beings; and the more deeply they were impressed by the feeling of the omnipresence of God, the more likely, on that very account, was it to happen, that their conceptions of God would take a sensuous shape, and the more difficult would it be to them to lift themselves up above all objects of the senses, to that which would seem to them a cold and negative abstraction. The religious Realism, as yet not sufficiently enlightened, which opposed itself to an Idealism, inclined in religion too much to refine away all things into insubstantiability, and reduce them to shadowy nonentities [2] would be inclined in the spirit of angry contrast too far to sensualize everything, and the more spiritual conception of the idea of God would then appear to such a disposition under a somewhat suspicious point of view. And these indeed are the very circumstances, which we meet with in Tertullian, who makes *corporeality* and *existence* convertible terms [3].

usage of its words in improper senses, that I feel it necessary sometimes to draw attention to the language, which is used in a sense different from that which it bears in common conversation and writings where no closeness is required. H. J. R.]

[1] See Tertullian, adv. Praxeam, c. vii. Spiritus corpus sui generis. Comp. Lactant. Institut. vii. 9. Origen, in Joh. t. xiii. c. 21.

[2] [Einem in der Religion alles zu sehr verdünnende und verflüchtigenden Idealismus. *Lit.* To an Idealism in Religion too much inclined to *thin* away and *volatilize* (or evaporate) everything. H. J. R.]

[3] De Carne Christi, c. xi. Nihil incorporale, nisi quod non est.

Now, two different causes would operate towards introducing a spirituality into the idea of God. These were, on the one hand, a sober and chastened practical direction of the religious spirit, proceeding immediately out of Christianity, and seeking to raise itself up to God through the heart, rather than through speculation and the power of the imagination; this was a Spirit which acknowledged from the depths of the religious conscience the truth, that the image of Divine things is only an image, and a faint expression of that which is bestowed upon the believing soul in its inward life,—and, on the other side, a style of thought, which worked up the contents of the Christian doctrines after a learned and scientific manner; such a turn of thought, in fact, as we find in Clement and Origen, and generally in the Alexandrian school. The former turn of mind is found in an Irenæus and a Novatian. Irenæus says, [1] "All which we predicate of God, we speak as if in a kind of similitude [or comparison], they are only images which love makes for itself, and our sentiments and feelings throw into these images something more than actually lies in them;" and Novatian [2] says of the nature of God, "What that is, that which he alone understands, that which every human soul feels, though it is unable to express its feelings [3]." The same writer says, "that although Christ, because the spirit of man must constantly be making progress in religious development, made less use of *anthropomorphic* images than the Old Testament, yet that he could speak of the Being, who is above all human representation and language, only in images, which fell short of the thing itself."

We must be careful to make a proper distinction between *Anthropomorphism* in the representations of God, and *Anthropo-*

[1] L. ii. c. 13. § 4. Dicitur quidem secundum hæc per dilectionem, sentitur supra hæc secundum magnitudinem.

[2] See ch. vi. and viii.

[The latter half of this sentence occurs p. 22. Ed. Welchman, c. viii. "*quem* mens omnis humana sentit, etiam si non exprimit." The former seems to me most nearly expressed in ch. v. "Est enim simplex, et sine ulla corporea concretione, quidquid illud est totus, quod se solus scit esse; quandoquidem *Spiritus* sit dictus." On the passage afterwards which makes *every Spirit* a creature, see Welchman's note. The meaning seems to be clearly 'every *mere* Spirit;' *i. e.* that of which nothing else could be predicated than that it is a Spirit, 'is a creature.'—The whole passage to the end of ch. viii. ought to be read, to enter into the writer's meaning. The first quotation is the same, as occurs in Neander's next note, only with a different reading. H. J. R.]

[3] Quod mens omnis humana sentit, et si non exprimit.

pathism[1]. The latter consists in that inclination of man to represent to himself the Supreme Being after the analogy of his own spirit, and by it he is easily misled into attributing to God that which is founded upon the limits and imperfections of his own nature; and even if that Anthropomorphism, of which we speak, was obliged to yield by degrees to the spiritualizing influence of Christianity, yet Christianity could not act upon *Anthropopathism* in the same manner, because there is a foundation to it (*namely, Anthropopathism*) which is inseparable from the nature of man, which can never step beyond its own peculiar condition, and can receive all which it does appropriate to itself, only in the form allowed by that condition. A great truth is also at the bottom of this Anthropopathism, inasmuch as the spirit of man is destined to represent the image of the Supreme Spirit. Now, as far as Anthropopathism is founded on the essential attributes of human nature, Christianity must engraft itself upon it, but must at the same time purify and ennoble it together with the rest of man's nature, because it revealed the perfect realization of the image of God in the human nature of Christ, and renewed that image of God in all mankind. Even here also all must arise and develop itself from the fundamental consciousness of a renewed communion between God and man. In the acknowledgment of God as the Redeemer of human nature an opposition was at once established to all false Anthropopathism in a moral point of view; for here the holiness of God revealed itself in opposition to all sin, as well as the eternal love of God towards a being entangled in sin, whom a holy love desires to free from sin and to lead back to God.

The two opposite dispositions, which resolve themselves into the common contrast of religious Realism and Idealism, were here also opposed to each other (as we remarked in the general introduction) among the Jews and the Heathens; namely,—an *impure sensuous corporeal conception*[2] of God among the ruder multitude, and *a stripping off all human attributes*[3], by which the idea of God was too subtilized and rendered untenable to the human mind; the latter was found among the Platonists, who placed only an abstract idea of perfection in the stead of that

[1] I use these two expressions in their proper senses, which are both etymologically and historically widely different.

[2] [Literally, a *humanizing* of God. H. J. R.]

[3] [Literally, a *de-humanizing* of God, if I may coin such a word to represent the German *Entmenschlichung*. H. J. R.]

of the living God. Between these two opposite extremes the development of the idea of God was to be conducted by Christianity.

One extreme constantly produced the other. The rude and carnal anthropopathical ideas, which fleshly-minded Jews and uninformed Christians, by clinging to the letter, made to themselves out of passages from the Old Testament, which they misunderstood, induced a Marcion to form to himself out of the God of the Old Testament, exactly such a being as those people had imagined their god to be. The carnal conceptions of the ideas of Divine wrath and a Divine justice, which he found current, impelled him to take up an opposite principle, by which he entirely mistook and obliterated the fundamental and objective truth, which really did belong to these notions, on account of the form in which they were presented to him; and after another mode of Anthropopathism, more in accordance with a tender heart, he formed to himself the notion of a *blessing* and a *redeeming Love*, entirely separate from the idea of that *Holiness*, which is a consuming fire to the sinner[1]. As for Tertullian, whose powerful Christian realism made him hold fast the fundamental truth of a Christian Anthropopathism, although in the feelings of his heart, and in the conception of his spirit, he frequently had more than he was able neatly and clearly to express in his uncultivated and carnal modes of expression, he justly reproaches Marcion, who thus separated the attributes of God, with inconsistency in his belief about redemption: and says to him[2], "Does not the forgiveness of sin pre-suppose the existence of sin in the eyes of God, who forgives sin?" and, on the contrary, he maintains, that the goodness of God cannot be separated from his righteousness; that principle, which sets every thing in order, and attributes to every one that which is his[3]. "The goodness of God has created the world, and his righteousness has duly arranged it." In opposition to Marcion, he shows the necessity of an Anthropopathism, which even Marcion himself, although unconsciously to himself, could not avoid; but he shows also how a just Anthropopathism must consist in this, that we should not let down the attributes of God to human sinfulness and imperfection; but, by a restoration of the image of God in human nature, ennoble

[1] See the representation of Marcion's system, given in a former section.

[2] Adv. Marc. ii. 26, 27. [3] L. c. ii. 12.

that which is human till it becomes a mirror of the Divine. He says to Marcion, "Those are extremely foolish, who judge that which is Divine according to that which is human. Why shouldest thou imagine God to be partly human, and not wholly Divine? . . . . . [Moreover while you acknowledge, that man became a living soul, being breathed into by God, and not God by man's operation,] it is perverse enough on your part, to let down God to the nature of man, instead of elevating man to the image of God . . . . . Why do ye consider long-suffering, mercy, and the mother of all *goodness itself*, to be something Divine. And yet, at the same time, all this is not in us in its perfection, because God alone is perfect[1]." Tertullian recognizes in every revelation of God a progressive condescension, the highest point and the object of which is the incarnation of God[2]. "Whatever you may collect together, which speaks of inferiority, or weakness, or anything that is unworthy of God, I will give you a simple and consistent answer. God cannot enter into any association with man, without attributing to himself human sensations and affections; and thus by his condescension he softens the overwhelmingness of his majesty, which human weakness could not bear; and this is a condescension, which, however unworthy of the Deity, is necessary for man, and therefore worthy of God; because nothing is so worthy of God, as that which serves to the salvation of man[3] . . . . . God deals with man, as with one like himself, in order that man may act towards God as with a being like himself. God appeared in humility, in order that man might be raised to the highest pinnacle of greatness. If thou art ashamed of a God like this, I see not indeed how thou canst believe in a crucified God." It must be acknowledged that the latter charge of inconsistency did not apply to Marcion, because the same principle which induced him to oppose the anthropopathical conceptions of God belonging to the Old Testament, made him also an opponent of the doctrine of a crucified Deity.

The Alexandrian Fathers distinguish themselves peculiarly, in consequence of their philosophical culture, by endeavouring to eradicate entirely a carnal Anthropopathism out of the Christian system of doctrine; but it was also very easy for them to carry their

[1] [Tertull. Contr. Marc. ii. xvi. Ed. Rigalt. H. J. R.]
[2] L. c. ii. 15.
[3] L. c. ii. 27.

notions too far in the contrary direction, and they were liable to lower the doctrine of the Divine attributes and involve it too completely in what is only subjective. Let us take as an instance the following beautiful passage of Origen, in which, notwithstanding all the beauty with which he speaks of God's education of man, he does not conceive with sufficient depth the sense of the Biblical expression of the 'wrath of God' against sin. Working upon the idea of Philo, as to the two systems in regard to Divine things, the *Humanizing*, and the *De-Humanizing* system [1]; he says [2], "When the Scriptures represent God, as God in his Divine majesty [3], and do not involve in their consideration his dealings in relation to men, they declare that 'he is not like a man, for there is no end of his greatness.' (Ps. cxlv. 3.) And again, 'The Lord is a great God, a great king above all Gods. (Psal. xcv. 3.) . . . . . But when his dealings with the human race are interwoven with the subject, then God assumes the mind, the fashion, and the language of man; just as when we talk to a child of two-years old, we lisp for the sake of the child; for if we maintain the dignity of mature age, in talking to children, and do not let ourselves down to their language, they are unable to understand us. Think, then, that God also acts in the same way, when he lets himself down to the race of men, and especially to those, who are still in their [intellectual] childhood. See now, how we grown-up men alter even the name of things, when we communicate with children, and how we call bread by some peculiar name, and also drinking we designate by some other term, because we make use of the language of children, and not of grown-up persons . . . . . If any one heard us talking thus, would he say 'This old man is become foolish?' and thus also God speaks [with us] as with children. 'Behold,' says our Saviour, 'I and the children whom God hath given to me,' Heb. ii. 13. . . . . When you hear of the wrath of God, do not imagine that wrath is a passion to which God is subject. It is a condescension of language in order to convert and amend the child, for we ourselves put on a look of severity and anger towards children, not from feeling the passion ourselves, but designedly. If we pre-

[1] See Part i. [p. 49.]

[2] Hom. 18. in Jeremiam, § 6. [p. 169. and seq. Ed. Huet. H. J. R.]

[3] [θεολογωσι τον Θεον κατ' αὐτον, i. e. speak of him absolutely and not in relation to man. H. J. R.]

serve our mildness of aspect, and testify our love of the child, without changing our look, as the real interest of the child would require us to do, we spoil it utterly. Thus also God is represented to us as angry, in order to our conversion and improvement, while in fact he is not subject to anger; but thou wilt undergo the wrath of God, by drawing down upon thyself by thy wickedness, sufferings hard to be borne, when thou art punished by what is called the wrath of God." Origen spoke thus in one of his *Sermons;* and also in another passage in his commentary on Matthew, where he developes the same theory, he says[1], "Much may be said to those, *who are not in a condition to be injured by it*, about the goodness of God and the abundance of his grace, which he properly hides from those *who fear him*."

The Alexandrians here also took a middle path between the Gnostics and the rest of the Fathers. While these maintained that there is no absolute retributive justice in God[2], nay, set aside the whole notion of justice as contradictory to the nature of a perfect God, and opposed the God of justice to the God of goodness, the Alexandrians, on the contrary, made the notion of justice altogether into the notion of a Divine love, which educates rational beings in a fallen state, according to their several capacities and needs[3]. Thus they might say, that the distinction made by the Gnostics between a just and a good God, might be applied in a certain true sense, by attributing the epithet of "the just" peculiarly to Christ (the Divine Logos) as the educator and the purifier of fallen beings, the aim of whose education was that they might be rendered capable of receiving the goodness of their everlasting heavenly Father, and thus becoming blessed[4].

[1] p. 378. Ed. Huet. [The phrase '*who fear him*' of course alludes to those whose religious character is imperfect; who have not arrived at the point where they may cast away fear. H. J. R.]

[2] [The sentence in Neander runs thus. 'Wenn diese *eine* absolute Gerechtigkeit in Gott setzten, ja den ganzen Gerechtigkeitsbegriff als einen dem Wesen des volkommenen Gottes widersprechenden umstiessen, und den gerechten Gott dem Guten entgegensetzten,' &c. 'While these acknowledged *an absolute* retributive justice in God, and even further than this threw aside,' &c.

As the two parts of the sentence are contradictory of each other, I conceive that there is some mistake, and I have translated it as if *keine* stood in the place of *eine*. H. J. R.]

[3] A δικαιοσυνη σωτηριος.

[4] Clemens, Pædagog. lib. i. p. 118. καθ' ὁ μεν πατηρ νοειται ἀγαθος ὡν, αὐτο μονον ὁ ἐστι, κεκληται ἀγαθος, καθ' ὁ δε υἱος ὡν ὁ λογος αὐτου ἐν τῳ πατρι ἐστι,

The *doctrine of a creation out of nothing* is closely connected with the peculiar character of the Christian doctrine regarding the Deity. In opposition to the notions of antiquity founded upon a religion, which consisted of a deification of nature, which either carried back a succession of causes and effects to a blind unconscious chaos, or at least made God only the fashioner of an inorganic, chaotic matter—in opposition to these notions, Christianity, which frees the consciousness of God's existence from everything like a connection with the deification of nature, presented the doctrine of the Creation as the object of a faith which raised itself over the whole circle of causes and effects in the world cognizable by sense [literally the *appearance-world*] up to the free author of all existence. The characteristic circumstance here, and that which is of practical importance, is this; that the incomprehensible was maintained to be incomprehensible, and that which alone can be of any interest or importance towards affecting our religious faith here, was separated from all the uncongenial elements of poetry and speculation, by which it had been contaminated in the old Oriental systems of religion. Christianity was here destined to purify the religious faith as it had been already revealed in the Old Testament, from all the strange additions it had received by intermixture with the Platonic and the Oriental systems. Thus in the Epistle to the Hebrews, chap. xi. it is proclaimed as an object of faith, that things visible came not from things visible, but that the world was created by the Almighty power of God. This was negatively expressed in the doctrine of a Creation out of nothing[1], a conclusion which was altogether misconceived by the Gnostics[2], when they opposed to it the old saying, (ex nihilo nil fit,) "from nothing, nothing can come," because this doctrine has an antithetical force only against the supposition of matter, which should limit creation; and in this doctrine it is not Nothing but the Supreme, absolute Being = GOD which is declared to be the formation of all existence. It

δικαιος προσαγορευεται. And Origen t. i. in Joh. p. 40. in speaking of the difference between the Θεος ἀγαθος and the δημιουργος δικαιος.

(τουτο δε) οἰμαι μετ' ἐξετασεως ἀκριβους βασανισθεν δυνασθαι λεγεσθαι ἐπι του πατρος και του υἱου, του μεν υἱου τυγχανοντος δικαιοσυνης, του δε πατρος τους ἐν τῃ δικαιοσυνῃ του υἱου παιδευθεντας μετα την Χριστου βασιλειαν ἐυεργετουντος.

[1] κτισις ἐκ του μη ὀντος.

[2] See above, Part ii.

must, however, be confessed, that this conclusion was intended to exclude also a view, which declared all existence as a kind of development of nature proceeding from God, subjected God to a necessity arising from the course of nature, and went near to destroy the notion of the absolute dependence of creation on the Creator. But we have already remarked that those Oriental Theosophists, the Gnostics, were unable to content themselves with this negative conception of the incomprehensible Being. They wished to explain it, and to make that intelligible and perceptible to our ideas, which the doctrine of the creation out of nothing only presented as an object of faith.

Hermogenes, who lived probably at Carthage, about the end of the second and the beginning of the third century, agreed with the Gnostics in their controversy against this portion of the Church doctrine. He was essentially distinguished from the Gnostics by the turn of his mind, which was more of a Western cast, for he was more addicted to Grecian speculation than to Oriental intuition [Anschauung], and hence also his system, which did not, like the Gnostic systems, set the powers of the imagination to work, was not able to obtain so much acceptance as theirs, and in fact we do not hear of any sect of Hermogenians. Nor did he, like the Gnostics, sketch out for himself a peculiar system of esoteric religious doctrines, but he departed from the Church doctrine only in one point, which was, however, a point necessarily very influential on the whole system of religion. He was a painter, and probably a very determined opponent of the Montanism which was spreading over the north of Africa; the artist was as little suited to the Montanistic sect, as they were to the artist. Perhaps also Hermogenes[1], while he

[1] The obscure words of Tertullian, from which we are enabled to derive this account, are as follows. Pingit illicite, nubit assidue, legem Dei in libidinem defendit, in artem contemnit. The first sentence might be understood so as to convey the notion that Tertullian looked on painting itself as something heathenish and sinful, but such a judgment could not be confidently affirmed even of the Montanistic hatred of art in Tertullian, and no proof in favour of such an explanation is to be found in his writings. Neither do the words "he despises the law of God in reference to his art" favour this interpretation, for one cannot think of any passage of Scripture, which Tertullian can have considered as an entire prohibition of painting; but probably Tertullian comprised the Old Testament under the expression "Lex Dei," and alluded to the prohibition of idolatrous images: and the sense would then be, "he despises the authority of the Old Testament by the manner in which he plies his art, and yet he will make its authority available to him to defend a second marriage, against the Montanists, who

opposed the harsh and gloomy character of the Montanists, went into the other extreme of laxness in his estimation of what is Christian and what unchristian; he appears to have had no scruple in representing the objects of the Heathen mythology in the way of his art, because he considered them as mere objects of art, independently of any reference to religion at all.

Hermogenes controverted the Emanation-doctrine of the Gnostics, because it transfers sensuous images to the Being of God, and because the idea of the holiness of God was irreconcileable with the sinfulness of a nature which emanated from him. But he also controverted the doctrine of a creation out of nothing, because, if the world had had no other source than the will of God, it would have corresponded to the nature of the perfect and Holy God, and therefore would of necessity have been perfect and holy; nothing imperfect nor evil could have found place in it, for in a world whose only source was God, whence could anything arise which was uncongenial to the nature of that God? Hermogenes, no doubt, here partly followed, as the Gnostics did, a subjective rule of too limited a nature in his estimation of the different creatures according to the different grades of being, and partly he omitted to take into consideration what is included in the very idea of Creation. In respect to moral evil he was as little inclined as the Gnostics to throw himself back upon the distinction between *willing* and *permitting* on the part of God, and he also with justice abandoned the ground, that evil is necessary as the foil to good, in order that the latter may be known by the contrast; because this position denies the self-existence and independence of good, and the very nature of evil would be destroyed, if it were considered as something which is necessary to the harmony of the whole. But Hermogenes fell into the very error which he desired to avoid; because he still deduced the existence of evil from a necessity inherent in nature. According to his theory, all that is imperfect or evil in the world originates from this cause, that God's creation is limited in consequence of the eternal existence of inorganic matter. From all eternity two principles have existed; the one, the active, and the forming and fashioning (the plastic)—namely God; and the passive, the undeterminate

maintained that the authority of the Old Testament in this respect was superseded by Christianity, and by the new revelations of the Paraclete."

in itself[1], and the formless—namely, matter. This latter is an infinite chaotic mass in constant motion, in which all opposite qualities are present undeveloped and run into each other, full of wild impulse, without law or order, and like the motion of a cauldron that boils up in every direction[2]. This infinite chaos, thrown as it was into endless and irregular motion, could not at any point be laid hold of by a single act, brought to a stand-still, and compelled to subject itself to be formed and fashioned. It was only through the relation of his nature to that of matter, that God could work upon this mass; as the magnet by some inherent necessity attracts iron[3]; as beauty exerts a natural force of attraction on all that approaches it, so God exerts a fashioning influence on matter by his mere appearance, and by the superior power of his Divine Being[4]. According to these principles, he could not, with any consistency, maintain a beginning of existence to the creation, and, in fact, he does not appear to have assumed any such beginning, as we may judge from the grounds which he alleges for his doctrine on this subject; namely, that since dominion is a necessary attribute of God, there must always have been matter for him to exercise that dominion upon. In accordance with this view he maintained an eternal influence of God upon matter, which consisted, according to his system, in the victorious plastic power. From what has been said, it follows, that we must not conceive that in his system chaos was a separate thing existing by itself, and that the influence of this Divine plastic power had begun at some particular instant, whereas [according to his system] it can exist only in connexion with this organization, which is imparted to it [by God], and they can be separated only in idea. From the resistance of this infinite matter, which was to be fashioned by degrees in all its separate parts, against the fashioning power of God, which could only penetrate it successfully by degrees, he deduced all that is imperfect and evil. Thus the old chaos manifests itself in all that is hateful in nature, and all that is morally evil in the spiritual world[5].

[1] ['Das in sich selbst unbestimmte;' 'without power or purpose to throw itself into any definite state or form.' H. J. R.]

[2] Inconditus, et confusus, et turbulentus motus, sicut ollæ undique ebullientis.

[3] We here recognize the painter.

[4] Non pertransiens materiam facit Deus mundum, sed solummodo adparens et adpropinquans ei, sicut facit qui decor, solummodo adparens, et magnes lapis solummodo adpropinquans.

[5] [i. e. Physical deformity and moral evil are the phenomena which give testimony to the existence of this Chaos, and they are its manifestations. H. J. R.]

That Hermogenes should maintain a progressive formation of matter, co-existing with an eternal creation, was an inconsistency, because no progressive development can be imagined without a beginning. His inconsistency would be still more striking, if the account of Theodoret is accurate, by which he is made to hold a final aim of this development. He maintained in fact then (if this account be true), like the Manichees, that at last all evil would resolve itself into matter, from which it originated, and then also that a separation would take place between that part of matter, which is capable of organization, and that which offered an obstinate resistance to it[1]. Here the teleological and moral element, which adhered to him from his Christianity, and did not suit this heathenish natural view of evil, rendered him inconsistent[2].

Irenæus and Tertullian maintained, the former against the Gnostics, the latter against Hermogenes, the simple Christian doctrine of the creation, without permitting themselves to enter upon speculations concerning it.

Origen was distinguished also in this respect from these Fathers by a system peculiar to himself, of which we must develope the fundamental features, as far as they are connected with the doctrine of the creation. In accordance with the character of *his* Gnosis (see above), he founded his system on the belief generally prevalent in the whole Church, and thought that his speculative inquiries, which stepped beyond this, might be very consistently united with it. He declared himself in favour of the doctrine of a creation out of nothing, as far as the free action of Divine power, unlimited by any condition inherent in pre-existent matter, was indicated by this doctrine; and this he did, not merely with

[1] Theodoret does not say this expressly, but such a doctrine is necessarily implied in that, which, according to his account, Hermogenes held. Theodoret's words (Hæret. fab. i. 19.) are these: *τον δε διαβολον και τους δαιμονας εἰς την ὑλην ἀναχθησεσθαι.*

[2] Theodoret ascribes to Hermogenes also the doctrine, that Christ deposited his body in the sun. A question would arise here, whether Theodoret has not confused his doctrine with some others like it; and in what way his words are to be understood. Perhaps Hermogenes taught that Christ, when he raised himself into his heavenly existence, left behind him in the sun the garb which he had taken from the material world. And yet it is difficult to attribute confidently so entirely fantastic an opinion to Hermogenes, and the matter must be left in obscurity for want of evidence. Perhaps also some meaning of Psal. xix. 4. with a *messianic* interpretation according to the version of the LXX. may have led the way to this notion.

acquiescence, but out of hearty persuasion [1]. He also acknowledged a definite beginning to the limited and definite world now in existence; but with regard to what preceded it, he conceived that Scripture and the faith of the Church left him fully at liberty to speculate. And here then he found those general grounds for opposing any beginning of creation, which are sure to strike any thinking mind, which is unwilling to be satisfied with a *mere belief* in the incomprehensible. How can it happen that if creating is suitable to the nature of God, anything which is suitable to that nature, should ever have been wanting? How should the qualities, which reside in the being of God, omnipotence and goodness, fail to have been always active? The transition from inaction to creation cannot be conceived without the notion of *change*; to which the Being of God is not liable.

Origen was also an opponent of the emanation doctrine, as it was conceived by the Gnostics; because it appeared to him to transfer sensuous representations to the being of God, and by the supposition of an unity-of-substance (the ὁμοουσιον), between God, and the natures that emanated from him, appeared to abolish the proper distinction between the Creator and the creation. But he assumed a system of emanation spiritually conceived and abjuring all sensuous images, a spiritual world of a kindred nature with God, and which beamed forth from him from all eternity, above which he is however immeasurably exalted, and in all these Spirits, was there the partial revelation, the partial reflexion of the Glory of God [2], as the Son of God is the collected revelation of the Glory of God.

Origen here conceived the idea of an absolute dependence without any beginning in time [3]; a causation, in which the existence of the creation, as a thing which could not have a self-existence, was founded from all eternity [4]. What he says of

[1] See Præfat. Libb. π. ἀρχ. p. 4. ibid. lib. ii. c. i. § 4. Lib. iii. c. 5.—Commentar. Genes. init.

[2] π. αρχ. lib. i. c. 2. § 6. In Joh. t. 20. c. 16. T. 13. c. 25. T. 32. c. 18. ὁλης μεν οὐν της δοξης του Θεου ἀπαυγασμα εἰναι τον νἱον, φθανειν μεν τοι γε ἀπο του ἀπαυγασματος της ὁλης δοξης μερικα ἀπαυγασματα ἐπι την λοιπην λογικην κτἰσιν.

[3] ['Ohne ein zeitliches werden,' literally 'without a temporal *becoming* or coming into existence.'

In the next clause of the sentence ('as a thing,' &c.) the original is 'als etwas seinem Wesen nach nicht in sich selbst ruhendes,' 'as something according to the laws of its nature not reposing on itself;' *i. e.* not self-dependent, or self-existent. H. J. R.]

[4] Methodius represents faithfully the expressions of Origen, when he ascribes to him

the continuous regeneration of the pious, and of the generation of the Son of God, may be applied in the sense in which he uses it to this also; because the Divine Logos stands in the same relation to the rest of the spiritual world as its source of Divine light, as God stands in to him. He says, Jerem. Hom. ix. § 4. [p. 106. ed. Huet. H. J. R.] "I will not say that the righteous is born of God once for all; but that he is constantly born of him in every good action. And if also I lay down to you in reference to our Saviour, that the Father did not beget the Son and then cease, but that he always begets him, I should also maintain something similar in respect to the righteous. Let us then see who is our Saviour? The reflected image of [God's] glory. Now the image of glory is not produced once for all, and then ceases to be produced; but as long as the light is efficient in creating the image of itself, so long is the image of the glory of God constantly created. If therefore thou hast the spirit of adoption (sonship), God constantly begets thee in that same sonship, in every act and in every thought, and thus thou art for ever being born as a son of God in Jesus Christ[1]."

Bishop Methodius, the adversary of Origen, whose theory of creation was controverted by the Bishop in his work concerning *creatures*, was by no means his equal in respect to a spirit of speculation[2]. He had not a sufficient power of speculative perception, justly to conceive the ideas of Origen, and he represented what he did not understand as foolish and impious. While he himself compares the relations in which God stands to his creatures with the relation between a human workman and the works of his hands, he makes against the system of Origen objections, which could not justly lie against it. How little able he was to understand that great man, whom in his blind zeal he calls a Centaur, appears by the following argument, which he casts in his teeth; viz. that, if the transition from non-creation to creation implies a change in God, the transition from creation to non-creation equally implies a change. Now God must have ceased to create the world, when it was finished, and thus a change in

the doctrine of a γενητον ἀει γενεσεως ἀρχην οὐκ ἐχον, and of an ἀναρχως κρατειν του τεχνηματος.

[1] Thus tom. i. in Joh. p. 32. we must not imagine that any limitation of time is indicated, but ὁ συμπαρεκτεινων τῳ ἀγενητῳ και ἀϊδιῳ ζωῃ, ἱν' οὑτως εἰπω, χρονος ἡμερα ἐστιν αὑτῳ σημερον, ἐν ᾗ γεγεννηται ὁ υἱος.

[2] Extracts from the book of Methodius found in Photius, Cod. 235.

God would clearly be implied. He did not observe, that with Origen the conception of the upholding of the world was the conception of a continuous creation, and he did not consider, that just exactly by such a representation of creation, as is contained in his own argument, a self-existence would be attributed to creatures which is inconsistent with the idea of them as creatures. He made another objection, which, although more directed against an inaccurate expression of Origen, than against what he really meant, was more correct; and it was this, that the idea of God's perfection actually implied, that it is a thing, whose foundation is in itself; that it is dependent on nothing besides, and limited or conditioned by nothing whatever [1].

The doctrine of Origen relative to creation is intimately connected also with his peculiar conception of *the omnipotence of God.* It happened to him in this matter, as indeed in many other respects, that, being entangled in the ideas of the philosophical school, from which his learning and his education were derived, he set out from those ideas, as if they were acknowledged truths. Thus he set out from the principle, *that an infinite line cannot be conceived by any mind*, into which the Neo-platonic school allowed itself to be deluded, by their attempt to measure an absolute reason by the limits of finite human thought [2]. From this Origen drew the conclusion; that we must not, in order to enhance the Divine omnipotence, make it *infinite*, because then it would be unable to comprehend itself [3]. Thus also God could create only a definite and not an infinite number of beings endued with reason, because otherwise they could not be embraced by his providence. We recognize also in this error of Origen the leaning which he had in the matter of religion. This doctrine is of great importance to his whole system (as will be seen below) when taken in connexion with his theory, that, since the number of reason-gifted beings is definite, and is always the same, therefore it is only from the

[1] το αὐτο δι' ἑαυτῳ ἑαυτου πληρωμα ὀν και αὐτο ἐν ἑαυτῳ μενον, τελειον εἰναι τουτο μονον δοξαστεον.

[2] [N.B. The word here is *Bewusstseyn*, which will express that wherein our knowledge or our capacity of entertaining ideas resides, as well as our consciousness of those ideas. In *popular* language, *understanding* would come the nearest; but it is so desirable to keep the distinction between *reason* and *understanding*, as definite as possible, that I would rather use *thought* or *comprehension* instead of it. H. J. R.]

[3] το ἀπειρον ἀπεριληπτον, and in Matth. Ed. Huet. p. 305, he says expressly: ἀπειρα γαρ τῃ φυσει οὐχ οιοντε περιλαμβανεσθαι τῃ περατουν πεφυκυιᾳ τα γινωσκομενα γνωσει.

change of will and intention among them that all other changes can proceed.

The peculiar nature of Christianity reveals itself in the recognition and worship of God, not merely as the Creator, but also as the Redeemer and Sanctifier of human nature, in the belief that God, who has created human nature pure, has redeemed it when it became estranged from him by sin, and continues to sanctify it, until it shall have attained in an eternal life to an untroubled and beatified communion with him in perfect holiness. Without this faith and knowledge, there is no lively worship of God, no worship of God in spirit and in truth, because a lively worship of God cannot exist without communion with him, and because this communion cannot be shared by man, as long as he is estranged from God by sin; as long as that, which separates him from God, is not removed; and because the worship of God in spirit and in truth, can only proceed from a soul which has been sanctified so as to become a temple of God. This doctrine of *God the Creator*, the *Redeemer* and the *Sanctifier* of human nature is the essential import of the doctrine of the *Trinity*, and therefore since in this latter doctrine the essence of all Christianity is contained, it could not but happen, that, as this doctrine proceeded out of the depths of Christian consciousness, it should be considered as the chief doctrine of Christianity, and that even in the earliest Church the essential import of the faith should be annexed to the doctrine of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost[1]. This doctrine again is nothing else than the doctrine of God, who has revealed and imparted himself to sinful man in Christ; everything here reverts to the doctrine of God's being in Christ, for the working of God in human nature redeemed by him, presupposes the inward relation, into which God has entered with human nature through Christ, and all is here only the continuation and the consequence of that [relation]; and therefore this doctrine is nothing else but the perfect development of the doctrine about Christ, which the Apostle Paul, 1 Corinth. iii. calls the foundation of all Christianity, the development of that which Christ himself designates

[1] This is literally translated; perhaps the meaning would be more nearly expressed as follows,—that the acknowledgment of the doctrine of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost was considered to comprise the essentials of the Christian Faith. The original is 'dass ..... der wesentliche Glaubensinhalt an die Lehre vom Vater, Sohne, und Heiligen Geist angereiht wurde.' H. J. R.]

as the essential import of his doctrine; "This is Eternal Life that they should know thee, that thou alone art the true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent." But the speculative doctrine of the Trinity is carefully to be distinguished from this its essential Christian import, and men might agree in the latter, and yet differ from each other in their conceptions of the former. The former only set itself up as an human attempt to bring into just harmony with the unity of the Divine Being, the existence of God in Christ, and through Christ in the faithful, as it is represented in Holy Scripture, and out of that Holy Scripture formed an image of itself in the inward life and the inward perceptions of the faithful. But it was an evil, that, in this attempt, men did not rightly divide the speculative and dialectic element from that essential and practical foundation; the consequence of which was, that men transplanted that doctrine from its proper practical ground, in which it is rooted in the centrepoint of Christianity, into a speculative region foreign to it, which might give an opportunity of mingling with it much extraneous matter, and again might lead to setting Christianity, contrary to its peculiar character, on a speculative instead of a practical foundation; and the consequence of this again was, on the one hand, that men, overprizing the importance of speculative differences, tore asunder the bond of Christian communion, where there was yet an agreement in what is practical and essential; and on the other hand, that men stinted the *free development* of the Christian doctrine by the attempt to *attain an uniformity of speculative* conceptions[1].

It is self-evident from what has been said, that the development of this doctrine must first proceed from speculations on the manner, in which the Divine nature in Christ was in relation

[1] [We must also be careful that in endeavouring to reconcile contending views we do not depart from the great truth which is contained in the acknowledgment of the Athanasian Creed, that each person is acknowledged 'by himself to be both God and Lord, and yet that no one should for a moment believe that there be "three Gods or three Lords." We must take care that we do not explain the Divinity of the Son as the mere indwelling of the Father in Jesus Christ; or believe that the Son is the mere manifestation of the Father; or we shall fall into Sabellianism or Patripassianism at once. The evil which Neander wishes to obviate seems to be the attempt to *explain* this great truth *speculatively*, and creating differences in consequence of such attempts. However wrong such attempts may be, in opposing them we must still be careful to maintain that great Catholic truth, the Trinity in Unity, and the Unity in Trinity, which is founded on the Scriptures and must be received by faith, though our finite faculties are unable to explain its mysteries. H. J. R.]

with the Godhead of the Father. Providence had then so exactly managed things in this respect, that in the Spiritual world in which Christianity first made its appearance, many notions, at least apparently of a kindred kind, were afloat, in which Christianity could find a point on which to attach the doctrine of a God revealed in Christ, or which it might appropriate to itself as general, intelligible forms, in which it might envelope that doctrine. In a discourse preserved to us by the Apostle John, Christ himself has expressed with Divine confidence the consciousness of his one-ness with God, an incomprehensible fact of his consciousness (Matth. xi. 27), without founding his declaration on any of the then notions of his age, but rather in opposition to the limited representations, current among the Jews, of the Messiah as a man, who proceeded from the ordinary development of human nature. But the Apostles Paul and John, united with the doctrine of God revealed in Christ, the idea that was already in existence in the Jewish theological schools, of a revealer of God elevated above the whole creation, the perfect image of the hidden Divine Being, from whom [the Word] all the communication of life from God proceeded, the image of the invisible God, the Word, in whom the hidden God reveals himself, the First-born before all creation—and they confirmed and established this idea and applied it to Christ. John, in particular, by the brief introduction prefixed to his Gospel, induced those among his contemporaries who sought after a knowledge of Divine things, who busied themselves with speculations on the self-revelation of God in his own express image—the Word that expressed his hidden nature, or the revealing and creating Reason—to give a lively, an historical and a practical meaning to this idea, by applying it to the appearance of Christ, instead of constantly restraining it to the regions of speculation. By this means, the development of the doctrine of Christ's Divinity was placed in connection with that speculative idea, which was already to be found current, although under a different form, among the Jewish Theologians, the Oriental Theosophists, and the Platonic Philosophers.

But in the conception of this doctrine there existed already among the Jews *two different views*. One party considered the Divine Logos as a Spirit, which existed in an independent personality, although in the most intimate union with the Divine

First Cause [1], while another party rejected this notion of an Hypostasis, as inconsistent with strict Monotheism, and they conceived to themselves, under the name of Logos, nothing but the Reason, which is either hidden in God and only engaged in contemplation [2], or else reveals itself both after the manner of thought, which manifests itself in human speech, and also by its efficient operation in the work of creation [3]—the Reason, which cannot be divided from God, and which either concentrates itself in him or beams forth from out of him [4].

While the former was the predominant mode of conception [as to the Logos] in the doctrines as exhibited by the Church, the other mode of conception made its appearance not unfrequently during this season in opposition to the Church doctrine, and this opposition served again, on the other hand, to promote the systematic formation and development of the former view.

Those who embraced the latter mode of conception, in their controversy against the Church Doctrine of the Trinity, and in their religious learning, were in agreement in one respect, namely, that it was of the utmost importance to them, firmly to maintain the doctrine of the Unity of God [5], and to avoid everything, which bore even the appearance of Polytheism [6].

[1] [Literally, Urwesen. Original Being.

It is impossible to express the idea with metaphysical accuracy; if we speak of *first*, we give the idea of being prior to the *Word*, which is yet held to be eternal. I use the word First-cause, therefore, relatively to other Beings, as it is used in common parlance, not as expressing priority of existence in the Father relative to the Son, or Word.—H. J. R.]

[2] The λογος ἐνδιαθετος.

[I recommend those English readers, who wish for clear statements on this subject, to consult Newman's 'Arians of the Fourth Century,' especially ch. ii. § 3 and 4. H. J. R.]

[3] λογος προφορικος.

[The same Reason therefore was conceived under two different conditions. It received the name of λογος ἐνδιαθετος when considered as residing in God, and delighting itself in contemplation, and that of λογος προφορικος when considered as emanating forth from Him and revealing God by spoken words or by the acts and the works of creation.—H. J. R.]

[4] See Clementin. Homil. 16 c. xii. τῃ δε σοφιᾳ, ὡσπερ ἰδιῳ πνευματι ἀει συνεχαιρεν, ἡνωται μεν ὡς ψυχη τῳ Θεῳ, ἐκτεινεται δε ἀπ' αὐτου ὡς χειρ δημιουργουσα το παν, κατα ἐκτασιν και συστολην ἡ μονας δυας εἰναι νομιζεται.

[5] The μοναρχια, the doctrine of the μονη ἀρχη, whence this party obtained the name of Monarchians.

[6] It was their term of distinction, the watchword of their party. Tertullian c. Praxeam, c. iii. Monarchiam tenemus. Origen, in Joh. t. ii. § 2. το πολλους φιλοθεους εἰναι εὐχομενους ταραασσον, ευλαβουμενους, ἀναγορευσαι δυο θεους.

But in the manner in which they applied this theory to Christ, they varied widely from each other, according as they happened to be peculiarly interested in maintaining merely the principles of the *Monarchia*, or were at the same time filled with a belief in the Divinity of Christ, and although they controverted the doctrine of an independent personality of the Logos, yet had a lively interest in maintaining the Divinity of Christ; in fact, according as they were under the direction of a dialectic and critical understanding, or of an inward and practical Christian disposition. The former, together with the Church-doctrine of the Trinity, controverted also that of the Divinity of Christ, though they were nevertheless content to admit his godly nature [Göttheit, divinity; Göttlichkeit, godly nature or godliness] in a certain sense; that is to say, they taught that Jesus was a man, like all other men, but that from the very first he had been animated and influenced, more than all other prophets and messengers of God, by that Divine Power, the Reason or Wisdom of God, and that, on this account, he was to be called the Son of God. They were distinguished from those, who embraced entirely Ebionite sentiments, by not admitting that this connection of God with Christ began at any one definite moment of his existence, but they conceived it to be coeval with the development of the human nature of Christ.

The others, on the contrary, in regard to the doctrine about Christ, were still more strongly opposed to this class of Monarchianism than to the opinion adopted by the Church; not only a leaning towards the doctrine of the Monarchia, in which even a Jew might join with them, but also a leaning towards some of the peculiar features of Christianity, made them hostile to the doctrine of the Church. Not only did the manner, in which the doctrine of the Unity of God was conceived in the Church doctrine, fail to meet their Monotheistic views, but also the manner, in which the Divinity of Christ was there understood, was unsuited to their peculiar Christian class of feelings and wants. While the Logos, who became man in Christ, was usually represented as a Being, different in person from God the Father and subordinate to him, although in the most intimate connection with him, they thought this a disparaging representation of Christ, and such a distinction between Christ and the supreme God was offensive to their belief about Christ; to them he was the one,

supreme God himself, who in a way that he had never done besides, had revealed himself in human nature, and had appeared in a human body. It was only inasmuch as God was to be named after two different considerations [or relations, ἐπινοιαι]—the hidden Being, as he was before the creation, the Father—and in so far as he revealed himself, the Son of the Logos—it was only in virtue of these considerations that Christ as the most perfect revelation of God the Father, was called the Son of God. They maintained that their doctrine was most eminently calculated *to dignify* Christ[1]. They were called *Patripassians*, because they were accused of attributing the sufferings of Christ to the Father[2].

The first name which occurs among the Patripassians is that of Praxeas, of Asia Minor, the native region of the doctrine of the Monarchia. Having made a confession of faith under torture, during the persecution of Marcus Aurelius, he afterwards[3] travelled to Rome, where Eleutheros was Bishop (see above), and there he brought forward his doctrine without receiving any obstruction, which perhaps arose from the Church-doctrine not having as yet been so accurately defined, that the contradiction to it by the doctrine of Praxeas could at once make any impression;

[1] τι οὐν κακον ποιω, δοξαζων τον Χριστον; said Noëtus, an adherent of this theory, when he was accused before a Synod. Hippolyt. c. Noët. c. ii. And Origen, in Matth. p. 420. ed. Huet, says, οὐ νομιστεον εἰναι ὑπερ αὐτου (του Χριστου) (*that they are on his side*) τους τα ψευδη περι αὐτον φρονουντας, φαντασιᾳ του δοξαζειν αὐτον, ὁποιοι εἰσιν οἱ συγχεοντες πατρος και νἱου ἐννοιαν· και τῃ ὑποστασει ἑνα διδοντες εἰναι τον πατερα και τον νἱον, τῃ ἐπινοιᾳ μονῃ και τοις ὀνομασι διαιρουντες το ἐν ὑποκειμενον (the one Divine Subject). And Origen, probably, had this in his mind, when, like the Gnostics, he separated those who knew no higher God than the God of the Old Testament, the Demiurgos, from those, who elevated themselves above him (the Demiurgos) to the knowledge of the Supreme God, and like Philo also, separated those who knew God only in his mediate revelation, the νἱους του Λογου, from those who elevate themselves above all mediate revelation to the intellectual perception of the Divine Being, who are the νἱοι του Θεου; and this is the manner in which Origen arranges the two classes of men.

1. οἱ μεν Θεον ἐχουσι τον των ὁλων Θεον, ἀνθρωποι οἰκειοι τῳ πατρι, μεριδος ὀντες αὐτου, 2. οἱ ἱσταμενοι ἐπι τον νἱον του Θεου, τον Χριστον αὐτου, οἱ ἐπι τον σωτηρα φθασαντες και το παν ἐν αὐτῳ ἱσταντες. In Joh. t. ii. § 3. [Ed. Huet. p. 49. In the above quotation μεριδος ought clearly to be μεριδες. The words are not exactly copied throughout. H. J. R.]

[2] Origen expressly distinguishes between these two classes of Monarchiani, particularly in Joh. t. ii. § 2. and t. ii. Joh. § 18. t. x. § 21. c. Cels. l. viii. c. 12. On the obscure passage Commentar. in Tit. f. 695. t. iv. Ed. de la Rue, see below.

[3] With regard to the chronological questions involved here see above.

it may have been the case, that by his zeal for the Divinity of Christ against the other party of Monarchiani, the Theodotians, which had perhaps arisen at Rome by that time, Praxeas, who must have been favourably looked upon in virtue of having been a *Confessor*, won still greater favour for himself, and thence therefore that men were more easily induced to overlook other points of difference. He appears afterwards to have betaken himself to Carthage, where he found followers, but where the contrast between his doctrine and that which was predominant attracted more observation. He wrote and published an explanation which was looked upon, at least by his opponents, as an express recantation; but we cannot very accurately determine the state of the case, because it may have happened that Praxeas defended his doctrine only against consequences with which it was unjustly charged, and misrepresentations of it. Tertullian, who would not be favourably disposed towards Praxeas, as an adversary of Montanism, wrote against him, and his book is the only source from which we can learn the doctrine of this person with any certainty.

But, if we take Tertullian as our guide, we might take two different views of his doctrine. From some places it would appear that Praxeas had taught the doctrine of the Patripassians, in the manner in which we have before represented it. He acknowledged the doctrine of a Divine Logos in a certain sense, he applied the name of *Son of God*, not merely to Christ after his appearance in the form of man, but he recognised from the time of the creation of the world a difference between the hidden invisible God, and that [God] who revealed himself outwardly as well in the Creation, as in the Theophaniæ [appearances of the Deity] of the Old Testament, and lastly in a human body in Christ. In the latter respect he was called the Logos or the Son; by extending his agency in a certain manner beyond himself and thus begetting the Logos, he made himself into a Son to himself[1]. On the contrary, in other passages, it appears as if he had denied every distinction in regard to the Divine Being, and had applied the name of Son of God only to the human nature of Christ[2]. We may suppose, either that Tertullian has not always entered justly into the tenour of the ideas of Praxeas, or else, that among the

[1] See Tertullian, c. 10. 14. 26.

[2] See c. 27.

adherents of this latter, different conceptions of his system had arisen, because men of uncultivated understanding, whom this doctrine suited, could not enter into those subtle distinctions.

Noëtus, also, who appeared at Smyrna during the first half of the third century, and was excommunicated for his unchurchly theory, belongs *to this class* of Patripassians. Theodoret gives, as well as Hippolytus, the most characteristic traits of his doctrine[1], and he observes, with justice, that Noëtus did not bring forward any new-invented doctrine of his own, but that others[2] had made up such a system before his time. According to this system, there is one God the Father, who is invisible when he will, and appears (reveals himself) when he will; he is visible and invisible, begotten and unbegotten[3].

It might be asked whether Beryllus of Bostra ought not to be placed in this class; and this question will be treated of hereafter.

Of the *other* class of Monarchiani, the first traces are found in the end of the second century, in the Roman Church, whither however, as the very name of the founder of the sect indicates, it must have come from some other place, and that too from the Oriental Church. A worker in leather, who came from Byzantium, by name Theodotus, is named as the founder of this party. Victor, the Bishop of Rome, must have excommunicated him at the end of the second or the beginning of the third century; but still his party extended itself in a state of separation from the predominant Church, and it endeavoured to procure itself respect on the ground that it was inclined to maintain Natalius, a Confessor held in much honour, in the rank of Bishop. This man appears, however, to have been thrown into a state of conflicting feelings, by thus falling away from the faith, which at an earlier period had enabled him to endure suffering for its sake. The uneasiness of his heart showed itself in fearful visions and dreams, and at last he returned in sorrow and penitence to the Catholic Church.

[1] Hæret. fab. iii. c. 3.

[2] Among whom he mentions two men who are unknown to us, Epigonius and Cleomenes.

[3] Theodoret refers this latter expression to the birth of Christ, but one is inclined to ask, whether he has properly understood the meaning of Noëtus, and whether Noëtus was not thinking of the γεννησις του Λογου, and under that phrase meant nothing but the agency of God extending outwards beyond himself.

One Artemon came forward also, from another point, as founder of such a party, which were called Artemonites after his name, and continued for a long time to spread themselves abroad. For about the middle of the third century, Novatian, the Roman Presbyter, considered it necessary, in his development of the Doctrine of the Divinity of Christ, to take especial notice of the attacks of that party, and in the later controversies, arising from Paul of Samosata, this party was spoken of as one that still existed [1].

The Theodotians and the Artemonites are, no doubt, to be considered as holding that Christ is a mere man, and as having looked upon him as being in no peculiar connection with the Father; but as far as Theodotus is concerned, his own words, which Epiphanius, his adversary, himself quotes, militate against this supposition. It appears that in the words of the Angel, Luke i. 31, he would not find any proof that the Spirit of God itself had appeared in an human nature; but he saw clearly enough, that they implied that the man Christ developed himself under the peculiar influ-

[1] The relation between the Artemonites and Theodotus is involved in great obscurity. One naturally asks how the Artemonites could appeal to it as a fact, that their doctrine had been the predominant doctrine at Rome down to the time of Bishop Zephyrinus, who was the first to corrupt the doctrine of the Church, if a sect existed at Rome at that time, whose founder, Theodotus, had been excommunicated by Victor, the predecessor of Zephyrinus, on account of professing that very doctrine. Although one may imagine it likely enough, that where the maintenance of men's dogmas is concerned they should be inclined to misrepresent facts, or to refuse to acknowledge them, yet both of these cases must have something, at least, on which they may be supported. We can then only imagine, that the Artemonites did not choose to acknowledge Theodotus as their predecessor, and that they thought they had reason to maintain, either that Theodotus had been excommunicated for some other reason than his doctrinal opinions, or that their doctrines were different from the Theodotion. Perhaps the following account may be given. The ancient author of the additions to Tertullian de Præscriptione, says, l. c. c. 53, that Theodotus brought forward his pestilent opinions, after he had denied Christ during the persecution. Although this account, which is prejudicial to the character of Theodotus, coming from the mouth of an enemy, cannot be accepted with confidence, yet it may be true, at least it is quite possible, that a man, who had embraced Christianity more with the understanding than with the heart, should, for that very reason, want the courage and the zeal to make a confession of it in the face of death. Perhaps he was excommunicated on account of this denial of the faith, and then, when he had nothing more to fear from the dominant Church which would not acknowledge him as one of her members, he brought forward his doctrines in public for the first time. This piece of truth may form the foundation of the old account of the matter, although it is to be looked upon as a fable after the fashion of Epiphanius, if the latter has only invented the opinions of Theodotus about Christ in order to excuse his denial of the faith.

ence of that Spirit[1]. And as far as the Artemonites are concerned, they professed that theirs was no new doctrine, but the old doctrine of the Church, and that Bishop Zephyrinus was the first who taught a different one in the Church. Now if they would acknowledge nothing whatever that is Divine in Christ, and utterly denied the doctrine of a Divine Logos, they had far too clear a testimony of facts against them when they maintained the high antiquity of their doctrines. But, on the contrary, if they belonged to the other class of the Monarchiani, they might very well make use of the indefinite nature of many old expressions so as to favour their views, and they might perhaps find some indefiniteness in a dogmatical point of view, in the statements of the Roman Church, which would also serve their purpose. And besides, the Samosatensians, who belonged to this class of Monarchians, were afterwards classed together with the Artemonites, a circumstance which favours the notion of a similarity of doctrine between the two parties.

As to the turn of mind from which the doctrine of these Artemonites proceeded, one of the accusations made against them gives us some very instructive hints; they busied themselves much with mathematics, dialectics, critical inquiries, with the philosophy of Aristotle and with Theophrastus[2], and thus their disposition was one, in which the reflecting, the critical, and dialectic elements predominated, and which would diminish in their case the inwardness and depth of the Christian feeling; they wanted a Christianity, which the understanding could fully comprehend, and that which exceeds the bounds of the under-

[1] It is not said γεννησεται ἐν σοι, but ἐπελευσεται ἐπι σε. He set out with the notion of an ἐπερχεσθαι του θειου πνευματος (or του Λογου, if Theodotus admitted the doctrine of the Λογος in any shape whatever) ἐπι τον Χριστον. As it is clear from this quotation, that Theodotus admitted the first chapter of St. Luke as genuine, the account given in the *additamenta præscript.*, and by Theodoret, that he acknowledged the supernatural birth of Christ, is more probable than that of Epiphanius, that he denied it.

[2] Not with the Philosophy of Plato, which exciting more the heart and the powers of inward perception, led to a conception of Christianity, more based on inward perceptions, and was exactly calculated to give a speculative form to the doctrine of the Trinity. We here perceive the different influence, exercised by the different schools of Philosophy, on the conception of Christianity by their adherents. The Neoplatonists, who were converted to Christianity, formed to themselves a speculative doctrine of Trinity; the Aristotelian Dialecticians denied the doctrine of the Divinity of Christ, and would represent the existence of God in Christ as something entirely capable of being comprehended.

standing, and must be assimilated into the life of man through some other channel, found no place in their dialectic categories. It was also made an accusation against them, that by means of a system of criticism, which professed to restore the true text of the Holy Scriptures, they allowed themselves to change at their own will those passages of Scripture, which were opposed to their doctrine. If we judge from their whole turn of mind, and from the boldness, with which critical inquiries were often conducted at this period so as to favour dogmatical prejudices, this accusation is likely enough to be a just one; and yet on the other hand it cannot be denied, that men were then inclined at once to accuse heretics of falsifying Scripture, when they only quoted a various lection which was found in their manuscripts [1].

One is inclined to inquire whether we are to assign to this class certain opponents of the genuineness of the writings of St. John, whom we shall designate by the name of *Alogi*, after the example of Epiphanius, who has given them in one place this heretical appellation, although the name is not particularly applicable [2]. The first trace of such opponents of the genuineness of St. John's Gospel is found in a remarkable passage of Irenæus [3]. He says,

[1] An example of an unjust polemical argument may be found in what is said by the writer against the Artemonites in Eusebius, v. 28. "Either they do not believe that the Holy Scripture is inspired by the Holy Ghost, and they are unbelievers, or else they consider themselves wiser than the Holy Ghost," as if those Artemonites, however capricious their criticism might be, did not think that by it they were enabled to restore the original, genuine text, just as it came from the inspiration of the Holy Ghost.

[2] Ἄλογοι, a word, which contains an allusion to their denial of the genuineness of the Gospel which treats of the Logos, and thus contains a paronomasia on the word Logos. ἄλογοι as denying the Logos, and as being *unreasonable*.

[3] The passage is in Irenæus, lib. iii. c. xi. [towards the end. H. J. R.] Infelices vere, qui Pseudo-prophetæ quidem esse volunt, propheticam vero gratiam repellunt ab ecclesia: similia patientes his, qui propter eos, qui in hypocrisi veniunt, etiam a fratrum communicatione se abstinent. Datur autem intelligi, quod hujusmodi neque Apostolum Paulum recipiunt. In ea enim epistola, quæ est ad Corinthios, de propheticis charismatibus diligenter loquutus est, et scit viros et mulieres in Ecclesia prophetantes. Per hæc [igitur, Ed. Massuet.—H. J. R.] omnia peccantes in Spiritum Dei, in irremissibile incidunt peccatum." According to the common reading, the first part of this would mean, "The truly unhappy persons, who wish themselves indeed to be false prophets, but deny the grace of prophecy to the Church." And this would give a sense, which in itself is quite good, and which suits the severity of the rest of the passage tolerably well. But the reading which has been accepted by my friend Dr. Olshausen, and is, if I mistake not, an emendation proposed by Grabe, viz. *pseudo-prophetas*, has the advantage of conformity with the part of the context which follows it. The sense would then be, "They suppose, indeed, that there are false prophets in the Church, but from fear of false prophets, they go to the length of acknowledging no true prophets

that they rejected the Gospel of St. John on account of the promise of the Paraclete, in order to cut off from the Montanists (see above) their appeal to this promise as a means of rendering credible the new revelations of the Paraclete. They maintained as a general position that there are no gifts of prophecy in the Christian economy, and they declared all that pretended to them to be false prophets. It was probably these same persons, against whom Hippolytus defended the genuineness of St. John's Gospel and the Apocalypse. The same persons occur again in Epiphanius: he describes them as warm opponents of Montanism and of the prophetical gifts of the Spirit, who thought that the Gospel of St. John was contradictory to the rest of the Gospels; and he represents them, where he treats of them specifically, as orthodox in other respects[1]. But he contradicts himself when he calls the Theodotians an offset from them, and then at the same affirms that they rejected the doctrine of the Logos. It may be said indeed, and not without reason, that Epiphanius is more worthy of credit, when he absolves from a charge of heresy, than when he makes such a charge, but other grounds of judgment also must be taken into the account. And, in fact, Epiphanius, when he absolved them from the charge of heresy, may have had before his eyes some writing of the Alogi, in which they had purposely avoided dogmatical arguments.

If, in accordance with the expressions of Irenæus, we suppose

either, and they resemble those schismatics, who, out of fear of hypocritical Christians, withdraw themselves also from intercourse with genuine ones." It is not necessary to suppose that this passage must have proceeded from a *Montanist*, it is only requisite to acknowledge as its author some person, who thought it of importance to maintain that the out-pouring of the Holy Ghost revealed itself in the Christian economy by 'prophetica charismata'—and it is clear from many of the expressions of Irenæus, that such were his sentiments. And yet, nevertheless, the passage does bear rather a Montanistic character. The latter part, especially, is wholly spoken in the tone of a *Montanist*, who sees an adversary of the Holy Ghost himself, in every one, who will not acknowledge the new communications of the Paraclete. One can hardly attribute to a man of the moderation of Irenæus such violence in this matter, and one could almost be induced to suspect, that the whole passage has been interpolated by a Montanist. The context would hold together entirely, if the whole passage were wanting, and there would be nothing in it except in reference to the Gnostics, to whom alone the whole section relates.

[1] Hæres. 44. § 4. δοκουσι τα αὐτα ἡμιν πιστευειν. The passage, where he says of them τον Λογον οὐ δεχονται τον παρα Ἰωαννου κεκηρυγμενον, does not make it altogether certain that he meant here to charge them with a denial of the doctrine of the Logos, because the word Λογος is ambiguous.

that the *Alogi* were seduced into the rejection of the Gospel of St. John merely in consequence of their controversy with Montanism, yet still it is extremely improbable, that they should have rejected a book of so great value and importance to every believing Christian, (and which in its whole tendency is so Anti-montanistic) only in consequence of those few passages, the application of which is so easily wrested from the Montanists by a right interpretation, and indeed may so easily be turned against them [1]. The matter appears more capable of the following representation; when the Montanists appealed to that promise of the Paraclete, the Alogi immediately answered that the whole Gospel was apocryphal [*literally*, not genuine], and from this their opponents gathered that they denied its genuineness, only in order to avoid recognising that promise. The case, indeed, we must confess is possible, that the Alogi may have belonged to the class of those who, whenever they believed that they perceived contradictions between the Gospels, immediately rejected that Gospel which appeared to them to stand in contradiction to the rest [2]. But still it is not probable, that in this age, in which the dogmatic influence was so powerfully predominant, any one, to whom the doctrine of the Divinity of Christ was of importance, could have determined himself, for the sake of some difficulties, which struck him, to give up the very chief book for the maintenance of this doctrine, especially in this youthful season of the Church, in which the immediate feeling bore far greater sway than reflection, and in which the immediate impression upon every one, who was not just enslaved by a prejudice against the Christianity of St. John, must have borne its testimony to the genuineness of that Gospel.

On the contrary, everything is explained, if we abide by the account of Epiphanius, which indicates a connection between the Alogi and the Theodotians or Artemonites, although we would not assert at once, that all the adherents of this party belonged to the Alogi, and rejected the Gospel of St. John. Their principles made the latter course unnecessary, for, as they ad-

[1] As for instance, if they said, as in fact the Church teachers did say, in answer to the Montanists, that this promise had already been fulfilled in the case of the Apostles.

[2] Origen, vol. iv. p. 160. t. 10. Joh. § 2. speaks of this capricious critical conduct in certain people of this age. The exaggerated view of inspiration promoted this hypocritical conduct.

mitted a certain connection of God with Christ, they might also admit the doctrine of a Divine Logos, who worked in him [1], and they might also explain the Gospel of St. John after their own notions, as it is clear from Novatian, that they explained many passages which did not suit their doctrine, as merely referring to a previous destination of Jesus as the Messiah, in the counsels of God. The unknown adversary of the Theodotians and Artemonites in Eusebius says, that they did not all misuse the Holy Scriptures in the same way, and that, while some endeavoured to bring it into accordance with their doctrinal opinions through *their own* sort of criticism, others rejected whole books of Scripture. The unnamed person here is certainly speaking, not of the New, but of the Old Testament. He says, that while they set the Gospel of grace in complete opposition to the Old Testament, they had cast away the Divine authority of the Law and of the Prophets, and had torn asunder all connection between Christianity and Judaism [2]. But this account gives us reason to suspect that they indulged in a critical system which judged according to their dogmatical preconceived opinions, and which might take different directions simply in consequence of their other differences. Thus it is by no means improbable that to many among these people, all, which was said of a Divine Logos, appeared to be something Gnostical or too mystical, as we learn from Epiphanius, that they felt themselves peculiarly at a loss in regard to the Prologue to St. John's Gospel; and the Gospel of St. John, which, from its whole character, would probably correspond but little to their predominantly dialectic and reflective cast of mind, and might appear to them too theosophical, was declared by them to be a forgery of the Gnostic Cerinthus. It will be seen also, that this cast of mind must have made them enemies of the prophetic gifts of the Montanists. In the same way, what we hear of the rejection of the Old Testament by one portion of this party, agrees with their violent opposition to Montanism, which was often inclined to mingle together too indiscriminately what belonged to the Old and what belonged to the New Testament, and it accords also with their rejection of the Apocalypse, although this last circumstance may easily be ex-

[1] As the *θειον πνευμα*, of which the Angel spoke to Mary, as at that time the ideas of the Holy Ghost and the Logos were joined together by many persons.

[2] *ἁπλως ἀρνησαμενοι τον τε νομον και τους προφητας .... προφασει χαριτος.*

plained on other grounds. That they attributed both the Gospel of St. John and the Apocalypse to Cerinthus, shows, that, although they ill understood the Gospel of St. John, because the sense for its understanding was wanting in them, yet they knew Cerinthus rightly for a Judaizing Gnostic. Nor can we leave it unobserved, that the Montanistic prophetic spirit busied itself much with the defence of the doctrine of the Trinity as received in the Church, to which it may have been induced by the circumstance of the Monarchians being violently opposed to it [*i. e.* this prophetic spirit].

To this class of Monarchians belongs also *Paul of Samosata* in Syria, who became Bishop of the Church of Antioch at some time between the years 260 and 270, A.D. The bishops, who condemned his doctrines, make a very unfavourable report of his character[1], and represent him as a proud, vain, and avaricious man, who was inclined to concern himself with worldly matters. Men however, being but little able to distinguish between persons and opinions, opponents in faith, and more especially passionate opponents, as these men appear to have been, deserve but little credit for their accusations; but these accusations contain, nevertheless, too many special traits to have been wholly without foundation, and alas! the picture drawn of him harmonizes well with what we hear besides of the bishops of Antioch[2], the great metropolis of the Roman dominions in eastern Asia. The being surrounded by earthly glory, pomp, and pride, has always been a most dangerous circumstance to Christianity, and especially dangerous to the clergy, if they allow themselves to be attracted by the glitter and the show of the world, which they, of all men, ought to despise in consequence of their elevated employment. At that time Zenobia[3] had the sovereignty of those regions as

[1] See Euseb. vii. c. 30.

[2] See what Origen says in Matth. Ed. Huet. p. 420. "We, who either do not understand what the doctrine of Jesus here means, or else despise such expressive exhortations of our Saviour, are of such a kind, that sometimes we even exceed the state of the wicked governors among the heathens, and want a body-guard like the emperors, and make ourselves awful and inaccessible, especially to the poor. And in many so-called Churches, and especially those of the *greater towns*, you may find rulers of the Church of God; such that they would hardly acknowledge the best among the disciples of Jesus to be their equals." μηδεμιαν ισολογιαν επιτρεποντας εσθ' ὁτι και τοις καλλιστοις των Ιησου μαθητων ειναι προς αὐτους.

[3] Wife of the celebrated Roman general, Odenatus, who had made himself independent of the Roman empire.

queen of Palmyra, and appears always to have been friendly towards Judaism [1]. Paul has been blamed, on the ground that, in order to obtain favour with this queen, he endeavoured to present the doctrines about Christ in a form more agreeable to the Jewish style of thought; but there is no proof to warrant such an accusation, as it was unnecessary to resort to this mode of explanation [2], and as the firmness of Paul in this persuasion, even after political circumstances had changed, does not appear to bespeak the truth of the charge. But intercourse with the Jews, who were around the queen, with whom Paul, as a courtier, had much influence, may very probably have worked upon this tendency of his doctrinal views, although even this supposition is not *necessary* to be made. It may also be the case that his peculiar doctrinal views contributed to procure him favour with the queen. He now made use of his connection with this powerful patroness, in order to obtain influence and authority in worldly things, and to keep up considerable state. In flat contradiction to laws already publicly promulgated (see above) at least in the western Church, he held a civil employment under government [3], which could scarcely be compatible with the episcopal office. At Antioch it seems that the profane custom of testifying approbation to preachers, by waving of handkerchiefs, exclamations, and clapping of the hands, which sets preachers in the same class with actors and declaimers for effect, had already passed into the Church from the theatre, and from the exhibition-schools of the rhetoricians. The vain Paul saw this with pleasure; but the bishops, who were his accusers, were well aware that this custom was contrary to the dignity and order which ought to prevail in the house of God. The Church hymns, which had been in use since the second century, he banished as an innova-

[1] Ἰουδαια ἡν Ζηνοβια και Παυλου προεστη του Σαμοσατεως. Athanas. hist. Arianor. ad Monachos, § 71.

[2] [This expression is not entirely clear. I have translated it literally, and I suppose it means that we need not resort to any supposition of a wish to procure the favour of Zenobia, in order to explain the Judaizing form under which Paul presented Christianity. H. J. R.]

[3] The office of a ducenarius procurator (which is not to be confused with that of ducenarius judex); so called because the pay amounted to two hundred sestertia [about 3000*l.* H. J. R.]. See Sueton. Claud. c. 24. Cyprian, Ep. 68. But it is also possible that he was in possession of this office, when he was elected bishop; and then of course the bishops would have themselves to accuse for having suffered such an infraction of the laws of the Church.

tion, apparently proceeding on the principle which has been set up by others in later times, that only passages out of the Holy Scripture ought to be sung in the Church; and thus he probably suffered nothing but Psalms to beused. There is no sufficient ground for the suspicion, that Paul did this in order to pay court to his patroness Zenobia, as being a Jewess. It is more probable that Paul, who might be well aware how deeply the import of Church hymns impresses itself upon the heart, when he banished those old hymns (which spoke of Christ as the incarnate Logos), might hope also to banish the doctrines they contained from the hearts of men. When we find it stated, that the man who thus carefully removed the expressions used to designate Christ, was delighted to receive the incense of exaggerated expressions about himself, in poems and declamations in holy places, and to be called in bombastic rhetorical phrases an angel sent down from heaven, we cannot receive such an accusation from the mouth of violent enemies as one on which we can entirely depend, but we have no reason whatever, for declaring it to be false.

As far as the doctrines of this man are concerned, he appears to have had but little that was peculiar to himself; in accordance with his Judaizing notions, he compared the Divine Logos to the reason of man [1], either as the hidden contemplative reason [2], existing within the very nature of God, or as the reason that reveals itself outwardly by word and by creation [3]. In the latter sense, the Logos, as the reason of God, by its agency inspired all the men of the Old Testament, who were enlightened by God, and thus would also inspire Christ; and whereas he was the most illuminated of all mankind, this Logos dwelt in him, as it dwelt in none besides; but the difference of this indwelling was only in degree and not in kind [4]. It was in virtue of this pre-eminent degree of illumination through the Divine wisdom, that the name of a *Son of God* belonged to Jesus. When he used the phrase Jesus Christ, who came from below, Ἰησους Χριστος κατωθεν; he must have used

[1] ὡσπερ ἐν ἀνθρωπον καρδιᾳ ὁ ἰδιος λογος. ap. Epiphan. p. 67.

[2] λογος ἐνδιαθετος. [3] λογος προφορικος.

[4] ἐνοικησαι ἐν αὐτῳ την σοφιαν, ὡς ἐν οὐδενι ἀλλῳ. He taught οὐ συγγεγενησθαι τῳ ἀνθρωπινῳ την σοφιαν οὐσιωδως, ἀλλα κατα ποιοτητα. These words of Paul are to be found in Leontius Byzantin. c. Nest. et Eutichen., a work which has hitherto been known to us in a Latin translation; but the fragment of Paul has been published in Greek from the MSS. of the Bodleian Library at Oxford, by *Erlich*, in a Dissertatio de erroribus Pauli Samosatensis. Lipsiæ, 1745, p. 23.

it to imply, that the Logos did not receive any human body, but that the human nature, which had already an independent existence, had been honoured by a peculiar influence and operation of the Divine wisdom[1]. From the deficiency of authentic and accurate information, it cannot be determined with certainty, but the point is quite unimportant, whether he referred the name of Son of God to Jesus only as a man, when he says of him, that, in accordance with the Divine pre-determination, or the Divine counsel, he existed before the creation[2]; or, whether, in the sense which we have remarked above, he transferred the name of Son of God to the Divine Reason also, inasmuch as it (the Divine Reason) had equally called forth God out of himself into outward activity in the creation of the world[3]; for his adversaries accused him of having maintained the existence of two Sons of God, one properly so called, the other improperly, although this may be regarded only as a consequence from his propositions *drawn by his adversaries from their own point of view*, and then charged on him. It is very probable that when he wished to hold more closely to the doctrines of the Church, he spoke, *in his own sense*, of a Son of God, whom God had begotten before the creation of the world; but on the contrary, when he expressed himself freely without any such intention, he spoke only of the man Jesus as the Son of God, for he expressly says that he *knew nothing of two Sons of God*[4].

Many synods were held on account of the controversies with the Bishop Paulus at Antioch; but he probably availed himself of

[1] See the Synodal Epistle in Euseb. vii. 30.

[2] In the Synodal Epistle to Paul of Samosata, published by Turrian in Mansi's collection of Councils, i. 1034, which is the only authentic document among those made known by him which refer to these transactions, the following antithesis occurs; viz. that the Son of God existed προ αἰωνων οὐ προγνωσει ἀλλ' οὐσιᾳ και ὑποστασει; from which we might judge that Paul maintained the contrary, τον υἱον του Θεου οὐχ' ὑποστασει ἀλλα προγνωσει.

[3] He might engraft his own opinions on the older expression in the Apologetic writers ἐγεννησε τον λογον προφορικον, by understanding this, so as not to include the notion of an emanation which had the attribute of personality. The antithesis in the Synodal Epistle quoted above, seems to support this explanation: δια του λογου ὁ πατηρ παντα πεποιηκεν οὐχ ὡς δι' ὀργανου, οὐδ' ὡς δι' ἐπιστημης ἀνυποστατου, γεννησαντος μεν του πατρος τον υἱον ὡς ζωσαν ἐνεργειαν και ἐνυποστατον. From this it may be concluded that Paul spoke of a σοφια, ἐπιστημη ἀνυποστατος, and understood by the γεννησις του λογου nothing but an ἐνεργεια ἀνυποστατος of God the Creator.

[4] μη δυο ἐπιστασθαι υἱους. Leont. Byzant.

the indefiniteness of the ecclesiastical terminology, and the different polemical views under which different expressions might be used, in order to hide his own opinions under ambiguous explanations, so that no charge of erroneous doctrine could positively be fixed upon him. In the last synod, A.D. 265, an able dialectician, the Presbyter Malchion [1], succeeded at last in forcing him to an open declaration of his opinion. He was deposed and his office bestowed on another; but as he was supported by a party, and favoured by Zenobia, the matter could not be accomplished before she was conquered by the Emperor Aurelius, A.D. 272. This prince left the decision to the Bishop of Rome. (See part i. p. 145.)

Besides these two classes of Monarchians, we find also a *third*, which stands in certain respects between the other two; these were such persons as approached the second class the most in their theory of the Logos, as a power that beamed forth out of the Divine nature, but receded from them again, and more nearly resembled the Patripassians as to their representations of the humanity of Christ. They were not satisfied with the idea of an influence of the Divine Logos on Jesus as man, which differed only in degree from the influence exerted on other enlightened and holy men; but, on the other hand also, they did not accept the Patripassian view of an indwelling of the whole Divine Being in an human body. They agreed with the Patripassian theory, so far as not to separate that which was Divine in Christ, from the soul that resides within him. But they modified this view so far that they supposed the Divine in Christ, the soul of his human nature, not to be the Divine Being himself, but a certain emanation [streaming out] from him, which formed itself to an individual spiritual life.

Among the Patripassians, who will not admit of any distinction in the Divine Being (see above, on Theodotus and Artemon,) Beryllus, the Bishop of Bostra, in Arabia, comes the nearest to this opinion. According to the theory of Beryllus, the personality of the Son of God first arose through a beaming forth, or an emanation out of the Being of God into an human body [2].

[1] From the expressions of Eusebius, although Theodoret, to whom they appeared very offensive, interprets them differently, we must conclude, that this clergyman also practised the profession of a rhetorician, which was hardly compatible with his Spiritual calling.

[2] From the deficiency of clear and accurate accounts, the development of the

In the year 244 a Synod was held respecting the affairs of Beryllus, which was attended by the great Origen, who lived at that time at Cæsarea Stratonis. He discussed matters with him very much, and apparently by his superiority of mind, his ability and moderation, he succeeded in persuading him, that he had erred. It is true, that in this case, we follow the account given by Eusebius, an enthusiastic friend of Origen, and we have not the means of consulting the document used by him, in order to form an unprejudiced and independent judgment. And yet, we

doctrine of this man is one of the most difficult subjects of historical investigation, and therefore we cannot expect to arrive at a perfectly certain result. The chief passage to the point is in Euseb. vi. 33. *τον σωτηρα μη προυφεσταναι κατ' ἰδιαν οὐσιας περιγραφην προ της εἰς ἀνθρωπους ἐπιδημιας*, and in Origen *ἰδια περιγραφη* or *οὐσια κατα περιγραφην* means an individual, proper, personal existence, the same as *ὑποστασις*, to which is contrasted *ἀνυποστατος, εἰναι κατ' ἐπινοιαν ἑτερου τινος*. See Origen. t. i. Joh. p. 42. In this description of his doctrine two points are to be remarked: (1.) Before the earthly appearance of Christ there was no Son of God, as a Being personally different from God the Father, which is to be understood, either as asserting that a Son of God existed only in an ideal Being, in the idea or the fore-ordaining counsel [of the Father] (*κατα προγνωσιν*, or *κατα προορισμον του Πατρος*) or else, that the Logos existed at first only as a dependant (unselbständige, lit. not-independent) Power of God; (2.) That contemporaneously with the incarnation of Christ, an existence of the Son of God also began, which was independently personal, and distinct from the Being of God (an *ὑφεσταναι κατ' ἰδιαν οὐσιας περιγραφην*). A Patripassian could not assert the latter, for he could only speak of an existence of the Father himself in the human nature, which existence was called the Son, from revealing itself.

And now we must add the second part of the representation of Eusebius, *μηδε μην θεοτητα ἰδιαν ἐχειν ἀλλ' ἐμπολιτευομενην αὐτῳ μονην την πατρικην*. If what we have above remarked is incompatible with the opinions of a Patripassian; so, on the contrary, this last says too much to suit the doctrine of a Monarchian of the second class. At the same time an opponent of this doctrine would certainly have been more ready to charge it with representing Christ as a mere man, than to make it say more than it really did say, of the Being of God in Christ. There remains, in order to reconcile these contradictory statements, only the representation given of the doctrine of Beryllus. We must therefore here bring forward the fragment occurring in the Commentary of Origen, on the Epistle to Titus. Origen, t. iv. p. 695.

'Sed et eos qui hominem dicunt Dominum Jesum præcognitum, et prædestinatum, qui ante adventum carnalem substantialiter et proprie non extiterit, sed quod homo natus Patris solam in se habuerit Deitatem, ne illos quidem sine periculo esse ecclesiæ numero sociari.' As in this passage Origen joins together two classes of Monarchians, and in the other member of the sentence, which has not been quoted here, the Patripassians; it may be supposed, if we should compare this passage with that above quoted (some pages back, on the subject of the Patripassians) from the Tom. on St. John, that Origen, in the first member of the sentence was describing the two classes of Monarchians, while in that passage from his writings on St. John, he was opposing these two classes to each other. I was myself deceived formerly by this comparison of passages; but it will not bear being carried out fully.

we must take into the account that as yet there was no *state Religion*, and no *state Church*, which *could compel* Beryllus to a recantation, although the authority of the Episcopal college had already much, and indeed too much power over the Church. But if the bishops had wished to overpower their colleague by mere numbers, they would have had no occasion to call in the services of a Presbyter who had been driven away and branded as an heretic, and who had no other power than that which belongs to knowledge. And besides, Origen was not the man to use the weight of his name or of his superiority of mind for the purpose of crushing an individual.

It is only among the men of the Alexandrian school that we find instances of theological conferences, which, instead of introducing still greater divisions, produced unity of mind. To what else can we attribute this, unless it be, that these men were not blind zealots for the letter, but men of a liberal spirit, and united the spirit of love and moderation with that zeal for the truth, which would not wish to triumph, except through the force of truth!

Although in other respects the system which Origen opposed to that of Beryllus was not free from error, and although perhaps, it was not merely the superiority of the system, but the mental superiority of Origen himself that contributed to effect this triumph; yet still the system of Origen was in many points of view when compared with the doctrine of his opponent, nearer to a pure developement of the truth.

According to the account of Jerome [1], Beryllus thanked Origen

Origen ascribes to those, of whom he is here speaking, too high an idea of the Divine in Christ, for us to suppose that he has in view the doctrines we have remarked; and he also expresses himself too mildly about their relation to the Church, to suit that supposition. So that these words most strikingly agree with those of Eusebius, and both passages are most naturally to be explained in the same way. We must suppose that Origen here speaks of a doctrine, with which he was unacquainted before, and with which he had first become acquainted by means of his transactions with Beryllus of Bostra. And then by comparing Origen with Eusebius we find, that Beryllus, under the words προυφεσταναι ἀνυποστατως, understood a προυφεσταναι κατα προγνωσιν και προορισμον του Πατρος. And thus also it is explained, why the Synod, as Socrates, b. ii. c. 6. informs us, should maintain against Beryllus the doctrine of a reasonable human soul in Christ; because Beryllus supplied the place of such a soul, by the special οἰκονομια του θειου πνευματος, out of which the proper, and God-allied personality of Christ was formed.

[1] De Vir. Ill. c. 60.

by letter for the instruction he had received. We have no cause to doubt this, but the account of Jerome is not so authentic as that of Origen.

The next to Beryllus of Bostra, is Sabellius, who lived at Ptolemais, in Pentapolis, after the middle of the third century; and who may probably have maintained a doctrine more curiously developed and perfected, than any other of this class; but unfortunately, we have only an imperfect acquaintance with his system as to the internal dependence of its various parts. The account of Epiphanius, that Sabellius borrowed the germ of his doctrine out of Apocryphal Gospels, and especially from one[1] that was current in Egypt, and bore the stamp of the Jewish Theosophy of Alexandria, is by no means to be rejected. In this Gospel, Christ, as a teacher of Esoteric wisdom, communicated this to his disciples, which entirely suited the Theosophic disposition of a certain class: If the multitude, which cannot raise itself up to the perception of the Supreme simple Unity, hold God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost for different Divine beings, they must acknowledge that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are only one; that they are only three different forms, under which the Supreme Unity is revealed[2]. As it is said in the Clementine[3] that God is either a μοναϛ, or a δυαϛ, just according as the Divine wisdom is hidden within him, as his soul; or as it works

[1] From the εὐαγγελιον κατ' Αἰγυπτιους.

[2] Epiphan. Hæres. 62. He says of this Gospel: ἐν αὐτῳ γαρ πολλα τοιαυτα ὡς ἐν παραβυστῳ μυστηριωδως ἐκ προσωπου του σωτηρος ἀναφερεται, ὡς αὐτον δηλουντος τοις μαθηταις, τον αὐτον εἰναι Πατερα, τον αὐτον εἰναι υἱον, τον αὐτον εἰναι ἁγιον Πνευμα. This may be illustrated by a passage in Phil. de Abrahamo, f. 367. (Ed. Hoeschel.) where it is said, that the ὀν, from which his two supreme δυναμεις, the ποιητικη, and the βασιλικη proceed, appears either *one*, or *threefold*, according to the greater or less purified condition of the souls which contemplate it. If the soul has elevated itself above the revelation of God in the creation to the intellectual perception (anschauung), of the ὀν, then the Trinity glides into Unity to its view: it looks upon one Light, from which at the same time two shades proceed, *i. e.* God's Being and those two operative faculties [Würkungsweisen. Lit. the modes of operation], are only shades, that fall from his overpowering Light. τριττην φαντασιαν ἑνος ὑποκειμενου καταλαμβανει, του μεν ὡς ὀντος, τοιν δ' ἀλλοιν δυοιν, ὡς ἀν ἀπαυγαζομενων ἀπο τουτου σκιων. And then: παρεχει τῃ ὁρατικῃ διανοιᾳ τοτε μεν ἑνος, τοτε δε τριων φαντασιαν' ἑνος μεν, ὁταν ἀκρως καθαρθεισα ἡ ψυχη και μη μονον τα πληθη των ἀριθμων ἀλλα και την γειτονα μοναδος δυαδα ὑπερβασα, &c. There is also a remarkable likeness between the mode of expression used by Sabellius, and that, which is peculiar to the Clementine, a work which proceeded from a Judæo-Christian theosophist.

[3] Clementin. H. 16. c. 12. κατα γαρ ἐκτασιν και συστολην ἡ μοναϛ δυαϛ εἰναι νομιζεται.

actively, proceeding forth from him, as the hand that creates the world[1]; so also Sabellius said that God before the creation had been the pure *Unity*[2], as being entirely hidden within his own Being, and not active through communication [of any of his attributes, &c.] with anything beyond himself; and in this respect, he called God the Father; but, at the creation, this unity had developed itself into a *Trinity*[3]. As, according to the apostle St. Paul, there is one Spirit, and yet this one Spirit worketh several ways through manifold gifts and graces; thus also, he says, is God the Father one and the same, but he pours himself abroad in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost, under which name Sabellius means to designate only two different modes of operation of the same Divine subject; namely, God the Father. Therefore he says also, it is one Divine Being, as to its self-existence, which is designated by two different names, according to these two different modes of operation—one Divine Subject, which represents itself under different forms, according to the necessity of each occasion, and sometimes speaks as the Father, sometimes as the Son, and sometimes as the Holy Ghost. He had therefore no scruple in using the language prevalent in the Western Church, and saying that we must acknowledge one God in three persons[4]; but then he understood under the word Person, nothing but different parts, different personifications under

[1] According as it may be said either συστελλεσθαι, or ἐκτεινεσθαι.

[2] ἡ ἀσυμπλοκος μονας, το ὀν, according to Philo.

[3] See Athanas. Orat. iv. c. 13: ἡ μονας πλατυνθεισα γεγονε τριας. And yet, one is inclined to enquire whether he supposed that the μονας unfolded itself immediately at the Creation into a τριας, or whether it was not originally only into a δυας, so that the τριας took its first origin from the emanation of the Logos into human nature. In order to decide on this point, we must know more of the manner in which Sabellius represented to himself the relation of the communication of the Holy Ghost to the incarnation of the Logos, and how he viewed the relation of God's operation in the New Testament, to that in the Old. It were much to be desired, that Origen had left us more distinct accounts of those whom he accuses, in the above-quoted fragment of his Commentary on the Epistle to Titus, of making the Holy Ghost as relates to the Prophets, and the Holy Ghost as regards the Apostles, two different things, and whom he expressly distinguishes from the Gnostics; to whom one would at first be inclined to apply this passage, were it not for that express distinction.

[4] l. c. 25. ὡσπερ διαιρεσεις χαρισματων εἰσι, το δε αὐτο πνευμα, οὐτω και ὁ Πατηρ ὁ αὐτος ἐστι, πλατυνεται δε εἰς Υἱον και Πνευμα.

[5] Basil. Ep. 210. τον αὐτον Θεον ἑνα τῳ ὑποκειμενῳ ὀντα προς τας ἑκαστοτε παραπιπτουσας χρειας μεταμορφουμενον νυν μεν ὡς Πατερα, νυν δε ὡς Υἱον, νυν ὡς το ἁγιον Πνευμα διαλεγεσθαι.

which the one Divine Subject presented itself[1]. He made use also of the following comparison: As in the Sun we must separate his proper substance (the ὀν, the μοναϛ), the round body, from the warming and illuminating power that proceeds from it, so also in God we must distinguish between his proper self-existent Being, and the enlightening power, the Logos; and the Holy Ghost, the power that warms, glows through, and vivifies the hearts of believers[2].

Sabellius spoke in the sense above given, of a λογοϛ προφορικοϛ, and of a begetting of the Logos, which preceded the whole creation, without which no creation could have taken place. No Being could have existed, if the *thinking* Divine reason had not become a speaking reason; if the Divine Monas, wrapt up in itself, had not unfolded itself in the words of creation. In this sense Sabellius said, "God, being silent, is inoperative; but God speaking, is effective[3]." He considered, however, human souls to be a revelation or a partial out-beaming of the Divine Logos, in which idea he followed Philo and the Alexandrian churchmen; reason in man, in this view, is nothing but a feeble reflexion of that reason of God, which is active in communicating itself. Therefore, Sabellius applied what he had said of the creation in general to man in particular, "That we might be created," says he, "the Logos proceeded forth from God (or was begotten), and no sooner hath it gone forth from God, than behold! we are in existence[4]."

For the purpose of redeeming the souls of men that were akin to it, the Divine power of the Logos let itself down into human nature; and the whole Spiritual personality of the Logos was considered by Sabellius, as a certain hypostatized out-beaming, a peculiar modification of the Divine Logos. The doctrine of a class of Jewish Theologians, that God sends forth his revealing power, the Logos, from himself, and recals it to himself again, as the Sun sends forth its beams; that the appearances of angels,

[1] ἐν τρισι προσωποις. [2] Epiphan. Hæres. 62.

[3] τον Θεον σιωπωντα μεν ἀνενεργητον, λαλουντα δε ἰσχυειν. l. c. Athanas. iv. c. 11.

[4] Athanas. iv. 25. ἱνα ἡμεις κτισθωμεν, προηλθεν ὁ λογοϛ, και προελθοντοϛ αὐτου ἐσμεν. These words would take a different sense, if they are referred to the καινη κτισιϛ, and are understood of the incarnation of the Logos. But, both from the words themselves, and from the context and the manner in which it is quoted by Athanasius, the most natural interpretation is that given above.

and the Theophanies of the Old Testament, are nothing else than different transient forms under which this one power of God appeared[1]; this theory he applied to the Theophany in the appearance of Christ. He made use of the same metaphor, that the Son was like a beam, that issued from the Sun, and returned again into God, like the beam to the Sun.

It may be doubted, whether he used the name, "the Son of God," merely for the human form under which the Logos appeared, or whether he applied this name to the λογος προφορικος on its first origin. As he spoke of an original generation of the Logos, and was generally willing to take up the expressions used in the Church, it would suit well with his whole theory, to suppose that he would have no scruple in applying this term, in the sense which we have observed, to the Logos[2].

It is further certain, that Sabellius ascribed *to the Redeemer no eternally-enduring personality;* but it might be doubtful, whether he maintained, that God did not recal again into himself the beam that had proceeded from him, until the whole work of redemption with all its consequences (after the general resurrection) was completed, or whether he supposed that God had taken back to himself this beam immediately on the ascension of Christ. The words of Sabellius support the first view: "just as the Logos was begotten for our sake, so also, does he return back again after us, to that which he was before, so that he may be what he was[3], after we have attained to the union with God, to which we are destined;" (that is to say, after man through him shall have attained to a Being in God, analogous to the Being of the Logos in God); on the contrary, the account of Epiphanius, who appears also to have had the words of Sabellius before his eyes, especially if we compare it with the doctrines of that Jewish sect, rather supports the second supposition. And there is something quite accordant with the whole Sabellian theory in the idea, that after God, through the sinking down of this one perfect

[1] Dial. c. Tryph. Jud. 358. As the Light proceeds from the Sun, and returns to it, οὑτως ὁ Πατηρ, ὁταν βουληται δυναμιν αὐτου προπηδᾳν ποιει, και ὁταν βουληται παλιν ἀναστελλει εἰς ἑαυτον. [p. 372. Ed. Jebb. H. J. R.]

[2] He pronounced an Anathema against those, who did not believe in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, which he might do in his own sense of those terms. See Arnobii conflictus cum Serapione. Bibl. Patr. Lugd. t. 8.

[3] Lib. cit. c. 12. μεθ' ἡμας ἀνατρεχει, ἱνα ᾖ ὡσπερ ἠν.

beam into human nature, had again restored this to himself[1], he should in its stead communicate himself to the individual souls of the faithful through individual separate beams of the same Divine Life, by means of the Holy Ghost. The words of Sabellius in Athanasius might certainly refer to something else; namely, they might mean, that after every thing had been restored to unity with God, the whole Spiritual creation would be in immediate connexion with God, and then the *Trias* would also subside into the *Monas*, the λογος προφορικος into the λογος ἐνδιαθετος: and then nothing else would exist than the One[2] simple Divine Being, at repose within itself with the blessed Spirits reposing within him. But what opinion Sabellius may have held with respect to the enduring personality of souls, we cannot state with any certainty from the deficiency of any authentic vouchers[3].

The Church doctrine formed itself in opposition to both these classes of Monarchians, and sought to maintain the substantial [selbständig] personal Being of the Logos. While those Monarchians considered the self-revelation of God in the λογος προφορικος, as only a certain activity of the Divine nature, in which the whole creation was called into existence; the Church teachers, on the contrary, supposed a self-revelation of God, preceding the whole creation, and forming the foundation of it; which self-revelation consisted in a Being, emanating from God with the attribute of personality, representing the Divine Being of God, and realizing his first conceived ideas; this Being was the substantial Word, in

[1] [The word '*dieselbe*' here translated '*this*,' grammatically considered, refers to human nature' with which it agrees; but I apprehend it means the 'human nature of, Christ, with its enlightening beam of Divine Light.' H. J. R.]

[2] In the εὐαγγελιον κατ' Αἰγυπτιους also, which Sabellius used, the doctrine that all opposites will at last be lost in unity, appears to be brought forward; for there, in answer to the enquiry of Solomon, when the kingdom of Christ was to come; Christ gives the answer, "when Two become One, and the outward like the inward, and the male like the female; when there is no further distinction of sexes."

[3] According to this view, we can understand how Dionysius of Alexandria (Euseb. vii. 6.) might accuse Sabellius of having spoken injuriously of God the Father (as the expression of the evolution of the Divine Monas into a Trias must have appeared to a follower of Origen), and of great unbelief in regard to the Logos, who became man (inasmuch as he looked upon Him as only a transient manifestation of Divine power), and of great insensibility (ἀναισθησια) in respect to the Holy Ghost (because he denied the reality, and the objectivity of the Holy Ghost, and understood under that name only individual transient out-pourings of Divine power).

which the Divine thought came forth into creative activity [1]. They said, "While the word of man is only the transient expression of his thought; on the contrary, out of the supreme and entirely perfect Being, nothing can come forth as his self-revelation (or the first act of the communication of Life from God), which is not substantial, real, and objective." They conceived to themselves this Logos as the most perfect outpouring of the Divine Being, and they made the doctrine of the unity of God (the μοναρχια) to consist in supposing the Divine Logos to be nothing but an outpouring from the Divine First-Being [Urwesen], who revealed himself through this Logos, and works by means of him. But still by degrees this idea, in the conceptions formed of it, was developed in two different and opposite ways; the one prevailing in the Western, the other in the Eastern Church.

In regard to the latter, the fashioning which this doctrine received from the philosophical spirit of the Alexandrian school, and especially of Origen, had a very great influence upon it, and we cannot fail to recognize the influence also, which the system, from which his philosophical notions were derived, had exerted upon him. Although the Christian spirit had leavened his speculative ideas, although his "God the Father" is something different from the supreme, simple principle of the Neo-Platonists, the ὀν, which was to them a mere abstract idea of perfection, although his Logos is something different from the νους of the Neo-Platonist, absorbed in ideal contemplation of itself; yet the speculative form, under which he had viewed things from this philosophy had certainly great effect in modifying his conception of this doctrine. We shall now view the ideas of this profound man, in their proper connection with each other.

That which is to be called God absolutely [2], is the original source of all being, the source of Divine life, and of blessed-

[1] [Lest I should have failed to represent by a literal translation the meaning of my author, I will merely state what appears to me to constitute the difference which he wishes to establish between these two views. The first considers the creation itself to be the act of this Divine energy of God set into activity, and thus the creation is the only manifestation of the thought of God, and is the λογος προφορικος. The second, on the contrary, maintains that, previous to the creation, and independent of it, there was a manifestation of God, and a conversion of the λογος ἐνδιαθετος into the λογος προφορικος. This λογος προφορικος has a personal existence, and by means of him God created the world. H. J. R.]

[2] The ἁπλως θεος, αὐτοθεος.

ness for a blessed world of spirits which is akin to him, and also elevated by communion with him above the bounds of temporary existence, and thus rendered divine. The higher spirits, in virtue of this Divine life, communicated to them by means of their communion with that original Divine Being, may, in a certain sense, be called Divine Beings or Gods[1]. But as the αὐτοθεος is the original source of all being, and all Divine life, so also is the λογος, the indispensable medium through which all communication of life from him must flow. This is the collected revelation of the glory of God, the universal all-embracing image of that glory, from out of which the partial beams of the Divine glory spread themselves over the whole world of Spirits[2].

Now as there is only One Divine First Being[3], there is also, One Divine First Reason[4], the Absolute Reason, through which alone the eternal Supreme Being reveals himself to all other beings, which is the source of truth to all them, the objective substantial truth itself. With Origen it is a great point to maintain firmly, that every particular class of reasonable beings has not its own subjective reason, nor every separate intelligence; but that there is one objective Logos for all, just as there is one objective absolute truth for all, the one truth of God-consciousness, which unites man with all classes in the world of Spirits. "Every one," he says, "will concede that truth is One, and in respect of truth, no one can venture to say, that there is one truth of God, another truth of angels, another of men; for in the nature of things there is One truth only in respect to every single thing. But now if truth is One, so must also the development of truth, which is wisdom, if thought of properly, be thought of as One also; because every false appearance of wisdom embraces not the truth, and does not deserve to be called wisdom. But if there be then One truth, and One wisdom, the Logos, which reveals the truth and wisdom to all who are capable of receiving it, will be One also." But although the Logos as to his nature and being, is absolutely One; yet he presents himself under a variety of forms and modes of operation, according to the different conditions and necessities of reasonable beings, to whom he is every thing, which is needful for their salvation (see above). Where the Gnostics, from the different modes of operation of the One

[1] μετοχη της ἐκεινου θεοτητος θεοποιουμενοι.
[2] Joh. ii. c. ii. 32; c. 18.
[3] The αὐτοθεος.
[4] The αὐτολογος.

Redeemer, and according to the different conditions of his operations, supposed different hypostases, Origen reduced these different hypostases to different conceptions and relations; but just as he opposed this fashion of hypostatizing every thing, so he opposed himself also to the Monarchians who reduced the whole Trias (or Trinity) only to different conceptions and relations under which the One Divine Being is viewed. Whosoever denied the substantial existence of the Divine Logos, appeared to him to reduce every thing into that which is subjective, to deny the existence of an absolute objective truth, and to make it a mere abstract idea [*abstractum*], for he could not think of the Divine Logos in any other way, than as he had been accustomed to think of the νους of the Neo-Platonists. "None of us," says Origen, c. Cels. viii. 12. "has so debased a mind, as to think that the Being of truth [1] had no substantial existence before the appearance of Christ on earth."

As Origen explained all designations of the Logos as symbolical, he looked upon the name Logos itself in this light, and he spoke against those, who built exclusively upon this name, and made the comparison with the λογος προφορικος always applicable, which to him as a philosophical thinker, appeared too human, and one which would not allow the Logos to be represented as something having a substantial existence[2]. The representation which up to this time had been current: that God before the creation had caused the substantial Word to emanate from his Reason, in which he had conceived the plan of the world, which was to be executed by the Word, and that he had caused his thought to become the Word, was banished, together with that comparison, by the philosophical spirit of Origen; because he could not allow the propriety of transferring in this manner the relations of time to the Eternal. Acknowledging no beginning of creation, but supposing an eternal creation, he could still less acknowledge a beginning in this case, and he endeavoured to remove every consideration of time from the idea of the generation of the Logos, and to maintain that we must think of a "present," without any determination of time [lit. a time-less present; an eternal now,]

[1] ἡ της ἀληθειας οὐσια.

[2] ἐπει συνεχως χρωνται τῳ· ἐξηρευξατο ἡ καρδια μου λογον ἀγαθον, ψ. 44. 1. οἰομενοι προφοραν πατρικην οἱονει ἐν συλλαβαις κειμενην εἰναι τον Υἱον του Θεου.

which he believed to be intimated in the "to-day" of Psal. ii. 7. What the Platonists said of the relation of the ὀν to the νους, that the revelation of the former in the latter is contemporaneously co-existent with the former, he applied to the relation of God the Father to the Logos, that the reflection of the glory of God in the Son is co-existent with its own existence; and thus, that always this reflection had been present with the glory after a manner, which is independent upon time[1]. And thus he was peculiarly instrumental in establishing the notion of an eternal generation.

While Origen endeavoured to conceive the idea of the generation of the Son after the most spiritual manner possible, he declared himself strongly against all sensuous conceptions of it, and against all such expressions as might give occasion to, or favour them at all. On this account he rejected the phrase of a generation out of the substance of the Father[2] (which, on the contrary, was used in the Western Church, in order to distinguish the Son of God from all creatures), because this expression, it appeared to him, might easily be used to favour the notion of a sensuous partition of the Divine Being[3].

As the idea of a generation out of the substance (lit. *the Being*) of God appeared to Origen to be too sensuous, it was also a concomitant of this caution on his part, that he thought it entirely necessary to maintain strictly the absolutely superiority of God the Father, the αὐτοθεος, in respect to his nature, over every other Being, just as he had indeed been accustomed as a Platonist, to consider the supreme ὀν as something incomparable with any thing else, and as elevated in his nature, even above the νους itself. It appeared to him therefore, injurious towards the Great

[1] Joh. i. 32. T. ii. c. 1; ii. 9. in Jerem. iii. 181.

[2] γεννησις εκ της ουσιας του Θεου.

[3] In opposition to those, who falsely explained the passage of St. John viii. 44. of the generation of the Son. T. 20. Joh. c. 16. ἀλλοι δε το· ἐξηλθον ἀπο Θεου, διηγησαντο ἀντι του γεγεννημαι ἀπο του Θεου, οἰς ἀκολουθει ἐκ της οὐσιας φασκειν του Πατρος γεγεννησθαι τον Υἱον, οἱονει μειομενου και λειποντος τῃ οὐσιᾳ, ἡ προτερον εἰχε δογματα ἀνθρωπων, μηδ' ὁναρ φυσιν ἀορατον και ἀσωματον πεφαντασμενων. In the report of a discussion between Origen and Candidus the Valentinian, a passage occurred, in which the former attacked an expression made use of by the more ancient Church-doctors, as Justin for example (viz. a προβολη ἐκ της οὐσιας του πατρὸς), without any scruple,—ne Deus Pater dividatur in partes, and on the contrary, in order to remove the idea of a necessity resulting from the nature of things, he maintained that the Son of God had received his existence from the will of the Father. Lib. ii. adv. Rufin. t. iv. 413.

First Being, to suppose any equality of nature or unity between him and any other Being, were it even the Son of God himself. As the Son of God and the Holy Ghost are incomparably elevated above every thing else, even above the highest grades of the Spiritual world; so much, or more than this, is the Father elevated above him[1]. This distinction between the nature of the Son of God, and of the Father[2] would necessarily be brought prominently forward by Origen against the Monarchians, because they denied not only the difference of nature, but even the distinction of the persons; and thus, on account of the connected nature of his philosophical and Christian system it was a point of practical importance to Origen to maintain against them the personal substantiality of the Logos. Sometimes, in the course of this controversy, he distinguishes between unity of nature and a personal unity, or unity of substance [subjects-einheit, lit. *subject-* or *substance-* unity] so that he only undertakes to controvert the latter idea[3]. This was the matter which was practically the most important to him to maintain, and he must have been well aware that many Church-teachers, who held a distinction of persons, at the same time maintained an unity of nature[4]. But in virtue of the intimate connection of his own system, as a system, both these opinions would give way together, and when he spoke as from the position taken by that system, he maintained both the ἑτεροτης της οὐσιας and the ἑτεροτης της ὑποστασεως or του ὑποκειμενου[5].

From this doctrine he drew the practical consequence, that we must pray to the Father and not to the Son, from which it is clear, how much in a Christian and practical point of view, the Patripassians (whom Origen accused of knowing only the Son, and being unable to raise themselves up to the Father) must have thought themselves obliged to exert themselves against such a system. But still Christ was nevertheless to Origen, as he himself declared, with full conviction from the connection of his

[1] T. 13. Joh. c. 25.

[2] The doctrine of an ἑτεροτης της οὐσιας maintained in opposition to that of the ὁμοουσιον.

[3] T. 10. Joh. against those who said ἐν οὐ μονον οὐσιᾳ ἀλλα και ὑποκειμενῳ τυγχανειν ἀμφοτερους.

[4] [Wesen-einheit, one-ness of being. See Wilson on the New Testament, p. 521. H. J. R.]

[5] In Joh. ii. t. ii. De Orat. c. 15. κατ' οὐσιαν και καθ' ὑποκειμενον ἐστιν ὁ υἱος ἑτερος του Πατρος.

philosophical and Christian system, the way, the truth, and the life; he knew no other way to the Father, no other source of truth, and of Divine life for all creatures, than him, "the mirror, by means of which Paul and Peter, and all who are like to them, beheld God[1]." He says, that in some respects, we may agree with the Gnostics, that the *Father* was not revealed before Christ revealed him, that men till that time, had known only the Creator and the Lord of the world, and that it was through the Son that they had first known him as their Father, and by the spirit of adoption received from him, had become capable of calling to him as to a father[2]. He acknowledged him to be the mediator, a confidence in whom must penetrate the whole inward life of Christians and unite them with God, in his name and through him, Christians must always pray to God the Father. Origen says, "How can we in the sense of him, who said "why dost thou call me good, there is none good, save only God the Father;" avoid saying also, "Why dost thou pray to me? thou must pray only to the Father, to whom I also pray! As ye have learnt from Holy Scripture, ye must not pray to him who is appointed by the Father to be your high priest, and who has received from the Father the office of being your advocate; but you must pray *through* your high priest and your advocate, through him, who can have sympathy with your feebleness, who was in all things tempted like unto you, but by the gift of the Father without sin. Learn also what a gift ye have received from my Father, by receiving through a new birth in me the spirit of adoption, so as to be called the sons of God, and my brethren[3]." And thus from the grounds already pointed out, as we see, by Origen, a controversy arose against the doctrine, that the Son of God was begotten of the substance of the Father, and against that of an unity of nature between them both, from which controversy, an opposition was afterwards to arise between the Eastern and the Western churches; for in the latter of these churches, the doctrine of one Divine Being in three numerically different persons, was already become predominant.

When we compare Origen and Tertullian together, we learn how the conception of the same Christian truth may be formed differently in persons, according to the difference of their spiri-

[1] T. 13. Joh. c. 25. [2] T. 19. Joh. l. iv. 286. [3] D. Orat. c. 15.

tual character and education. Tertullian accustomed to sensible representations of the Supreme Being, could not find the difficulties, which met the philosophizing Origen. With his sensuous notions of emanation, he could easily make it clear to himself, how the Divinity could cause a being to proceed out of his own substance, which possessed this same substance, only in a smaller degree, and bore the same relation to the Divinity that the sunbeam does to the sun. Hence, he acknowledged one Divine Being in three persons intimately united together [1].

The Son [according to this view] does not differ in number from the Father in relation to the Divine Nature, inasmuch as the same Nature of God is in the Son also; but he differs in degree, inasmuch as he is a smaller portion of the common whole of the Divine Being [2]. This became the prevailing view in the Western Church; viz. one and the same Divine Nature in the Father and the Son; but a subordination withal in the relation of the Son to the Father. But while the interior Christian life impelled men constantly to make the distinction between Christ and all creatures, always more and more sharply defined, and while on the other hand the idea of the Unity of God was constantly more and more definitely conceived, particularly by the spirit of the western people; so the notions of this subordination would necessarily be more driven into the background.

The form of doctrine, which had formed itself in the Alexandrian school, was now again brought more prominently forward in the second half of the third century, during the controversy against the systems of Sabellius, and of Paul of Samosata. In the controversy against the latter, the expression ὁμοούσιον was condemned by a council at Antioch [3], a circumstance which is of importance as an introduction to the controversies of the next century [4].

[1] Una substantia in tribus cohærentibus.

[2] Deus de Deo, modulo alter, non numero. Adv. Praxeam.

[3] See *e. g.* Athanas. de Synod. § 43. and Hilar. de Synodis, § 86.

[4] As this may be explained so naturally by the doctrinal conceptions of the Alexandrian school, and also the ground brought forward by the council against this expression of the Church is quite in accordance with this, this account has hence, an *à priori* probability. The Arians, from whom it comes, are, however, suspicious witnesses in this respect; but the circumstance that neither Athanasius, Hilary of Poictiers, nor Basil of Cæsarea, their bitter opponents, who quote from their mouths, contradict them in the matter, may pass as a voucher for its credibility.

We see already the seed of a controversy between the system of Origen, and the system of the Unity[1] in Trinity, which was constantly becoming more strongly defined in the Romish Church, and a protype of the doctrinal controversies of the fourth century. Dionysius, the bishop of Alexandria, issued a pastoral letter against the doctrines of Sabellius[2], which were spreading themselves abroad in the province of Pentapolis, a district, the churches of which were under the superintendence of the Bishop of Alexandria. In this letter in contradiction to the Sabellian confusion of persons [hypostases] he brought forward in consequence of that heresy the difference between the Son of God and the Father still more strongly, and made use of many inappropriate comparisons, and hard expressions, which he would not probably have used, if he had not been carried to extremes by means of this contrast between the two systems, and which might be so understood, as if he acknowledged no essential difference of nature between the Son of God and created beings, and as if he ascribed a temporal commencement of existence to the Son; he declared himself against the word *Homousion*. Many, who were offended by the expressions he used, complained of them to Dionysius, the Bishop of Rome, who thereupon issued a letter, in which he contradicted those who denied the unity of nature in the Trinity [Trias], who placed the Son of God in the rank of a creature, and assigned him a beginning of existence in time, as well as the Sabellians. If Dionysius of Alexandria (who would easily be able to show that people had fastened too severely on single expressions of his, instead of explaining these expressions according to a general view of his ideas) had at once maintained obstinately his opposition to the doctrine of the Roman Church, and had proclaimed these points of difference more definitely, this would have sounded a tocsin to a contest of doctrines, in which the Eastern and Western church might possibly have taken part. But Dionysius acted in the spirit of moderation, which held fast what is material, and avoided contests on incomprehensible Divine things; a moderation which had passed from the great Origen to his worthy scholar. Without manifesting any resentment against his accusers, who had appealed to a foreign bishop, who was glad

[1] [Wesenseinheit. Literally, Unity of Being, or nature. H. J. R.]

[2] The letter to Ammonius and Nicanor.

enough to set himself up as a judge over other churches, without manifesting any resentment towards the latter himself [the Bishop of Rome], who appears to have spoken more in the tone of a judge, than in that of a colleague in the office of bishop, he developed with composure and sound thought, the meaning of his expressions which had been misunderstood, and endeavoured while doing this, to avoid as much as possible any opposition to the Roman doctrine. He supplied also, according to the mode of Origen, what was requisite to complete the idea of the eternal generation of the Logos. He was willing even to allow the validity of the word ὁμοούσιον, as far as it was applied only to denote the affinity of nature between the Father and the Son, and to separate the Son from all creatures, although he might say against it, that this word had hitherto never been in use in the Church, and did not occur in the Holy Scriptures; which, however, it must be acknowledged, is not a satisfactory objection to make to a doctrinal expression; because the changes which take place in the general development of mind in a doctrinal point of view, and new errors arising in it, may render new expressions necessary; and because the only point of any importance here is, that the idea, which the doctrinal expression is to denote, can be deduced from the Scriptures. By this self-denial of Dionysius (in which he showed more of the spirit of Christ, and did more to honour him, than if he had maintained the unity of nature by dialectic rules), the controversy was put aside, and a division, which might have torn asunder the bond of Christian communion, was thus avoided[1].

It will appear from what we have remarked above, that the development of the doctrine of the Holy Ghost is closely connected with that of the Son of God. We see also here, how completely religion is a thing of life, before it can obtain for itself an adequate form of development in definite conceptions, and we see the want of correspondence which must arise between the inward life and conscience, and the conceptions of the mind, until Christianity has penetrated the whole of man's nature. In that age of the first outpouring of the Holy Ghost on human nature; while the new life communicated by Christ to human nature, the

[1] See the fragments of the letter of Dionysius to Ammonius and Euphranor, and of the second letter under the title, ἔλεγχος καὶ ἀπολογία: in Athanasius de Sententia Dionysii et de Decretis Synodi Nicenæ.

life in communion with God, was felt so powerfully, and while its operations against the corrupted heathen world were so strongly marked, there were generally wanting ideas of it, corresponding to the nature of that Spirit, whose power was felt to be Divine.

The Church-teachers, in virtue of the modes of mental conception in those days, could not (if we except the Monarchians above mentioned and Lactantius [1]) maintain the reality and objective existence of the Holy Ghost in any other way, than by representing it to themselves as a personal substantial being. They were therefore compelled by their system of subordination, to consider the Holy Ghost as a being subordinate both to the Father and the Son. Justin Martyr, for example, who certainly spoke with a just interior experience of that, which the Holy Ghost is for the interior life of the Christian; calls him "the angel of God, the power of God sent to us through Jesus Christ, which defends them [Christians] from the assaults of the evil spirit, and compels him to leave them [2]." With a just Christian view [Anschauung] also, Origen calls the Holy Ghost—as the source of the Divine life communicated to the Christian, which, penetrating and sanctifying the natures of men, although according to its nature it be One, still reveals itself in manifold ways in the manifold qualities of human nature, and shows itself efficient in acting upon them—"the substance of all gifts and graces effected by God, and communicated through Christ, as something substantial in the Holy Ghost." According to his system of subordination, which is of importance for the development of the doctrine of the Greek Church in the following period, the Holy Ghost is in his view, the first Being [or nature, *Wesen*] produced by God the Father, through the Son. In this respect also the Unity-system was already brought more prominently forward in the Western Church during the last years of

[1] Who appears to have declared the Holy Ghost to be the sanctifying power of the Father and the Son, "eum vel ad Patrem referri vel ad Filium; et sanctificationem utriusque personæ sub ejus nomine demonstrari." See Hieronym. ep. 41. ad Pammach. et Oceanum.

[2] Dialog. c. Tryph. Jud. 344. ὁ ἀγγελος του Θεου, τουτ' ἐστιν ἡ δυναμις του Θεου, ἡ πεμφθεισα ἡμιν δια Ἰησου Χριστου, ἐπιτιμᾳ αὐτῳ και ἀφιστησι τοὺς ἡμων. This affords a key to the passage in the Apolog. ii. ed. Colon. p. 56. which is often found difficult: "we reverence the Son of God, and all the host of the other angels which follow Him, as especially the Holy Ghost;" as this last is ranked among angels, although considered to be elevated above all others.

this period, especially in the letter of Dionysius the Bishop of Rome to his namesake of Alexandria. (See above.)

From the 'Doctrines relating to God' (Theology in the more confined sense of the word) we pass to the Doctrines which relate to the nature of man (Anthropology); two classes of doctrines which stand together in close connexion, when conceived after that mode of viewing them which belongs exclusively to Christianity, just as both of them receive their properly Christian character and significance, by their peculiar relation to the Doctrine of Redemption, the centre-point of Christianity.

The Doctrine of Redemption, while it is indissolubly connected with one mode of viewing human nature, is essentially contradictory to other modes. It necessarily presupposes the recognition of the truth, that human nature stands in need of redemption, and hence, that there exists a schism and discord in it, and an estrangement of it from God, through communion with whom alone it can be rendered blessed. It stands in contradiction to the stoic view of the moral self-sufficiency of man, as well as to that heathen view of nature, which removed the opposition between sin and the holiness of God and deduced evil from the natural organization of man, or from the influence of a blind destiny. Christianity therefore necessarily introduced with itself a new point of view for the consideration of human nature, and this point of view was to be maintained against those conceptions of it previously in existence. Christianity directed the attention of the thoughtful to the struggle [Zwiespalt, division] between good and evil in human nature, from which that nature must be set free, and to such inquiries as the following:—"Whence this struggle arose? whence did evil originally come? and how is it to be considered in respect to the holiness of the Creator?" And in the case of many men (see the Gnostics as described above), even before this time speculation had taken the turn to these inquiries, in consequence of the desire that had been awakened for some solution of the enigmas of the course of nature; and in consequence of the perception of the dis-harmony that exists, and the feeling of commiseration for man's misery, that had already been excited.

Christianity united *Anthropology* with the *Doctrines that relate to the nature of Spirits* (Pneumatology), inasmuch as it ascribed to man the same reasonable and moral nature, and the same destination, as to all the spirits of a high order; it repre-

sented man, on the one hand, as the companion of a race of holy and blessed Spirits in a world to which he belongs, even while here below, in virtue of his inward life; while on the other hand, it threw back the origin of moral evil on this very world of Spirits, by the doctrine of a fallen Spirit of a higher order, from whom at first the origin of sin proceeded. This latter representation was of practical importance, in establishing the doctrinal view of sin, inasmuch as by means of it, a more express and direct contrast might be presented against the important error of the moral judgment, which deduced evil from the mere nature of the senses, and from the natural organization of man.

The Gnostics, however, did not merely neglect the practical and Christian view in their union between Anthropology and Pneumatology, but they rather lost sight of it entirely in their idle speculations. We observed before (see above), how their theories, intended to reconcile the holiness of God with the actual presence of evil, necessarily disparaged alike the holiness and the omnipotence of God, and tended altogether to remove the notion of evil, which they traced finally up to a necessity arising from the nature of things. The Christian doctrine of Satan's influence, &c. lost with them its whole characteristic importance; because in their estimation, Satan was nothing more than a mere natural power, the culminating point of the power of the Ὑλη, which resisted every Divine influence.

In contradiction to the Gnostics, the Church-teachers were especially concerned to show, that evil was no necessary result of the composition of nature, but had its origin in the free will of beings, created by God for good, and also that there were no natures either essentially wicked in consequence of their derivation from one source, or essentially good in consequence of their derivation from another; but that in consequence of their derivation, equal moral capabilities were present in all, and the use or neglect of them was wholly dependent on the free will of the individual. There was no need, in arguing against the Gnostics, to prove, in the first instance, that human nature had been defiled by some element foreign to it; but on the contrary, the first point to make good against them was, that this foreign admixture could not have utterly destroyed man's free will. Upon the whole, the Church-teachers agreed unanimously in maintaining both the free will of man, as a necessary condition for the existence of any

morality, without which there could be no righteous judgment on the part of God, and also in maintaining, at the same time, the necessity of Divine grace for the moral reformation of human nature. The accurate investigation of the mutual relation between these two things, was yet far from this period; but still, amidst this agreement in essentials, two tendencies in the development of the doctrines pertaining to these points, which recede from each other, are nevertheless to be found, when we compare the doctrines of the North-African and the Alexandrian teachers with each other.

The formation of the North-African system of Church doctrine proceeded from Tertullian. He received from the then-existing Church-doctrines the idea, that the first man, as he was created by God, had every capability of manifesting the image of God through his spiritual and moral nature; but that these capabilities were still undeveloped. Their development depended on the free will of man. The nature of man was pure enough that no obstruction was offered to the influence of God upon it; through communion with God human nature would have been constantly more and more ennobled and refined, and would have been enabled to attain to a participation in a divine and imperishable life, so that it would have been for ever removed out of the dominions of death. But, by means of the first sin, which consisted in man's not subjecting his will to the will of God, but opposing it[1], man stepped out of this communion with God, and thus became subjected to the mastery of sinfulness and perishableness[2]. As the harmony between the Divine and the human will entailed as its consequence an harmony between all the parts of human nature; so the rent between the Divine and the human will introduced a rent in the *whole* nature of man. Connexion with an ungodly Spirit took the place of connexion with the Spirit of God. The Father of the race of men communicated the Spirit of this world [*literally*, the world-spirit] to all his descendants[3].

But Tertullian's theory about the mode of propagating this first element of destruction to the nature of man, was peculiar to himself, and connected with his theory, of the propagation of souls.

[1] Electio suæ potius quam divinæ sententiæ.

[2] Among the Fathers of this period both of these notions were included in the idea of φθορα: just the opposite term ἀφθαρσια with them signified divine, imperishable, and holy life.

[3] Spiritum mundi universo generi suo tradidit.

In fact, he thought that original forefather of the race bore within himself the undeveloped seed of all mankind; that the soul of the first man was the source of all other human souls, and that all the qualities of human nature were only manifold modifications of that one spiritual substance[1]. (This is a point of view, which, although it was conceived in sensuous images by Tertullian, who could not think of any thing except through the medium of images drawn from the senses, was not necessarily connected with sensuous views.) Hence, the whole nature of man became corrupted in our first forefather, and sinfulness was propagated together with the souls of men[2].

Tertullian was, in like manner, imbued with the conviction of the sinfulness that adhered to man's nature, and also the conviction of man's nature being undeniably akin to God; and that it was expressly in contrast to this latter element of his nature, that sin manifested itself as sin. "The corruption of man's nature," he says[3], "is a second nature, which has its own God and Father; namely, the author of this corruption himself; but still in such a way that good is also present in the soul, that original Divine and genuine [Good] which is properly natural to it. For that which is from God is not so much extinguished as dimmed. For it may be dimmed, because it is not God, but it cannot be extinguished, because it is from God. Wherefore as Light, which is obstructed, nevertheless remains, but does not appear, if the obstruction is sufficiently dense, so also the good which is in the soul, being oppressed by the evil, in conformity to its own peculiar nature[4], either remains entirely inactive, whilst its Light remains hidden, or when it finds its freedom, shines out where an opportunity is given. Thus some are very good and some are very wicked, and yet all souls are one race; and also in the very worst there is something of good, and in the very best something of wickedness, for God alone is without sin, and Christ is the only man wholly

[1] De Anima, c. 10, and c. 19.

[2] Tradux animæ, tradux peccati.

[3] De Anima, c. 41.

[4] [Ita bonum in anima a malo oppressum, *pro qualitate ejus*, aut in totum vacat, occultata luce, aut qua datur radiat, inventa libertate.

So auch ist das von dem Bösen, *wie es dessen eigenthümliches Wesen mit sich bringt*, unterdrückte Gute in der Seele ganz wirkungslos, &c.

It would seem, although it is rather ambiguous, from this, that Neander refers *pro qualitate ejus* to the nature of evil, as opposed to good, and oppressing where it can; but (if Rigalt's reading is correct) it seems to me to belong to *good*, which being like light in its nature, suffers either partial or entire obscuration.]

sinless, for Christ is also God. The Divine nature of the soul breaks forth into anticipations in consequence of its original goodness, and its God-consciousness delivers a testimony ..... Therefore no soul is without guilt, because none is without the seed of good."

He considered every part and power of man's nature as the work of God, as something intrinsically good; and hence, all that is contrary to reason in it, only as the consequence of that first rent produced in man by transgression; and he acknowledged the justice of Plato's division of the soul into the λογικον and the ἀλογον, not in reference to the original nature of man; but only in regard to it in a state of corruption [1].

With regard to the Gnostic doctrine of essential difference in the natures of men, in consequence of which they maintained that no Pneumaticus [or Spiritual man] could be formed from a Hylicus or Choicus [a man of a low material or earthly nature] or *vice versâ*—Tertullian contrasted with this doctrine the omnipotence of grace, and the changeableness of the human will. When the Gnostics appealed to the declaration of Christ, that no good tree brings forth evil fruit, and no evil tree good fruit, Tertullian answered them thus [2], "If this be so, then God cannot raise up children to Abraham out of stones, nor could the generations of vipers bring forth fruits of repentance, and the Apostle was in error when he wrote as follows: '*And we too once were darkness, and we also once were the children of wrath, among whom ye were once also, but ye are washed.*' But can the declarations of the Holy Spirit stand in contradiction to each other? No! for the evil tree will never bring forth good fruit, *until it be graffed*, and the good tree will produce evil fruit, if it be not cultivated; and the stones will become the children of Abraham, when they are fashioned into the faith of Abraham, and the generation of vipers will bring forth the fruits of repentance, when they have vomited out the poison of wickedness. This, the grace of God may effect, which is certainly more powerful than nature, and to which the free will of man is subordinate in us ..... But as this will is also a part

[1] De Anima, 16. Naturale enim *rationale* credendum est, quod animæ a primordio sit ingenitum a *rationali* videlicet auctore; irrationale autem posterius intelligendum, ipsum illud transgressionis admissum atque (quod) exinde inoleverit in anima, ad instar jam naturalitatis, quia statim in naturæ primordio accedit.

[2] De Anima, c. 21.

of our nature, and changeable, whithersoever it turns, thither our nature leads us also." This remarkable passage may be taken by some, as if Tertullian ascribed to grace an irresistible and attractive power in reference to the corrupted will of man; and it might be said, that he maintained the free will of man only in opposition to the doctrine of a necessity of fate, and against the opinion of an entire moral incapacity in *certain* natures; but that he did not maintain it in reference to the nature-reforming principle of grace. Montanism might easily lead to this result, that the overpowering influence of the Divine nature should be exaggerated, and the free will of man made only a blind passive instrument. But still this view would be by no means supported by the context, according to which Tertullian only wishes to make out, that grace by its Divine influence on our corrupted nature, in virtue of its free will can communicate to it a higher power than that which resides in itself; and we are bound to take that explanation, which best accords with the rest of Tertullian's declarations about free will. And even supposing that Montanism necessarily exalts especially the doctrine of Divine grace, yet the doctrine of an irresistible grace is anything but established by it [Montanism], for the very circumstance that Montanism attributes such an influence to the case of prophets only, proves that it does not maintain it in ordinary cases.

The other disposition we find in the Alexandrian Church. Clement, without intending it, opposed the North-African Church-doctrine, while he had in view only the Gnostic doctrine, that birth is a work of the evil Spirit. "As children may have sinned, and fallen under the curse of Adam, while as yet they have never done any action of their own[1]." Clemens was particularly anxious to maintain this point; that all the Divine operations of grace went on the condition of the independence [*lit.* self-determination, self-choice] of the free will, as the ground of all moral development. No doubt he went too far, (as any man is likely to do, who always follows a single point of view,) in endeavouring to define too accurately the limits which separate [in these operations of grace] the Divine from the human; but at the same time he did it only out of a wish to maintain the practical importance of the moral independence of man; though it is still quite certain that

[1] III. f. 453. 469. [p. 541. 556-7. Ed. Pott. p. 194. 201. Ed. Sylb.]

he was far from ascribing to the will of man, a self-sufficiency that was independent of the reforming power of Divine grace. In one passage he expresses himself thus, with respect to the mutual relation of these two[1]: "When man seeks to free himself from passions by his own discipline and his own endeavours he does not succeed. But if he shows a right earnest desire and endeavour after this end, he will attain it by the assistance of God's power, for God communicates his Spirit to those souls that desire it. But if they relax from their desire, then also the Spirit of God which had been bestowed upon them, withdraws itself..... For the kingdom of God does not belong to those who sleep and are lazy, but 'the impetuous seize upon it.'"

The system of Origen in respect to this matter is altogether peculiar to himself. We observed above, that he was attached to an Emanation-scheme, spiritually conceived; but while the Gnostics tried to explain the difference between reasonable creatures, partly by a natural law deduced from the gradual development of life from God, and partly by their descent from two fundamentally-different principles, Origen, on the contrary, endeavoured to deduce all differences *from moral freedom*. "God," he maintained, "as the absolute unity can be the source of nothing but unity; inasmuch as all being is derived from him, the unity of its nature must be shown therein. From him no difference and no variety [*lit.* multifariousness] can arise, and it would be contrary to his love and his justice, not to bestow on all his creatures the same measure of perfection and blessedness. Thus, God is to be conceived originally as the first source of a spiritual world, allied to him, and rendered blessed by communion with him, and the members of this world were all similar to each other. In the second book of his work περὶ ἀρχῶν, he expresses himself as if he not only considered all differences in the measure of powers and of blessedness, but also generally all differences of proper and peculiar being, no original difference, but as something which had proceeded in the first instance from a difference in the moral direction of the will. According to this, Origen will have considered the original creation to have been only one that consisted of beings altogether alike, but only numerically distinct, and all peculiarity to have been the consequence of alienation from God. This was, to say

[1] Quis dives salvetur? c. 21.

the truth, a very limited representation of the creation, in relation to the infinite Being of God; but, in contrast to Gnosticism and to the Platonism by which Origen is usually directed, the predominance of the Christian point of view in his mind (although this was conceived by him in a one-sided way) is here shown in a characteristic manner, because he opposes the moral view, as the highest, and as that which shall determine everything, to the scheme of a natural necessity or fate.

It may, at the same time, be the case that Origen in later days retracted this notion, as he did many other crude ideas, which he had brought forward in that work of speculative doctrine. He says, nevertheless, in a passage of later date [1], that the Son of God is the general reflection of the glory of God, but that in part, the beams of this general reflection spread themselves over the rest of the reasonable creation; for no created being can contain the whole of the glory of God, and the inference to which this would seem to lead is, that what is One in the Logos, in the rest of the spiritual world develops itself into a variety of individual properties, of which every one reflects and represents the glory of God in some mode peculiar to itself, and thus the collected totality of these individualities, which mutually supply the deficiency of each other, would correspond to the collected revelation of the glory of God in the Logos. That would certainly be a just conclusion, if Origen had unravelled to himself with a clear consciousness the full meaning of the thought, which he expressed; but one is led to inquire whether this was the case. He appears, in a passage of the same Commentary of St. John, from which the first passage was quoted, to determine it as the final aim of all this development, that all reasonable beings, in attaining to God through the Logos, might have only one employment, [Thätigkeit, activity] namely, the employment of the contemplation [Anschauung, perception or intuition] of God; and that being fashioned through the knowledge of the Father, might thus become perfectly, that which the Son is, as now none but the Son hath known the Father [2]. As now according to this last

[1] T. xxxii. Joh. c. 18.

[2] T. i. Joh. c. 16. Also the passage in Matt. 207. "Then will the righteous no longer shine after a different manner, as in the beginning, but all will shine as one sun in the kingdom of their Father."—Matt. xiii. 43. But still this passage of Origen may be understood to apply only to an equality of moral condition and blessedness.

doctrine of Origen, by means of this last completion [1], everything will return again to its original condition, it appears also to follow as a consequence that according to this same doctrine such an equality and unity also *originally* existed.

Origen still further concluded that God alone is good by his very nature; but on the contrary, that all created beings are, and remain good, only by means of their communion with the original source of all good, the Logos. As soon as ever the desire exists in any being gifted with reason, of being anything for itself, there evil is sure to exist. "The good, which has become so," says Origen [2], "cannot be like that which is good by its nature; this however will never be wanting to him, who receives in himself for his own preservation the bread of life, as it is called. But wherever it is wanting to any one, it arises from his own fault; because he has neglected partaking of the living bread and the true drink, by which his wings being nourished and moistened will grow [3]." Evil is the only thing which has the foundation of its being in itself, and not in God, and which is therefore founded in no being, but is nothing else than an estrangement from the true Being, and has only a subjective and no objective existence at all, and is in itself Nothing [4]. Therefore he says: "The proposition of the Gnostic, that Satan is no creature of God [5], has some truth for its foundation, namely this, that Satan in respect to his nature is a creature of God, but not as Satan [6]."

When the will of the Spirits, who were blessed in a Divine

[1] The ἀποκαταστασις.

[2] c. Cels. vi. 44. [p. 305. Ed. Spencer. The two expressions are, το οὐσιωδως ἀγαθον, and ἀγαθον το κατα συμβεβηκος ἀγαθον και εξ ἐπιγεννηματος ἀγαθον. The "this," in the text refers to this last; the adventitious good. H. J. R.]

[3] An allusion to the Platonic myth, of the wings of the soul in the Phædrus. [We must observe that Origen himself continues the sentence by alluding to the wings of the eagle, mentioned by Solomon, Prov. xxiii. 5. which Origen rather alters. But see Plat. Phæd. § 56. H. J. R.]

[4] Origen gave a more ethical meaning to the metaphysical Platonic idea of the μη ὀν (according to which [namely, the Platonic notion] if we make the idea clear to our own minds, evil is necessary as the limit to the development of life, and therefore the idea of evil according to its moral import is really superseded). With him [*i. e.* Origen] the μη ὀν is here rather a privative than a negative. See t. ii. Joh. § 7. οἱ μετεχοντες του ὀντος, μετεχουσι δε οἱ ἁγιοι, εὐλογως ἀν ὀντες χρηματιζοιεν· οἱ δε ἀποστραφεντες την του ὀντος μετοχην, τῳ ἐστερησθαι του ὀντος, γεγονασιν οὐκ ὀντες.

[5] See above in the account of the Gnostics.

[6] In Joh. t. ii. c. 7.

life, estranged itself from God, the original unity became dissolved, there arose a Disharmony, which needed now again to be brought to unity by means of a process of purification and improvement. The soul of the world is nothing else than the power and wisdom of God, who knows how to bind up these great moral differences in one living whole; and which, subjecting all these dissonances to a higher law, penetrates and vivifies the whole [1]. We see before us only a fragment of the great course, which the world will run, which embraces all moral differences with all the consequences that develope themselves from them, until their entire removal; and hence our imperfect *Theodicea* [2].

It follows necessarily from the doctrines of Origen, that even human souls were originally altogether of a similar frame with all higher Spirits, and that all differences between the former and the latter, and between individuals of the former, proceeded only from differences of the moral disposition of the will of all individuals, and that consequently all souls are fallen heavenly beings. The whole temporal conscience moving itself between opposites, the understanding, directed to what is finite, proceeded only out of estrangement from that unity of the Divine life, the life of immediate intuition, and it is the destiny of the soul that it should, being purified, again raise itself up to that life, in the pure immediate intuition of God; or that, just as through the cooling of that heavenly fire, the life of spirit degenerated into the life of the soul, so also the soul should again be elevated to the rank of spirit [3].

Origen set his theory of the pre-existence of souls in opposition to Creatianism, which supposed individual souls to arise from the immediate act of creation on the part of God; for this theory appeared to him irreconcileable with the love and justice of God, which maintains itself equally towards all his creatures; and also in opposition to the Traducianism of Tertullian, for this theory appeared to him too sensuous. Thus, as he in order to be able

[1] Π. ἀρχ. l. ii. c. i.

[2] Homil. iv. in Jer. § 1. [Theodicea is perhaps a new word in English, although known as the name of the essay of Leibnitz. H. J. R.]

[3] Παρα την ἀποπτωσιν και την ψυξιν την ἀπο του ζῃν τῳ πνευματι γεγονεν ἡ νυν γενομενη ψυχη· νους πως οὐν γεγονε ψυχη, και ψυχη κατορθωθεισα γινεται νους. Lib. ii. c. 8. περι ἀρχων. Compare the similar view entertained by the Gnostics, for which see the former part of this volume.

to maintain his theory of a creation which preceded this temporal world, without prejudice to the Church-doctrine, appealed to the circumstance that the Church-doctrine defined nothing concerning this point; so also did he appeal to the same circumstance, in regard to his own peculiar speculative theory of the origin of souls.

In the doctrine, however, of a corruption and guilt that cleaved to human nature from the beginning, he might, exactly as the North-African Church-teachers expressed themselves,—he might speak of a mystery of birth [1], according to which every one who comes into the world needs purification, and he might quote in favour of this view the passages of the Bible, which were quoted by others in favour of the doctrine of original sin [Erbsünde—inherited iniquity—original, or birth-sin]. But he felt himself obliged to deduce this condition of human nature from another source; namely, from the proper guilt of every individual fallen heavenly Spirit, contracted in a former state of existence: and hence, according to the theory of Origen, this corruption could not be alike in all, but its degree would depend on the degree of the former guiltiness. Although he accounted Adam as an historical person, yet he could be nothing else in his view, than the first incarnate soul that sunk down from the heavenly state of existence: he must have looked upon the history of paradise, like the Gnostics, as being symbolical, so that it [paradise] was to him the symbol of a higher spiritual world, and Adam was to him at the same time, the type [image, or form] of all mankind, of all fallen souls [2].

Origen in his work περι ἀρχων, agreeing also here with the Platonists, and many Gnostics, had considered [3] the doctrine, that the fallen souls might, through entire decomposition, sink into the bodies of animals, as at least something which was not to be exactly rejected. But as his system was essentially distinguished from the Neoplatonic by the predominance of the Christian, morally-teleological point of view; so this point of view, always becoming more and more fully formed, necessarily would lead *to the follow-*

[1] μυστηριον της γενεσεως.

[2] c. Cels. l. iv. § 40. οὐχ οὑτως περι ἑνος τινος, ὡς περι ὁλου του γενους ταυτα φασκοντος του θειου λογου. It is not inconsistent with this, that Origen should speak of Adam, quite *in accordance with the Church view*, as in t. i. Joh. § 22. t. xiii. § 34; he might place his own sense upon this; especially in *Homilies*, where Gnosis was out of place. H. 14. in Jerem.

[3] See the Greek Fragment. π. ἀρχων, lib. i. Origen. Ed. de la Rue, t. i. p. 76.

ing result; namely, at last entirely to throw away [1] the doctrine of *such* an incorporation of souls, as inconsistent with the final purpose of the purification, which pre-supposes a continuity of consciousness. According to the same point of view, he opposed his theory of the process of purification of souls, which was to continue to the last limit of the restoration, to the doctrine of a *cycle* in the wanderings of the soul.

Origen, like the Gnostics, supposed three principles [2] in human nature in its fallen state, the σαρκικον, the ψυχικον, and the πνευματικον, and also three different conditions of human nature, corresponding to these principles. But he separated himself from them in an essential point; namely, that as he recognised all human souls as similar, he accordingly supposed the same principles in every one of them, and that he therefore considered their different conditions to proceed, not from an original difference of nature in them, but from the predominance of one or other of those [three] principles in them, dependent on the different directions of their will. The πνευμα is that portion of man's nature properly called the Divine, the power of the higher inward intuition of that which is Divine, which originally formed the essential nature of the Spirit, and is synonymous with νους; this πνευμα can have no connexion with evil, and nothing evil can proceed from it [3]. But by the predominance of sensuousness, and of the lower powers of the soul, which conduce to selfishness, the activity of this πνευμα becomes depressed. Those, in whom, on the contrary, this highest principle of human nature is the predominant and animating one, are the πνευματικοι [4]. He by no means, as follows immediately from his general ideas on the relation of human nature to God, ascribed an independent self-existence to this principle of human nature; but he considered it as the organ destined to receive in itself the operations of the θειον πνευμα [5]. The *Psychici* are, in the view of Origen, the more

[1] See c. Cels. iii. c. 75; ii. 16. in Jerem. where he speaks of a Metempsychosis in a parabolic sense, and guards himself carefully against any misunderstanding, which could lead to taking this literally.

[2] [I have used the word "*principle*" throughout this passage, as *Princip* is the word in the original. Perhaps, to an English reader the word "element" would better convey the idea intended. H. J. R.]

[3] T. xxxii. Joh. c. 11. ἀνεπιδεκτον των χειρονων το πνευμα.

[4] Πνευμα το θειοτερον, οὐ κατα μετοχην ἐπικρατουσαν χρηματιζει ὁ πνευματικος. In Joh. t. ii. c. 15.

[5] Origen Comment. in Matt. Ed. Huet. p. 306.

refined egotists, the men-of-understanding[1], among whom a more refined selfishness prevails, which does not manifest itself in open outbreaks of sinful conduct and passions; who are, as he expresses himself, neither hot nor cold; and he throws out the inquiry, whether the σαρκικος cannot attain[2] more easily than the ψυχικος to a consciousness of the misery of sin, and hence to a true conversion; an enquiry which may be changed into that other, whether the publicans often might not be more easily converted than the Pharisees. With this is connected the idea of Origen, that, just as a skilful physician sometimes calls forth the sources of disease, which are lying hid in the body, and produces an artificial evil, in order that this source of disease which threatens to destroy the whole fabric may by this means be driven forth out of the body; so also God places men in such a condition, that the evil hidden within them is called forth into open activity, in order that they may thereby be led to a consciousness of their moral guilt and its destructive consequences; and then may be able to be healed more easily and more completely[3]. And in this way he explained the Scriptural phrase "God hardened the heart," and others similar to it.

It is clear from the remarks we have made above on the Anthropology of the Church teachers of this period, that the need of redemption for human nature was generally recognised in their system, and thus the *Doctrine of the Redeemer*, which forms the peculiar essence of Christianity found in it [their system, or anthropology] a point on which it would naturally engraft itself. As far as the development of *this doctrine* is concerned, its essential import, the idea of a God-man, was deeply implanted in the Christian conscience; but the different portions of which it consists, which belong to the perfect development of the full contents of this idea, could not come forward at once and immediately with clearness in the Christian conscience. It was only through the opposition called forth in controversy that the full impression of what was comprehended in this idea, could be obtained in definite conceptions; namely, the clear and definite consciousness of that, which we have to conceive in the assumption of human

[1] [Verstandes-menschen; where *Verstand* is opposed to Vernunft. H. J. R.]

[2] Περι ἀρχων, l. iii. c. 4.

[3] See de Orat. c. 29; and the fragment of the Commentary on Exod. c. 10. 27; in the 26th chapter of the φιλοκαλια, and in the 2nd Part [Band] of de la Rue's Edition, p. 3.

nature on the part of the Divine Logos. In the development of this doctrine, *realistic Christian views* would be peculiarly called forth by the opposition to all Gnostic attempts to set aside, or to mutilate the one side of [the doctrine of] the God-man, that is the human part of it, to do away with the human nature of Christ, or, at least either more or less to deprive it of the proper attributes of humanity,—and especially by the opposition to *Docetism*. The consciousness of the objective reality of the human nature of Christ, and his appearance in the flesh, the idea of the form of a servant taken upon him by Christ, was declared during this opposition [to Gnosticism] strongly and clearly. Thus, Ignatius of Antioch can find no words sufficiently strong in his opinion, to express the confidence of the Christian persuasion on this point, and he says in an original manner of the Docetæ, that they who would make Christ only an apparition, were themselves only like apparitions [1]. "How comes it that thou makest Christ half a lie?" says Tertullian [2] to a Docetist: "he was wholly truth!" And the same writer in another place [3], "It is offensive to you to think that the child is taken care of in swaddling clothes and caressed! Dost thou despise this reverence shown to nature? and how wert thou born thyself? . . . . . Christ, at least, loved man born under these conditions [and charged with these infirmities] . . . . . For his sake he came down, for his sake he let himself down to every humiliation, even unto death . . . . . he loved, together with man, both his birth and his flesh." In opposition to Docetism, the idea of the form of a servant, taken upon him by Christ, as it peculiarly suited this primitive Christian spirit [4], which opposed itself to heathenism with all its rival show of beauty, was worked up so as to present a contrast between the hidden Divine glory of Christ, and the wretchedness of his outward form and appearance. Tertullian says [5], "This was the very thing which makes the rest about him wonderful; for they said, 'Whence came this man to such wisdom

[1] *αὐτοι το δοκειν ὀντες ἀσωματοι και δαιμονικοι.*

[2] De Carne Christi, c. 5.

[3] L. c. c. 14. [c. 4. Ed. Rigalt. In the passage as it is found at length in Tertullian, the infirmities attendant on the birth and infancy of a child are enumerated and mentioned, as things which Marcion looked upon with horror or contempt; and the argument appears to be, "though you consider these things derogatory to the dignity of man's nature, our Saviour did not; he loved the race of man, though encompassed with all these weaknesses," &c. In the portion selected by Neander, this, perhaps, is not sufficiently apparent. H. J. R.]

[4] See Part II.

[5] De Carne Christi, c. 9.

and such works?' That is the outcry of those who despised also his form [1]."

In Clement of Alexandria, pure Christianity was on this point disturbed by intermixture with Neo-Platonic ideas. The Neo-Platonic philosopher wished to have a Christ, freed from the wants and imperfections of sense, and utterly unaffected by it, and this Christ was to represent to him the Ideal of ἀπαθεια; and therefore he must not be subjected to hunger and thirst, to the sensations of pain, to pleasure or displeasure. But in this case, how could the form of the *historical* Christ of Scripture be maintained? The forced explanation was to be used, that Christ, although not subject to those affections by his nature, had subjected himself to them voluntarily (κατ' οἰκονομιαν) with a peculiar view to the salvation of man [2]. Nevertheless, Clement in a remarkable manner with this view, which does not accept the servant's-form of Christ in its full extent, united the other view, which carried it to the extreme. But even this suited his philosophical ideas; "the unsightliness and formlessness of Christ's appearance ought to teach men to look upwards towards the invisible, incorporeal and formless nature of God [3]."

But while from the beginning, the true and real humanity of Christ was maintained; yet at first, the distinction between the different parts which belong to the completeness of man's nature, was either not brought forward at all, or only brought forward in individual cases, and even then with only a dim consciousness about them. Under the notion of an assumption of man's nature nothing was thought of but the assumption of a human body, as in Irenæus we find this only clearly spoken of. Justin, on the formation of whose mind the Platonic philosophy had some influence, appears to have formed to himself the following peculiar chain of ideas: Christ, as the God-man, consists of three parts, like every other man—of the body, the animal soul (the inferior principle of life), and the thinking reason; only with this difference, that the place of the fallible human reason, which is only a beam of the Divine reason, of the λογος [4], is supplied [5] in him by

[1] Nec humanæ honestatis corpus fuit, nedum cœlestis claritatis.

[2] Clemens, Strom. vi. 649-50. [Pott. 775. Sylb. 276. Klotz iii. 140.]

[3] Strom. iii. 470. ὁ Χριστος ἐν σαρκι ἀηδης διεληλυθως και ἀμορφος, εἰς το ἀειδες και ἀσωματον της θειας αἰτιας ἀποβλεπειν ἡμας διδασκει. [Pott. 559. Sylb. 202. Klotz ii. 271.]

[4] The σπερμα λογικον, the λογος σπερματικος, the λογος κατα μερος.

[5] Apol. II. § 10. And yet one might suspect that the words και σωμα και λογον

the general Divine reason the λογος itself [1]; and hence in Christianity alone could the universal revelation of religious truth be given, without being obscured by any one-sidedness [2].

Tertullian was the first who definitely and clearly proclaimed the doctrine of a proper human soul in Christ, being led to this by his view of the relation of the soul to the body in general, and by the direction taken by his controversy about the person of Christ in particular. He did not assume, like others, that there are the *three* above-mentioned parts in human nature, he only acknowledged two parts in it; he maintained that we must not consider a mere animal soul distinct from the rational soul in man to be the animating principle of the body, but that in all living beings the animating principle [*literally*, being] is one only, but in the case of man's nature that this is furnished with higher powers, and that the thinking soul itself is also the animating [soul] of the human body [3]. When Tertullian acknowledged only *one soul* as the means of communication between the Divine Logos and the body in Christ, he must necessarily have thought here of a proper reasonable human soul. And further, he was in controversy with a Valentinian sect, which taught that Christ, instead of investing his soul with a gross material body, had so modified the ψυχη, that it might become visible to the senses of man [*literally*, to the sensuous man] like a body. Against this sect he maintains, that we must necessarily, in the person of Christ, as in the case of every other man, distinguish between soul and body, and the attributes of each, and that he [*i.e.* Christ], in order to redeem man, must place a proper human soul in union with himself, and indeed so much the more, inasmuch as the soul composes the proper nature of man [4].

Origen, however, had greater influence than Tertullian on the development and the settlement of this doctrine in the doctrinal system of the Church. His struggles to attain an inward living intuition into the doctrines of the faith, his peculiar philosophical education, and his spirit that longed after a systematic connection of ideas, led him to an erudite and scientific develop-

και ψυχην were interpolated by a later hand, with the intention of making Justin orthodox on this point, because this more precise determination on the matter does not occur any where else in Justin, and does not seem altogether in its place here. But, to say the truth, the first reason cannot be a very striking proof; nor indeed, the second either, in the case of a writer, whose works are like those of Justin.

[1] λογικον το ὁλον.

[2] Justin is the predecessor of Apollinaris.

[3] De anima, c. 12.

[4] De carne Christi, c. 11. et seq.

ment of this doctrine. The communion of believers with Christ afforded him an analogy for the union of the Divine Logos with the human nature in Christ. From the derived Divine life of believers, which is to appropriate to itself and penetrate by degrees more and more their whole human nature, even to the completion [of this process] at the general restoration, from this Origen reverted to the original source of this Divine propagation of life in man's nature, which, in his view, was Christ as the God-man. If, as St. Paul says, believers become one spirit with the Lord; this has happened [according to the view of Origen] in a far higher manner with *that* soul, which the Logos has received into an indissoluble union with himself. According to the theory of Origen, it is the original destination of the soul, to be wholly spirit (*νους*), and to find its life only in communion with the Logos. That which happened with other souls only in the highest concerns of the inward life, namely, that they enter wholly into communion with the Logos, and wholly forget themselves in the intuition of the Divine, this had become with that soul something constant and uninterrupted, so that its whole life had passed into the communion with the Logos, and it had become itself entirely made Divine [1].

As Origen, still further, in every man distinguished the *πνευμα* from the *ψυχη* in the stricter sense of the word; so also he applied this distinction to the human nature of Christ. Christ [in his view] represents the Ideal of human nature *in the very circumstance*, that all activity, all conduct, and all suffering in him proceeded from, and was surrounded in, that supreme [source], which was in his whole human nature the animating principle. "As the holy man," says Origen, "lives in the *πνευμα*, as that from which his whole life, every action, every prayer, and the praise of God proceeds, thus he does all which he does, in the Spirit; yea, when he suffers, he suffers also in the Spirit. If this be so in the case with the holy man, how much more must we affirm this of Jesus, the fore-runner of all holy men, with whom, when he took upon him the whole of man's nature, the *πνευμα* set all the rest of his human qualities into movement [2]."

[1] *ου μονον κοινωνιαι αλλ' ενωσις και ανακρασις, της εκεινου θεοτητος κεκοινωνηκεναι, εις Θεον μεταβεβηκεναι.*

[2] T. 32. Joh. c. xi. This is a just doctrinal remark, but it is one which Origen, with whom this often happens, when he inserts his own doctrinal distinctions of ideas

But as we observed, it was a chief point in the system of Origen, that all in the world of Spirits must be limited and subjected to conditions dependent on the differences of the moral direction of the will. From this general law of the order of the world he was able to allow of no exception in the case of this supreme dignity, to which a soul attained. That soul, through the faithful direction of its will towards the Divine Logos, and by affection to him, through which it had always remained united with him, had deserved that it should after such a manner become altogether One with him[1]. Thus all here corresponds with the destination conformable to his nature; the soul, which the Logos received into personal union with himself, has obtained the highest destination attainable by any Spirit, and it is therefore become the *instrument*, through which the communication of Divine Life by inward communion with the Logos, shall extend itself also to all other souls. And again it suits the nature of the soul, that it should unite itself with a body, and become the intermediate connecting principle between this and the Logos.

As Origen supposed a peculiar connection to exist between every soul, and the body which serves it as an instrument—(considering that every soul does receive such a body, which corresponds to its condition as derived from a former state, either an instrument which will willingly lend itself to spiritual activity; or such an one, as will specially impede and oppose it)—thus he applied this principle to the relation between *that* soul and the body which was bestowed upon it as an instrument. The noblest soul was to appear in the noblest body, which was the purest and most free instrument of the Spirit. But this dignity of the body of Christ's was, like the glory of the Logos at his appearance here, a hidden glory. Here also the earthly life of Christ is an image of the spiritual activity of the Logos. As the Logos (see above) reveals himself in different ways to men, according to their different capabilities; thus Christ appeared to the greatest num-

into Scripture, wishes to support by a passage to which it is altogether foreign, if we look at the meaning of the words: *viz.* Joh. xiii. 21. ἐταραχθη τῳ πνευματι.

[1] περι ἀρχων, L. ii. c. 6. c. Cels.; L. ii. c. 9. and c. 23; L. iii. c. 41. In Joh. t. i. 33; t. xix. 5.; where he says altogether after a Platonic fashion, ἡ ψυχη του Ἰησου ἐμπολιτευομενη τῳ ὁλῳ κοσμῳ ἐκεινῳ—the κοσμος νοητος, των ἰδεων being synonymous with νους, or the λογος itself—και παντα αὐτον ἐμπεριερχομενη και χειραγωγουσα ἐπ' αὐτον τους μαθητευομενους. In Matth. 344. 423. H. 15. in Jerem. f. 147.

ber in the unattractive form of a servant, but to those who had eyes to perceive it, he showed himself in an ennobled form. Thus Origen was able to unite with his theory of the correspondence between the soul and body of Christ, even the common representation of the unattractiveness of the outward appearance of Christ, in fact, to reconcile Ps. xliii. 2. [xlv. 2?] and Isaiah liii. 3; the passage on which that common representation was founded. This glory of the body of Christ, which was usually hidden here below, and only shone forth on particular occasions to those who were worthy of it, was to come forth fully after his glorification, the body was then to be freed from the imperfections of sense, and be ennobled into an etherial nature, more analogous to the spirit. This change would be entirely conformable to the nature of matter, which in its own nature is wholly indefinite, and capable of receiving different forms and qualities [1].

By means of Origen, who wrought out this doctrine so systematically, the idea of a proper reasonable soul in Christ received a new dogmatical importance. This point, which up to this time had been altogether untouched in the controversy with the Patripassians, was now for the first time expressly brought forward in the Synod held against Beryllus of Bostra, A.D. 244; and the doctrine of a reasonable human soul in Christ settled as a doctrine of the Church. But as Origen was the first who so completely carried out the theory of this distinction, as he found in the spiritual communion of believers with the Redeemer an analogy for the union of that soul with the Logos in Christ, so he drew upon himself from those, who maintained the old mode of conceiving the matter, the reproach that he, like many Gnostics, made a distinction between a higher and a lower Christ, or between a *Jesus* and a *Christ;* or that he made Jesus to be a mere man, who only differed from other holy men by a higher degree of communion with the Logos, that is, differed from them only in degree [2]. Thus, we perceive also here the germ of a difference, which entered into the following period of the Church.

As far as relates to *the work of redemption* itself, we find already existing in this period all the fundamental elements of

[1] See c. Cels. i. 32; iv. 15; vi. 75. et seq.; ii. 23; iii. 42. On the Ubiquity of the glorified body of Christ, see in Matt. iv. Ed. de la Rue, p. 887.

[2] See many of the passages cited and referred to, and the Apology of Pamphilus for Origen, t. iv. p. 35.

the development of this doctrine as held in the Church; only, however, not so precisely defined and not so sharply separated. For the most part the Church-teachers spoke, without striving after any very sharp distinction of doctrinal conceptions, out of the fulness of the Christian feeling, and the Christian intuition, which had accrued to them from the lively appropriation of the doctrines of the Bible. The Doctrine of Redemption has two sides, a *negative* and a *positive* side, in relation to the condition from which mankind was set free, and in relation to the new condition into which it is to be placed—the assumption of man's nature with all the consequences of sin, which had hitherto prevailed in it, and with the guilt which burdened it [thus making] a communion with sinful humanity, weighed down with a consciousness of its own guilt—and the perfection of an ideal holiness [*literally*, of the Ideal of holiness], in this human nature, hitherto under the dominion of sin, [thus effecting] a communication of a Divine life to this nature and ennobling it. Both these important points, although at first they were not so sharply separated from each other, were to be especially maintained against Docetism and similar Gnostic views, through which Christ was more or less withdrawn from communion with the real and true nature of man. Irenæus brings forward especially the latter point of view with great strength, although the first is not wholly wanting [in him]. We will now present a connected view of his ideas on this subject[1]: "Only the Word of the Father could reveal the Father to us, and we could not learn from him unless the Teacher himself had appeared to us. Man must accustom himself to receive God into himself, God is to accustom himself to dwell in human nature. The Mediator between the two must restore the communication between them, by means of his affinity to both, and he must pass through every age of life, in order to sanctify every age (*i. e.* human nature according to all its several degrees of development) [by means of] the perfect likeness of God, which is perfect holiness[2]. In an human nature, which was that very

[1] [*Literally*, we will represent his ideas according to their inward connection. H. J. R.]

[2] ὁμοιωσις του Θεου according to the views [*literally*, the connection of ideas] of this Father is different from the εἰκων του Θεου, which latter expression denotes only the *frame-work* [Anlage] for a likeness to God, which has its foundation in the reason and in the free-will. [N.B. In the text I have supplied the words '[by means of]' which

nature that was bound captive by sin, he condemned sin, and banished it, as now being condemned, out of human nature, Rom. viii. 3. but he required of man to become like him. Men were the prisoners of evil, and of Satan, Christ gave himself up for the redemption of the prisoners. Evil reigned over us, who belonged to God, God redeemed us not with might, but in a manner consistent with justice, as he redeemed those who were his [1]. If he had not, as man, conquered the adversary of man, the enemy would not have been conquered in a right manner; and on the other side, if he had not, as God, given this salvation, then we should not have it in a secure manner. And if man had not been united with God, then he could not have participated in an incorruptible life [2]. Through the obedience of one man, must many be made righteous, and obtain salvation, for eternal life is the fruit of righteousness. What that means, that man is created after the image of God, was hitherto not revealed [3], for the Logos was still invisible; and therefore, man easily lost even the likeness to God. But when the Logos became man, he sealed both. He revealed truly the image, while himself was that which his image was, and he represented in a secure manner the likeness of man to God, while he made man like the invisible God [4]." The other side is brought forward by Justin Martyr, when he says [5],

seem to be necessary, from Irenæus, lib. ii. c. 22. Ed. Massuet. (39, in other editions) which appears to me the passage referred to here. H. J. R.]

[1] This thought often occurs in the Church-teachers [the Fathers?] under different forms. The just notion, which is the foundation of it, is this, that redemption is no act of caprice; but a method consonant to law and order, and answering the conditions required by the moral order of the world, a method, by which God freed the beings, who belonged to him by their original nature, from the dominion and consequences of evil, and led them back to himself.

[2] The communication of a Divine Life to man through Christ, the ἑνωσις προς ἀφθαρσιαν.

[3] Two ideas are here to be taken together, which were already in existence in Philo, that man, as the image of God, had been created after the image of the Logos, and that God had already had for his aim as the original form of human nature, the Ideal of the whole nature of man, represented in the person of the God-man. Limus ille jam tum imaginem induens Christi futuri in carne, non tantum Dei opus, sed et pignus filii, qui homo futurus *certior et verior*. Tertull. de carne Christi, c. 6. adv. Praxeam, c. 12.

[4] See Iren. lib. iii. c. 20. Massuet. (al. 22.) lib. iii. 18. (20.) 31; v. 16. [I have not been able to verify and compare all these quotations, and I think there is some error in the references. H. J. R.]

[5] Dial. c. Tryph. Jud. c. 30. p. 322. Ed. Col.

"The law pronounced the curse upon all men, because no man can fulfil it in its whole extent, Deut. xxvii. 26; Christ freed us from this curse, by bearing it for us." The author of the *Letter to Diognetus* joins the two together: "God, the Lord and Creator of the universe, is not only full of love to man, but also full of long-suffering. He was, and *always* is such a one, and always will be such a one, the benevolent, the angerless and the true, the only good! He made a great and inexpressible resolution, which he communicated only to his Son. As long as he kept this resolution, as a secret one, to himself, so long he appeared to have no care for us. During the time past, he suffered us to follow our own lusts, as we chose, not as if in general he had any pleasure in our sins, but in order that we, after we had proved ourselves during that time through our own works unworthy of life, might now become worthy through the grace of God, and in order that we, after we had revealed our own inability to enter into the kingdom of God, might become capable of that through the power of God. But when the measure of our sins had become full, and it had been fully revealed, that punishment and death were before us as our recompense, he hated us not, but he proved his long-suffering. He himself took our sins upon him, he himself gave his own Son as the ransom-price for us, the Holy one for sins, for what else could our sins discover, but his righteousness?"

Now Origen, according to the exposition of his views, given above, considered that the highest object of the appearance and operations of Christ on earth, was the following: *to set forth* the Divine operation of the Logos, limited neither by time nor space, for the healing and purification of the fallen beings, in order that sensuous men, who were unable to lift themselves up to the intuitive perception of the everlasting spiritual operation of the Logos, might be able to raise themselves to [the consideration of his] spiritual nature from his appearance in the flesh[1]; but according to his theory, the individual actions of Christ, besides this object of setting forth [these truths] have also, considered in themselves, a special and salutary operation. And thus, also, about the relation of the passion of Christ to sin, he might express that, which was acknowledged in the common consciousness

[1] [*Literally*, 'from the sensuous appearance to the spiritual Being,' von der sinnlichen Erscheinung zum geistigen Wesen. This appears ambiguous. I have therefore supplied what is requisite in English. H. J. R.]

of Christians, although he might point it out in a manner peculiar to himself.

Thus, he says[1], "He took upon himself our transgressions, and bore our diseases, the transgressions of the soul, and the diseases of the inner man; on account of which transgressions and diseases which he bore away from us, he said his soul was troubled and disturbed;" and in another place he says[2], "This man, the purest among all creatures, died for mankind; he, who took our sins and diseases upon himself, as he was able to take upon himself and abolish the sins of the whole world. His passion was the means of purification for the whole world, which would have gone to destruction if he had not died for it."

As far as relates to the particular opinion of Origen, he thought, that according to secret causes in the nature of things, the suffering of a holy Being for the guilty had a sort of magic power, in crippling the power of evil spirits, and freeing the former [the guilty] from the evils that impended over them, and he appealed to the belief existing even among the heathen, that innocent individuals by a voluntary sacrifice of themselves had saved nations and cities from heavy calamities[3].

As the whole nature of Christian life depends upon a living appropriation of the redemption through Christ, as all depends upon this, *viz.* that Christ should through faith become in man all in all, a life-giving and a forming principle for his whole nature; as therefore in Holy Scripture, the whole life of the Christian is set forth as a fruit of faith, a superstructure raised upon the foundation of faith in Christ, as the whole of practical Christianity is nothing else than faith working by love, so every thing required for the genuine conception of practical Christianity, both in theory and in Life, depended on this circumstance, that the right relation of Life to the appropriation of the work of redemption in faith should be set forth in a clear manner. It had, for the essential nature of Christian doctrines, and for the true power of Christian morals, and thereby, at least in its consequences, for the Christian life itself, the most prejudicial con-

[1] In Joh. tom. ii. c. 21. [2] Joh. tom. 28. c. 14.

[3] See Origen, in Joh. t. vi. c. 34; t. 28. c. 14. Origen was certainly right in one respect; that is, instead of deducing for himself a system of religious truth *à priori* from abstract conceptions, he inquired after the voice of the universal religious conscience of man, and quoted this as a witness for the Christian doctrine, although he did not understand this testimony rightly in one of its bearings [*literally*, on one side].

sequences, when this intimate connection between the objective and subjective in Christianity was not rightly brought forward. It is therefore of great consequence, that, while we observe, how that intimate connection was bestowed upon the original condition of the Christian conscience, we should also recognise the seed of the errors of later times, adhering to this connection, and troubling this conscience. The whole mode of conception of the doctrine of redemption in this period, pledges for the recognition of this intimate connection. Men recognised Christ as him who had communicated an inward Divine Life[1] to human nature; through faith in Christ this Divine Life was to be received by man into himself, and to be appropriated to himself, and his whole nature to be constantly more penetrated by it.—(It is only unfortunate, that men bound this belief up too much with the outward things, which Christ, in consideration of the necessities of the mixed nature[2] of man, had appointed as tokens to represent the Invisible and the Divine, which faith apprehends, and it is unfortunate also that men did not sufficiently separate from each other the operations of faith, and of those outward things.)—Men acknowledged Christ as the destroyer of the kingdom of Satan, and they assigned all evil to this kingdom, and through communion with Christ, by means of faith every one also was to appropriate to himself the victory of Christ over the kingdom of Satan; the Christian must therefore (see above), from a *miles Satanæ*, become a *miles Christi*. The idea, also, of the general calling of all Christians to a priesthood, has its root here.

We might here bring forward separate living [contemporary] witnesses to the original Christian conviction and consciousness of the intimate connection between redemption and sanctification, Faith and Life. A man, of whom it cannot be said, that he distinguished himself by any peculiar power of mind in the elaboration of Christian doctrine, *viz.* Clement, the bishop of Rome, after he had strongly expressed that no man could be justified by his own righteousness and his own works, but that all could be justified only through the grace of God and faith, says, "And what shall we do then, Brethren? Shall we

[1] The ἀφθαρσια, about which see above.

[2] [*Literally*, 'the spiritually-sensuous nature,' *i. e.* a nature consisting partly of spiritual, partly of sensuous elements. H. J. R.]

be slack in doing good, and neglect love? The Lord would in no wise suffer this to happen with us, but he induces us to endeavour to fulfil all goodness with unabating zeal, for the Creator and Lord of all delights himself in his works[1]." The author of the Epistle to Diognetus, after the beautiful passage quoted above [vol. i. p. 61], says of the redemption: "With what delight wilt thou be filled, when thou recognisest this; or how wilt thou love him, who hath first loved thee so much? But if thou lovest him, thou wilt be a follower of his goodness." Irenæus thus contrasts the free-obedience that flows from faith with the servile obedience under the Law: "The Law given to servants formed the soul through that which is outward and sensuous, by attracting it to obedience to the commandments, as it were by chains ..... but the Word, that makes free, taught a free purification of the soul, and through that of the body. After this had happened, it was necessary that the chains of slavery, to which man had become accustomed, should be taken away, and he must follow God without chains. The requirements therefore of liberty must be extended more widely[2], and obedience towards the king must become greater, that no one may turn back and appear unworthy of his liberator ..... for God hath not set us free, in order that we may run away from him, as no one, who severs himself from the source of all goodness in the Lord, can find the nourish of salvation for himself, but in order that we should love him the more; because we had obtained more ..... To follow the Saviour, is to partake of salvation; and to follow the Light, is to partake of the Light[3]."

It cannot, however, be denied that the genuine Pauline notion of faith was soon obscured. In the stead of faith, in that peculiarly Christian sense (*viz.* the living appropriation of that, which Christ has effected for human nature, as a fact of the inward Life, by means of which something altogether different results from that [Life],) men placed the notion of a mere belief-upon-authority, which could only mediately introduce a new direction of Life, but could not immediately produce it. And from this

[1] See Ep. i. ad Corinth. § 32. and 33.

[2] [That is (see the context in the original), the law of freedom must even require more of man than that of servitude, *e. g.* where the latter forbids murder, the former must prohibit even malice, &c. H. J. R.]

[3] Lib. iv. c. 13. 14. [In the last sentence Massuet reads percipere lumen, instead of participare lumen. H. J. R.]

error, the second necessarily followed, that men, instead of considering all good as the necessary revelation of the new Divine Life planted with faith, spoke of good works which were to be added to faith, and that they added to that belief-upon-authority, the doctrine of a moral law that incited man to good; both of these being more Jewish than Christian. Here, also, as well as in the history of the formation of the Church, and of Christian worship, a great source of the corruption of Christianity appears in the intermixture of the Jewish and the Christian position, and the Apostle Paul cries out to all ages, "Ye have received it in the spirit, will ye fulfil it in the flesh?"

The Gnostics, and in part, the Alexandrians had that false notion of faith before them, when they overprized Gnosis in respect to it. Marcion (see above) appears here clearly and deeply to have conceived the Pauline idea of faith, and on this side, not without reason, to have fought against the intermixture of Jewish and Christian things; we may here cite the heretic as a witness for Catholic truth.

The idea, indeed, of that Divine communion of Life with Christ, as is clear from what has been said above, was a fundamental idea of the whole Church system of doctrine; but the right point of view was thrown into the back-ground by the circumstance, that men were accustomed to annex this Divine communion of Life, not to the inward facts of faith, but to the outward things, which were meant to be for faith, only the outward tokens of that which was present in the inward Life—a confusion between the Inward and the Outward, of which we have already had occasion to speak several times.

This shows itself particularly in *the doctrine about the Church and the Sacraments.*

In the *doctrine concerning the Church*, we have nothing to add to that which we have said in the history of the formation of the Church; we have already there pointed out the origin of the confusion of the ideas and the predicates of the invisible and the visible Church, and its prejudicial practical consequences. But in regard to the *doctrine of the Sacraments*, as standing in close connection with the history of the doctrine of the Church, we have still much to add to that which we have already said in the history of the Christian worship.

The source of the interchange between the Inward and the

Outward[1] was here the same as in the case of the doctrine concerning the Church. Of that, which is the Divine matter in the Sacrament, the teachers of the Church had a lively perception from their own Christian experience; but the relation of this Divine matter to the outward token was not so clear to them, and with most of them the Spiritual and the Sensuous easily glided into each other.

At first, as far as *Baptism* is concerned, the predominant idea with most of them was this—the idea of a spiritual and sensuous communion with the whole Christ, for the salvation of the whole spiritual and sensuous nature of man. "As out of the dry wheat," says Irenæus, "neither one mass of dough, nor one mass of bread could be made without moisture, so neither could we all become One in Christ without the water, which is from heaven. And as the dry earth brings forth no fruit, if it receives no moisture; so neither could we, who are at first dry wood, ever bring forth the fruit of Life, without the rain, which sheds itself freely from heaven, *for our bodies by Baptism, but our souls through the Spirit*, have received that communion with the incorruptible Being[2]. Tertullian says, beautifully, in respect to the operation of Baptism[3], "If the soul comes to faith, and is formed again by regeneration from the water and the power from above, there she beholds, after the scales of the old corruption are removed, her whole light. She is received into the communion of the Holy Spirit, and the soul which unites itself with the Holy Spirit, is followed by the body, which is no longer the servant of the soul, but the servant of the Spirit." But even Tertullian here was unable rightly to distinguish between the Inward and the Outward. While he defends the necessity of outward Baptism against the sect of *Caians* (see Sect. II.), he ascribes to the water a supernatural sanctifying power. And yet, even in the case of Tertullian, we see the pure evangelical idea making its way through the midst of this confusion of the Inward and the Outward, and standing forth in contradiction to it—when he says,

[1] See the section relating to the Sacraments in the history of the Cultus (or worship), Section II.

[2] Iren. iii. 17. The Divine principle of Life, for soul and body in Christ, the ἑνωσις προς ἀφθαρσιαν.

[3] De Anima, c. 41. Compare the passage above cited on the corruption of human nature.

that *Faith* receives the forgiveness of sin in Baptism, and when he says, while combating against haste in Baptism, that, where a right faith is present, that faith is sure of salvation[1].

We have observed already in the history of the Christian worship [Cultus], the practically injurious consequences of that confusion between the Inward and the Outward in Baptism. While by a confusion between baptism and regeneration, regeneration was considered as a magical thing completed at once, and while a magical purification and abolition of sin was supposed to take place at Baptism, it became usual to refer the forgiveness of sins obtained through Christ, *only especially to sins committed before baptism*, instead of maintaining, as they ought to have done, that, as that which is objective in baptism retains its power during the whole life of man; so also, the subjective appropriation of it, by means of penitence and faith, must, as well as regeneration, continue to develope itself more and more through the whole life, until the Objective, and the Subjective, justification and sanctification have become wholly blended into each other (which does not happen in our life below). But according to that false conception, since it could not fail to be remarked that even in Christians the old corrupt nature preserved its power, the question would necessarily arise: Whence do we obtain forgiveness of sins committed after baptism? And the answer was: 'Since we have once for all obtained a satisfaction for the sins committed before baptism, in the merit of Christ, so in order to obtain satisfaction for those after baptism, voluntary penances [exercises of repentance], and good works must be added[2].' This point of view is clearly presented to us in the following words of Cyprian[3], "When the Lord came and healed the wounds

[1] Fides integra secura de salute.

[2] See Tertullian's Book de Pœnitentia. This writer introduced the expression, *satisfactio*, into the doctrine of repentance from his system of jurisprudence; but we must not on that account ascribe so great an influence in the formation of the Church doctrinal notions on this point, to his mode of representing the doctrine derived from his jurisprudence—nor indeed, generally ought we [to ascribe so great influence] to the idea of any individual—for when once the πρωτον ψευδος was in existence, all the consequences contained in it would necessarily, of their own accord, develope themselves; and more especially, as these consequences find so many points in human nature, on which to attach themselves.

[3] De Opere et Eleemosynis. [This passage is found, though not quite continuously, in the first two pages of the Treatise. To judge, however, quite accurately of the force of this passage we must compare it with the context. H. J. R.]

of Adam, he gave to the convalescent a law, and he commanded him to sin no more, lest something worse should befal him. By the condition of innocence being prescribed to us, we were limited to a narrow range; and the infirmity of human weakness knew not what it should do, if the grace of God had not come again to its assistance, and showing to it the works of mercy, had opened to it a way for the preservation of its health, so that we might hereafter cleanse ourselves by alms from all the uncleanness that afterwards cleaved to us. Since the forgiveness of sins has once been bestowed in baptism; so also, by the constant performance of good, which is like the renovation of baptism, man obtains anew for himself the Divine forgiveness."

With regard *to the doctrine of the Lord's Supper*, upon the whole, the same remark may be made, as those made above upon the doctrine of Baptism, only with the difference, that here, in reference to the relation between the thing represented and the outward sign, three different gradations may be observed in the representations made of it. The most predominant representation was that, which we find as early as the time of Ignatius of Antioch, as well as in Justin M., and in Irenæus; namely, that of a supernatural penetration of the bread and wine, by the body and blood of Christ, in virtue of which, those who partook of the Lord's Supper were penetrated by the Divine principle-of-life of Christ in their whole nature, so that their body even then, became thereby even now, a partaker of the power of an imperishable life, and hence was prepared for the resurrection[1]. In the North-African Church, on the contrary, in Tertullian and Cyprian we find no representation at all implying such a penetration. Bread and wine are represented rather as the symbols of the body and blood of Christ, but not as symbols without efficacy; a spiritual communion with Christ in the holy Supper of the Lord is brought forward, and at the same time a certain sanctifying association with the body of Christ is also supposed[2]. The practice also of the North-African Church proves that the belief in a supernatural sanctifying power in the outward tokens of the Holy Supper

[1] Therefore in Ignatius, Ep. ad Ephes. c. 20. the Holy Supper is called, *φαρμακον ἀθανασιας, ἀντιδοτον του μη ἀποθανειν, ἀλλα ζην ἐν Ἰησου Χριστῳ διαπαντος.*

[2] Tertull. c. Marcion. iv. 40. corpus meum, *i. e.* figura corporis mei. De Res. Carn. c. 8. anima de Deo saginatur. De orat. c. 6. The perpetuitas in Christo, is a constant spiritual communion with him, and individuitas a corpore ejus.

prevailed in it, and hence came the daily communion[1], and hence also, together with infant-baptism, came infant communion[2]. While Joh. vi. 53 was improperly understood, of the outward [sinnlich, corporeal, or sensuous] participation in the Holy Supper, it was concluded that no one could attain to salvation without such a participation in it[3], just as it had been concluded from a misunderstanding of Joh. iii. 5, that no one could be saved without outward baptism.

Among the Alexandrians, and especially in Origen, the distinction is brought forward, even in his doctrine about the Sacraments, as well as in his whole system of doctrine, between the inward Divine thing, the invisible spiritual operation of the Logos[4], and the sensuous sign[5] which represents it. "Just as the miracles of Christ," says Origen, "as far as their highest object is concerned, represent the healing power of the Logos, which operates invisibly, but also at the same time an utility was annexed to the outward deeds as such, because they led men to believe; so also, is outward baptism, in regard to its highest object, a symbol of the inward purification of the soul through the Divine power of the Logos, which is the preparation for the general restoration; by the beginning of that in enigmas, and in a mirror, which will be perfected face to face; but at the same time, in virtue of the words of consecration then uttered, there is united with the whole transaction of baptism, a supernatural healing; it is the beginning of the operations of grace, which are bestowed upon believers; but nevertheless, this is only for those who through their disposition of heart are capable of receiving such operations[6]."

The same distinction he also makes in respect to the Lord's Supper. He distinguishes between that which in a metaphorical sense is called the body of Christ[7], and the true spiritual eating of the Logos[8]; between *the more Divine promise and the more common understanding* of the Lord's Supper, as it was suited to

[1] See above Vol. i. p. 387. [2] See Cyprian, Sermo de Lapsis.
[3] See Cyprian, lib. iii. testimon. c. 25.
[4] Compare what is said above of the *επιδημια αισθητη*, and the *επιδημια νοητη*.
[5] The *νοητον*, or *πνευματικον*, and the *αισθητον*.
[6] See in Joh. vi. c. 17. and Matth. xv. c. 23.
[7] *το σωμα Χριστου τυπικον και συμβολικον*.
[8] The *αληθινη βρωσις του Λογου*.

the more simple[1]. The first bears reference to the spiritual participation in the Logos that became flesh, who is the true heavenly bread of the soul. The outward supper of the Lord can be enjoyed by the unworthy and the worthy, but not that true heavenly bread, for it could not otherwise have been said, that he who eats that bread will live eternally. Origen therefore says, that Christ in the true sense has designated as his flesh and blood *the word* which proceeds from the Word, and the bread from the heavenly bread, the living word of truth, through which he communicates himself to the soul; just as the breaking of the bread and the division of the wine is a symbol of the multiplication of the word, through which the Logos communicates itself to the soul. Even in the outward supper of the Lord, as well as in the outward baptism, he supposes a higher sanctifying efficacy in virtue of the words of consecration then uttered, but in such a manner that with the earthly elements considered by themselves nothing Divine can unite itself; and, as in baptism, no one without the inward capability of heart can become partaker of this higher efficacy. As it is not that, which enters into the mouth, that can defile a man, although it might be held to be unclean by the Jews, so also nothing, which enters into the mouth, *sanctifies* the man, although by the simple the bread of the Lord, as it is called, is held to be something that sanctifies. Nor indeed, considered by itself, is any thing wanting to us by the not eating the bread consecrated by prayer, and yet by the mere eating it, considered by itself, we have somewhat more; but the cause of our receiving less is the evil heart of each individual [partaker], and the cause of his receiving more is his good heart and disposition. The earthly bread, in itself, is nothing different from all other food. Origen was, however, desirous only of contradicting in particular the fanciful notions of some magical advantage in the Lord's Supper, independent on the heart of the recipient, which also the other Church-teachers were far from maintaining; and yet his contradiction touches every representation which supposes any higher signification and efficacy whatever of the outward token, even such an one as that which was received in the North African Church[2].

[1] The κοινοτερα περι της εὐχαριστιας ἐκδοχη τοις ἁπλουστεροις, and that κατα την θειοτεραν ἐπαγγελιαν, which correspond to the two conditions of γνωσις and πιστις.

[2] The passages in Origen are found in t. xi. Matt. c. 14; t. 32. Joh. c. 16. In Matt. 898. v. iii. Opp.

As the Old Testament contains a forecast of the things of the New, so Christianity also gives hints of a higher condition of things, which is to be prepared by means of Christianity itself; but faith must necessarily be inferior to actual knowledge and perception of that condition. The Divine revelations permit us only to catch some isolated glimpses of that higher state of things, which do not present a complete picture of it. As prophecy is always obscure before its fulfilment, so also the last prophecies of Christ about the fate of his Church must be obscure, until the introduction of that higher condition of the world. Although so many indications were made by our Saviour as to the gradual activity and efficacy of Christianity in penetrating human nature, yet these could not be understood by the first Christians. They had no presentiment of the different kinds of contests, which the Church had yet to encounter, before it could attain to its victorious completion. They were accustomed to consider the Church only in its opposition to the heathen state, and it was far from entering their thoughts, that by the natural development of circumstances under the guidance of Providence, this opposition should hereafter cease. They believed that the struggle of the Christian Church with the Heathen state would continue on, until the victory should be conceded to it through the immediate interposition of God, and through the return of Christ. It was natural enough that the Christians should willingly employ their thoughts on the prospect of this victory, during the seasons of persecution. It was thus that many formed a picture to themselves, which had come to them from the Jews, and which suited with their then condition. This was *the idea of a millennial reign*, which the Messiah should establish on earth as the close of the whole career of the world, during which all the saints of all ages were to live together in holy communion with each other. As the world was created in six days, and according to Ps. xc. 4, a thousand years in the sight of God is but as one day, so the world was supposed to endure six thousand years in its present condition; and as the Sabbath-day was the day of rest, so this millennial reign was to form the seventh thousand-year period of the world's existence as the close of the whole temporal dispensation connected with the world. In the midst of persecution it was an attractive thought for the Christians to look to a period when their Church, purified and per-

fected, should be triumphant even on earth, the theatre of their present sufferings. In the manner in which this notion was conceived by many there was nothing unchristian in it. They imagined the happiness of this period in a spiritual manner, and one that corresponded well with the real nature of Christianity; for they conceived under that notion only the general dominion of God's will, the undisturbed and blessed union and intercourse of the whole communion of saints, and the restoration of harmony between man as sanctified, and all nature as refined and ennobled [1]. But the gross images, which the carnal sense of the Jews had made to itself of the delights of the millennial reign, were transferred in part also to the Christians. Phrygia, the dwelling-place of a spirit [2], which took a fanciful turn, and would embody religious ideas in sensuous images, was also inclined to the propagation of this gross Chiliasm. In that region, in the first half of the second century, Papias was living, as the Bishop of the Church at Hieropolis, a man of plain piety, but, as the fragments of his writings and historical notices tend to prove, of a very limited mind, and a very uncritical credulity. He collected together, out of oral traditions, certain notices about the lives and sayings of Christ and the Apostles [3]; and among these he received much which was misunderstood and false, and thus he was the means of propagating many unfounded notions about the enjoyments of the millennial reign. The injurious consequence of this was, that a relish for sensual enjoyment, which was in contradiction to the Gospel, was furthered, and that much prejudice against Christianity might be engendered by it among educated and civilized heathens [4].

In the mean time we must also be very careful not to pronounce sentence about the Divine life itself from such isolated representations, which are, perhaps, nothing but isolated admixtures of the carnal and sensuous mind, not thoroughly penetrated and ennobled by the hidden Divine life. If we find in an Irenæus vital Christianity, and an elevated idea of blessedness, which he made to consist in communion with God, notwithstanding the accompaniment of those rash and speculative representations, we must conclude that such sensuous representations might very

[1] So Barnabas, c. 15.

[2] [Lit. 'of a religious-sensuous fanciful spirit:' where fanciful is used for indulgence in the dreams of an uncurbed imagination—*Schwärmerische.* H. J. R.]

[3] In his book entitled Λογων κυριακων ἐξηγησεις.

[4] See Orig. Select. in ψ. p. 570. vol. ii.

well exist in conjunction with, and be engrafted upon, an essentially Christian habit of thought in those times, when the new creation of Christianity had not yet been able thoroughly to penetrate and imbue all things. With Irenæus the millennial kingdom was only a stage of preparation for the saints, who were thus to be adapted gradually to a higher state of heavenly existence, and to the perfect revelation of the Divine glory[1]. It was also exactly under this form that Christianity might be able to find access to a class of sensuous men, whose habits of religious thought would afterwards gradually continue to be more and more spiritualized, by the practical influence of the Gospel, and the inward change constantly produce in them its outward effects.

If we find, that Millenarianism [Chiliasmus] was then extensively propagated, and are able to explain this by the circumstances of that period; yet, we are not to understand by this, that it ever belonged to the universal doctrines of the Church. We have too scanty documents from different parts of the Church in those times, to be able to speak with certainty and distinctness on that point. When we find Chiliasm in Papias, Irenæus, J. Martyr, all this indicates that it arose from one source, and was propagated from one spot. The case is somewhat different with those Churches which had—as for instance, the Romish Church (see above)—an Anti-Jewish origin. We find, afterwards an Anti-Millenarian feeling in Rome; and might not this feeling have existed from the very first, and only been called into greater publicity in the opposition which was made against Montanism? The same may also be said of an Anti-Millenarian feeling, which Irenæus combats, and which he expressly distinguishes from the common Anti-Millenarian feelings of Gnosticism. But it was natural enough that the zealots for Millenarianism should at first be willing to represent every opposition to it as a Gnostic feeling[2].

Two causes co-operated together in causing a more general repression of Millenarianism; on the one hand, the opposition to Montanism, and on the other, the influence of *the spirit*, which proceeded from the Alexandrian school. As the Montanists laid much stress on Millenarian expectations, and, although they did

[1] Iren. v. 35. Crescentes ex visione Domini, et per ipsum assuescent capere gloriam Dei et cum sanctis Angelis conversationem——Paullatim assuescent capere Deum. cap. 32.

[2] Iren. v. 32. Transferuntur quorundam sententiæ ab hæreticis sermonibus.

not entirely conceive them after a gross and sensuous manner[1], still propagated in accordance with their fanciful dreams, many extravagant representations[2] of what should take place during the millennium, the whole doctrine of Chiliasm lost all respect and authority. An anti-Millenarian party, which had been in existence considerably earlier, obtained an opportunity by this means of attacking Chiliasm more violently; and the most vehement opponents of Montanism appear to have combated Millenarianism as one of the Montanistic doctrines. The Presbyter Caius, at Rome, in his treatise against the Montanist Proclus, endeavoured to brand Chiliasm as an heretical doctrine, propagated by the abominable Gnostic, Cerinthus; and it is not improbable, although not quite certain, that he declared the Apocalypse to be a book forged by Cerinthus for the promotion of that doctrine.

The more spiritual and more learned character of the Alexandrian school, which had so great a general influence on the spiritualization of the doctrines of our faith, would also tend to further the spiritualization of the ideas about the kingdom of God and Christ. Origen was a peculiarly zealous opponent of the sensuous representations of the millennial kingdom, and endeavoured to give a different meaning to the passages of the Old and of the New Testament, on which the Chiliasts relied, and in which they understood every thing quite literally. And besides this, the allegorical interpretation of Scripture in vogue among the Alexandrian school, was in general very widely opposed to the literal and sensuous interpretation of the Chiliasts. The more moderate Alexandrians, who were not inclined to extreme opinions in criticism, did not reject the Apocalypse at once, as altogether an unchristian book, in order to take away this support from the Chiliasts; but they only combated the literal interpretation of it. At the same time, it was natural that the spirit of the Alexandrian school should not extend itself very easily from Alexandria into the other regions of Egypt, which were so far behind this flourishing seat of learning, as to spiritual advancement and culture. A pious bishop of the Arsenoite Nomos,

[1] Tertullian at least places the happiness of the millenarian kingdom in the enjoyment of all spiritual goods—spiritalia bona.

[2] Such as that in Tertullian, of the wonderful city, the heavenly Jerusalem which was to descend from Heaven.

in Egypt, named *Nepos*, was a zealous partisan of the sensuous Millenarianism, and he wrote a defence of it against the Alexandrian school, under the title, 'a Refutation of the Allegorists' (ἐλεγχος των ἀλληγοριστων), in which he appears to have thrown out a theory of Chiliasm, according to his own anti-allegorical mode of deciphering the Apocalypse. This book appears to have been very popular among the clergy and laity of this region, as it usually happens that men are better pleased to apply themselves to things which busy and charm the powers of the imagination, than to those, which sanctify, warm, and animate the heart, and take the will into their government. They expected to find here great mysteries, and explanations relative to the future, and many occupied themselves more with the book and theory of Nepos, than with the Bible and its doctrines. As it usually happens, by their zeal for such favourite opinions, which had no connection with the true nature of the Gospel, men became led away very far from that which is the chief business of practical Christianity; that is, the Spirit of Love. Those who would not enter into these opinions, were denounced as heretics, and things went so far, that whole regions separated themselves from communion with the mother church of Alexandria. After the death of Nepos, Korakion, the pastor of a country place stood at the head of this party. If Dionysius, the Bishop of Alexandria, had now chosen to exert his ecclesiastical authority, and condemned these erroneous doctrines by an authoritative decree, the seed of a lasting schism would have been sown, and the Chiliasm, which they hoped to subdue by decrees, would probably have become only more wild and fanatical in consequence of such a proceeding. But Dionysius, the worthy disciple of the great Origen, showed here, how charity, moderation, and true freedom of spirit, which cannot consist except with charity, may attain, what cannot be effected by any power, or any law whatever. As he did not, like others, forget the Christian in the Bishop, his love for souls induced him to repair in person to those Churches, and to call the clergy, who defended the opinions of Nepos, together to a conference, and he permitted all the laity of those Churches, who were desirous of instruction in these subjects, to be present at the conference. The book of Nepos was laid before them, and the Bishop discussed its contents with those clergy for three days, from morning to evening; he listened quietly to all their objec-

tions, endeavouring to answer them out of Scripture, and conducting the discussion by quoting fully from Scripture on every point; and the consequence was a result which seldom indeed proceeds from theological disputes; namely, that the clergy were thankful for the instruction they had received, and Korakion himself, in the presence of them all, honestly retracted his former opinions, and declared himself persuaded of the truth of the contrary to them, A.D. 255[1].

After Dionysius had thus restored unity of faith among his Churches, he wrote his work about the Promises (περι επαγγελιων), for the confirmation of those, who had been persuaded by his arguments, and for the instruction of others, who still held the opinions of Nepos. Here also the Christian mildness and moderation with which he speaks of Nepos deserves to be remarked. He says, "In many other respects I reverence and love Nepos, for his faith, his diligence, his intimate acquaintance with Holy Scripture, and on account of the many hymns composed by him, in which many of the brethren still delight[2], and I honour the man the more, because he is already entered into his rest. But the truth is dearer and of more value to me than ought besides: we must praise him, and agree with him, when he says anything which is right; but we must examine and set him right, when he writes what does not appear to be true."

In respect to the *doctrine of the resurrection*, the teachers of the Church had to defend this doctrine especially against the Gnostics, who, in part, explained the passages of Holy Scripture relating to it in a very arbitrary manner, and made them mean only the spiritual renovation effected by Christianity. In this controversy they felt strongly how essentially this doctrine was bound up with Christianity, inasmuch as Christianity brought with it, not the annihilation, but the ennobling and the glorifying of that which peculiarly belongs to human nature; and the de-humanizing idealism of the Gnostics was wholly incompatible with this fundamental principle of Christianity. But the opposition between these two often seduced them into conceiving this doctrine

[1] Euseb. vii. 24.

[2] της πολλης ψαλμῳδιας, ᾗ μεχρι νυν πολλοι των ἀδελφων ἐνθυμουνται. This passage may be taken in two ways; either as it has been translated above, which suits well with the custom of those times (see Part ii.); or else it may be translated, "in consequence of the constant custom of Psalmody diligently introduced by him into the Churches," &c.; the first appears the most natural.

of the resurrection after too carnal a manner, and into making to themselves too confined a representation of the identity between the body after the resurrection, and the earthly body. Origen endeavoured here also to find out a middle way between these two opposite tendencies, by making more use of what St. Paul (1 Cor. xv.) says of the relation between the earthly and the glorified body, and by distinguishing the proper essential substance of the body [das eigentliche Grundwesen des Körpers], which remains the same during all the changes of earthly life, and is not annihilated even in death, from the changeable form under which it appears at different times. This essential substance of the body was to be awakened again by the influence of Divine Omnipotence to a new and glorified form, such as would be answerable to the glorified quality of the soul; so that, as the soul had communicated its own peculiar impress to the earthly body, it should communicate it to the glorified one also [1].

It follows from what we have said above of the doctrine of the Alexandrians about the Divine justice, that the Alexandrian Gnosis must have considered, as the final aim of all things, a final general redemption, the removal of all evil, and a general return o the original unity of the Divine Life, from which all proceeded. (This would be the general ἀποκαταστασις.) But Origen, in consequence of his theory about the necessary changeableness of the will in created beings, was seduced into supposing, that evil, which is for ever sowing new seeds, would render necessary new processes of purification, and new worlds destined for the purification of fallen beings, until again all shall have returned again from multiplicity to unity; and thus, that there would be a continual alternation between fall and redemption, unity and multiplicity. To such a comfortless system did a notion, carried to the extreme, lead this profound man! This doctrine he has expressed with confidence in his work περι ἀρχων; but still it is open to question, whether this be not one of the subjects on which he afterwards changed his views; but still there are even

[1] The εἰδος χαρακτηριζον in the σωμα πνευματικον, as in the σωμα ψυχικον. In part, he here made use of his doctrine of an ὑλη [or substance; matter] which, undeterminate [as to *form and qualities*, &c. Transl.] of itself, was capable of receiving higher or lower qualities through the fashioning power of God; and in part he makes use of the doctrine of a dynamical essential substance of the body, a λογος σπερματικος (ratio ea quæ substantiam continet corporalem, quæ semper in substantia corporis salva est.) See περι ἀρχ. l. ii. c. 10. c. Cels. iv. 57.

in his later writings traces of this opinion, though not perhaps any which are altogether certain and definite [1].

§ III. *The history of the most celebrated Fathers.*

The next ecclesiastical writers who come after the Apostles, are the so-called Apostolical Fathers (Patres Apostolici), who come from the Apostolic age, and must have been the disciples of the Apostles. The remarkable difference between the writings of the Apostles and those of the Apostolical Fathers, who are yet so close upon the former in point of time, is a remarkable phenomenon of its kind. While in other cases such a transition is usually quite gradual, in this case we find a sudden one. Here there is no gradual transition, but a sudden spring; a remark, which is calculated to lead us to a recognition of the peculiar activity of the Divine Spirit in the souls of the Apostles. The time of the first extraordinary operations of the Holy Spirit was followed by the time of the free development of human nature in Christianity; and here, as elsewhere, the operations of Christianity must necessarily be confined, before it could penetrate further, and appropriate to itself the higher intellectual powers of man.

The writings of the so-called Apostolic Fathers are, alas! come down to us, for the most part, in a very uncertain condition; partly, because in early times writings were counterfeited under the name of these venerable men of the Church, in order to propagate certain opinions or principles; partly, because those writings which they had really published were adulterated, and especially so to serve a Judæo-hierarchical party, which would fain crush the free evangelical spirit.

We should here, in the first place, have to name Barnabas, the well-known fellow-traveller of St. Paul, if a letter, which was first known in the second century in the Alexandrian Church under his name, and which bore the inscription of a Catholic Epistle [2], was really his composition. But it is impossible that

[1] Origen, *π. ἀρχ.* l. ii. c. 3. c. Cels. iv. c. 69. He says merely, *εἰ μετα τον ἀφανισμον της κακιας λογον ἐχει, το παλιν αὐτην ὑφιστασθαι ἡ μη, ἐν προηγουμενῳ λογῳ τα τοιαυτα ἐξετασθησεται.* There is an obscure expression in Matth. f. 402. to this effect, "After the *ἀποκαταστασις* is fulfilled in certain Æons, *παλιν ἀλλη ἀρχη.*"

[2] *Ἐπιστολη καθολικη*, that is to say, an epistle general in its destination and con-

we should acknowledge this Epistle to belong to that Barnabas, who was worthy to be the companion of the Apostolic labours of St. Paul, and had received his name from the power of his animated discourses in the Churches[1]. We find a different spirit breathing throughout it, than that of such an apostolic man. We perceive in it a Jew of Alexandrian education, who had embraced Christianity, who was prepared by his Alexandrian education for a spiritual conception of Christianity; but who set too high a value on his Alexandrian and Jewish Gnosis, who looked for especial wisdom in a mystical and fanciful[2] interpretation of the Old Testament, more resembling the spirit of Philo than that of St. Paul, or even that of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and who indulged himself in such interpretations in a silly manner. We cannot at all find in this epistle that view of the Mosaic ceremonial law, as a means of religious education for man in a certain stage of his development, which we perceive in Paul; but such a view, as gives evidence altogether of an Alexandrian turn of mind, such a view as does not meet us again in the later Fathers, and which proceeds from the most extravagant idealists among the Alexandrian Jews[3]; 'Moses spoke every thing ἐν πνευματι, that is to say, he has only enveloped general spiritual truths in a symbolical form; but the carnal-minded Jews, instead of penetrating into the meaning of the symbols, had understood every thing literally, and believed that they must obey it to the letter; and thus the whole ceremonial religion had proceeded from a misconception of the carnal-minded multitude.' It is said[4], that an evil angel guided them to this misunderstanding, just as we find in the Clementine, and other similar writings, the supposition that the original Judaism had been adulterated by foreign admixtures, introduced by evil spirits. The writer of the Epistle will not allow it to be true, that circumcision is a seal, or token of a covenant; because, he says, on the contrary, it is found among the Arabians, the Syrians, and an idolatrous priesthood (in Egypt). But he argues that Abraham, by the circumcision of the 318 men (Gen. xvii. and xiv. 14.), had prefigured the cruci-

tents, an hortatory piece, destined for many Churches; a description, which corresponds to the contents of this letter.

[1] υἱος παρακλησεως, υἱος προφητειας.

[2] [Spielenden, *literally* playing; a mode of interpretation, which caught at fanciful resemblances, &c. and plays on words, &c. H. J. R.]

[3] See above, vol. i. p. 50.

[4] c. 9.

fixion of Jesus, and makes it out thus,—IH (18) the beginning of the name of Jesus, and T (300), which stands as the token of the Cross;—an explanation founded on Greek letters and numerals, which can only suit some Alexandrian Jew, unaccustomed to, perhaps unacquainted with, the Hebrew language, who was only at home in the Alexandrian translation, but certainly cannot suit Barnabas, who assuredly was not such a stranger to the Hebrew language, even if we could attribute such a spiritless play on words to him. And yet the man, who could fall into such trifling, held it for something extraordinary, and he adds these pompous words, which are characteristic of the mystery-mongering of the Jewish Alexandrian Gnosis: "No one hath received a more authentic doctrine from me, but I know that ye are worthy of it[1]."

The prevailing tendency of the Epistle is directed against carnal Judaism, and carnal Judaism in Christianity. We recognise a controversy against the latter, which had extended its doctrinal influence even to the views entertained of the person of Christ, when in chap. xii. it is particularly insisted upon, that Christ is not only the son of Man, and the son of David, but also the Son of God.

We find also nothing to induce us to believe, that the author of the Epistle was desirous of being considered Barnabas. But since its spirit and its mode of conception corresponded to the Alexandrian taste, it may have happened, that as the author's name was unknown, and persons were desirous of giving it authority, a report was spread abroad in Alexandria, that Barnabas was its author.

After Barnabas, we come to Clement, perhaps the same whom Paul mentions (Phil. iv. 3.); he was at the end of the first century, Bishop of Rome. Under his name we have one Epistle to the Church of Corinth, and the fragment of another. The first was read in the first centuries aloud at divine service in many churches, even with the writings of the New Testament; it contains an exhortation to unity, interwoven with examples and general reflections, addressed to the Church at Corinth, which was shaken by divisions. This letter, although, on the whole,

[1] οὐδεὶς γνησιωτερον ἐμαθεν ἀπ' ἐμου λογον· ἀλλα οἰδα ὁτι ἀξιοι ἐστε ὑμεις. [On the subject of this interpretation of the number 318, the reader is referred to the Rev. S. R. Maitland's "Letter to a friend on the Tract for the Times, No. 89." 1841.]

genuine, is nevertheless not free from important interpolations; *e. g.* a contradiction is apparent, since throughout the whole Epistle we perceive the simple relations of the earliest forms of a Christian Church, as the Bishops and Presbyters are always put upon an equality, and yet in one passage (§ 40 and following) the whole system of the Jewish priesthood is transferred to the Christian Church. The second Epistle, as it is called, is evidently only the fragment of an homily.

Under the name of this Clement, *two* letters have besides been preserved in the Syrian Church, and they were published by Wetstein in an appendix to his edition of the New Testament. They are two circulars, especially addressed to Christian men and women living in celibacy. It cannot be adduced as a proof against the Clementine origin of these Epistles, that this state of life is held in special esteem in them, because this high estimation of celibacy found admittance in early time [1]. The high antiquity of these Epistles is in some degree testified by the non-appearance of any endeavour to support the pretensions of the hierarchical party; and by the circumstances, that the ideas of the priesthood belonging to the Old Testament are not here introduced into the Christian Church, as is the case in similar writings of this kind; that neither the separation of the priesthood from the laity, nor the distinction of Bishops and Presbyters occurs here; and that the gift of healing the sick, and especially demoniacs, is considered as a free-gift, and not as a gift belonging to one peculiar office. And yet this is no certain proof of the high antiquity of the Epistles; because, even if it were of later origin, all this might be explained from the idiosyncrasy of certain regions of the East.

As these Epistles must have been admirably suited to the ascetic disposition of the Western Churches, especially the North-African, and as in similar writings of practical import (against similar abuses to those which are censured in these Epistles) occasion to make use of them must often have arisen, it is the more remarkable that they were never quoted before the fourth century [2], which certainly must create a suspicion against their genuineness.

These Epistles altogether bear the character of having been

[1] See Part ii.

[2] The first traces of them are in Epiphanius and Jerome.

counterfeited in the latter years of the second, or in the third century, partly in order to enhance the value of celibacy, partly in order to counteract the abuses which rose up under the cover of a life of celibacy, especially the introduction of the συνεισακτοι [1] (see above).

Many writings were counterfeited under the name of this Clement, to serve an hierarchical or a doctrinal purpose; such, for instance, are the writings which relate the history of Clement himself, who is supposed there to be converted by the Apostle Peter, and meets again with his father whom he had lost[2],—the Clementine, the peculiar Ebionitish character of which we have before remarked,—as well as the collection of the Apostolic Constitutions (διαταξεις, or διαταγαι Ἀποστολικαι), and the κανονες Ἀποστολικοι.

The same thing may have occurred in regard to the origin of these two collections, as took place with regard to the origin of the Apostles' Creed, as it is called. As it was usual originally to speak of an apostolical tradition, without its being supposed, that the Apostles had published a confession of faith; so in the same manner, in regard to the constitution and customs of the Church, an apostolical tradition was spoken of, without its being thought that the Apostles had given laws in writing on the subject. And when people had once become used to the expressions, "Apostolical traditions," "Apostolical ordinances," the pretence, or the belief, at last attached itself to them, that the Apostles had written down a collection of ecclesiastical laws, as they had a confession of faith. And hence, under the influence of different interests, different collections of this kind may have existed, as those, which Epiphanius quotes in many places, are evidently not identical with our Apostolical Constitutions. These latter appear to have arisen gradually in the Oriental Church, out of different pieces, whose ages extend from the latter part of the second to the fourth century.

Hermas would follow here, if he, as many of the ancients thought, were the same with the Hermas mentioned in the 16th chapter of the Epistle of the Apostle Paul to the Romans. We have a work under his name, which bears the title of the Shep-

[1] This abuse had spread itself in the Antiochian Church, as well as in the North-African. See the Synodal Epistle against Paul of Samosata. Euseb. vii. 30.

[2] Hence comes the name of the edition of this work, preserved to us in the translation of Ruffinus,—ἀναγνωρισμοι, Recognitiones.

herd (ποιμην), so called, because in the second book, an angel is represented as a shepherd, to whose guidance Hermas is entrusted.

It cannot be ascertained with certainty, whether the author really believed that he had the visions, which he represents, or whether he supposed them, in order to gain a more ready entrance for the doctrines, especially those of a practical kind, inculcated by him. The work was originally written in Greek, but it is preserved to us in great measure, only in a Latin translation; and it was held in great reverence by Greek writers of the second century, to which the name of Hermas and the renowned visions may have deeply contributed. Irenæus quotes the book under the name of "the Scripture:" and yet there are strong reasons to doubt of its being derived from that Apostolic Hermas, although the other tradition, (supported by the poem against Marcion ascribed to Tertullian, and the fragment on the canon of the New Testament published by Muratori[1],) that the brother of the Roman Bishop Pius, who obtained this office about the year 156, was the author, is also very doubtful, because we cannot determine what credit is due to these two writings, and because the high reverence entertained for the book in the time of an Irenæus and a Clement of Alexandria, can hardly be reconciled with so late an origin of the work[2].

Ignatius, Bishop of the Church at Antioch, in the time of the Emperor Trajan, it would appear, was carried as prisoner to Rome, where he expected to be exposed to wild beasts. On the journey, it would seem, he wrote seven Epistles, six to the Churches of Asia Minor, and one to Polycarp, Bishop of Smyrna. Certainly, these epistles contain passages which at least bear completely upon them the character of antiquity. This is particularly the case with the passages directed against Judaism and Docetism; but even the shorter and more trustworthy edition is very much interpolated.

The epistle to Polycarp the Bishop of Smyrna appears the most like a diligent compilation; and that to the Church of Rome bears, the most, the stamp of individuality upon it.

[1] Murat. Antiq. Ital. Jud. Ævi, t. iii.

[2] It may be the case, that the Roman Bishop Pius really had a brother of this name; and that those, who wished to destroy the reverence paid to this work, for that very purpose assigned to it so late an author.

We have already spoken before of Polycarp, Bishop of Smyrna. An Epistle to the Church at Philippi is ascribed to him, the genuineness of which there are no sufficient grounds to deny.

We shall now, after considering the Apostolic Fathers, notice the Apologists, who follow immediately after them in chronological order. The defence of Christianity against the heathens first led the way to an union between Christianity and the knowledge and cultivation of those days. As under the government of Hadrian, Christianity began to extend itself more among the more cultivated classes, as heathens of a certain philosophical and literary character came over to the Christian Church, they felt themselves obliged to defend their faith against the accusations which were spread abroad against it by false reports, and they used their comprehensive and scientific education and knowledge in order to represent the Christian doctrine to the more cultivated heathens in a point of view more agreeable to their turn of mind.

Among these we must first name Quadratus, who was known as an Evangelist[1], and celebrated for his prophetic gifts. We must not confound him, as Jerome has done, with a Quadratus who was Bishop of a Church at Athens in the days of Marcus Aurelius. His Apology, alas! has not reached us, and Eusebius has preserved to us only the following remarkable words: "The works of our Saviour were always present, because they were real and true; those who were healed by him; those, who were raised from the dead, who were to be seen, not only when they were being healed and raised, but constantly; not only during the lifetime of our Saviour, but after his departure they were present a considerable time, so that some of them have reached even to our time[2]."

The second Apologist, Aristides, even as a Christian still retained the gown of the philosopher (τριβων), in order to be able to represent Christianity to the educated classes as the new heavenly philosophy[3].

[1] We must understand this word in a sense agreeable to the New Testament, *i. e.* a teacher, not appointed to *one particular church*, but a missionary travelling for the purpose of propagating the Gospel.

[2] Euseb. iii. 37; iv. 3; v. 17.

[3] Hieronym. de Vir. Illust. c. 20. Ep. 83. ad Magnum: *apologeticum contextum philosophorum sententiis.* The traveller *de la Guilletière* says, that in a convent about six miles from Athens they profess to have a copy of this Apology.

Justin Martyr is remarkable, as the first among these apologists whose writings have reached us, and as the first of those better known to us, who became a teacher of the Christian Church, in whom we observe an approximation between Christianity and the Grecian, but especially the Platonic philosophy; and in this respect he may be considered as the precursor of the Alexandrian Fathers. We can obtain, for the most part, only from his own writings any account of his life and education; and here also we feel most certainty at first, by restricting ourselves to his two Apologies, because these are the undoubted work of Justin, and bear upon them the stamp of a peculiar character of mind which cannot be mistaken; and the rest of his writings, on the contrary, must in the first place prove their genuineness by a comparison with these.

Flavius Justinus was born in the town Flavia Neapolis, formerly Sichem, in Samaria; it was then a Roman-Greek colony, in which the Greek language prevailed. It was probably not a predominantly speculative character of mind, which was not the case with him, but an endeavour after a satisfactory religious persuasion, which led him, as well as so many others of those days, to the study of philosophy; and for this very reason, the Platonic philosophy would have peculiar attractions for him. Since it was rather a religious than a speculative interest which led him on, it is possible, although some isolated and elevated Platonic notions, like those of the relationship of the human soul to God, and of the intuition of Divine things, animated him, that he was not so taken by the system of the school, that his heart should thence become incapable of those higher impressions, which passed the bounds of the empire of this system. How he became a Christian he relates himself[1]: "While I still found my delight in the doctrines of Plato, and heard the Christians calumniated, but yet saw them fearless towards death, and all that men account fearful; I learnt that it was impossible, that they should live in sin and lust[2]. I despised the opinion of the multitude; I was proud of being a Christian, and I endeavoured with all my powers to remain one."

Justin retained as a Christian, the philosopher's cloke[3], which he had borne as a heathen philopher and ascetic; and he used

[1] Apolog. i. p. 50, 51. [2] See Part i. [3] See Part ii.

this garb and mode of life, in order easily to be able to introduce conversations on religious and philosophical subjects, and thus to prepare a passage for the Gospel into the hearts of men; and he was, as it were, a travelling Evangelist in the philosophic garb[1]. It has been unsoundly concluded[2] that he was ordained to the priesthood, from his own language in his representation of the Christian faith in the second Apology, "We conduct the convert, after we have baptized him, to the assembled brethren." There was at that time no such separation of the clergy from the laity, that Justin might not have been able to say this from his position, as sharing the priesthood common to all Christians. But whether he was solemnly ordained to the calling of an Evangelist in the name of the Church or not—an inquiry of no importance—it is hardly to be supposed that his gifts were left idle, whether for the propagation of the Gospel among the heathen, or for the instruction of the Churches themselves. If the account of the martyrdom of Justin were worthy of credit, it would prove, that when he was resident in Rome, a part of the Church, which understood the Greek language, used to assemble in his house, in order to hear his discourses.

We observed in the first part of this history[3], that after the death of the Emperor Hadrian, persecutions arose against the Christians in the beginning of the reign of Antoninus Pius. Thereby Justin, who was then resident at Rome, was induced to address a writing in defence of the interests of the Christians to the emperor. Since, however, in the superscription of this work, he does not give the title of Cæsar to M. Aurelius, it is probably to be inferred, that it was written before his adoption into that dignity, which took place A.D. 139[4].

[1] Even if the *Dialogus cum Tryphone* were not genuine, we might nevertheless use the account given in it; for we might presuppose that the author of it had an accurate knowledge of Justin's life.

[2] By Tillemont. [The conclusion of Tillemont may be unwarranted by the expression of Justin, but surely at that time there was a separation of clergy and laity. See note, vol. i. p. 180. H. J. R.]

[3] See vol. i. p. 99.

[4] The superscription is Αὐτοκρατορι Τιτῳ Αἰλιῳ Ἀδριανῳ Ἀντονινῳ Εὐσεβει Σεβαστῳ Καισαρι και Οὐηρισσιμῳ υἱῳ φιλοσοφῳ και Λουκιῳ φιλοσοφῳ (according to Eusebius φιλοσοφου) Καισαρος φυσει υἱῳ και Εὐσεβους εἰσποιητῳ ἱραστῃ παιδειας ἱερᾳ τε συγκλητῳ και δημῳ παντι Ῥωμαιων. The first-named is Augustus Antoninus Pius, who had then entered on his reign, the second M. Antoninus, philosophus, to whom the Emperor Hadrian (in compliance with whose wishes Antoninus Pius adopted him) had given the name Annius Verissimus, the third is Lucius Verus Antoninus, afterwards the associate of M. Aurelius in the government, the son of

There are greater difficulties in the determination of the time, at which the first Apology, as it is called, was written. The occasion, which moved him to write for the Christians (an occasion full of instruction, with regard both to the history of the active efficacy of Christianity, and to that of the persecutions) was this, —a woman in Rome, who had led a vicious life with her husband, was converted, and refusing any longer to share the vices of her husband, endeavoured to bring about his reformation. As, however, she was unable to effect this, and was unable, if she remained any longer in union with her husband, to withdraw herself from participation in his sins, and as she had, according to the doctrines of our Lord, grounds sufficient to justify a separation, she separated herself from him. In order to revenge himself, the divorced husband accused her as a Christian. The accused woman presented a petition to the emperor, that she might be allowed first to arrange her family concerns, and then she was willing to undergo her judicial trial. When her husband found his revenge against his wife thus delayed, he turned his rage against her instructor in Christianity, named Ptolemæus. He was arrested by a centurion, and carried before the Præfectus urbis. As he openly declared before him, that he was a Christian, he was condemned to death. Another Christian, by name Lucius, who heard this sentence, said to the Præfect, "Wherefore have you sentenced to death this man, who has committed no murder, no theft, no adultery; but only because he is a Christian? You are acting in a manner, which is not becoming either to the pious emperor, or the philosopher the son of the emperor[1]." The Præfect concluded from this declaration that he was a Christian, and when he confirmed this, the Præfect sentenced him in like manner to death. A third person shared the same fate.

Lucius Ælius Verus, whom Hadrian had adopted and nominated as Cæsar; after the early death of the latter, he (the son), as Hadrian wished, was adopted in the same manner by Antoninus Pius, who had stepped into the place of his father. The reading found in Eusebius is most likely the true one, for it is hardly to be supposed that Lucius Verus should have had two epithets. The name of Philosopher is utterly out of character for a boy of nine years of age, who might yet very well be called ἐραστης παιδειας. It is more likely that the name of Philosopher should have been given to Ælius Verus, who was dead, whom Spartianus calls "eruditus in literis."

[1] οὐ πρεποντα Εὐσεβει αὐτοκρατορι οὐδε φιλοσοφῳ (according to Eusebius, the common reading is φιλοσοφον). [N.B. This expression is ambiguous,—the meaning is, that Eusebius reads φιλοσοφῳ, and the common editions of Justin read φιλοσοφον. See the note of Valesius. H. J. R.]

The question is therefore, Whether this event suits best with the reign of Antoninus Pius, or that of M. Aurelius? We find here nothing that would be *absolutely* inconsistent with the former; for, as we remarked[1], the law of Trajan was by no means abolished by the rescripts of Hadrian and of Antoninus Pius, in accordance with which law, the open avowal of Christianity might be punished with death, although the mildness of the emperor permitted a governor favourably disposed to Christians, to pass over a great deal. But is it *probable* that a Christian should have spoken thus to the Præfect, if the reigning emperor had himself issued a severe law against the Christians, as Christians? Even in the Apology itself, there is no trace of the existence of a new law against the Christians, for the abolition of which Justin entreated the emperor. It may be said, that it suits only the time of M. Aurelius; for Justin says, that confessions had been extorted from the servants, women, and children of the Christians, by which the popular reports about unnatural practices in the assemblies of Christians were declared to be true. It is certainly[2] in the reign of M. Aurelius that we first find examples of such conduct towards the Christians quoted; but as popular fanaticism had, ever since the reign of Nero, spread abroad such reports against the Christians, that fanaticism may easily have found at an earlier time many magistrates who gave credit to it, and ministered to it. Even in the Apology, which according to the common supposition is placed in the time of Antoninus Pius, Justin at that time is anxious, that people would only not give credit to the blind reports of the people against Christians. But he says, that the same things which happened at Rome under Urbicus, commonly took place elsewhere also; that the other Governors acted as unreasonably; that everywhere, if any one was improved by Christianity, one of his nearest relations or friends came forward as his accuser; and this seems to agree better with the general persecutions under M. Aurelius. But even in the time of Antoninus Pius, many violent popular assaults had taken place against the Christians, which moved him to issue the rescript, which was calculated to allay the irritations of men's minds. This is also still further remarkable in the above-quoted designation of the reigning princes through Lucius, that the title of philosopher, peculiarly appropriated to M. Aurelius, is not bestowed

[1] See vol. i.

[2] See vol. i.

upon him, but transferred to Verus, whom it does not suit, and to whom it is not elsewhere attributed, while the title of Antoninus Pius is bestowed upon M. Aurelius, who is nowhere spoken of during his life-time by this name. Even if we throw away the reading of Eusebius we have quoted, the difficulty is not removed, for the same titles are attributed at the end of the Apology to both the emperors[1]. These grounds are an argument to place this Apology, not according to the common belief, which has however great names, *e. g.* Pagi, Tillemont, Mosheim, in its favour, but with Valesius and Longuerue in the time of Antoninus Pius.

It is also a striking circumstance[2], that Justin, twice[3] in this Apology, appeals to *that which he has before said*, which yet does not occur in this Apology, but in the first. He uses the same formula, ὡς προεφημεν, which he uses in other places, where he quotes passages out of the same writing.

We do not, however, wish to deny, that the authority of Eusebius is opposed to our supposition, because he certainly appears to consider the first-mentioned Apology as written in the reign of Antoninus Pius, and to place the second in that of M. Aurelius[4]; but still the authority of this historian is not decisive here, for the proper relation of the second Apology, as it is called, to the first, might be lost and forgotten in the time of Eusebius.

An idea, which afterwards re-appears among the Alexandrians, is altogether peculiar to these two treatises; namely, that in Christianity there is to be found the unclouded and unbroken revelation of Divine truth, while on the contrary, in all human systems, there are only to be found fragments of a revelation of truth, clouded through the partial views of man. What Clement says of the revelation of the Logos, torn in pieces like the body

[1] Ειη οὐν και ὑμας ἀξιως ε ὐσ εβειας και φιλοσοφιας τα δικαια ὑπερ ἑαυτων κριναι. That in the beginning of the Apology of Athenagoras the title of φιλοσοφος is attributed, whether it be to L. Verus, or to Commodus, cannot be alleged to remove this difficulty, because it is easy to understand that the titles, properly belonging only to one emperor, should be attributed to two in common, as is the case here.

[2] As the Benedictine Editor has already observed.

[3] In the Benedictine Edition, § 4, where he speaks of the enmity with God; § 6, where he speaks of the incarnation of the Logos; and § 8, where he speaks of Heraclitus.

[4] If we compare ii. 13. and iv. 16. (for iv. 11. is somewhat obscure,) and ch. 17. with the preceding, we cannot doubt, that either the reading προτερα is faulty, or that Eusebius himself has only written thus from some oversight.

of Dionysus (see above), had already been said by Justin in other words. He supposes that there is in human nature something akin[1] to the Divine Logos, that universal and absolute Divine reason, from which the partial recognition of religious and moral truth in the heathen philosophers proceeded. The revelation, however, of truth, which here is in broken fragments, and is disturbed by the intermixture of what is human, was first shown in its clearness and perfection, by the appearance of the Logos itself in human nature. The same relation which exists between it and the clouded, partial reason of man, exists also between Christianity and all other systems of religious truth. Certainly, this was an idea, extremely calculated to seek for points in the common religious conscience of man, for Christianity to attach itself upon, as well as to set forth the elevation of the Gospel above all previous systems containing religious matter. He hence says[2], that all good, which has ever been spoken by any, belongs to Christianity. He hence concludes, that in all times those who have followed the inward revelation of the Logos, and lived in accordance with it, were Christians; although they were called Atheists, as Abraham and Socrates, and that such men were always persecuted by the enemies of the Logos (those who live without reason). We certainly need not suppose that Justin delivered these notions at Alexandria, and that they have passed from him to the Alexandrian Fathers, or on the other hand, that Justin has borrowed them from a previously-existing Alexandrian theology. For certainly, every Platonist,—accustomed to the ideas of the relation of the νοερον in man to the supreme νους,—who was converted to Christianity, while he was seeking for some medium between his former Platonic notions and his newly acquired Christian ones, might easily be led to these notions.

But it is indeed remarkable, that in the other writings of Justin, we find no trace of the notions, which prevail so completely in the Apologies, as to the relation between that which is divine in man to the self-revelation of the Divine Logos, and the notions that are connected with these; namely, in regard to the

[1] The σπερμα του λογου, or the λογος σπερματικος.

[2] Apolog. ii. (commonly called i.) Ὁσα παρα πασι καλως εἰρηται, ἡμων των Χριστιανων ἐστι. [In Grabe's Edition [Oxford. 8vo. 1700—1703.] this is printed as the second Apology.]

relation between the scattered traces of truth found among the heathen and Christianity. It may indeed be said, that he has attributed these notions to himself only in furtherance of his object, that by this means he might dispose the philosophical emperor to be favourable to his proposals; but this is, nevertheless, not a natural supposition. We may especially remark, that judging of Justin from his writings, we can hardly give him credit for the adroitness of moving so freely in a circle of ideas, taken up by him in appearance only. And besides, in his Apologies he makes no scruple of blaming the religious doctrines of the Stoics, although the stoicism of M. Aurelius was well known. We may thence conclude, that he pretended also to no milder opinion of the Grecian philosophy in general, than he really held. And in other writings also, intended to facilitate the conversion of the heathen, he might just as well have used this method, as in the Apologies. Why therefore does he never use it in those other writings? This circumstance would be still more striking, if we suppose, according to the common view of the matter, that Justin wrote these Apologies at such different times.

We have under the name of Justin a treatise, with the title of "An exhortation to the heathen" (παραινετικος προς Ελληνας), the object of which is, to persuade the heathen of the unsatisfactory nature of their popular religion, and their philosophical doctrines of religion, as well as of the necessity of some higher and Divine instruction. It is most probably the same writing, as that which is quoted by Eusebius and Photius, under the title of "The Confutation" (ἐλεγχος), which suits its contents well enough.

In this treatise we find no trace of that mild and liberal thought, which we remark in the Apologies, and no trace of that *peculiar circle of ideas*, but far rather a contrary mode of thinking. All knowledge of God is here deduced from outward revelation only; but there were many misunderstood accordances with truth, recognised among the heathen; but these are all deduced from a misunderstood and falsified tradition, according to the Judæo-Alexandrian notion, that a knowledge of the doctrines communicated to the Jews by Divine revelation, was conveyed to the Greeks from Egypt. While in the Apologies men are acknowledged to have existed among the heathen, who, following the revelation of the λογος σπερματικος, were witnesses of the truth before the appear-

ance of Christianity; here, on the contrary, it is said: "Your teachers also are compelled to say much for us about Divine Providence, even against their will, and especially those who dwelt in Egypt, and have received benefit from the religion of Moses and his ancestors[1]."

It is impossible to suppose, that this treatise can have proceeded from the same cast of thought, as the two Apologies of Justin. But if it is determined to attribute it to him, then we must at least not consider it, in accordance with the common supposition, as the first of his writings after his conversion; but far rather as one of the later. We must suppose that his original more liberal and milder habits of thought had latterly become narrower and harsher, that the views which originally prevailed with him, and proceeded from his own disposition, those views of the connection between the revelations of the λογος σπερματικος to the revelation of the absolute λογος, which we find as the predominant views in the Apologies, were latterly entirely driven into the background by the views imparted to him by the Alexandrian Jews, of outward Revelation as the source [of this knowledge among the heathen][2]. Such a change is no doubt possible, and examples of such changes are certainly to be found, but one is led to inquire whether this treatise contains sufficient evidence of the authorship of Justin, to drive us to this explanation.

We have also under the name of Justin a short address to the heathens (λογος προς Ἑλληνας), which none of the treatises enumerated in the list of Justin's writings among the ancients suits, but which, even if it does not proceed from him, as the style is somewhat more rhetorical than his, yet bears the stamp of that time upon it. It is a rhetorical exposition of the untenableness of the heathen doctrines about the gods, in which the most beautiful part is the conclusion: "The power of the Logos

[1] Cohortat. p. 15.

[2] It cannot be denied, that this view occurs even in the Apologies, only that it is more in the background, while the other is the predominant view. Apol. ii. p. 81. "All which, philosophers and poets have said of the immortality of the soul, of the contemplation of Divine things, or of doctrines like these, they may have learnt and developed, while they received the first hints from the Prophets. There seems therefore to be amongst all a Sun of truth, and it is clear, that they have not understood it properly, because they contradict themselves." So also, p. 92, Plato's doctrine of the Creation is deduced from Moses.

makes neither poets, nor philosophers, nor accomplished orators; but, while it forms us, it turns mortal men into immortal, mortal men into gods. It lifts us from the earth above the bounds of Olympus. Come, suffer yourselves to be formed. Become as I am, for I was also like you; for this, even the divine nature of the doctrines, the power of the Logos, has overcome me; for as a skilful serpent-charmer entices and frightens away the terrible animal from its lurking-place, so the Word banishes the terrible passions of sensuality out of the most hidden corners of the soul. And after the desires are banished, the soul becomes tranquil and cheerful, and turns back to its Creator, freed from the evil that adhered to it."

We have also under the name of Justin, a treatise on the unity of God (*περι μοναρχιας*), containing, for the most part, passages collected from the ancient literature of the Greeks, especially from the poets; the object of the treatise is to convert the heathen by means of their own literature. This writing is perhaps only the fragment of a larger work, as the work which Eusebius knew by this name contained more, and consisted of arguments for the unity of God, taken partly from the Holy Scriptures, and partly from Greek literature.

The greatest and most important work of Justin's, which we possess, after his *Apologies*, is his *Dialogue with Trypho the Jew*, the business of which is to prove, that Jesus is the Messiah promised in the Old Testament, and to confute the then usual accusations of the Jews against Christianity. Justin meets, apparently at Ephesus, with Trypho a Jew, whom the war, undertaken by Barchochab, had driven out of Palestine, and who was travelling about in Greece, and had there studied the Grecian philosophy, and was much beloved. The garb of the philosopher, worn by Justin, induces Trypho to address him in a retired walk, and a conversation arises between them about the knowledge of God, which conversation Justin turns to Christianity, and the treatise consists of this conversation set down in writing.

The concordant testimony of antiquity assigns this piece to Justin; the author gives himself out as Justin, who wrote the Apologies, for he quotes a passage from the *second* (as it is called), as coming from himself[1]. The author describes himself in the introduction, as one who had left Platonism for Chris-

[1] S. Simon Magus in Dial. Tryph. 349.

tianity, which exactly suits Justin. No unprejudiced man can deny that the treatise must have been written by a contemporary of Justin, or at least by a man, the time of whose life approached nearly to that age; now one cannot imagine any reasonable cause, why a man, who could bear so much weight by his own personal qualities, as Justin could, if we judge of him from this book, instead of writing it in his own name, should have allowed this book to appear under the mask of a contemporary. Besides, we find in this book no trace of the endeavour, elsewhere so apparent in such counterfeited pieces, to bring certain favourite notions into vogue. Its principal feature is controversy against the Jews and Judaists, and this could obtain no new support with either party by the name of the heathen from Samaria, the former Platonist [1].

The same circumstance will perhaps strike us here, as in the above-mentioned controversial treatise against the heathen; but the case is altered here. We saw there that Justin was endeavouring to show on the one hand, the affinity between Christianity and the best of Grecian philosophy; and on the other, the unsatisfactoriness of the latter in regard to religion. If therefore, the former point of view was likely to be most prominent in the Apologies addressed to the philosopher M. Aurelius, it would on the contrary, be wholly suppressed in a treatise directed against the Jews, who sought in Grecian philosophy a completion of the religious instruction of the Old Testament. There appears also, nevertheless, an affinity of ideas between the Dialogue and the Apologies, even in the favourite notion of the Apologies, that of the λογος σπερματικος. As he says in the first Apology, that men would have been able to excuse themselves in their sins, if the Λογος had revealed himself to human nature, for the first time, only an hundred and fifty years ago, and if he had not been in operation in all ages by means of the λογος σπερματικος; he says the same thing

[1] The reasons against the genuinenessof this work are given by Wetstein, Prolegomena in Nov. Test.; and Semler in his Edition of Wetstein, 1764. p. 174 (see an answer to their arguments from the mode in which the Alexandrian version is cited, in Stroth Repertorium für bibl. und Morgenländ. Literatur. Bd. ii. §74,) and Koch in his Justini Martyris dial. cum Tryphone secundum regulas criticas examinat. et νοθευσεως convictus, 1700 (a work which I have never seen); and Lange in the first book of his History of Opinions. There is an admirable confutation of them by Münscher. See Commentationes Theologicæ, Ed. Rosenmüller, Fuldner and Maurer, t. i. pt. ii.

here in regard to the moral ideas (*φυσικαι ἐννοιαι*) inseparable from human nature, which compelled man universally to acknowledge sins as sins; and which might have been extinguished and overwhelmed rather than annihilated by the operations of the evil spirit, and by bad education, customs, and laws. What he here says of that, which has revealed itself in all ages, and in accordance with its own nature, as Good, by which alone men could please God, is said in opposition to the Ceremonial Law, which was only calculated as a means of discipline and education for the hard-heartedness of the Jews; or as a system of typical prophecy[1]. This leads us to the idea of that *λογος σπερματικος*, through which a moral conscience was given to all mankind.

There is, indeed, in the Apologies no trace of Chiliasm (Millenarianism), but the spiritual ideas of eternal life, and of the reign of Christ, which shine forth in the Apologies, are by no means contradictory to this doctrine (see above); but we must certainly consider, that the Chiliasts themselves, only considered the reign of a thousand years as a point of transition to a higher grade of life. It may easily be explained, why he should not quote this doctrine, which was peculiarly offensive to the heathens; because, although important in his estimation, it did not belong to the chief and fundamental doctrines of Christianity, which latter he certainly brought forward without disguise, even when they were offensive to the heathens. In a dialogue, intended to justify the doctrines of Christianity against the reproaches of the Jews, he had, on the contrary, particular occasion to bring forward this doctrine, in order to show that Christians were orthodox, even in this point, according to the Jewish notions. In both these works an Anti-Gnostic and Anti-Marcionitish spirit is prominent, on which Chiliasm would in those times easily be engrafted.

In the doctrine of the Logos, and the Holy Spirit, (see above,) there is a striking similarity between the Dialogue and the two Apologies. There are exhibited besides in thoughts and expressions, which occur in both works, even more significant marks of the identity of the author[2].

[1] *τα φυσει και ἀει και δι' ὁλου καλα και δικαια και ἀγαθα.* See § ? p. 247. 264. 320.

[2] See the mystical explanation of the Messianic passage, Gen. xlix. 11, in Apol. ii. 74. "*το γαρ πλυνων την στολην αὐτου ἐν αἱματι σταφυλης*" *προαγγελτικον ἠν του παθους, οὐ πασχειν ἐμελλε, δι' αἱματος καθαιρων τους πιστευοντας*

We cannot at all determine with certainty whether Justin really held such a disputation with a Jew named Trypho; but at least it is most probable, that many disputations with Jews gave him an opportunity of writing such a dialogue, as he would by that means have acquired such an acquaintance with the Jewish theology of that day. He was always ready to give a reason of his faith, both to Jews and to heathens. As we cannot ascertain what is mere ornament, and what is real fact in this dialogue, we cannot find any sufficient marks in it for a chronological decision; but it is certain, by the quotation from the first Apology, that this dialogue was written later than that work, and apparently, from what we have above said, than both the Apologies.

Justin in this dialogue speaks of the power of the Gospel from his own experience, as he does in the Apologies: "I found in the doctrines of Christ," he says, "the only sure and saving philosophy, for it has in itself a power which commands reverence, which restrains those, who depart from the right path, and the sweetest tranquillity is the lot of those who practise it. It is clear that this doctrine is sweeter than honey, because we who have been formed by it, even to death, never deny his name."

We have to lament the loss of a work of Justin against all the heretical sects of his own day, as well as of his work against Marcion. It is a matter of very great doubt, whether the fragment of a work on the resurrection, which John of Damascus, in the eighth century, has imparted to us under the name of Justin, really belongs to him; Eusebius, Jerome, and Photius knew nothing of such a work by him.

Among the most beautiful remains of Christian antiquity, is a letter which is found among the works of Justin, on the characteristics of Christian worship in relation to heathenism and

αὐτῳ· ἡ γαρ κεκλημενη ὑπο του θειου πνευματος δια του προφητου στολη, οἱ πιστευοντες αὐτῳ εἰσιν ἀνθρωποι, ἐν οἱς οἰκει το παρα τον Θεον σπερμα, ὁ λογος, το δε εἰρημενον αἱμα της σταφυλης, σημαντικον του ἐχειν μεν αἱμα τον φανησομενον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐξ ἀνθρωπειου σπερματος, ἀλλ' ἐκ θειας δυναμεως. Compare with this the passage in Dial. Tryph. 273, which betrays the same author, who only in that passage made use of such expressions, which were rather borrowed from the language of the Platonic philosophy, as his object required. το τῳ αἱματι αὐτου ἀποπλυνειν μελλειν τους πιστευοντας αὐτῳ ἐδηλου· στολην γαρ αὐτου ἐκαλεσε το ἁγιον πνευμα τους δι' αὐτου ἀφεσιν ἁμαρτιων λαβοντας ἐν οἱς ἀει δυναμει μεν παρεστι και ἐναργως δε παρεσται ἐν τῃ δευτερᾳ αὐτου παρουσιᾳ· το δε αἱμα σταφυλης εἰπειν τον λογον, δεδηλωκεν, ὁτι αἱμα μεν ἐχει ὁ Χριστος οὐκ ἐξ ἀνθρωπου σπερματος, ἀλλ' ἐκ της του Θεου δυναμεως.

Christianity. It contains that splendid portraiture of the Christian life, from which we have already quoted some passages. Its language and thoughts, as well as the silence of the ancients, prove that the letter does not proceed from Justin. But the Christian simplicity which reigns in this letter bespeaks its high antiquity, which is further supported by this circumstance, that the author classes Judaism and heathenism together, and does not appear to deduce the Jewish cultus from a Divine origin, and yet there is nothing properly Gnostic in the treatise,—a phenomenon which could only exist in a very early age.

We cannot, however, from the author's speaking of the sacrifices of the Jews as an existing thing, show that he lived before the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem; for in a lively description he might very well present in such a manner what really did not exist any longer. Nor does his calling himself the disciple of the Apostles, give us any sure chronological mark, because he might name himself thus as a follower of their writings and doctrines; *even if* this passage in the beginning of § 11 really belongs to the *genuine* letter.

The part which follows it is clearly from another hand; that which is there said of the Jewish people, of the Divine authority of the Old Testament, and of orthodoxy, which fixes itself on the determinations of the Fathers, by no means corresponds with the character of mind and thought, which prevail in this letter.

Justin, as he himself says in the last-quoted Apology, expected that his death would be compassed by a person, from one of the then notorious classes of hypocritical professors of holiness,—a Cynic, as he was called, named Crescens, who was much esteemed by the people, and excited them against the Christians; for he had peculiarly attracted the hatred of this man to himself by exposing his hypocrisy. According to Eusebius, Crescens really accomplished the purpose, with which he had threatened Justin; but Eusebius in support of this quotes a passage from Tatian [1], the scholar of Justin, which can by no means be used to prove it; for Tatian there says only, that Crescens *had endeavoured* to compass the death of Justin, from which it does not follow, that he succeeded in that endeavour [2].

Eusebius may, however, be quite right in affirming, that Justin

[1] § 19. orat. contra Græcos. [2] θανατῳ περιβαλειν πραγματευσασθαι.

suffered martyrdom during the reign of M. Aurelius. This account is in accordance with the relation of the martyrdom of Justin and his fellow-traveller, which, although it does not come from a source entitled to our confidence [1], yet bears upon it many internal marks, which speak more in favour of, than against its authenticity [2].

The next to Justin in order of time is Tatian of Assyria, his disciple, of whom we have already spoken in the history of the Gnostic sects [3]. He himself in the only writing which we have of his, which we are about to mention, gives an explanation of the progress of his religious development. He was brought up in heathenism; and frequent travels gave him an opportunity of learning the multifarious sorts of heathen worship, which at that time were existing together in the Roman empire. None, among them all, could recommend itself to him as reasonable: not only did he observe how religion in them was used to the service of sin; but even the highly-wrought allegorical interpretations of the ancient myths, as symbols of a speculative system of natural philosophy, could not satisfy him, and it appeared to him a dishonourable proceeding for a man to attach himself to the popular religion, who did partake in the common religious belief, and who saw nothing in its doctrines about the gods, but symbols of the elements and powers of nature. The mysteries into which he suffered himself to be initiated, appeared to him also in the same manner, not to correspond to the expectations, which they awakened, and the contradictory systems of the philosophers offered him no sure grounds of religious faith. He was rendered mistrustful of them, by the contradiction, which he often observed in those, who gave themselves out as philosophers, between the seriousness which they exhibited for the sake of appearances in their dress, mien, and language, and the levity of their conduct. While he was in this condition, he came to the Old Testament, to which his attention was drawn by what he had heard of the

[1] In the collection of Symeon Metaphrastes.

[2] These marks and grounds are the following: that it contains no miraculous tales, and nothing exaggerated, nothing that contradicts the simple circumstances of Christian Churches in those days, and that one reads nothing at all about Crescens in it; for one would expect a Græculus, who invented the history of such a martyrdom, setting out from the supposition, that Crescens compassed the death of Justin, would have made him an important personage, and told many tales about him.

[3] See above, vol. ii. p. 108.

high antiquity of these writings, in comparison of the Hellenic religions, as might easily be the case with a Syrian. He himself says of the impression which the reading of this book made upon him: "These writings found acceptance with me because of the simplicity of their language, the unstudiedness of the writer, the intelligible history of the creation, because of the prediction of the future, because of the wholesomeness of their precepts, and because of the doctrine of the One God which prevails throughout them[1]." The impression which the study of the Old Testament made upon him, would appear from this to have been with him the preparation for a belief in the Gospel[2]. Coming in this state of mind to Rome, he was converted to Christianity by Justin, of whom he speaks with great reverence.

After the death of the latter, he wrote his "Address to the heathen," in which he defends the φιλοσοφια των βαρβαρων against the contempt of the Greeks, who had, nevertheless, received the seeds of all knowledge and arts originally from the Barbarians. In his view of the relation of the philosophy as well as the religion of the Greeks to Christianity, we recognise far more the *later* than the *earlier* Justin. We have already observed (page 108), that even as early as in this treatise, the seeds of a speculative and ascetic turn of thought are to be seen, which he probably brought from Syria with him, as also its obscure style betrays the Syrian. He says to the heathen: "Wherefore will ye excite your state-religion to battle against us? And wherefore should I be hated as the most godless of men, because I will not follow the laws of your religion? The Emperor commands taxes to be paid, I am ready to pay them. The Lord commands me to serve him; I know how I have to serve him, for we must honour men as becomes men, but fear God alone, who can be seen by no human eye, and comprehended by no human art. It is only when I am commanded to deny him, that I refuse to obey, but prefer to die, that I may not appear ungrateful and a liar."

Next to Tatian comes Athenagoras, who addressed his Apology (πρεσβεια περι Χριστιανων), to the Emperor M. Aurelius, and

[1] Tatian had already learnt the untenableness of Polytheism, and was already come to the persuasion that none but a Monotheistic religion could be a true one.

[2] It would in this case be remarkable, that Tatian should afterwards have become an Anti-Jewish Gnostic; but we have remarked above, that we are by no means justified in this supposition. See p. 109.

his son Commodus[1]. We have no distinct account of this man's personal history. Only two among the ancients mention him, Methodius and Philip of Sida, who was the last president of the school of Catechists at Alexandria, the only person who relates any thing of the history of the life of Athenagoras[2]; which, however, deserves no credit at all, because this writer is known to be undeserving of our confidence, and because it contradicts other creditable documents, and because of the suspicious circumstances under which the fragment from him has come down to us. Neither what Athenagoras (see above) says of a second marriage, nor what he says of the ecstacy of the Prophets, who served as the unconscious instruments of the operations of the Holy Spirit, suffices to prove him a Montanist; because, as we remarked above, the Montanists in this case said nothing altogether new, but only carried an already existing mode of thought on religious and moral matters to the extreme.

We have also a writing in *Defence of the Resurrection*, by the same Athenagoras.

Together with the Apologists we may mention a writer who is not otherwise known to us, Hermias, who wrote a short treatise in ridicule of the heathen philosophers (διασυρμος των ἐξω φιλοσοφων). He seeks to collect together a multitude of foolish and mutually contradictory opinions of the Grecian philosophers, without advancing anything positive himself,—a proceeding, which could scarcely be of any utility; for in order to persuade those who had received a philosophical education, more would be required than this declamation, and with the ignorant there was no need either of such a caution against the errors of the philosophers, or of such a negative preparation for the Gospel. We see in this Hermias, an example of one of those passionate enemies of the Grecian philosophy, against whom Clement of Alexandria contends (see above), who in accordance with Jewish fables, deduced the Grecian philosophy from the communications of fallen angels. This Hermias is called a philosopher in the superscription of his book; it may be the case, that before his conversion he went about in the garb of the philosopher, and then after his conver-

[1] See the essay of Mosheim on the time at which this Apology was written, in the first part of his Commentationes ad hist. eccles. pertinentes.

[2] Published by Dodwell (Dissertt. in Irenæum). He relates that Athenagoras lived in the time of Adrian and Antoninus Pius, to whom he presented his Apology, and that he was Catechist at Alexandria, *before* Clement.

sion he passed over from enthusiasm for the Grecian philosophy to passionate hatred against it. According to the different constitution of men's minds, on a change of opinions, their new habits of thought may be engrafted on their former, as in the case of Justin and Clement of Alexandria, or they may produce a violent and harsh abomination of their former sentiments.

The Church in the great metropolis of the Eastern part of Roman Asia—a flourishing seat of literature—could not be at a loss for teachers *gifted with a learned education*, and their intercourse with well-educated heathens and Gnostics would evidently spur on their activity as authors. Theophilus was Bishop of this Church in the time of M. Aurelius. After the death of this Emperor, he wrote, during the reign of Commodus, an apologetic work in three books, addressed to Autolycus, a heathen, through whose reproaches against Christianity he was induced to write this work, in which he shows himself a thinking man, and full of knowledge. We have already quoted some parts of this work. It is remarkable that this Theophilus, who wrote against Marcion and Hermogenes, composed also a commentary on the Holy Scripture. We see here the seed of that exegetic disposition of the Antiochian Church, of which we shall speak again at the end of this section [1].

During the course of the second century a peculiar turn of mind in theology was formed in the Church of Asia Minor. It was here that the Anti-Gnostic, practical and realistic spirit (which we have described in the general introduction to this section) first took a definite form. The practical Christian spirit, which had resulted from the long activity of the Apostle John in these regions, often alloyed here, we freely confess with

[1] Jerome c. 25. de vir. ill. quotes a commentary of his in evangelium (which may denote the whole corpus evangeliorum), and on the Proverbs, but he adds: "qui mihi cum superiorum voluminum elegantia et phrasi non videntur congruere." But in his preface to his Commentary on St. Matthew, he distinctly quotes Commentaries of Theophilus; and in his letter to Algasia, t. iv. p. 197, he quotes, as it appears, an explanatory harmony, or synopsis of the Gospels by him (qui quatuor Evangelistarum in unum opus dicta compingens). All this may certainly be only notices of the same work. We have nothing more of his (as the Latin fragments under the name of Theophilus do not belong to him) unless the Catenæ contain fragments of his. The specimen which Jerome gives of his mode of interpretation is far from the spirit of the late Antiochian school, for it shows a fanciful mode of allegorizing, which might suit well enough with the Alexandrian cast of mind, which betrays itself in the work first quoted.

a mixture of a carnal tendency, opposed itself to the speculative caprice and licence of the Gnostic sects and schools, which made especial progress in these places. A firm dependence on the doctrines and declarations, which the oldest of the leaders of the Church remembered to have heard from the mouth of St. John himself, opposed a counter-balancing weight to Gnosticism; and these men, of simple spirit and childlike piety, performed this service towards the development of the Church, that through them the extension of the pure fundamental principles of the Gospel was secured, and the practical spirit of Christianity preserved unalloyed, although from the impure source of tradition, in which the Divine and the Human were often mingled together, they received and attached importance to many accompaniments which were foreign to the essential nature of Christianity. But then, if only the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, and the genuine documents of the original, pure communication of the word of God, were propagated, provision was by that means made, that Christianity should be able to cleanse itself by its inward divine power from such dross, as in the stream of its temporal development it must constantly contract. But could the spirit of Gnosticism have obtained the victory; then, inasmuch as it destroys the essential foundations of Christianity, the collection of the holy original documents would have been sacrificed to caprice, and the possibility of such a process of purification would thus have been cut off.

It was the endeavour of these teachers of the Church to oppose to the caprice of the Gnostics the concordant tradition of the Christian Churches, especially of those of Apostolical origin. From this endeavour, apparently proceeded the first beginning of an Ecclesiastical History, the work of Hegesippus, a Jew of Asia Minor, converted to Christianity, who lived during the reigns of Hadrian and the Antonines, and who, perhaps in order to reconcile differences between the usages of the Jewish and heathen churches, or to persuade himself by ocular demonstration of the harmony of all old Churches in the essentials of Christianity, undertook a journey to Rome in the days of Antoninus Pius, and remained there for a season. The result of his enquiries and collections was his 'Five Books of Ecclesiastical Events' (πεντε ὑπομνηματα ἐκκλησιαστικων πραξεων). He may perhaps here have inserted much impure tradition of Jewish

origin, and have been influenced by many errors, proceeding from a Judæo-Christian carnal mode of thought. The picture of James, who was called the brother of the Lord, is painted by him entirely in the taste of the Ebionites[1]. From a quotation, however, made by Stephanus Gobarus[2], a monophysite writer of the latter part of the sixth century, it may be concluded, that he was, as a proper Ebionite, an opponent of the Apostle Paul; for in the fifth book of his Ecclesiastical History, after citing the words of 1 Cor. ii. 9. "That which no eye hath seen, no ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of any man;" he says that this is false, and that those who said such things belied the Holy Scriptures and the Lord, who said, "Blessed are your eyes, for they see, and your ears, for they hear," Matth. xiii. 16[3]. If we refer these words of Hegesippus to the above-cited passage of St. Paul, it appears to follow, that he accused him of false doctrine; nay, accused him of having quoted something under the name of Scripture, which is not to be found there. But the contentment of Hegesippus with the general tradition of the Church, and his connexion with the Church of Rome, oppose this supposition. According to this supposition, he must have been an opponent of both. As far as we can judge (without knowing the context that belongs to these words of Hegesippus) we should, therefore, far rather conjecture, that he said this not in opposition to St. Paul, but in his angry zeal against the opponents of carnal Chiliasm, who might probably enough quote the above passage of St. Paul, and similar ones, in order to oppose sensual representations of the happiness of the world to come.

The contests *about the time of Easter* (see above), and concerning the Montanistic spirit of prophecy, gave afterwards, as well as the controversies against the Gnostics, and the Apologies against the heathens, another circumstance to exercise the activity of these Church-teachers, as authors. The list of the writings of Melito, Bishop of Sardis, whom we have already mentioned as the author of an Apology addressed to the Emperor M. Aurelius, shows with what matters the Church-teachers of Asia Minor then occupied themselves. We find among them the following treatises: on *Right Conduct*, on the *Prophets*, of *Prophecy*, of the *Church*, of

[1] Euseb. ii. 23. [2] In Photius, Cod. 235.

[3] ματην μεν ειρησθαι ταυτα, και καταψευδεσθαι τους ταυτα φαμενους των τε θειων γραφων και του Κυριου λεγοντος, &c.

the *Revelation of St. John* (which writings may collectively refer to the circumstances of the Montanistic controversy), *the Key* (ἡ κλεις), (perhaps this also refers to the keys of the Church [1], in reference to the controversies about penitence,) a treatise on *Sunday* (perhaps in reference to the controversies between the Jewish and heathen Christians about the festival of the Sabbath, or Sunday), *on the Corporeality of God*, a defence of that sensuous Anti-Gnostic conception [2]. The contents of the following treatises may also refer to the controversies against Gnosticism: on the *Nature of Man*, on *the Creation of the Soul*, ὅr on the *Body*, or on *the Spirit*, on the *Birth of Christ*, on *Truth*, on *Faith*, on *the Senses, of the obedience of Faith* [3]. The importance of the subjects, and their deep hold upon the life of the Church in those times, make us regret the more the loss of these writings.

Claudius Apollinaris, whom we mentioned above, Bishop of Hierapolis, in Phrygia, was a contemporary of Melito; his

[1] [The *Power* of the *Keys* is the more usual English phrase, but this would include more than the subject of penitence. H. J. R.]

[2] περι ἐνσωματου Θεου. These words might be taken to mean, *concerning the appearance of God in the flesh*; or, *concerning the incarnation of God*. But a comparison with the account of the trustworthy Origen, on the contents of the book (fragment. Commentar. in Gen. vol. ii. Opp. fol. 25.) compels us to the explanation we have given.

[3] The list of writings is to be found in Eusebius, iv. 26. [The expression in Neander is, '*von den Sinnen des glaubigen Gehorsams*;' which appears to me to be only capable of the above translation, or of this, 'about the senses of faithful obedience;' *i. e.* about the senses, by which we perceive and accede to the doctrines of the faith; meaning, perhaps, our inward means of perception, &c. On referring, however, to Eusebius, I see that the title of the work is ὁ περι ὑπακοης πιστεως αἰσθητηριων, on which in Heinichen's edition, I find the following note extracted (I believe) from Valesius. "'Ο περι ὑπακοης, &c. Apud Nicephorum legitur ὁ περι ὑπακοης πιστεως· και ὁ περι αἰσθητηριων, ut duo fuerint Melitonis libri; alter de obedientia fidei, alter de sensibus, idque confirmant Hieronymus et Rufinus. In omnibus tamen nostris codicibus legitur και ὁ περι ὑπακοης πιστεως αἰσθητηριων absque distinctione, quam R. Stephanus post vocem πιστεως addidit. Fuit igitur hic Melitonis liber ita inscriptus: De obedientia sensuum fidei; seu quod idem est, de obedientia fidei, quæ fit a sensibus. Quidam enim hæretici aiebant, animales quidem seu psychicos sensuum opera, spiritales vero per rationem. Ita Heracleo explicabat locum illum ex Joannis evangelio: *Nisi signa et prodigia videritis, non credetis.* Quæ Christi verba aiebat Heracleo dici proprie ad eos, qui per opera et sensus naturam habeant obediendi, non autem credendi per rationem. Refert hæc Origenes enarrationum in Joannis Evangelium tomo xiii., ubi id refutat, docetque tam spiritales quam animales non posse nisi per sensum credere." This title is therefore differently understood by others, and made to mean *on the acceptance of the faith by means of the senses.* On Heracleon, see Grabe Spicil. vol. ii. p. 80. N.B. The titles of the works are altogether uncertain, from the various lections in this passage. H. J. R.]

writings, although not so numerous, were occupied with several similar matters[1].

From the school of these Church-teachers of Asia Minor, proceeded Irenæus; who, after the martyrdom of Pothinus, became Bishop of the Church of Lyons and Vienne (see above). He remembered, even in his advanced age, what he had heard in his youth from the mouth of Polycarp, about the life and doctrine of Christ and the Apostles. In a piece, addressed to Florinus, an heretical teacher, with whom he had been in his youth with Polycarp, he says, "These doctrines, the Elders, who preceded us, and were in habits of intercourse with the Apostles, have not delivered to you; for when I was a boy, I saw you[2] with Polycarp in Asia Minor, for I remember what then happened better than things of the present day; what we have learnt in childhood grows up with the soul, and becomes one with it, so that I could describe the place in which the holy Polycarp used to sit and talk, his out-going and his in-coming, his mode of life, his personal appearance, the discourses he addressed to the multitude, and his own account of his intercourse with John, as well as with the rest of those who had seen the Lord; and how he remembered their conversations, and the account they gave of the Lord's miracles and doctrines. While he related all from the accounts of eye-witnesses of his life, he related it in entire accordance with the Scripture. This I heard at that time with earnestness by reason of the grace of God imparted to me, writing it down, not on paper, but on my heart, and I am able by the grace of God, constantly to bring it with freshness into my memory. I can also testify before God, that if that blessed and apostolic Presbyter had heard any such thing, he would have cried out at once and stopped his ears, and have said according to his custom, 'Oh! good God! for what a time hast thou preserved me, that I should endure this!' and he would have left the place, where he was sitting or standing, when he heard such language[3]." The spirit,

[1] If in the Catenæ, especially in the Catena of *Nicephorus* on the *Octateuchus*, published at Leipzig, 1772, the fragments which belong to this Apollinaris were properly separated from those which belong to Apollinaris of Laodicea, and the fragments in Eusebius, and the Chronicon Paschale Alexandrinum, were compared with them, the character of this Church-teacher might be drawn more definitely.

[2] [Neander has here omitted a part of the sentence. λαμπρως πραττοντα ἐν τῃ βασιλικῃ αὐλῃ, και πειρωμενον εὐδοκιμειν παρ' αὐτῳ. H. J. R.]

[3] Euseb. v. 20.

which here speaks out, was inherited by Irenæus. We have already spoken of his peculiar practical disposition in his conception and mode of handling the doctrine of Faith, his zeal for the essentials of Christianity, and his moderation and liberality in controversies about external, non-essential things. We observed above (see p. 193), that he apparently came forward as a peace-maker between the Montanists and their most violent adversaries. This supposition suits best with the spirit of his writings; for his having many opinions and dispositions, which agreed with the spirit of Montanism, and which would therefore contribute particularly to endear him to a Tertullian, cannot, after the observations we made above, about the relations of Montanism and the opinions of the Church, at all serve as a proof that he was a Montanist. Had he been a zealous Montanist, whenever he touched upon a darling theme of Montanism, he could scarcely have omitted to appeal to the new explanations communicated by the Paraclete; but he always appeals only to Scripture, or to the traditions of those elders of Asia Minor. But we cannot possibly suppose, that where he speaks of the condemnation of false prophets, he means by that the Montanistic prophets, for he was probably too favourable to the Montanists for this; but as a zealous Montanist, he would hardly have omitted to mention, with the false prophets, also the opponents of the true prophets; because he is here reckoning up everything deserving of condemnation. Instead of this, a passage follows, which far more characterizes the peace-loving spirit of Irenæus, which endeavoured to prevent a schism between the Montanistic and other Churches, as it made peace in the controversies about Easter: "The Lord will also judge those, who create schisms, who have not the love of God, and seek their own advantage, not the unity of the Church; who, for slight reasons cut in pieces the great and glorious body of Christ, and, as much as in them lies, destroy it, who really do strain out a gnat and swallow a camel. But no advantage which they can offer, can counterbalance the evil of schism[1]." These were the principles on which he acted also in the controversies about Easter (see above)[2].

[1] L. iv. c. 33. § 6. [L. iv. c. 62. Ed. Bill. and Feuard. Paris, 1675.]

[2] It may be concluded also, from the manner in which Tertullian adv. Valentinian. c. 5. speaks of Irenæus, that he was no Montanist, for otherwise he would have called him "noster" as he does call Proculus immediately after.

The chief work of Irenæus, which for the most part has only descended to us in the old literal Latin translation, with important fragments of the original Greek, is his *Confutation of the Gnostic Systems*, in five books, which has preserved to us the most graphic picture of his mind.

Many of the writings of Irenæus we know only by name. He himself cites a writing in which he has treated of *a matter*, which seems to be quite foreign to this Father's turn of mind; viz. *of the peculiarities of St. Paul's style*, the *hyperbata* which so often occur in his writings[1]. It is probable that this treatise was not *expressly* upon the peculiar language of this Apostle, but that Irenæus incidentally touches upon this subject, while he is combating the capricious nature of the Gnostic exegesis, which, no doubt, despised with theosophic contempt (see above) the simple rules of all just interpretation. He justly observes, that the origin of this peculiarity in St. Paul's style lies in the overwhelming press of thoughts that arise in his ardent spirits[2]; a remark which, as it pre-supposes a recognition of the natural peculiarities of man's character while under the influence of the Holy Spirit, is founded upon a more liberal and just conception of inspiration, although Irenæus may not have been aware of it.

It will besides be seen by this example, as we have before observed, that the opposition to Gnosticism promoted the growth of sound hermeneutical principles, although they were not always justly used, but their application was sometimes led astray to serve the purpose of a moment in regard to some doctrinal controversy, as was the case with Irenæus in the passage we have quoted.

Among the writings of this Father, which we find named by the ancients, we shall only mention two letters, which have an historical importance in consequence of their subject, because schisms in the Romish Church were to be healed up by them. One is addressed to Blastus, who was probably a presbyter of the Romish Church. The account in the additions to Tertullian de Præscriptione[3] is likely enough to be true, viz. that Blastus had

[1] L. III. c. 7. quemadmodum de [*ex* al. edit. H. J. R.] multis et alibi ostendimus eum utentem.

[2] Propter velocitatem sermonum suorum et propter impetum, qui in ipso est, spiritus. [Ita Neander. I find the passage he alludes to in the addition found in the MS. of Agobardus to the treatise de Præscriptione Hæreticorum, § liii.]

introduced a schism into the Romish Church by his adherence to the usage of Asia Minor in regard to the time of the Paschal festival. This suits perfectly well with the time of Victor, Bishop of Rome; and perhaps also many other Jewish notions were interwoven with this opinion about Easter.

The other letter was addressed to a presbyter, named Florinus, with whom Irenæus in early youth had lived with the aged Polycarp; and who, it would seem, carried Monarchianism, or the doctrine of one God, as the Creator of all Being, to such an extreme, that he made God the origin of evil [1].

Hippolytus is named as a disciple of Irenæus by Photius [2], and took a prominent place among the ecclesiastical writers of the

[1] It is difficult to judge from the title of the book, as it is quoted by Eusebius, v. 26, in what the peculiarity of the opinions of Florinus consisted. The title is *περι μοναρχιας ἡ περι του μη ειναι τον Θεον ποιητην κακων*. The first part of this title may be taken to mean that Florinus, as a Gnostic Dualist, had denied the doctrine of the *μοναρχια*; but then this will not suit the second part, for this cannot be understood as if Florinus had maintained the existence of an *absolute evil principle* [i. e. an *independent one*, H. J. R.] or a Demiurgos, as the author of an imperfect universe, for in this case the title must have run thus, *περι του μη ειναι Θεον τον ποιητην κακων* [1]. It can therefore only be understood to mean, that Irenæus wished to show how we must maintain the doctrine of the Unity (the Monarchia), without making the *μια ἀρχη* the *ἀρχη των κακων*, and also that Florinus had made God the Creator of evil, whether it was in accordance with a doctrine of absolute predestination, which many uninformed Christians had imagined from passages of the Old Testament, which they understood too literally, (according to Origen, Philocal. c. i. p. 17. *τοιαυτα ὑπολαμβανοντες περι του Θεου, ὁποια οὐδε περι του ὠμοτατου και ἀδικωτατου ἀνθρωπου*, forming such opinions of God as they would not of the most unjust and cruel of men), or whether it was, that he made God the Creator of an absolute evil principle, whether a conscious or an inconscious one (an *ὑλη*). But further, had Florinus only held one of the common Gnostic doctrines about the origin of evil, Irenæus would not have said, that no heretic even had ventured to bring forward such a doctrine. Since Eusebius says, that Florinus afterwards allowed himself to be carried away by the Valentinian doctrines, and that Irenæus was in consequence induced to write his book *περι ὀγδοαδος* against him (see above, in the account of the Gnostic systems), it would seem to follow from this, that the earlier doctrines of Florinus *were no Gnostic doctrines*. One is inclined therefore to think that, while Florinus acknowledged the untenableness of a theory, which placed the cause of evil in God, he fell into the opposite extreme, and supposed a self-existent independent principle of evil out of God.

[2] Cod. 121.

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[1] [See Middleton on the Greek Article, p. 50, in the edition of 1833, by my late brother. This is only in accordance with the well-known rule, that in such propositions the subject has the article, and the predicate has not. The translation of the first title would be on the Unity of God, or an essay to show that God is not *the creator of evil*. Of the second it would be—to show that the creator of evil (i. e. the Demiurgos, or whosoever it may be *whose existence is assumed* as creator of evil) is not God. H. J. R.]

first half of the third century; but unfortunately only a very small portion of his works has remained to us. The testimony, however, of Photius taken by itself, is not sufficient to establish the account, that he was a disciple of Irenæus; but since, as appears from his quotation, expressions of Hippolytus himself about his connexion with Irenæus lay before his eyes, and since in the turn of mind of Hippolytus, so far as we can judge of it from the fragments and titles of his works, (inasfar as these give us any means of drawing conclusions as to their contents, and the tendency of his exertions as an author,) there is nothing to oppose such a supposition, but rather, on the contrary, much to favour it, we may fairly give credit to this account.

Hippolytus was a bishop. But since neither Eusebius nor Jerome were able to indicate the city in which he was bishop, we cannot state any thing definite on the subject, nor do the later accounts, which place his see in Arabia [1], nor the others, which place it in the neighbourhood of Rome [2], deserve consideration. Certainly there is much to prove that the sphere of his exertions was in the East, and much, on the contrary, to fix it in the West. Both these points may be reconciled by introducing the supposition of different times; and this very circumstance, that he was occupied at different times in different countries, may have given rise to the indistinctness of the ancient accounts of him.

We may obtain a perfect catalogue of his writings, by comparing together the citations of Eusebius and Jerome, the specification of his works found upon the marble statue [3] to his memory, which was dug up at Rome, on the road to Tivoli, A.D. 1551, the account of Photius, and the catalogue of Ebedjesu [4], the Nestorian writer of the thirteenth century. We see from these indications, that he wrote various exegetical, doctrinal, polemico-doctrinal and chronological works, and homilies.

[1] According to one supposition it was Porus Romanus, or Aden, in Arabia, to which report perhaps only a misunderstanding of the passage in Eusebius, vi. 20, may have given rise.

[2] Portus Romanus—Ostia.

[3] In which he is represented as sitting on his Episcopal seat, the καθεδρα or θρονος, and underneath him is the sixteen-year Cycle of Easter prepared by him, κανων ἐκκαιδεκαετηρινος, of which there is a full investigation in the second part of Ideler's Handbuch der Chronologie, p. 214, &c. The monument itself is published in the first part of the edition, by Fabricius, of the works of Hippolytus.

[4] In Assemani Bibliotheca Orientalis, t. iii. p. 1.

We shall mention only those of his writings, the subject of which gives them an historical importance. In regard to Exegesis, Jerome hints that he preceded Origen in giving an example of an accomplished interpretation of Scripture, and that Ambrosius (see below), the friend of Origen, had urged him to follow this example. He must somewhere, whether it was at Alexandria, in Palestine, or in Arabia, have met with Origen, because Jerome cites an homily by Hippolytus in praise of our Saviour, which he had delivered in the presence of Origen [1]. His exegesis, judging from the few fragments that remain, was of the allegorizing kind.

In the enumeration of his writings on that old monument, a work occurs ὑπερ του κατα Ἰωαννην εὐαγγελιου και ἀποκαλυψεως. This can hardly be a commentary on these two books of the Bible, although Jerome seems to quote a commentary of Hippolytus on the Revelations; but this title would far more indicate a piece written in defence of those two books. This is also in accordance with the title, which Ebedjesu gives to this work. We must therefore suppose it a defence of the genuineness of these scriptural books, and a justification of them from the reproaches of the Alogi. If Hippolytus in this appears as an opponent of the Ultra Anti-Montanists, this agrees with the fact, that he wrote a book on the Charismata [2]. We may here refer to the circumstance that Stephanus Gobarus, in Photius, l. c., opposes to each other the opinions of Hippolytus and Gregory of Nyssa, about the Montanists, from which we may conclude, that the former belonged to the defenders of the Montanists. We have no means of determining with certainty whether the κεφαλαια προς Γαιον, which Ebedjesu ascribes to him, are to be brought into the account in this matter. (If, in fact, this Caius was the violent opponent of Montanism.)

A work of Hippolytus is quoted *against the two-and-thirty heresies*, which (according to Photius) closed with the heresy of Noetus. He declares, as Photius has quoted him, that he has in this work made use of the contents of a series of discourses by

[1] Had this discourse been preserved, it would perhaps have given us a great deal of information on the history of the festivals of the Epiphany and Christmas.

[2] It cannot be entirely ascertained with certainty whether this work bore the title ἀποστολικη παραδοσις περι χαρισματων, or whether the work on the Charismata, and the exposition of the Apostolical Tradition, were two separate works.

Irenæus against these heresies [1]. We have already quoted his writing against Noetus, which is still preserved, which probably formed the conclusion of this work.

We have also an unimportant piece by him *on the Antichrist*, which was also known to Photius. The same writer mentions a commentary on Daniel by him, out of which he quotes the remarkable circumstance [2], that he placed the end of the world at 500 years after the birth of Christ. His placing this event later than it was usual to represent it in the earliest ages of the Church, may be attributed to the season of tranquillity, which the Church was then enjoying, under Alexander Severus.

In the list of the writings of Hippolytus on the monument, a προτρεπτικον προς Σεβηρειναν occurs. It is hardly to be doubted that this is the very treatise, from which Theodoret, in his ἐρανιστης, quotes several passages under the title of a *Letter to the Queen or Empress* (προς βασιλιδα), which Fabricius has collected in his edition of Hippolytus. Its contents answer to the title, which the writing mentioned in the monument bore; it is a discussion of the doctrines of the Christian faith, for the advantage of a heathen woman. That Severina must also have been a queen or an empress. But the name Severina can hardly be correct; it must be Severa, and it is in the highest degree probable to suppose it addressed to Severa, who was wife of the emperor Philippus Arabs. (See above.)

An entirely peculiar character marks the theological *development of the North-African Church*, whose theological spirit was constantly taking a more definite form from the time of Tertullian to that of St. Augustin, and afterwards obtained the greatest influence over the whole Western Church, by means of St. Augustine.

Tertullian is a writer of peculiar importance, both as the first representative of the theological character of the North-African Church, and as the representative of the Montanistic opinions. He was a man of ardent mind, warm disposition, and deeply

[1] The words of Photius are as follows: ταυτας (τας αἱρεσεις) δε φησιν ἐλεγχοις ὑποβληθηναι ὁμιλουντος Εἰρηναιου. ὡν και συνοψιν ὁ Ἱππολυτος ποιουμενος τοδε το βιβλιον φησι συντεταχεναι

[2] Cod. 202.

serious character[1], accustomed to give himself up with all his soul and strength to the object of his love, and haughtily to reject all which was uncongenial to that object. He had a fund of great and multifarious knowledge, but it was confusedly heaped up in his mind, without scientific arrangement. His depth of thought was not united with logical clearness and judgment; a warm ungoverned imagination, that dwelt in sensuous images, was his ruling power. His impetuous and haughty disposition, and his early education as an advocate or a rhetorician, were prone to carry him, especially in controversy, to rhetorical exaggerations. When he defends a thing, of the truth of which he is persuaded, one often sees in him the advocate who only collects together all the arguments, by which his cause may be advanced, both just arguments and sophisms, that deceive by a mere dazzling appearance; his very richness of fancy at times leads him astray from the perception of the simple truth. The circumstance which renders this man a phenomenon of so much importance to the Christian historian, is this, that Christianity is the soul of his life and thought, that by Christianity there was opened to him an entirely new and fertile interior world, but not until the leaven of Christianity could wholly penetrate and ennoble his ardent, powerful, and somewhat rugged nature: we find the new wine in an old cask; so that the taste, which it has received in that cask, might easily deceive one that is not a connoisseur. Tertullian had often more within him, than he could express; an adequate form was wanting to the overflowing spirit. He was compelled first to create a *language* for the new spiritual matter (and that, too, out of the rough Punic Latin), without the advantage of a logical and grammatical training, and to create it just as he was carried on in his ardour by the stream of his thoughts and feelings. Hence come the difficulties and obscurities to be found in his mode of writing, but hence also come its originality and liveliness. Hence, this great Father, who united great gifts with great faults, has been often misunderstood by those who could not acquaint themselves with his spirit through the rough and uncultivated unassisted form in which it is presented to us.

Quintus Septimius Florens Tertullianus, was born in the latter years of the second century, probably at Carthage, and was the

[1] [*Literally*, of a fiery and deep spirit, of a warm and deep disposition. H. J. R.]

son of a centurion in the service of the Pro-consul at Carthage. He was at first an advocate or a rhetorician, and arrived at manhood before he was converted to Christianity; and he then obtained, if the account given by Jerome is correct, the office of a Presbyter. It is doubtful, however, whether it was at Rome or Carthage. The latter is, in itself, the most probable; because in different writings, composed at different times, he speaks as if he were settled at Carthage; although [1] the accounts of Eusebius and Jerome may be taken to favour the former supposition. The accession of Tertullian to Montanism may be sufficiently explained from its affinity to the early character of his mind and disposition. His writings relate to the most varied points of Christian doctrine and of Christian life: it is here a matter of great importance, to separate those among them, which bear the stamp of Montanism, from those which contain no trace of it [2].

[1] The words of Eusebius, ii. 2. *των μαλιστα επι Ρωμης λαμπρων*, do not exactly assert, that as a Christian he obtained an important place in the Roman Church, but taken in conjunction with the context they may very well imply, that before his conversion to Christianity he was in great estimation at Rome, as a Juris-consultus (for the arbitrary translation of Rufinus, 'inter nostros scriptores admodum clarus,' must at all events be rejected); but we might then also conclude, that if Tertullian lived at Rome as an heathen, and was so much esteemed, it is also probable that he was there also first invested with a spiritual office. Jerome says that the jealousy and injuries of the Romish clergy moved him to change to Montanism. But such stories, which the ancient Church-teachers used to set about, are always very suspicious, because men were universally too much inclined to attribute to external causes a conversion from the Roman Church to heretical opinions,—and Jerome in particular, although he reverenced the Catheda Petri in the Roman Church, was notwithstanding, inclined to speak evil of the Roman Clergy, who did him so much injury during his residence at Rome, especially after the death of Damasus, and to accuse them, in particular, of jealousy against great talents.

[2] I have given a more elaborate investigation of this subject in my treatise on Tertullian. [Anti-Gnostikus, Geist des Tertullian. Berlin, 1825. H. J. R.] I shall here only add something in regard to the objections made by Dr. Cölln to my conclusions. He finds a mark of Montanism in what Tertullian says, de Patientia c. 1. " bonorum quorundam, sicuti et malorum intolerabilis magnitudo est, ut ad capienda et præstanda ea, sola gratia divinæ inspirationis operatur." I must here certainly retract the declaration made in my Tertullian, p. 161, that there is nothing contained in this passage but the common Christian doctrine, which attributes to the Holy Spirit the operation of all good in believers. The following is the idea contained in the passage: 'But for all good, we need not only human exertions, but the communication of the Holy Spirit. The higher the grade of goodness is, the more man needs the operation of the Holy Spirit. But there are grades of goodness so exalted, qualities and gifts of such elevation, that man can do nothing whatever towards attaining them. They are entirely the free gift of the Holy Spirit, and man in these cases is only passive, in regard to the work of the Holy Spirit. Such are the Charismata, which

It is difficult to decide the question, whether Tertullian remained always in the same connexion with the Montanistic party; or whether he afterwards again inclined more to the Catholic Church, and endeavoured to form a middle way between the two parties. The narratives of Augustine[1], and of Prædestinatus[2], as well as the account given by the latter[3] of a Montanistic work of Tertullian, in which he endeavours to lessen the number of the points of difference between the two parties, are favourable to the latter notion, and on this supposition, many of

are to be separated from the common Christian virtues.' 'I acknowledge that there is something here besides the doctrine, which every Christian must deduce from the Bible; but it need not therefore be called Montanistic. Such a view might proceed from the original character of Tertullian's mind. We have already observed above, that the Montanistic notion of *certain* operations of the Holy Spirit, under which man is only passive, was by no means a new view; but that it engrafted itself on a mode of representation which had long been in existence.

The passage about fasts and abstinence cannot in any way be looked upon as a proof of Montanism, for a voluntary ἄσκησις had already found acceptance with many, who were no Montanists (see above). The words, 'jejunia conjungere,' might indeed, although not necessarily, be understood of a *superpositio*, by no means Montanistic (superpositio is a continuation of the Friday's fast to Saturday, on which day no Montanist fasted. See above, vol. i. p. 339). And besides, the whole manner in which penance is here treated, the whole spirit of mildness which breathes here, is not Montanistic.

As far also as regards the work de Præscriptione, I find myself by no means induced to change my opinion of its non-Montanistic origin. The words 'alius libellus hunc gradum sustinebit,' contr. Marcion. l. i. c. 2. might be used by Tertullian of a piece already written, whether by himself or another, by representing it (the book) personified as a defender. It does not at all follow, from his particularly bringing forward the doctrine of a creation out of nothing, in his quotation of the Creed, c. 13, that he had already had to sustain a contest with Hermogenes; because even in the controversy against the Gnostics this definition must have been brought forward; and the connexion in which these words there stand, far more favours the supposition that he was thinking of the Gnostics, than that he had Hermogenes in his thoughts. It is, indeed, quite certain, from c. 30, that before Tertullian wrote this book, Hermogenes had brought forward his peculiar views; but it cannot at all be proved, that Hermogenes had not already published his doctrines a long time before Tertullian wrote his book against him. From the very cursory manner in which Tertullian mentions him in the treatise de Præscriptione, we might be inclined to suspect, that Hermogenes was, at that time, by no means a person of such importance in his eyes, and that it was his additional interest in the matter as a Montanist in later times, which moved him to enter into an elaborate refutation of the doctrines of Hermogenes. The manner in which he speaks of the emanation of the Logos, cannot be called Montanistic, for he represents it in the same manner in the Apologeticus, c. 21,—a treatise acknowledged not to be Montanistic. [Those who are desirous of seeing a condensed statement of Neander's views on Tertullian's writings may consult the able preface to Bp. Kaye's work on Tertullian, 2nd Edition, 1826. H. J. R.]

[1] Hæres. 86. [2] Hæres. 86. [3] Hæres. 26.

the writings of Tertullian, which are moderately Montanistic, or border upon Montanism, might be assigned to a different epoch. But these accounts are not sufficient to challenge our belief in them. From the disposition of Tertullian one is led to think, that he was not unlikely to keep to his opinions, when they were once formed, and when opposed, constantly the more to harden himself in them. The peculiar sect of the *Tertullianists*, which is found at Carthage in the fifth century, is no proof of the supposition we have mentioned; because it is possible, that this sect, which adhered closely to the peculiar opinions of Tertullian, was first formed in later times, when it was cut off from communication with the Montanistic Churches in Asia.

The study of the writings of Tertullian had plainly a peculiar influence on the doctrinal development of Cyprian. Jerome relates, after a tradition, supposed to come from the secretary of Cyprian, that he daily read some part of Tertullian's writings, and was accustomed to call him by no other name than that of *Master*[1].

We have already spoken sufficiently in various places of the character, the activity, and the most important writings of Cyprian. We shall here mention only one more remarkable writing of Cyprian, his three books of Testimonia, a collection of the most important passages of Scripture, to prove, that Jesus is the Messiah promised in the Old Testament, and to form the foundation of Christian faith and morals. The collection was destined for a certain Quirinus, who had entreated the Bishop to make him such an abridgment of the essential contents of the Bible in regard to faith and morals, for his daily use and for the assistance of his memory. Since Cyprian addresses him as 'my son,' he cannot have been a Bishop or a Presbyter, for whom Cyprian threw together this collection in order to assist him in communicating religious instruction[2]. By comparing the introduction

[1] He would say to his secretary, Da mihi magistrum. Hieron. de Viris illustribus c. 53. In order to see how he used the writings of Tertullian, the treatises of Cyprian *de Oratione Dominica*, and *de Patientia*, in particular should be compared with those of Tertullian on the same subjects, and that *de Idolorum vanitate* with the *Apologeticus*.

[2] It might be concluded that this was the case, from the words at the beginning: quibus non tam tractasse, quam tractantibus materiam præbuisse videamur. We could then only suppose, that he had composed this book as an aid to a Deacon, or a Catechist, a doctor audientium. But the words which follow show, that the collection

to the second and third books, it will appear extremely probable, that the person, to whom Cyprian wrote, was a layman belonging to his Church, to whom he wished to give the means of making his own the important practical truths, and the most important rules for all the chief relations of Christian life[1]. This collection then will give us a proof of the intimate union subsisting between the Bishop and the members of his Church, who were troubled about the salvation of their souls, and show how much he had it at heart, to lead every individual to an intimate acquaintance with the Divine Word,—a wish, which peculiarly breaks forth in the beautiful words with which he closes the preface to the first book: "More strength will be granted to thee, and the view of the understanding will constantly be more and more fully formed, if thou searchest more perfectly the Old and the New Testament, and runnest through every part of the Holy Scripture; for I have only poured out a little to thee from the Divine fountains, in order to satisfy thee for a time. Thou canst drink more plentifully and satisfy thyself, if thou also comest with us to the same fountains of the Divine fulness, in order to drink as we do."

The particular rules, which Cyprian brings forward and supports by passages from the Bible, show how anxious he was to counteract the notion, that a mere outward confession, and a compliance with the forms of Christian worship, would satisfy the demands of the Gospel, and serve to obtain salvation; but at the same time, we freely acknowledge that they show also, how important he thought it, to impress upon the laity a veneration for the priesthood, according to the notions of the Old Testament.

We must here cursorily mention a person, who is of importance in many respects for the history of Christian morals and worship; particularly in the North-African Church, that is to say Commodianus, who is known by his 'Instructions adapted for heathens, and all classes of Christians' (Instructiones. Exhortations and Reproofs), and written in verse. He was born of Christian parents, who troubled themselves but little about giving him a

was also intended to infix upon the memory the chief passages and doctrines of the Bible, by constantly reading them over. The collection must, therefore, in this case have been intended at the same time as a guide for the teachers of religion, and a book of aid for the Catechumens; but the view taken above is more natural.

[1] Quæ esse facilia et utilia legentibus possunt, dum in breviarium pauca digesta et velociter perleguntur et frequenter iterantur.

Christian education, and hence he joined in the heathen worship, without their being aware of it, until he was led away from heathenism and to Christianity, by means of *reading the Bible* (Ego similiter erravi tempore multo | Fana prosequendo, parentibus insciis ipsis | Abstuli me tamen inde, legendo de lege. This passage would, no doubt, bear another interpretation, if we were to put a stop after prosequendo, and connecting the words immediately after it with what follows; but this is not so natural a supposition as the other.

In his Christian notions, and the picture of manners painted by him, as well as in his latinity, we recognise a North-African who lived not long after the time of Cyprian. The Christians at that time, after some persecutions that had taken place (apparently under Decius and Valerianus), were enjoying a state of outward prosperity under Gallienus; but outward prosperity had also exercised again a prejudicial influence on the inward life, both among the clergy and laity. The Christians participated in the pleasures of the heathens, and many teachers of the Church gave in too much to them, being influenced by presents, or by fear of giving personal offence. (57. Si quidam doctores, dum expectant munera vestra | Aut timent personas, laxant singula vobis.)

Commodian shows great zeal for the strictness of Christian morals, and he speaks against the delusion of a false estimation of martyrdom, as of an opus operatum; he declares, on the contrary, that every man might become a martyr, even in a season of peace, by genuine Christian virtue; and that on the contrary, many, who were proud of having vanquished Satan by their blood, and did not remember that Satan is always Satan—had afterwards suffered themselves to be conquered by him. But with all this, Commodian held a very gross system of Chiliasm, which bears upon it the colouring of carnal Judaism. The chiefest princes of the world were, in the first place, to become the slaves of the pious in the kingdom of the Millennium; and all the vanity of the world under the influence of an unchristian imagination is transferred to that kingdom. (See Instruct. 80.)

We have here also to mention Arnobius, as belonging to the same Church, although he showed a more peculiar doctrinal turn of mind, and the spirit of the North-African Church appears, at least in the time that he came forward as a Christian writer, to have exerted no influence upon him,—a fact which is apparent,

from the liberal and independent manner in which he seems to have come to Christianity through the reading of the New Testament, especially the Gospels. He was a rhetorician at Sikka, in Numidia, during the reign of the Emperor Diocletian [1]. His writings give testimony to the literary acquirements, which a rhetorician in so respectable a town would be required to have. Jerome, in his Chronicle, relates that Arnobius, who had previously always opposed Christianity, was moved by dreams to a faith in it, but that the Bishop, to whom he applied, did not trust him, because he knew his former enmity against Christianity; and that Arnobius, in order to prove the sincerity of his intentions, wrote his Apologetic work (the septem libros disputationum contra gentes). This narrative has been suspected of being a mere interpolation by another hand,—for it is, at all events, not in its proper place; it is an evident anachronism to suppose that all this should have taken place in the twentieth year of Constantine, A.D. 326. And further, Arnobius appears to have been a man who would be led to believe by a detailed examination, and not one who would have been thus influenced by the sudden impression made by dreams. In his work, we recognise, not the novice who was still a Catechumen, but the man already matured in his conviction, although not one who was orthodox in the sense the Church would affix to that word.

And yet one is not led by these arguments entirely to reject the narrative. We have already observed (p. 67 et seqq.), how the conversion of many was facilitated by such impressions; but in saying this, it is not declared, that his whole conversion proceeded from these impressions, for his work would certainly contradict such a supposition. But if Arnobius, as will clearly appear from a passage we are about to quote, was devoted to blind heathenish superstition, it is on that account less unlikely that many more outward impressions were needed, to lead the zealous heathen to an inquiry into Christianity. It may, indeed, have been the case, that he had been convinced some time before he offered himself for baptism, which is easily to be explained by the circumstances of those times. His Apologetic work, however, appears certainly to have been written in compliance with some inward impulse, and not in consequence of any external excite-

[1] Hieronymus de vir. illustr. c. 79.

ment. But it may also be the case, that his determination to make a public confession of Christianity, and to come forward as a public defender of it, were formed at the same time in his soul—and that he then went with this resolution to the Bishop. In after-times, the Bishops were often inclined to be too little suspicious towards those, who became Christians from external motives. But it is by no means so improbable, that a Bishop in these unhappy times of the Church, when he saw before him a man who had been so violent an enemy to Christianity, should fear in him an evil-minded informer. And then, in order to destroy his doubts at once, Arnobius shows him his writing in defence of Christianity. He himself thus speaks of the change that was effected in him by Christianity [1]: "Oh, blindness! it is not long ago, that I worshipped even the images that came from the forge, the gods that were made on the anvil and by the hammer; when I saw a stone that had been polished and besmeared with oil, I testified my veneration, I addressed it as if a living power had been there, and I begged for benefits for myself from the insentient stone, and I even did the gods, whom I took to be gods, the injury of believing them to be wood, or stone, or bones, or I thought that they dwelt in such things. Now, as I have been led on the way of truth by so great a teacher, I know what all that is."

As far as relates to the period, at which Arnobius wrote his book, he himself determines it, when he says [2], that Rome had been built 1050 years, or not much less. According to the *æra Varroniana* then in vogue (Rome built, 753), this would tally with the year A.D. 297. But this is not entirely satisfactory, because there are in the work, evident traces of those persecutions under Diocletian, which did not break out (see above) before the year A.D. 303. We must therefore suppose, either that Arnobius has made use of an æra different from the usual one of that day, or that the exact number did not occur to him [3], or that he wrote the work at different times. He says to the heathen [4]: "If a pious zeal for your religion animated you, you would far rather have long ago burnt those writings, and

[1] Lib. i. c. 39. [2] Lib. ii. c. 71.

[3] This is the most natural supposition, for the chronology of Arnobius is certainly not very exact; for in l. i. c. 13. he says: trecenti sunt anni ferme, minus vel plus aliquid, ex quo cœpimus esse Christiani.

[4] Lib. iv. c. 36.

destroyed those theatres, in which the disgrace of the gods is daily published in scandalous plays. For, wherefore have our writings deserved to be delivered up to the fire? wherefore have our assembling-houses deserved to be destroyed, in which the Supreme God is adored, peace and grace are implored for governors, for the armies, for the emperors,—joy and peace are implored for the living and for those freed from the fetters of the body,—in which nothing is ever heard, but what tends to make men humane, mild, discreet, modest, generous in giving of their own, and akin to all those, whom the one bond of brotherhood embraces?"

The objection also of the heathen against Christianity, which moved Arnobius to write (as he himself says), indicates the time, at which he wrote; for it was the very accusation which had occasioned the persecutions under Diocletian; namely, the public calamities which took place, because the reverence for the gods had been supplanted by Christianity, and hence protection and aid were no longer afforded by these gods. Arnobius justly says in reply to this charge: "If men instead of trusting to their own wisdom and following their own opinion, would only endeavour to follow the doctrines of Christ, which bring salvation and peace, how soon would the form of the world be changed, and iron, instead of being required for war, would be used in peaceful works!"

However important the Roman Church became by its outward ecclesiastical influence, and by the influence of the element of the Roman political spirit upon the progress of the Church, it was proportionably poor from the beginning in regard to theological attainments. The anxiety for the outward existence of the Church, which predominated here, appears early to have depressed the scale of theological knowledge. Only two distinguished writers appear among the Roman clergy, neither of whom, perhaps, can be compared with a Tertullian, a Clement, or an Origen; they are the Presbyter Caius, whom we have already named as an opponent of the Montanists, and the Presbyter Novatian, also mentioned before. Of the writings of the first, nothing has been preserved to us; of the second, we have only short expositions of the essential meaning of the Christian doctrines; especially of the doctrines of the Divinity of Christ, and of the Trinity. Accord-

ing to Jerome, § 70, this work was an extract from a greater one of Tertullian. But at all events, this writer was something more than a mere copyist of another man's mind, we should far rather say that he showed a character of his own; he had not the power and depth of Tertullian, but a more spiritual disposition [1].

We have also a treatise by him on the *Jewish laws about food*, a paronomastic allegorical interpretation of them, intended to show, that they are no longer binding upon Christians [2]. We see from this treatise, that it was written by a Bishop separated from his Church by the persecution, who maintained a constant interchange of letters with this Church, and endeavoured to preserve it from the seductions offered to it by heathens, Jews, and heretics: every thing about it answers well to a Roman Church, for many Jews dwelt at Rome. Only then, this treatise can hardly have proceeded from a Presbyter; the author speaks, as only a Bishop could have spoken at that time to his Church. And we know also from the letter of Cornelius, that Novatian did not remove from Rome during the persecution under Decius. We must therefore call to mind the relation between Novatian and the Church which recognised him as its Bishop, and we shall naturally suppose that this piece was written under the first persecution of Valerianus (see above), during which so many Bishops were separated from their Churches.

There belonged also to the Roman Church a man, who deserves a conspicuous place among the Apologists of this age for his sensible, ingenious, and graphic dialogue, animated throughout by genuine Christian feeling, and taken from the life,—I mean Minucius Felix, who, according to Jerome, was celebrated as an advocate at Rome, before his conversion to Christianity; he lived apparently in the first half of the third century, but *before Cyprian*, who made use of his writings. We have already quoted some portion of this Apologetic dialogue under the name of Octavius.

We now pass to the teachers of the Alexandrian school, of whose influence over the progress of the development of the

[1] Novatian's opponent Cornelius, the Bishop of Rome, appears evidently (in Euseb. vi. 43.) to allude to this treatise, when he calls Novatian, ὁ δογματιστης, ὁ της ἐκκλησιαστικης ἐπιστημης ὑπερασπιστης. This is certainly a hint, that such a phenomenon was not common among the *Roman* clergy.

[2] Jerome mentions this as one of his writings, as well as two others, *on the Sabbath*

Church we have already spoken. We have no written monument of him, who is named to us as the first teacher of this school who was held in much estimation, Pantænus (Παντ*αι*νος), the Philosopher, who was converted to Christianity. We know him only through his scholar, Clement.

Titus Flavius Clemens was arrived at the age of manhood before he became a Christian; for he numbers himself among those who came from the service of sin in heathenism to the Redeemer, and received from him forgiveness of their sins[1]. He persuaded himself of the truth of Christianity by a free inquiry, as he was one who had attained a great knowledge of all the systems of religion and philosophy about Divine matters, that were known to the more cultivated world of his days[2]. This free spirit of inquiry, which had brought him to Christianity, impelled him also, after he became a Christian, to seek out distinguished Christian teachers of different characters of mind in different countries. He himself says[3], that he had several distinguished men for his teachers; in Greece an Ionian; in Magna Græcia (the lower part of Italy), one from Cœlesyria, and another from Egypt; in the east of Asia (probably Syria), an Assyrian, and in Palestine a person of Jewish origin. He remained at last in Egypt, where he found the greatest Gnostic, who had penetrated most deeply into the spirit of Scripture. This last was no other than Pantænus. Eusebius does not confine himself to this statement, but he appeals[4] to a passage also in the Hypotyposeis of Clement, where he calls him his teacher. Perhaps, when Pantænus entered upon the missionary journey mentioned above, Clement followed him in the character of a catechist, and at the same time, or later, was a Presbyter in the Alexandrian Church. The persecution under Septimius Severus, A.D. 202, probably compelled him to absent himself from Alexandria[5]. But great obscurity envelopes the history of his life, and the place of his abode at this period. We only know, that in the beginning of the reign of the Emperor

and *on Circumcision*, which Novatian quotes as two letters, that had preceded this letter to his Church, in which he had been desirous of showing quæ sit vera circumcisio, et quod verum sabbatum.

[1] Pædagog. l. ii. c. 8. p. 176. [Pott. 205. Sylb. 76.]

[2] παντων δια πειρας ἐλθων ἀνηρ. Euseb. Præparat. Evangel. l. ii. c. 2.

[3] Stromat. l. i. 274. [Pott. 322. Sylb. 118.] [4] vi. 13. [5] Euseb. vi. c. 3.

Caracalla he was at Jerusalem, whither at that time many Christians, especially clergy, had been accustomed to betake themselves, partly in order to become eye-witnesses of places sanctified by religious remembrances, and partly in order to make use of a more accurate knowledge of these places for the better understanding of Scripture. Alexander, the Bishop of Jerusalem, who was then imprisoned for the faith, commended him to the Church at Antioch, whither he was travelling, by a letter, in which he called him a virtuous and approved man, and took it for granted, that he was already known to the Antiochians [1].

We have *three works* written by him, and dependent in some sort on each other; because he sets out from the idea, that the instructor of mankind, the Logos, first leads the rude heathens sunk in sin and idolatry to believe, then continually improves their lives by moral precepts, and lastly, elevates those who had been purified in morals to a deeper knowledge of Divine matters, *i. e.* to Gnosis. Thus the Logos appears, as first exhorting the sinner to repentance and converting the heathens (προτρεπτικος), next as forming by his discipline the conduct of the converted (παιδαγωγος), and then as the teacher of the Gnosis to the purified [2]. His three works, which we still have, are formed on this fundamental notion, the *apologetic* work, the Protrepticos, next the *ethical* work, the Pædagogus, and then the *work containing the elements of Gnosis*, the Στρωματεις (Στρωματα) [3]. Clement was not a man of a systematic mind; many multifarious elements of mind and ideas, which he had received from his intercourse with minds of varied character, were heaped up in him, as one sees at times in his Stromata, and as must have been shown still more strongly in his Hypotyposeis, which we shall have to mention hereafter, if Photius has understood him properly. It is beyond doubt that by isolated flashes of mind he must have exercised an animating influence on his disciples and his readers, as we see particularly shown in the case of Origen. Many ideas unconnectedly thrown out by him, in a manner full of the loftiest conceptions,—ideas which contain the germ of a complete and

[1] Euseb. vi. c. 11.

[2] καθαραν προς γνωσεως επιτηδειοτητα εὐτρεπιζων την ψυχην δυναμενην χωρησαι την ἀποκαλυψιν του Λογου. Pædagog. l. i. c. 1.

[3] Just like the κεστος, a word of similar import, which was commonly used to denote a work of mixed contents.

systematic theological course of thought, are found in him scattered among a multitude of insignificant discussions.

As far as regards his Στρωματα, it was here, nevertheless, his intention, as he testifies in many places, to place together confusedly truth and error from the Greek philosophers and the systems of Christian sects, as well as fragments of the true Gnosis. Every one was to find out that which was adapted to himself; he *wished* rather to excite than to teach, and often purposely only to give a hint in those cases where he might fear to give offence to the πιστικοι, who were as yet unable to comprehend these ideas. The eighth book of this work is lost; for the fragment of dialectic investigations, which now goes under the name of the eighth book of the Stromata, evidently does not belong to this work. Indeed the eighth book was lost as early as the time of Photius[1].

We have to regret the loss of the Ὑποτυπωσεις[2] of Clement, in which apparently he gave doctrinal and exegetical investigations and views on the principles of the Alexandrian Gnosis. Fragments from this work, the short explanations of some of the Catholic Epistles, which have descended to us in the Latin translation[3], and perhaps also the fragment of the ἐκλογαι ἐκ των προφητικων, belong to this class. The fact is, that people made for themselves extracts out of the larger work for common use on different parts of Scripture, and some of these extracts have been preserved to us, while this very custom may have contributed to effect the loss of the whole work.

Obscure as it is in its nature, the fragment of the extracts from the writings of Theodotus and of the διδασκαλια ἀνατολικη (that is, of the Theosophic doctrines of Eastern Asia), which has remained to us among the works of Clement, is of the highest importance for the knowledge of the Gnostic systems. It is perhaps a fragment of a critical collection, which Clement had made during his sojourn in Syria. We have already spoken of the treatise of Clement on the time of Easter[4], and of his work τις ὁ σωζομενος

[1] See Cod. 111.

[2] This word would probably be best translated thus: sketches, shadows, general outlines. Rufinus translates it, adumbrationes.

[3] See the second volume of Potter's Edition.

[4] The writing also which Eusebius quotes under the title, κανων ἐκκλησιαστος ἡ προς τους Ἰουδαιζοντας, was on a similar subject.

πλουσιος, which is of importance in regard to the history of Christian Ethics.

Clement, in his Stromata[1], intimates his intention of writing a work περι προφητειας, in which he would treat of the nature of the Holy Spirit, and on the mode of his communication, as well as of the proper judgment to be made about the Montanistic prophets. As the subject of this work involves so important and interesting a portion of the doctrinal controversies of his day, and as we might expect from Clement, a more unprejudiced and moderate judgment of the Montanists than from any other man of those times, we have had a very great loss in losing this work, if he really carried into execution his intention of writing it[2].

Origen, who bore also the additional name of *Adamantios*[3], was born at Alexandria, A.D. 185. It is of importance, in regard to his education, to remark, that his father Leonides, a pious Christian, and probably a rhetorician, was in circumstances to give him a good literary, as well as a Christian and pious education. Both had an abiding influence on the disposition of his interior life, the development of his intellect and of his heart went side by side with him, and progressed together, and the longing after truth and holiness remained as the influential dispositions of his life. We have before observed, that the Bible then was not reserved exclusively for the study of the clergy, but that it was used also as a book for family edification; and we see in the case of Origen, that a judicious use was made of it also in education, as well as the wholesome consequences of such a custom. Leonides taught his son daily to learn by heart a portion of the Holy Scriptures. The boy took great pleasure in this, and his deeply-inquiring spirit soon showed itself. Not contented with the explanation of the literal meaning, which his father gave him, he desired to have his inquiries about the intention of the passages

[1] L. iv. 511. [Pott. 605. Sylb. 219.] v. 591. [Pott. 699. Sylb. 252.]

[2] If vi. 681. a. [Pott. 808. Sylb. 289.] δια της πιστεως προσγενομενον αγιου Πνευματος χαρακτηριστικον ἰδιωμα, be compared with iv. 591, it might be concluded, although not with certainty, that Clement in the work which is lost denied the personality of the Holy Ghost.

[3] If this name was given to him after his death, yet we must not follow the forced interpretation of it in Photius, c. 118, '*because the proofs of Origen were like bonds of adamant*,' but far rather that of Jerome, that it was given to him '*from his iron industry, as we often say*,' and thence he was also named συντακτης, and χαλκεντερος. Eusebius, however, appears to quote this name as one which Origen bore from his birth.

he learnt by heart resolved; so that his father often found himself in difficulties from this cause. He blamed, however, his curiosity, and advised him to content himself, as it became his age, with the literal sense; but in secret he delighted himself with the promising abilities of his son, and thanked God with a grateful heart, that he had given him such a son. Often, when his son lay asleep with his bosom bare, would he kiss that breast, as a temple in which the Holy Ghost was willing to prepare himself an habitation, and he thought himself happy to possess such a son.

The trait, which we have mentioned, of the early life of Origen, teaches us to recognise in him, even at that age, the mind that sought the overpowering spirit in the earthly guise,—a mind which afterwards plainly showed itself in his allegorical mode of Scripture interpretation, and which, had it been accompanied by sound and well-informed judgment, and been an enlivening spirit grafted on a grammatical education, might have made of him a well-grounded and profound interpreter of Scripture. This mind was rather repressed than encouraged by his father. But if Origen had been early determined by the influence of the theological school of Alexandria in regard to his intellectual and spiritual character, this mind must soon have found encouragement, and have completed its own formation. As we afterwards learn to know Origen from his own writings, the influence which Clement had exerted on his theological development is undeniably shown most conspicuously; we find in him the predominant ideas of the latter systematically developed. Now it is certain [1] that, as a boy, he was at least a scholar of Clement as a Catechist [2]. But a youthful impatience in Origen (on which we shall hereafter touch),

[1] According to Eusebius, vi. 6.—Alexander, the Bishop of Jerusalem, who either originally came from Alexandria, or had been thither in his youth, in order to receive the instruction of the Catechists there, appears in his letter to Origen to hint that he had been in the habit of intercourse with Pantænus, although he does not directly say that he was his disciple: "We acknowledge as our Fathers those blessed men, who have gone before us, Pantænus and Clement, who was my master, and was of service to me, and who belongs to these men, *through whom I became acquainted with* you." Euseb. vi. 14. Unfortunately, however, there is an obscurity spread over the early influence of these men on the formation of Origen's character, which, from a deficiency of documents, we cannot remove.

[2] We may conclude from this passage of Eusebius, that the Alexandrian Catechists not only gave private instruction in religion to heathen adults, but also public religious instruction to Christian children.

proceeding from a carnal and literal interpretation of Scripture, shows that in his youth he was yet far from that, his later theological turn of mind; and he himself says of himself, while he calls to mind this fault of his youth, "I who once knew Christ, the Divine Logos only after the flesh and the letter, now know him no longer in this way [1]." It is clear from this, that the education of his father had more influence on the first religious character of Origen, than the instruction of Clement; and that the influence of the Alexandrian theological spirit on him belongs to a later period of his life, when his character was more developed. We freely confess, that in the history of the formation of his mind there is much obscurity, which we are unable entirely to dissipate, from want of historical documents. The religion of the heart was at first the predominant one with Origen.

The persecution which raged against the Christians in Egypt, under the emperor Septimius Severus (see above), gave an opportunity to him, then a stripling of sixteen, of showing his faith and zeal. The example of the martyrs carried him away, and induced him to wish to declare himself a Christian before the heathen governor, and thus expose himself to death. Such was the feeling of the high-spirited and ardent young Christian; but the reasonable and soundly-informed man, who better understood the spirit of Christianity, and the docrines and example of Christ, judged otherwise [2]. "A temptation, which comes upon us without our own co-operation," he says, "in touching on this matter, we must sustain with courage and with patience, but it is useless, when we can avoid it, not to do so." As the father of Origen was thrown into prison, the son felt himself still more strongly urged to join his father in death [3]. As all arguments and entreaties had proved fruitless, his mother was unable to retain him in any other way than by hiding his clothes. The love of Christ now so completely overwhelmed all other feelings within him, that when he found himself prevented in his first intention, of sharing the imprisonment and death of his father, he wrote to him thus: "Take care that thou changest not thy mind for our sakes."

Leonides suffered martyrdom; and his property being confiscated, he left behind him an helpless widow with six children, none

[1] T. xv. Matth. Ed. Huet. f. 369. ἡμεις δε Χριστον Θεου τον Λογον του Θεου κατα σαρκα και κατα το γραμμα ποτε νοησαντες, νυν οὐκετι γινωσκοντες.

[2] He appeals to Matth. xiv. 13; x. 23.

[3] In Matth. f. 231.

of whom, except Origen, were grown up. He found a friendly reception in the house of a rich and well-esteemed Christian lady of Alexandria. A characteristic trait here showed his firmness in that which he acknowledged as the true faith, and how he prized it above all besides. His patroness had devoted herself to one of those Gnostics, who came so commonly out of Syria to Alexandria, and there propagated their systems, dressed up after the Alexandrian fashion,—one Paulus of Antioch. She had received him as a son, and allowed him to deliver lectures in her house, which were frequented not only by the friends of Gnosticism in Alexandria, but also by those of the orthodox, who were constantly desirous of learning something new. The young Origen, however, did not allow respect for his patroness to withhold him from speaking out freely his abhorrence of the Gnostic doctrines, and nothing could induce him to frequent these assemblies, because he would then have been obliged to join in the prayers of this Gnostic, and thus to testify his concurrence with him in matters of faith.

He was soon able to release himself from this state of dependence; his knowledge of the Greek language and literature, which he had improved still more after the death of his father, put him into a condition at Alexandria, where such knowledge was peculiarly prized, to gain his livelihood by instruction in these subjects.

As he had made himself known even among the heathens by his knowledge and intellectual endowments, by his zeal for the things of the Gospel, and by his pure and strict life, and as the office of a Catechist was vacant at Alexandria in consequence of the persecution, many heathens who were desirous of instruction in Christianity applied to him, and by this stripling those were brought to Christianity, who afterwards distinguished themselves as martyrs, or as teachers of the Church. By this activity of his in the propagation of Christianity, he must have constantly attracted to himself more and more the hatred of the fanatical multitude, especially as he, without regarding his own danger, showed such sympathy towards those who were imprisoned for faith, that he not only visited them frequently in their dungeons, but accompanied them to execution, and even in the face of death encouraged them by the strength of his faith and his love. Providence often saved him from imminent danger of his life, when soldiers had surrounded the house in which he was dwelling,

and he was obliged to betake himself secretly from one house to another. Once a crowd of heathens seized him, put upon him the dress of a heathen priest of Serapis, and led him in this dress to the steps of the temple, and then gave him palm-branches, that he might distribute them, after the usual manner, to those who were entering into the temple. Origen said to those, to whom he offered the palm-branches, "Receive, not the palm of the heathen gods, but the palm of Christ[1]."

These effective exertions of Origen in the communication of religious instruction called the attention of Demetrius, Bishop of Alexandria, to him, and moved him to bestow on Origen the office of a Catechist in the Alexandrian Church. At that time, however, no salary was attached to this office; and as he now wished to be able to devote himself entirely to the duties of his spiritual calling, and his theological studies, without being interrupted and called away by other employments, and as he was nevertheless desirous that he should be dependent on no one for his support, he sold a collection of beautiful manuscripts of old authors, which he had been at much pains to make for himself, to a lover of literature, who was to pay him for this library four oboli daily for many years. This must have been sufficient for the very limited personal wants of Origen, for he led the same kind of life as the strictest among the ascetics. He was, as we before observed, then devoted to a literal interpretation of Scripture; and, as he was actuated by a serious and sacred zeal to act up to the Ideal of holiness set forth by our Saviour, and endeavoured with conscientious fidelity to apply to himself all the words of that Saviour, he must, in the warmth of his youthful ascetic zeal, which was not accompanied by a sound and judicious interpretation of Scripture, have been led into many practical errors, where he understood literally the figurative expressions of Christ, or maintained as applicable to all times and circumstances, that which Christ had said only in reference to particular circumstances. The most remarkable error of this kind, which afterwards attracted much odium to him, was that he was induced, by a literal interpretation of the passage in

[1] See Epiphan. H. 64. This narrative may certainly, taken by itself, appear to be improbable when we remember how such an address must have excited the fanatical rage of the Alexandrian multitude, and when we take into account the untrustworthiness of Epiphanius. But the first of these circumstances, although it may excite a doubt, is no decisive argument, and Epiphanius is entitled to more credit when he repeats any thing which tells to the advantage of one reputed to be an heretic.

Matth. xix. 12, to practise in his own case what he believed prescribed by these words to those, who wished to be quite certain of admission into the kingdom of heaven. It was a mistake which might easily arise from the partial views of asceticism, and from this kind of scriptural interpretation, and which was encouraged by many writings then in circulation [1]. But through this error there still shines forth conspicuously the earnest desire of this young man, so ardent in his zeal for holiness, as well as his intimate love for the Redeemer, whose every hint he wished to follow so literally. Although, however, such an error, proceeding as it did from that which is most holy in man, ought always to be judged most mildly; yet there are at all times many, who, having only one measure for all things, judge all eccentric excesses of this kind the more harshly, the further that principle, from which alone such enthusiastic exaggeration could proceed, lies from their own carnal feelings, or their own sobriety of intellect. Origen speaks from his own experience when he speaks of those, who by such mistakes and errors have got to themselves shame and reproaches, not only among unbelievers, but with those who would pardon every thing human, rather than such errors as proceed from a misinformed fear of God, and an immoderate desire after holiness [2]. When the Bishop Demetrius was first made acquainted with this circumstance, he honoured *the intention* even in the error, but he afterwards used this false step of Origen to his prejudice.

It would be of great importance if we could accurately determine *the time when, and the mode in which,* (to use the language of the Alexandrian school) the point of transition from πιστις to γνωσις was effected in Origen. According to what we have above remarked on the peculiar character of Clement's mind, we

[1] Philo, Opp. f. 186. ἐξευνουχισθηναι ἀμεινον, ἢ προς συνουσιας ἐκνομους λυτταν. Again, one of the sentences (Gnomai) of Σεξτος then very current among the Alexandrian Christians, No. 12. (according to the translation of Rufinus), omne membrum corporis, quod suadet te contra pudicitiam agere, abjiciendum. These Gnomæ certainly are neither the production of a Roman Bishop Sixtus (neither the first nor the second), as Rufinus thought them, nor, as Jerome believed, (v. ep. ad Ctesiphon.) of an heathen Pythagorean, but they are the work of some person, who out of the Platonic and Gnostic sentiments, and by putting together detached passages of Scripture, had formed his own moral code, the highest aim of which was ἀπαθεια. A moral code interpenetrated by the essential principles of the Gospel is not to be found in them;—they consist of many elevated sentiments, joined with many distorted notions.

[2] T. xv. Matth. § 367.

cannot doubt, that if Origen had been a scholar of Clement himself, as a Theologian, he would have been incited by him from the first to make himself accurately acquainted with the systems of the Hellenic philosophers, and of the different heretics, as the liberal spirit of Alexandrian theology would require. But apparently Origen had originally a far more uncouth and a narrower turn. A literary education indeed accompanied his ascetic zeal and his inward Christian life, but it was unconnected with that which was the animating principle of that Christian life. He himself says, that he was first induced by an outward necessity to busy himself with the Platonic philosophy, and generally to acquaint himself more accurately with the systems of those who differed from him, namely, because heretics and philosophically educated heathens, attracted by his reputation, sought him for the purpose of conversation on religious subjects, and he was compelled to give them a reason of his faith, and to refute their objections to it. He expresses himself on the subject in the following manner in a letter, in which he justifies himself for being occupied with the Grecian philosophy: "When I had entirely devoted myself to the preaching of the Divine doctrines, and the reputation of my ability in these things had extended itself widely,—and sometimes heretics, sometimes persons, who had pursued the Hellenic sciences, and especially men from the philosophical schools, came to me, —then it seemed necessary for me to investigate the doctrinal opinions of heretics, and what the philosophers pretended to know of truth." He adds, that he then frequented the lectures of "*the Teacher*" of philosophical sciences, with whom Heracles, a convert made by Origen, had passed five years. As he here indicates the person, who was commonly known at Alexandria by the name of "the Teacher of Philosophy," chronology naturally leads us to think of the celebrated Ammonius Sakkas, through whose means the chaotic neo-platonic eclecticism, formed out of a mixture of Greek and oriental elements, obtained a more defined and settled form,—the master of the deep-thinking Plotinus. We may add, that Porphyry, in his work against Christianity, expressly calls Origen a scholar of this Ammonius [1].

[1] For there can be no doubt that Porphyry, in Euseb. vi. 19, speaks of no other than this Ammonius Sakkas, although Eusebius confounds him with Ammonius, teacher of the Church, who wrote an harmony of the Gospels, which has been preserved, and a book on the Agreement between Moses and Jesus. At nearly the same period there

From this time the great change in the theological character of Origen unfolded itself. It was now his endeavour to seek out the traces of truth in all human systems, to investigate every thing, in order universally to distinguish falsehood from truth. His life at Alexandria, where so many sects of various kinds met together, his journey to Rome (A.D. 211), his journeys to Palestine and about it, to Achaia, and Cappadocia, gave him an opportunity, as he himself says[1], every where to seek out those who pretended to any peculiar knowledge, and to attain a knowledge of their doctrines, and a means of investigating them. It became his principle, not to allow himself to be governed by the traditional opinion of the multitude, but to hold fast as truth that only, which he found to be truth after an impartial investigation. He expresses this in the following manner, in a practical application of Matth. xxii. 19, 20. "We learn here from our Saviour not to stand under a pretence of piety upon that which is said by the multitude, and is held therefore in great esteem, but upon that which proceeds from investigation, and from the internal connexion of truth; for we must remark, that when he was asked whether it was lawful to give tribute to Cæsar or not, he did not simply express his opinion, but saying, 'Show me the tribute-money,' he inquired 'whose the image and superscription was;' and when they said that 'they were Cæsar's,' he answered, that 'they must render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsars, and not defraud him, under the pretence of piety, of that which was his due[2].'" Hence comes the mildness with which he could judge of those who are in error, as he expresses himself in this beautiful remark on St. John xiii. 8. "It is clear that, although Peter said this with a good and reverential feeling towards the Master, he said it still to his own shame. Life is full of this kind of sins, which happen to those who wish indeed to

were in Alexandria an *heathen* Ammonius, distinguished among the learned, a *Christian Ammonius*, and *Origen*. When Porphyry elsewhere says of Origen: Ἑλλην ἐν Ἕλλησι παιδευθεις λογοις, προς το βαρβαρον ἐξωκειλε τολμημα (he became a renegado, and joined the religion of the barbarians), one part alone of this account is true, namely, that Origen had, from the first, an education in Hellenic literature; but Porphyry is wrong in stating further that he was brought up in *heathenism*, which is notoriously false. We cannot suppose that Porphyry, who knew both the persons who bore the name of Origen, should have made a confusion between the two.

[1] C. Cels. vi. 24. πολλους ἐκπεριελθοντες τοπους της γης και τους πανταχου ἐπαγγελλομενους τι εἰδεναι ζητησαντες.

[2] c. Matth. f. 483.

be right in their faith, but out of ignorance say, or even do, that which leads to the very contrary. Such are those who say 'touch not, taste not, handle not[1].' Coloss. ii. 21, 22. . . . . But what shall we say of those, who in sects are driven about by every wind of doctrine, who call that which is destructive holy, and who make to themselves false representations of the person of Jesus, in order, as they think, to honour him? [2]"

By means of this liberality Origen succeeded in bringing back many heretics, whom he met at Alexandria, especially Gnostics, to the simple doctrines of the Gospel. A remarkable instance of this is furnished by the case of Ambrose, a rich man at Alexandria, who, being dissatisfied by the manner in which Christianity was presented to him in the ordinary expositions of the doctrines of the Church, had sought and fancied that he had found a more spiritual conception of Christianity among the Gnostics, until he was undeceived by the influence of Origen, and rejoiced to find in that teacher the true Gnosis joined with faith[3]. He became now the most zealous friend of Origen, and endeavoured particularly to forward his literary labours for the advantage of the Church.

If Origen, after having learnt from his own experience the errors of a carnal and literal interpretation of Scripture, and the disadvantageous consequences resulting from it, passed over to the other error of an arbitrary allegorizing mode of explanation, he deserves on that account the greater esteem for his earnest and conscientious endeavours to use all the means of assistance, which could serve to restore the letter of Holy Writ to its original condition, and to understand it accurately. For this purpose, after arriving at the years of manhood, he learnt the Hebrew language, which must have been difficult to a Greek; he undertook a correction of the MSS. of the Bible by means of a collation of them; and he is the founder of a learned and scientific study of the Bible among Christians, although his arbitrary hermeneutical principles do not allow all the fruits, which otherwise might have been produced, to arise from it.

As now the number of those who sought religious instruction at his hands was constantly increasing, and at the same time his

[1] [There is an omission here of two or three lines of the original. H. J. R.]

[2] In Joh. xxxii. § 5. [vol. ii. p. 380, 381. Ed. Huet.]

[3] See the words addressed to Ambrosius, Tom. Evang. Joh. p. 99, as cited above.

labours in biblical literature which became continually more extensive, laid more and more heavy demands upon him, in order to obtain more time, he shared his office of catechist with his friend Heraclas; he transferred to him the duty of giving the preparatory instruction in religion, and reserved for himself the more accurate instruction of those who were further advanced [1], apparently with respect to both the classes of catechumens mentioned above. (See above [2].)

The division of the duties of his office in this manner enabled him to enlarge the sphere of his exertions in public teaching with advantage to the Church. Persuaded of the utility of a thorough education in general knowledge for the right understanding of the Scriptures, and the right application of their contents, and persuaded also that this enlarged education would be the best and most efficacious antidote, as well to a too sensuous belief, as to the capricious and fantastic theosophy of the Gnostics, he endeavoured to spread such an education among the young men who joined themselves to him. He delivered lectures as well on that which the Greeks called Encyclopædic education, as on philosophy. He explained to his scholars all the old philosophers, in whom there were moral and religious principles; and he endeavoured to form them to that freedom of mind, which should enable them every where to separate truth from the admixture of falsehood, and to preserve them also from becoming the slaves of a school or a system [3]. And in all that he did his ultimate aim was to point out to his scholars how they ought to use every thing to the service of Christianity, and consider every thing with reference to that which is Divine; and he endeavoured to instil into them the mind to do this. By these means he did great service towards promoting a more free and enlightened Christian education, as the school which originated from him will prove. He succeeded also in leading many, whom the love of learning alone had first brought to him, more and more to faith in the Gospel, by first raising up in them a longing after divine things, then proving to them the incompetence of the Greek systems of

[1] Euseb. vi. 15.

[2] [I apprehend Neander here alludes to a note a few passages back. The two classes of catechumens are adult heathen converts, and Christian children. H. J. R.]

[3] His scholar, Gregory Thaumaturgus, has painted to us, in this point of view, the method of instruction pursued by Origen in an oration of his to be quoted hereafter.

philosophy to satisfy the religious wants of man, and by presenting to them last of all the doctrines of Scripture about Divine matters, and comparing these with the doctrines of the old philosophers. The completion of his instruction was thus his lectures on the explanation of Scripture, with which in his case the whole range of theology, and all *Christian* philosophy, all in short, which he understood under the name of Gnosis, was connected; by which means we must allow, although he awakened in his scholars reverence and love to that which is Divine in Scripture, and preserved them from a mere dead knowledge of Scripture, he introduced much foreign matter into Scripture, and in part led his hearers away from its proper, simple, and at the same time profound, meaning, rather than conducted them to it. Many of those whom Origen was able to lead thus gradually to the knowledge and the love of Scripture, afterwards became zealous and successful teachers in the Church.

Ambrose, the above-named friend of Origen, took peculiar interest in his learned labours, and Origen used to call him his task-master. Not only did he, by his inquiries and demands, drive him to many investigations, but he made use of his own large fortune, in order to buy for his friend the means of pursuing many of them that were expensive; as, for instance, in those where the purchase and comparison of manuscripts was necessary. He gave him seven rapid writers, who were to take turns with each other in writing down from his dictation, and making a clear copy of all that was written. Origen, in a letter, says of this friend [1], "He who gave me credit for great diligence and thirst after the Divine word, has, by his own diligence and love of holy learning, convinced himself of the contrary [2]. He has so completely surpassed me, that I am in danger of being unable to meet his demands. The comparison of manuscripts leaves me no time to eat, and after my meals I cannot go out, nor rest myself, but even at that time I am compelled to institute philological inquiries, and correct manuscripts. Even the night is not allowed me for sleep, but my philological inquiries occupy a considerable portion of it. I will not mention the time from early in the morning till the ninth, and sometimes even the

[1] T. i. Opp. Ed. de la R. f. 3.

[2] [This is not quite an exact translation of the original, which rather means, 'has put me to shame, ἠλεγξε, coarguit me.' H. J. R.]

tenth hour[3], because all who have pleasure in such employments use this time for the study of the Divine word and reading."

Ambrose urged Origen, by making known his theological labours, to extend their utility to the whole Church, and thus to counteract the Gnostics, who had at first excited deeper inquiries after Divine things among the Christians, and then were enabled, under the pretext of a more profound interpretation of Scripture, to introduce their philosophy into the Holy Scriptures by means of arbitrary and allegorizing explanations. Origen himself attributes this latter object to his labours in the end of the fifth tomus of his Commentary on the Gospel of St. John, which was in part directed against the Gnostic Heracleon. "As now," he says, the "heterodox under the pretence of Gnosis, rise up against the holy Church, and propagate works consisting of many books, which promise explanations of the evangelic and apostolic writings, they will, if we are silent, and set forth no true and sound doctrines, get dominion over the hungry souls, who, for want of wholesome food, run to that which is forbidden."

He finished at Alexandria his Commentaries on Genesis, the Psalms, the Lamentations of Jeremiah (of which writings only fragments have been preserved), his five first Tomi [i. e. sections] on the Gospel of St. John, his Treatise on the Resurrection, his Stromata, and his work περι ἀρχων, i. e. probably not about the fundamental principles of the Christian faith, but about the origin of all Being[1], a subject of which the controversies with the Gnostics particularly treated. The last-mentioned work became of especial importance by the struggles between opposite theological dispositions which it set on foot, and by the influence which it exerted over the fate of Origen and of his school. At that time, even more than at a later season, Platonic philosophy and the doctrines of the Christian faith were in him intermingled together; his caprice of speculation was afterwards more moderated by the influence of the Christian spirit, and many notions which he (although more in a problematic than a decisive manner) had thrown out, he afterwards retracted, although the principles of his system remained always the same. He himself afterwards declared, in a letter to Fabianus, the Bishop of Rome,

[1] Till three or four o'clock in the afternoon, according to our reckoning.

[2] Λογος ἀρχικος, in the language of Clement, means a discourse which relates to the doctrine of the ἀρχαι. See Strom. l. iv. 510, a. [Pott. Sylb.]

to whom his system had probably been denounced as heretical, that in this book he had brought forward much, which he now no longer considered true, and that his friend Ambrose had made the book known against his will[1].

And yet, as it often happens, the dispute between Origen and the party of the Church zealots would not have come to an open rupture so soon, without an external occasion, and without the accession of personal and improper passions, especially as Origen was far from having *the pride*, which commonly so easily attaches itself to a theological turn of mind like his, and as he always shows so much tenderness towards those whose religious and theological views and condition are different from his own. The authority of his Bishop Demetrius was a great support to him; but this man, who was animated by the hierarchical pride, which we find subsisting at this age, especially among the Bishops of the great Metropolitan sees, was excited to jealousy against him, by the great reputation of Origen, and the honour which he obtained on particular occasions.

One especial cause of this jealousy was the honour showed to Origen by his two friends, Alexander, the Bishop of Jerusalem, the friend of his youth, and Theoctistus, the Bishop of Cæsarea, in Palestine. It had already much embittered the proud Demetrius against them, that they had permitted Origen, as a layman, to preach in their Churches. (See Part I.[2]) As, however, in obedience to the call of his bishop, he returned to Alexandria, he was enabled to renew his former friendly relations with him. But in the year 228 it happened that he travelled into Hellas[3], on account of some ecclesiastical matters, of which we have no exact

[1] See Hieronym. ep. 41. t. iv. opp. ed. Martianay.

[2] There were apparently, in the year 216, hostile incursions upon Alexandria (according to Euseb. vi. 19) which made then an abode there no longer safe for him—perhaps, when the fanciful Caracalla, departing for the Parthian war, gave up this town to plunder and to slaughter at the mercy of his soldiers (Æl. Spartian. vi. 6); and one is inclined to think, that the rage of the heathen soldiers would peculiarly attack the Christians. Origen then betook himself to Palestine, to visit his old friends; and, as he himself says (Joh. t. vi. 24.), to investigate the spots which had been trodden by Jesus, by his apostles, and by the prophets. (ἐπι ἱστοριαν των ἰχνων Ἰησου και των μαθητων αὐτου και των προφητων.)

[3] Perhaps he was called into these parts in order to dispute with the Gnostics who were spread about there, because it was known how much he was an adept in this business. His disputation with Candidus, the Valentinian, the Acts of which Jerome quotes, might lead us to this conclusion.

statement. On this journey he visited his friends in Palestine,—and they ordained him a presbyter at Cæsarea in the year 228.

Demetrius could not forgive the two bishops and Origen for this transaction. After the return of Origen, he assembled a synod, consisting of the presbyters of his diocese, and of other Egyptian bishops, in which he used against Origen that extravagant act of his youth, by which he was, undoubtedly, according to the letter of the laws of the Church, excluded from the clerical profession[1]. But they ought to have considered, that he had become a different man since that time, and that he *had long condemned the step*, to which his youthful enthusiasm had led him. And yet he was for this deposed from the dignity of presbyter, which had been conferred upon him, and the administration of the office of public teaching in the Alexandrian was forbidden to him[2]. After he had once so strongly attracted to himself the jealousy and hatred of the pharisaical bishop, he could no longer find any peace in Alexandria. Demetrius did not content himself with this single attack upon him, but he began to cast the imputation of heresy on the doctrines of Origen; to which imputation perhaps, the expressions of the latter in his disputes with the Gnostics had given some new occasion[3].

Yet that which animated him, gave him tranquillity of mind enough to finish his fifth tomus on the Gospel of St. John, amidst the storms of Alexandria (for, as he says[4], Jesus commanded the storms and waves of the sea), until at last he thought it advisable to leave Alexandria, and to betake himself to his friends at Cæsarea, in Palestine. But Demetrius pursued him

[1] It is in the highest degree probable that the ecclesiastical regulation which we find in xvii. of the Canones Apostolici, was then in existence. It was there, however, by no means unconditionally forbidden, in accordance with the law of the Old Testament, Deut. xxiii. that any eunuch should enter into the clerical profession, but it was expressly appointed that one, whom such a misfortune might have befallen without his own instrumentality, might be allowed, if he was in other respects worthy, to become a clergyman; it was only ὁ ἑαυτον ἀκρωτηριασας μη γινεσθω κληρικος. It was only to put a stop to such ascetic enthusiasm.

[2] Photius, however, says that this synod had already forbidden Origen, not only to exercise the office of a teacher, but even to remain at Alexandria. And yet it is difficult to see, how a bishop at that time could effect the latter of these two things. He could only exclude him from the communion of the Church, and it was not until the second synod that this was done. Nor does the language of Origen appear to hint, that he was compelled to leave Alexandria.

[3] As we may conclude from the disputation with Candidus the Valentinian. Hieronym. adv. Rufin. f. 414. vol. iv.

[4] T. vi. Joh. §. 1.

even thither with his persecutions; and he laid hold of a matter as a pretext, wherein he could easily find associates, both in Egypt and out of it, since the prevailing doctrinal spirit in many parts of the Church was altogether hostile to the idealistic tendency of the school of Origen, and since the book περὶ ἀρχῶν was calculated to give occasion to so many accusations of heresy. In a more numerous synod of Egyptian bishops, Demetrius excommunicated Origen, as an heretic, and the synod sent forth a violent decree against him. It is in reference to this, that when he began again at Cæsarea to continue his commentary on the Gospel of St. John, Origen says, that "God, who once led his people out of Egypt, had saved him also out of Egypt; but that his enemy had assailed him with the utmost bitterness by his recent letter, so utterly opposed to the Gospel, and that he had raised up all the pestilential winds of evil in Egypt against him[1]."

[1] We are without connected and trustworthy accounts of these important transactions. We can only endeavour, by means of combining particulars, to trace the real progress of the matter. From the indications which Eusebius gives, and from the above-quoted words of Origen about the rash act of his youth, it is certain, that this was then used against him; but it could have been used as a ground only for excluding him from the clerical office. The other proceedings against him must have arisen from another accusation against him. Photius, who had read the Apology of Pamphilus for Origen, says Cod. 118, that Demetrius made it a matter of reproach to him, that he had travelled to Athens without his permission, and during this journey, undertaken without his permission, had allowed himself to be ordained, which would certainly on the part of Origen, as well as of the bishop who ordained him, have been a violation of the laws of the Church. But supposing that Demetrius did make this accusation against Origen, we have still to inquire, whether he had the right to do so. We see from the quotation of Jerome de Vir. illustr. c. 62, that Alexander, the Bishop of Jerusalem, in reply to Demetrius, might allege, that he had ordained Origen on the strength of an epistola formata, brought by him from his own Bishop. The laws of the Church about these circumstances were then perhaps so indefinite, that Alexander might believe himself fully justified in ordaining a man, who was recommended to a foreign Church, and yet that Demetrius might see in this an invasion of the rights of his episcopal office. Be this as it may, even this could not be a sufficient ground for excommunicating Origen. The sympathy, which the attack upon him found in other churches—the accusations of heresy against Origen which continued after his death—what he said afterwards in his own justification to Fabianus, the Bishop of Rome, in the letter we have already cited (as he had also written to other bishops in defence of his orthodoxy. See Eusebius, vi. 36.) All this points out, that *his opinions* [seine Dogmatik], were the cause of his excommunication. We see also from what Jerome (l. ii. adv. Rufin. f. 411.) quotes out of the letter of Origen against Demetrius, that errors in the doctrines of the faith had been charged against him, as he defends himself against the accusation that he had maintained, that even Satan would hereafter be in bliss; although one

This personal contest became now a contest between the opposite opinions of two parties. The Churches in Palestine, in Arabia, Phœnicia and Achaia declared themselves for Origen, while the Roman Church declared herself against him[1]. The judgment which Origen himself formed of those who branded him with the name of heretic, will be seen from his expression in the following passage[2], where, after quoting 1 Cor. i. 25. he says, "Had I said, 'the foolishness of God,' how would those who love to accuse men of heresy[3], have accused me! how should I, who had said a thousand things, which they themselves approve of, have been assailed for having said this one thing, 'the foolishness of God?'" In his defence against the synod, which had excommunicated him, he quotes the denunciations of the prophets against wicked priests and rulers, and then says, "We must pity them rather than hate them, pray for them rather than curse them, for we are created for blessing, and not for cursing[4]."

cannot well perceive, how he could deny this conclusion, which is grounded by a necessary consequence on his system. Rufinus quotes passages out of a defence of Origen's, addressed to his friends at Alexandria, from which we see that a falsified report [protokoll] of a disputation held between him and the heretics, had excited astonishment in Palestine, even among his friends, at the opinions he expressed. They had sent a messenger to him at Athens, and begged him to send them the genuine original report. Even at Rome these adulterated copies had been propagated. See Rufin. de Adulteratione Librorum Origenis, in opp. Hieronym. t. v. ed. Martianay, f. 251. Even if Rufinus is not really a faithful translator, this cannot have been wholly invented by him. The disputes with the Gnostics would easily give an opportunity of bringing forward the peculiar religious opinions of Origen, and to those who had in him so powerful an antagonist, an opportunity of rendering his orthodoxy suspicious in his own Church, would be welcome enough.

[1] Hieronym. ep. 29. ad Paulam. Damnatus a Demetrio episcopo, exceptis Palestinæ, et Arabiæ, et Phœniciæ, atque Achaiæ sacerdotibus. He certainly adds, non propter dogmatum novitatem: non propter hæresin, sed quia gloriam eloquentiæ ejus et scientiæ ferre non poterant. But this is not a fact, it is only a subjective interpretation of motives, according to the bias which Jerome was under at that time. Comp. also the remark made on the case of Tertullian.

[2] Hom. viii. in Jerem. § 8. [3] οἱ φιλαιτιοι.

[4] See l. c. Hieronym. iv. f. 411. Compare what Origen says against the importance [*i. e.* validity, the German is Bedeutung. H. J. R.] of unjust excommunication. See above, vol. i. p. 245. Comp. also on Matth. f. 445, where Origen, applying the passage in Matth. xxi. 16. to the bishops of his own time, says: "As these priests and scribes are blameable according to the letter of this history, so according to spiritual application, are also many high priests worthy of blame, who adorn not the name of the episcopal rank by their lives, and have not clothed themselves with *light and truth*. (Exod. xxviii,) These, while they behold the wonders of God, despise the little ones and babes in the Church, who praise God and his Christ, and they are angry at their advances in godliness, and they accuse them to Jesus, as doing

The enemies of Origen were destined to contribute to the further extension of the sphere of his exertions; his change of residence to Palestine was assuredly followed by important consequences; because an opportunity was thus afforded to him, of effecting also from that point the propagation of a liberal and enlightened spirit in the Church; and the traces of his exertions are to be found for a long time in these regions. Here also he collected a body of young men around him, who educated themselves for theologians and teachers of the Church under his influence; among whom was Gregory, who afterwards became so remarkably active in the preaching of the Gospel. (Of him we shall afterwards speak more particularly.) He continued here also his literary labours. Among other works he composed here his already mentioned treatise on the use of prayer and on the explanation of the Lord's Prayer, which he addressed to his friend Ambrose. He was here in a personal communication with the most distingnished teachers of Cappadocia, Palestine, and Arabia, and was constantly called upon to give his advice in deliberations on any novel circumstances in the Church.

As, under the persecution of Maximinus Thrax, the friends of Origen, the Presbyter Prototectus of Cæsarea himself, and Ambrose, had much to suffer; he addressed to these men, who were as confessores, in prison awaiting the termination of their sufferings, his treatise *on Martyrdom*, in which he exhorts them to steadfastness in their confession, and endeavours to hold them up by the promises of Scripture, and to refute the sophistry of which many Gnostics, as well as heathens, who considered

wrong, while they really do no wrong; and they say to him, Hearest thou what these say? And we shall understand this the better, if we consider, how it often happens that men of an ardent spirit, who brave imprisonment by their bold confession of faith before the heathen, who despise danger, and resolutely lead a strict life of abstinence and celibacy; how it happens such men, being rude in speech * (ἰδιωται τῃ λεξει), are calumniated by the blame-worthy high priests as disorderly, and how they are accused by them before Jesus, as if their own conduct was better than that of these zealous and simple children! but Jesus gives his testimony to the children, and, on the contrary, accuses the high priests of ignorance, when he says, Have ye not read this, 'out of the mouth of babes and sucklings thou hast prepared praise?'" Well might Origen here set before his mind the image of Demetrius, and other bishops like him, who were inclined to judge the errors of a pious enthusiasm with extreme severity.

* [In literis vero ignari.—*Lat. translator.* H. J. R.]

religion as an affair of state, made use in order to persuade the Christians that, without any prejudice to their belief, which no man wished to take from them, they might satisfy the demands of the laws of the state, in regard to the external things of religion. But in this book the prevalent tone is at times more the spirit of that philosophically ascetic, and dehumanizing morality, than the spirit of that evangelical morality, which sanctions all that is pure in human nature, and unites the consciousness of God's quickening power with the feeling of human weakness[1]; and we find also in the same work the false notions of the opus operatum of martyrdom, to which we have before alluded; and yet with all this the force of his faithful confidence and his evangelic zeal for the faith is beautifully expressed in it. He says to the two confessors[2]: "I desired also, that, during the whole of the present struggle, you should rejoice and be glad, when you remember the great recompense, which is laid up in heaven for those who suffer persecution and shame for righteousness' sake, and for the sake of the Son of Man, as the Apostles of old rejoiced, that they were counted worthy to suffer shame for the name of Christ. But if at any time you feel anxiety in your soul, let the Spirit of Christ, that dwells in you, speak to it thus, when she for her part would trouble him, 'Why art thou cast down, O my soul! and art so disquieted within me. Trust in God, for I will give thanks to him, forasmuch as he helps me with his countenance.' Ps. xlii. 6. . . Let it [never] be troubled! but even before the tribunal itself, and while the naked sword impends over the neck, let it be guarded by the peace of God, which passeth all understanding[3]." He says to them in another passage[4], "Since the Word of God is lively and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, and penetrates even to the dividing asunder soul and spirit, marrow and bone, and is a judge over the thoughts and the faculties of the heart, Heb. iv. 12; this Divine Word now bestows on our souls the peace which passeth all understanding, which it once shed over the souls of

[1] In proof of this assertion we may particularly appeal to the manner, in which Origen explained so artificially the simple sense of those words of Christ, which he spoke in his agony, and which the spirit we allude to would not allow him to conceive in their natural meaning, §. 29. [pp. 189—191. in Wetstein's Edition of the Dial. cont. Marcion. et alia opuscula. Basileæ, 1673. H. J. R.]

[2] § 4. [p. 165. Ed. Wetstein.]

[3] § 37. [p. 201. Ed. Wetstein.]

[4] He applies this passage to the Logos.

Apostles, but it has thrown the sword between the earthly and the heavenly form within us, in order that, for the present, it may take our heavenly man to itself; and hereafter, when we are so far advanced, as to need no further dividing[1]; it may make us altogether heavenly. And he is come also, to bring not only a sword on earth, but the *fire* also, of which he says, "I would that it were already kindled," Luke xii. 49. Let then this fire be kindled also in you, and let it consume all your earthly thoughts, and be ye baptized with the baptism, whereof Jesus spoke[2]. And thou also! (Ambrose) who hast both wife and children, and brethren and sisters, remember the words of the Lord: 'if any man cometh to me, and hateth not father, mother, wife, children, brethren, sisters, he cannot be my disciple.' But both of you remember also the words, 'If any man cometh to me and hateth not also his own life, he cannot be my disciple.'"

It was, perhaps, this very persecution, which moved Origen to leave for a time the place, which hitherto had been his abode. Since the persecution, as we have before remarked, was only local, it was easy to obviate it by a flight to regions where tranquillity at that moment prevailed. Origen betook himself to Cæsarea in Cappadocia, to his friend, the Bishop Firmilianus, with whom he was in the habit of communicating on subjects of theological learning[3].

But, probably exactly about the time that he had settled there, the above-mentioned persecution (see above) in Cappadocia broke out, and he was induced by it, to withdraw into the house of Juliana, a Christian lady, who for two years kept him hidden in her house, and maintained him. He there made a discovery of great importance to his literary undertakings. For some years he had already busied himself *with a work, the object of which* was, as well to correct the text of the Alexandrian version of the Old Testament (which was then the translation prevalent in the Church, and was looked upon by many Christians, in consequence of the old Jewish legend, as inspired, and the MSS. of which differed very much from each other in their

[1] No separation of holiness from ungodliness.

[2] Luke xii. 50.

[3] They used sometimes to visit each other, in order to converse on theological subjects. Euseb. vi. 27.

readings), as also to promote the improvement of the translation itself, by comparing it with other old translations, and with the Hebrew original. Origen, who constantly disputed much on religious subjects with heathens and Jews, had learnt, as he himself says, how necessary a knowledge of the original text of the Old Testament was, in order not to give openings to the Jews, for they were in the habit of ridiculing the ignorance of the heathen converts, who disputed with them, when they quoted such passages from the Alexandrian version, as did not exist in the Hebrew, or when they knew nothing of those, which were only to be found in the Hebrew [1]. He had therefore made use of the fortune of his friend Ambrose, and of his own frequent journeys, in order to collect different manuscripts of the Alexandrian version and other old translations, wherever he could find them. He had for instance, in rummaging everywhere, found at Jericho in a barrel, an old translation of some books of the Old Testament, which was elsewhere unknown. Now it happened that his protectress Juliana had inherited the writings of the Ebionite Symmachus, who possibly lived about the beginning of that century, and he found in her house a commentary by this writer on the εὐαγγελιον καθ' ἑβραιους [2], and a translation made by him also of the Old Testament [3]. He was now enabled to complete his great work of a collection of the

[1] Origen. Ep. ad. African. § 3. τοιαυτης οὐσης ἡμων προς αὐτους ἐν ταις ζητησεσι παρασκευης, οὐ καταφρονησουσιν, οὐδ' ὡς ἐθος αὐτοις, γελασονται τους ἀπο των ἐθνων πιστευοντας, ὡς τ' ἀληθη και παρ' αὐτοις ἀναγεγραμμενα ἀγνοουντας.

[2] The following words of Eusebius, vi. 17, on the work of Symmachus (which he afterwards reckons among his ἑρμηνειας εἰς τας γραφας) "εν οἰς δοκει προς το κατα Ματθαιον ἀποτεινομενος εὐαγγελιον την δεδηλωμενην αἱρεσιν (των Ἐβιωναιων) κρατυνειν;" from the context can hardly be taken to mean, as Valesius makes them, that Symmachus endeavoured to maintain the Ebionitish doctrines *against* the Gospel of St. Matthew; but they must be understood to mean, that he wrote a commentary on the Gospel according to St. Matthew (that is to say, probably, on the εὐαγγελιον καθ' Ἑβραιους which resembled St. Matthew's) from which he endeavoured to establish the Ebionitish doctrines.

[3] Palladius (in the beginning of the fifth century) relates in his history of Monachism (Λαυσιακα), ch. 147, that he had found in an old manuscript which had descended from Origen, the words written by Origen himself, in which he narrated the circumstance mentioned in the text. This Palladius, however, in consequence of his credulousness, is a very suspicious witness, but in the present case we have no grounds to suspect his evidence, especially since it harmonizes well with the account given in Eusebius, vi. 17.

then existing translations of the Old Testament, and a comparison of them with the Hebrew text[1].

After the murder of the Emperor Maximinus, Origen was able under Gordianus, A.D. 238, to return again to Cæsarea, and there again to begin his former course of activity.

As he had once before, on account of some ecclesiastical affairs, been sent for from Alexandria by the Churches of Greece, which esteemed him most highly, the same thing apparently took place again. His way led him through Nicomedia in Bithynia, where he staid some days with his old friend, Ambrose; who, if the account of Jerome is correct, had in the mean time become a deacon, although it does not appear whether Ambrose had employment in the Church of that city, or had only come thither in order to meet Origen. He there received a letter from one of his friends, Julius Africanus[2], one among the distinguished Chris-

[1] The Hexapla. It would be foreign to our purpose to enlarge on this and similar works of Origen, for information on which we must refer to the Introductions to the Old Testament. We only quote here the words of Origen himself on the comparison instituted by him between the Alexandrian version and the other old translations of the Old Testament. After he has spoken (Comment. in Matth. f. 381. Ed. Huet.) of the differences between the copies of the New Testament, which had arisen, partly from the negligence of transcribers, and partly from their boldness in assuming a critical liberty of correcting the text, he adds the following words: "As far as relates to the difference between the copies of the Old Testament, we have found by God's assistance a mode of remedying this inconvenience, by using the other translations as a criterion. Wherever any thing was doubtful in the version of the LXX. by reason of a difference in the manuscripts, we have constantly retained that which agreed with the rest of the translations, and we have marked a great deal, which was not found in the Hebrew, with an *obelus* (the critical mark to denote an omission) because we did not venture to leave it out entirely. We have added also some passages with the mark of an *asterisk*, to denote, that we have added these passages, which are not found in the LXX. from the other translations, in accordance with the Hebrew, and that he, *who is inclined to do so, may receive them into the text* (I think we must read προσεται*), but he, who is offended at them, may receive them or not, just as he pleases." [Comp. Ep. ad African. p. 226, Ed. Wetstein. H. J. R.] From these latter words we see how much Origen had to fear those, who were ready to charge every one, who deviated from that which had been received, with falsification of the Holy Scriptures.

[2] He was a man far advanced in years, as will appear immediately from his being able to address Origen, at that time a person of fifty years of age, by the title of 'my son.' He seems to have fixed his usual residence in the old decayed town of Emmaus, or Nicopoli, in Palestine (as it was afterwards called by the Romans, in order to distinguish it from the Emmaus of the New Testament, it being more distant from Jerusalem than the latter; namely, about 176 stadia). The inhabitants of this

* [The common reading is προηται. H. J. R.]

tian men of learning of this period. It appears that Origen, at a conversation which took place in the presence of Africanus, had cited the history of Susannah on the authority of the Septuagint version, as a genuine piece belonging to Daniel. Africanus expressed to him his surprise at this in a letter, distinguished alike by the moderate, delicate, and learned tone of its argument, and by its unprejudiced criticism, and he begged him to enter into a further discussion of the subject. Origen answered him from Nicomedia, in a very elaborate writing. Not so unprejudiced as Africanus, he endeavoured to defend the authority of the Alexandrian version and collection of the Holy Scriptures. It is remarkable to observe how the free, inquiring spirit of Origen, from a mistaken piety, and perhaps also from being made fearful in consequence of the troubles which he had involuntarily caused in the Church, fell back upon the authority of a Church tradition, which was supposed to be under the guidance of God; he says [1], "But hath not that Providence, which has given edification in the Holy Scripture to all the Churches of Christ, taken care also for those who have been bought with a price, for whom Christ died, whom [i. e. Christ] though he

decayed place chose him as their delegate to the Emperor Heliogabalus, to effect the restoration of their town by this emperor, which he obtained for them. Hieronym. de Vir. Illustr. c. 63. He is known as the first Christian compiler of a history of the world (his χρονογραφια in five books, see Eusebius, vi. 31.) This work, which is only known to us by the quotations of other writers, and fragments, proceeded from an intention to compose something of an apologetic nature. He is known also to us, by his letter to Aristides on the solution of the difference between the genealogies of Jesus as given by St. Matthew and St. Luke, of which a portion is preserved by Eusebius, Hist. i. 7. Another remarkable fragment of this letter has been published by Routh, Reliquiæ Sacræ, vol ii. p. 115. In that he combats those, who maintained that these different genealogies were given, in order to show clearly in this way the truth, that Jesus is both a King and an High priest, as being descended from a royal and a priestly race. He here also declares himself expressly against the theory of a fraus pia. "May such an opinion never prevail in the Church of Christ that a falsehood has been invented for the glory of Christ!" μη δη κρατοιη τοιουτος λογος, ἐν ἐκκλησιᾳ Χριστου, ὁτι ψευδος συγκειται εἰς αἰνον και δοξολογιαν Χριστου. Eusebius ascribes a work to him, which, under the name of κεστου, contains a kind of literary miscellany, according to the then mode of unscientifically mingling together a variety of historical materials. And yet among the fragments of this work, which are ascribed to him, there is much which does not suit the views and principles, which we are accustomed to ascribe to this man, from what we learn of him elsewhere. The most natural supposition is, that he wrote that work before his habits of thought had become decidedly Christian.

[1] C. 4. [p. 227. Ed. Wetstein.]

was his own Son, God, being love itself, spared not; but gave him up for us all, that with him he might give us all things [1]. Consider, therefore, whether it is not good to remember these words, 'Remove not the boundaries which thy fathers have made [2].'" (Prov. xxii. 28.) He says then, "that although he has not neglected the other old translations, he has yet bestowed his chief industry upon the Alexandrian version, in order that it might not seem as if he wished to introduce a spurious innovation into the Church, and in order that he might give no handle to those who sought for opportunities, and who desired to calumniate those men, who were well known, and had obtained stations of eminence in the Church [3]." Athens was the point to which the journey of Origen tended; he staid there some time, finished his commentary on Ezekiel, and began that on the Song of Solomon [4].

Till the end of his life he busied himself in theological labours;

[1] These are arguments by which a free investigation of the canon of Scripture,—an inquiry, I freely grant, which ought, like all theological inquiries, to be animated by a spirit of piety,—has often been opposed. But the arguments of Origen only prove that God, who revealed in Christ his unspeakable love to man, without doubt must have provided for all the wants implanted by himself in human nature. But the mode, in which he has provided for them, must not be determined *à priori* in accordance with the prejudices of any existing system of opinions (einer stehenden dogmatik), nor according to the measure of the limited faculties, the little faith, or the dulness of man. Nay, after all, a mode by which truth comes forth victorious from the contest with error, after a free inquiry, may be the mode most consonant to human nature itself. It may be the plan of Providence, that Faith should fight the battle out herself without any external support, by means of its own inward and Divine power, by means of its own attractive power over the inmost heart of man. The incorrect conclusion, drawn from these correct premises, would, if consistently carried out, lead to the supposition of an outward visible Theocracy constantly guiding mankind, as in a state of infancy, as alas! in after times the conclusion was pushed to this point. But it is far rather true that human nature, in consequence of having had every thing given to it in Christ, has grown up to the maturity of the years of manhood.

[2] These words, which, taken as an unconditional and unlimited rule of life, have so often since those times been used in support of old errors to the prejudice of pure evangelical truths, contain the same principle, which the religio à majoribus tradita of the heathen at first opposed to the new Gospel. See the First Part of this work. The truth victorious through her Divine power—the answer, that could not be refused, to inquiries based on the inmost being of human nature,—the satisfaction of undeniable wants, required by human nature itself,—this needed no *prejudice* for its support, no prejudicium, no præscriptio antiquitatis.

[3] ἱνα μη τι παραχαραττειν δοκοιημεν ταις ὑπο τον οὐρανον ἐκκλησιαις· και προφασεις διδωμεν τοις ζητουσιν ἀφορμας, ἐθελουσι τους ἐν μεσῳ συκοφαντειν και των διαφαινομενων ἐν τῳ κοινῳ κατηγορειν.

[4] Euseb. vi. 32.

and during the reign of Philip the Arabian, with whose family he was connected, he wrote the work against Celsus, which we have already mentioned, his Commentary on St. Matthew, &c. He now permitted for the first time, being sixty years of age, his sermons to be taken down by short-hand writers. In what reverence he was held we may see clearly from the fact, that he was called into council by synods of bishops in weighty ecclesiastical affairs, on which people could not come to a decision; and we have already spoken of the manner in which Beryllus, the Bishop of Bostra, in Arabia, received instruction at his hand. We must, however, still mention, that among the Christians of Arabia at that time a party had caused a controversy, by maintaining that the souls died with the body, and that they would be raised again only at the general resurrection at the same time with the bodies. It was an old Jewish notion (see above) that immortality was not founded upon the nature of the soul, but a peculiar gift of Divine grace; a representation which had been transferred from Judaism to Christianity, traces of which we find in the theory of the Gnostics about the nature of the Psychici, in the doctrine of the Clementine, and in the *opinions* of Justin and Tatian. Perhaps also in this district, the position of which placed it in close connection with Jews, it was no new doctrine, but the predominant one from ancient times; and perhaps the influence of Origen (in whose system the doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul necessarily obtained a place) first effected the change that this latter should obtain universal acceptance among the Church-teachers of that district; and that the small party, which still maintained the old opinion, should appear heretical, although the predominant opinion had previously really pronounced itself against it[1] [the new opinion]. Hence we may understand, how the convocation of a *Great Synod* was considered necessary, in order to allay these controversies. When they were unable to agree, Origen was invited by the synod, and his influence prevailed upon the opposers of the doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul to acknowledge their error, and renounce it.

Origen, who on account of his individual opinions was consi-

[1] Eusebius (vi. 37) may perhaps judge the controversies of this period too much according to his own subjective doctrinal system, and according to the Church-orthodoxy of his own times, when he represents the maintainers of this opinion as generally acknowledged teachers of heresy, and propagators of a new opinion.

dered as an heretical opposer of the evangelical doctrines of the Christian faith, was destined in the last days of a life, consecrated to labouring and struggling for that which he believed to be the cause of Christ, to confute by facts the accusations of his enemies, and to show how he was ready to sacrifice every thing to his faith, and how he belonged to those who are ready to hate even their own lives for the sake of the Lord.

As the fury of the enemies of Christianity in the *Decian* persecution fell chiefly upon *those persons*, who were distinguished among the Christians by their offices, their virtues, or their knowledge, and their activity in the propagation of the faith [1], so it was natural that a man like Origen, should be especially a mark for fanatical cruelty. After a stedfast confession he was thrown into a dungeon, and it was endeavoured, according to the plan pursued in the Decian persecution, to triumph over the weakness of age by refined and gradually increasing tortures. But the faith, which he bore in his heart, supported the feebleness of his age, and enabled him to bear all the trials to which they put him. After he had endured so much [2], he wrote from his prison a letter full of comfort and encouragement for others. The circumstances already related (see above), which in part softened this persecution, and in part entirely put an end to it, obtained at last for Origen also freedom and tranquillity. And yet the sufferings undergone by him, perhaps, contributed to hasten his death. He died about the year 254, aged sixty-nine [3].

The influence of Origen on the formation of a theological system did not continue bound up in his own person, but remained and developed itself independently of him, by means of

[1] The personæ insignes. [2] Euseb. vi. 39.

[3] Euseb. vii. 2. According to Photius, cod. 118, there were two accounts of the death of Origen, which differed both as to its circumstances, and the time of its occurrence. Pamphilus and many others, who had been personally acquainted with Origen, related that he died at Cæsarea as a martyr in the Decian persecution. Others related that he lived to the times of Gallus and Volusianus, and then died at Tyre, and was buried there; and the truth of this latter account was testified by the letters written by Origen after the persecution, of the genuineness of which, however, Photius was not decidedly convinced. But after that, which Eusebius, who certainly followed the account of his friend and instructor Pamphilius, says in the above-cited passage of his Church History, it can hardly be supposed that Pamphilius really gave the account alluded to by Photius. Perhaps Photius may have misunderstood Pamphilius, when by the term martyrdom he meant only a confession under torture, or when he spoke of *the consequences of those sufferings* as affecting Origen.

his writings and his disciples, but not without a continuing contest with the opposite dispositions of the human mind. The friends of Chiliasm, of the carnal and literal interpretation of Scripture, and the anthropomorphical and anthropopathical mode of representing Divine things connected with such a system of interpretation, and the zealots for the letter of the doctrinal tradition of the Church, were enemies of the Origenistic school. The contest between these opposing principles is the source of the most marking phenomena for the theological development of the latter portion of this period. We shall here first throw a glance upon the Church, which was the original scene of the activity of Origen, namely, the *Alexandrian* and the *Egyptian* Church.

Origen had left behind him disciples in this district who continued to work on in *his* spirit, although with a greater degree of speculative moderation. The Bishop Demetrius, as is shown by what precedes, was rather a personal enemy to Origen than an enemy to his theological opinions. The opposition made by him to these was apparently, in his case, only a pretext. He therefore allowed the disciples of Origen to continue their operations undisturbed, and he himself died soon after the breaking out of these controversies in the same year, 231.

Heraclas, the friend and scholar of Origen already mentioned, who after his [Origen's] departure had become the head of the Catechetical school, was made successor to Demetrius in the Episcopal office. In the year 247, Heraclas was succeeded in his office of Catechist, and afterwards as Bishop, by Dionysius, another worthy disciple of Origen, who constantly retained his love and reverence for his master, to whom when in prison (see above), during the Decian persecution, he wrote a letter of consolation. This man, as he himself says, had come to a belief in the Gospel through the method of *free investigation*, by giving an unprejudiced and thorough examination to all systems; and hence he remained true to this principle, even as a Christian and a Church-teacher. He read and examined in an unprejudiced manner all writings of the heretics, and rejected their systems, only after having learned to know them accurately, and after having placed himself in a condition to confute them on just grounds. A Presbyter of his Church warned him against the evil, which might happen to his soul from his employing himself so repeatedly with these godless writings. But the Spirit of God

gave him confidence enough not to allow himself to be frightened at this danger. He believed that he heard a voice which said to him, "Read all that falls into your hands, for you are able to judge, and to examine every thing, and this has *been to you* from the very beginning a source of faith." Dionysius was strengthened by this encouragement in his resolution, and he thought it corresponded with that precept of the Lord to those who are strong, which is found in an Apocryphal Gospel, "Be ye able money-changers:" (γινεσθε δοκιμοι τραπεζιται) that is to say, be capable of distinguishing genuine from counterfeit coins [1].

We have already on different occasions given examples of the liberal mind and moderation of this man, and of the blessed effects produced by it. His Christian moderation and mildness are shown also in his Letter to an Egyptian Bishop, named Basilides, which contains answers to inquiries concerning circumstances relative to the discipline, and the rites of the Church [2]. The Letter of Dionysius to this Bishop, who was subordinate to him, concludes thus: "Thou hast not laid these inquiries before me, as if thou wert ignorant in the matter, but in order to do me honour, and that I might be of the same mind with you, as indeed I am. I have stated and explained my opinion to you not as a teacher, but in all the openness with which we must speak to each other. But it is now your business to judge about the matter; and write to me then what seems to you better, or whether you are also yourself satisfied that this is right [3]."

[1] Dionysius, in his Letter to the Romish Bishop Philemon (Euseb. vii. 7), appeals to an heavenly vision and to a heavenly voice. He speaks of the thing so simply, and betrays so little design, that we should do him an injustice to charge him with what is called a *fraus pia*, although the somewhat lax principles of the Alexandrian school in this respect (a laxity which is connected with their distinction between two different conditions with regard to religion) might favour such an accusation; but we must here take into the account also, that these pious men certainly were better guided by the Christian spirit, which animated them, than by their theoretical principles. It may easily be explained in a psychological way, by supposing that the truth, which the Spirit of God caused him to acknowledge, presented itself again to his imagination in this form, perhaps in a dream. The manner in which he speaks of it seems, however, to indicate that he himself was not so firmly convinced of the Divine nature of the vision, as of the truth of its purport, and of the declaration of Christ, his words being these: ἀπεδεξαμην το ὁραμα, ὡς ἀποστολικῃ φωνῃ συντρεχον, τῃ λεγουσῃ, &c.

[2] Which Letter maintains, in the Greek Church, a lawful reverence as an ἐπιστολη καθολικη. The fragments which remain of it were last published by Routh, Reliquiæ Sacræ, vol. ii.

[3] A larger fragment of the work of this Dionysius "On Nature," in which he defends

Afterwards also in the last period of the third century, Pierius and Theognostus distinguished themselves as teachers of the Alexandrian Church. In the fragments of their works (preserved in Photius) we recognise the peculiar doctrines of Origen.

We have already remarked, that in Egypt itself an opposition existed between an *Origenistic* and an *Anti-Origenistic* party. We find this opposition in the fourth century, especially among the Egyptian monks, occurring again, and the parties named *Anthropomorphites* and *Origenists*. Perhaps also this opposition among the Egyptian monks is to be derived from the time of which we have just been speaking. There were, indeed, at this time no monks; but as early as the end of the third century there were in Egypt assemblies of ascetics, who lived in the country [1]. Among these Egyptian ascetics there appeared a man at the end of this period, by name Hieracas, who was reckoned among the heretics in the times that followed, because men judged of him from the position assumed by the Church system of doctrine, as this had formed itself in the fourth century, but who, during his lifetime, would hardly have been considered as an heretic [2]. As far as we can become acquainted with his turn of mind, and his doctrines, from the fragmentary accounts preserved of him, for which we are chiefly indebted to Epiphanius [3], he had in his peculiar views much that was akin to the Origenistic school, and it may be the case that he himself was originally of that school; but we nevertheless find no *such* similarity of doctrines, that it cannot be explained any other way. Views similar to these might easily be formed also in other parts of Egypt.

Hieracas lived in the town of Leontopolis [4], in Egypt, as an ascetic; and, according to the practice of ascetics, he procured for himself what was necessary for his livelihood, and means for the exercise of his benevolence, by an art which was much prized,

faith in Providence against the Atomic theory of the Epicureans, is preserved to us by Eusebius in the xivth Book of his Præparatio Evangelica, and it is printed in Routh, l. c. vol. iv.

[1] As we may perceive from the Life of Antony in Athanasius. More will be said on this subject in the following period.

[2] On this account—as in this work we can conceive the notion of heresy only in its historical signification, we have not reckoned Hieracas among the heretics, as is usually done.

[3] Hæres. 67.

[4] Unless, perhaps, he was at the head of an ascetic body in the neighbourhood of that town.

and much used in Egypt, that of *fine penmanship*, in which he was skilful, both as regarded the Greek and the Coptic character. He must have lived to beyond the age of ninety years, which may easily be explained from his simple mode of life, and to his very end was in possession of his faculties, and therefore was able to exercise his art to the latest hours of his life. He was equally acquainted with the Greek and the Coptic literature; and from this very cause it may have happened, that he mingled with Christianity many elements foreign to it, drawn from both those classes of literature. He wrote Commentaries on the Bible both in the Coptic and the Greek language, and composed many hymns for the Church.

He was addicted to the allegorizing interpretation of Scripture, which was closely connected with a certain theosophical disposition. Like Origen he explained the account of Paradise in an allegorical manner, and denied a material [*sinnliches*, sensuous] Paradise. Probably, like Origen, he considered Paradise as the symbol of a higher world of spirits, from which the heavenly Spirit sunk down through an inclination for earthly matter. But as men were by no means of one mind as to what was to be understood symbolically in that narrative, and what literally, and also as nothing had been finally settled (see above) in the prevailing doctrine of the Church on the origin of souls, and, besides, as the peculiar opinions of Origen had at that time in the Egyptian Church many considerable advocates, he could not have been generally set down as an heretic on that account.

From that theory of his concerning the incorporation of the heavenly Spirit, which sunk down to an union with matter, it may easily be explained how Hieracas must have despised the earthly material body, and have made its renunciation and mortification [1] the chief business of Christian morality, and how he must have contended against the doctrine that the soul once freed, should again at the Resurrection become enclosed in this prison-house of the body. In regard to the last subject, he may very possibly have held that the soul would become enveloped with a higher organ of ethereal matter (a σωμα πνευματικον). And this opinion also he might dress up in such a manner that

[1] [*Entäusserung*. Perhaps a stronger phrase would more nearly translate Neander's word. It seems to express such a system of self-denial as would almost free us from the body, even while we are in it. H. J. R.]

he could not be said exactly to reject the doctrine of a resurrection of the body, but only to explain it after his own views.

As far as regards the first point, he pronounced that an unmarried life of continence was an essential element in true Christian perfection. In the recommendation of celibacy he placed the characteristic difference between the moral position of the Old and of the New Testament. Hieracas discovers the traces of those false views of the nature of morality, and of the requirements of the moral law from human nature, (according to which it might be supposed that this moral law could be so easily fulfilled, and men could do even more than it required, viz. the opera supererogationis,) when he inquires, 'What new thing, then, has the doctrine of the only-begotten One introduced? what new good hath he planted in mankind? The Old Testament has already treated of the fear of God, of envy, of covetousness, &c. What new thing then remains, if it be not the introduction of celibacy?' This inquiry, we must acknowledge, shows that Hieracas had no right conception either of the requirements of the moral Law, or, which is closely connected with it, of that which Christ is as the Redeemer of mankind, and of the nature of redemption. From the view of human nature, and of the requirements of the moral Law upon it, which we find here set forth, a doctrine might easily be deduced, according to which man has no need of a Redeemer. But it would be unjust on that account to ascribe to Hieracas the doctrine that Christ was only the founder of a more perfect moral system, and not the Redeemer of mankind. A zealous Montanist might have said something similar to what Hieracas advanced. And traces of these false ethical and anthropological views, are besides found also at this season, and particularly among the Alexandrians.

By means of passages, detached from their context, in the 7th chapter of the first Epistle to the Corinthians, he endeavoured to prove that St. Paul had permitted marriage only out of a regard for the weakness of men, and only to avoid a worse evil in the case of those who were weak. In the parable of the virgins, Matth. xxv., he neglected the rule of interpretation, which indicates that we are not to seek a resemblance in every particular, but only in the points of comparison; and he concluded from that parable that here *virgins* only were named,

and that only unmarried persons could attain to a participation in the kingdom of heaven. In his application of the passage, in which it is said, that "without holiness no man can see God," Heb. xii. 14, he sets out from his presumption that the nature of holiness consists in a life of celibacy.

As Hieracas himself admits, that St. Paul permitted marriage to those who are weak, it follows, that he by no means unconditionally condemned married Christians, and excluded them from the number of Christians. It may be the case, that persons drew too large conclusions from many of his exaggerations in his recommendation of celibacy. Or else, when he said that only those who lived in celibacy could attain to the kingdom of heaven, he must by that expression have understood not the blessedness of heaven generally, but only the highest grade of it; which doctrinal expression, as peculiar to himself, appears likely to have been thus used, from what we are now about to observe.

In virtue of his ascetic disposition Hieracas laid particular stress on this point, viz. every one was to obtain for himself a participation in the kingdom of heaven by his own moral endeavours, and his own ascetic strictness. This point, the laying particular stress on man's own endeavours, was also altogether in accordance with the Alexandrian views. Now Hieracas, setting out from the principle: 'that participation in the kingdom of heaven being only the recompense of a combat, he who has never fought cannot attain the victor's crown,' came to this conclusion, 'children who die before they attain to knowledge and consciousness, do not enter into the kingdom of heaven.' He could hardly have intended thus to express an unconditional sentence of condemnation upon them, but only to exclude them from the *highest grade* of blessedness, which proceeds from communion with God, and from the ennoblement of human nature by its union with God in Christ: for the participation in this is only to be attained by man through his own moral endeavours, when he does more than the Law requires. He supposed a middle state for these children, as was afterward supposed in the case of unbaptized children by many Orientals and by Pelagius. If Hieracas maintained this with regard to all children, even those that were baptized, it follows from this that he denied a *supernatural operation*, as existing in infant-baptism. Perhaps also

in accordance with this principle he opposed infant baptism itself, and pronounced it to be a rite of later origin, which was contrary to the intention of baptism and the nature of Christianity. What we have here observed, serves also to the confirmation of what we have said above, that Hieracas by no means reverenced Christ merely as a moral teacher; it is clear from it, that he recognised him as an ennobler of human nature, the obtainer of the highest grade of blessedness, to which men could not have attained by their own powers.

In the view of orthodoxy maintained by the Church in later days, errors would be charged on Hieracas in regard to the doctrines of the Trinity. He must have used the comparison that the Son of God emanated from the Father, as the light of a lamp is kindled from another lamp, or as a torch is divided into two[1]. Such sensuous comparisons were, it must be granted, contrary to the spiritual disposition of Origen; but the older Church-teachers, Justin and Tatian, had been fond of them. He maintained further, that the Holy Ghost was represented under the image of Melchisedec, for he [the Spirit] is set forth both as the advocate for men, Rom. viii. 26, and as a priest. He represents the image of the Son, subordinate indeed to him, but the most like to him among all beings, which representation was entirely conformable to the Origenistic theory of subordination, which maintained itself for a long time in the Oriental Church[2].

The influence of Origen extended itself through the influence of his friends and scholars from Palestine, as far as Cappadocia and Pontus, as the three great Church-teachers of Cappadocia give testimony to it even in the fourth century. We must here mention particularly his great scholar *Gregory*, on whom the veneration of Christians has conferred the name of wonder-worker (Θαυμα-

[1] ὡς λυχνον ἀπο λυχνου, ἡ ὡς λαμπαδα εἰς δυο. Arius ad Alexandr. apud Epiphan. Hæres. 69. § 7. Athanas. t. i. p. ii. 68.

[2] He appeals to a passage of an Apocryphal writing, which is of importance for the illustration of the doctrinal history of the earliest times, the ἀναβατικον Ἡσαιου; that is, the narrative of the ascension of Isaiah into different regions of the heaven, and of what he saw there. After the accompanying angel has shown Isaiah the Son of God, who stands at the right hand of God, the ἀγαπητος, Isaiah inquires και τις ἐστιν ὁ ἀλλος ὁ ὁμοιος αὐτῳ, ἐξ ἀριστερων ἐλθων; και εἰπε· συ γινωσκεις, τουτ' ἐστι το ἁγιον πνευμα το λαλουν ἐν σοι, και ἐν τοις προφηταις· και ἠν, φησι, ὁμοιον τῳ ἀγαπητῳ. The passage is found in this work which has now been published in a complete manner from the old Ethiopic translation, by R. Laurence, Oxford, 1819, pp. 58, 59, v. 32—36.

τουργος). His original name was Theodorus. He was descended from a respectable and wealthy family at Neo-Cæsarea in Pontus; his father, a zealous heathen, educated him in the principles of heathenism. But when he was fourteen years of age he lost his father, and now he was first gained to the cause of Christianity, as it often happened (see above, vol. i.) that the Gospel first found entrance into families by means of children and women. He however still knew Christianity only from the tradition of others, he still remained unacquainted with Holy Scripture, his interest in religion was still a subordinate feeling, and the endeavour after a splendid career in the world was of more value in his eyes. His mother used every means in her power to enable him to learn whatever in those days would serve to promote the object of his wishes in this respect. He therefore received a good rhetorical education, so as to be able to advance himself, either as a rhetorician or an advocate; and he also learned Latin, the language both of the governing power and of the courts of law. His instructor in the Roman language showed him, how very necessary to him a knowledge of the Roman law would be for the attainment of the object he had in view. He began this study, and had already formed a scheme to visit Rome, in order to increase his acquaintance with the Roman jurisprudence. But Providence had selected him for an instrument in a work of higher importance, and as he himself remarks in his portraiture of the events of his life, without his own desire or will, he was prepared for that work.

His brother-in-law had been called to Cæsarea as law-adviser (assessor) to the Præses of the province of Palestine. He had left his wife at Neo-Cæsarea, but she was now to follow him. They requested his brother-in-law, the young Theodorus, to conduct her to him, as he might then with great facility put in execution his plan of studying Roman law, by going from Cæsarea to the celebrated neighbouring school of Roman jurisprudence at Berytus in Phœnicia. Theodorus accepted the offer; but this journey was attended by consequences different from those which he had expected. He became acquainted with Origen at Cæsarea; Origen soon remarked the powers of the young man, and endeavoured to win them to the service of something higher than that which then animated him. Theodorus felt himself attracted by Origen, as he worked upon his

spirit and his heart, exciting, warming, and encouraging them. In spite of his own will he felt himself detained there; he forgot Rome, and Berytus, and the study of the law. Origen led him to perceive the nothingness of his former endeavours and pursuits, he lighted in the soul of the young man the holy fire of love to truth and to godliness [*lit.* the Divine]. The noblest effort of Origen, as Theodorus himself represents it in his farewell address, was to excite in him a spiritual activity of his own, and an unprejudiced spirit of inquiry and examination. After he had allowed him to seek for the scattered beams of truth in the systems of Greek philosophy he showed him the higher thing which Revelation bestowed on him; he led him now to the study of Holy Scripture and explained it to him. Theodorus says of Origen's exposition of Scripture: "I think he spoke this in no other way than by the communion of the Holy Spirit, for to be a prophet and to understand a prophet requires the selfsame power. And none of the prophets can understand it, to whom the Spirit himself, from whom the prophecies come, has not given the understanding of his words. This man has received the greatest gift of God, *to be the interpreter for men, of the words of God*, to understand the word of God, as God speaks it, and so to preach it to men, that they can understand it[1]."

After he had passed *eight years* with Origen, and apparently received baptism also at Cæsarea, and assumed also here the name of *Gregorius*, he returned to his own country. It was with sorrow that he left his instructor, on whom his whole soul hung: he compared the bond, which knitted him to Origen, with the bond of friendship between a David and a Jonathan. He testified his thankfulness to Origen, and to Providence, which had conducted him to Origen without his knowledge or will, in his farewell oration, in which he describes the events of his life, and the methods of instruction and edification employed by Origen[2].

[1] Panegyric. in Orig. c. 15.

[2] We have followed this oration, as the most trustworthy source, for the history of the early life and education of Gregory. The accounts given by Gregory of Nyssa, in his life of this Gregory, are in open contradiction to the narrative of this Gregory himself; and as Gregory of Nyssa dressed up rhetorically what he had taken from unauthentic inaccurate accounts, it would be an useless trouble to endeavour to reconcile the contradictory narratives with each other. The Panegyricus of Gregory may be found in the fourth volume of the works of Origen, by *de la Ru* and in the third volume of the *Bibliotheca Patrum* of *Galland*.

While he tears himself away with pain from intercourse with his dear instructor, and from an unmixed employment about godly things, and with sorrow and fear prepares to meet the occupations of so different a character, to which he must devote himself in his own country, he speaks thus:—"But why should I lament this? We have, we know, a Saviour for all, even for those who are half-dead, and fallen into the hands of robbers; One who cares for all, and is a physician for all, the watchful protector of all men. We have *also the seed within us, of which, as bearing it about within us, we became conscious through thee* (Origen), and the seed which *we have received from thee*, those glorious doctrines. With this seed we depart, in tears indeed, because we are leaving thee, but taking this seed with us. Perhaps the heavenly Protector will join himself to our company, and save us, but perhaps we shall return to thee, and bring to thee also from that seed fruits and grain,—not ripe ones, indeed, (for how can that be?) but such as can grow up amidst civil employments." And turning himself to Origen, he addresses him thus: "But thou, dear head! stand up! and dismiss us with thy prayer; as thou hast led us [1] to salvation by thy holy doctrines, while we were with thee, so lead us, now that we are departing from thee, to salvation by thy prayer. And transfer us and commend us, or rather only give us back again to God, who led us to you. Thank him for that which he has hitherto done for us, but call upon him also, that he may engraft his commands upon our Spirit, that he may pour upon us the fear of God, and that this may serve as our best corrector. For at a distance we can no longer hearken to him *with that freedom*, with which we have done so, as long as we have been with you. Pray to him to send us a good angel to accompany us, as a consolation for our separation from you. But entreat him also to conduct us back to you, for this alone will be our chief consolation."

After his departure also Origen retained him in his heart. We have still a letter full of fatherly love, which he addressed to him. (Philocal. c. 13.) He here says to him, that his distinguished qualities might make him an able Roman jurisconsult, or a respected teacher of one of the celebrated philosophical

[1] He speaks here in the plural number, because he probably had in his mind at the same time his brother Athenodorus, who came with him to Origen, and also afterwards became Bishop of the Church of Pontus. See Euseb. vi. 30.

schools; but he wished that Gregory should propose to himself Christianity alone as his aim and object, and use his talents only as means to the one great end. According to his principles, which we have before detailed, as to the relation of different departments of knowledge, and especially of Philosophy, to Christianity, he incites him to appropriate to himself from the whole circle of human knowledge, [*lit.* from the Encyclopædical sciences] and from philosophy, every thing, which he might be able to use for the advantage of Christianity. By many beautiful allegorical explanations of the narratives of the Old Testament he endeavours to make it clear to him, that we must use every thing to the service of godliness [*lit.* the Divine], and sanctify every thing else by referring it to that; but not, as often happens, forget godliness itself amidst these elements which are foreign to it, and thus desecrate it by the admixture. He then addresses him thus:—"Do thou then, my son! above every thing study the Holy Scriptures; but let it be a serious study to thee, for Scripture requires a very serious study, in order that we may not too hastily pronounce or judge any thing out of it. And if with a believing heart, and a mind well pleasing to God, and pre-occupied with him[1], thou studiest the Scripture, then knock, where any thing in it is shut up to you, and it will be opened to you by the porter, of whom Jesus speaks, John x. 3, 'To him shall the doorkeeper open.' Seek with immoveable faith in God, the sense of Holy Scripture which is hidden from the multitude. But let it not be enough to thee to knock and to seek, for prayer is especially necessary for the understanding of holy things, in exciting us to which the Saviour has not only said, 'Knock, and it shall be opened to you,' and 'seek, and ye shall find,' but also, 'pray, and it shall be given to you.'"

He answered the expectations of his great teacher. While he found in his native city, of which he became bishop, *seventeen* Christians, the major part of the inhabitants was converted by him, and Christianity extended far into Pontus. It is a matter

[1] The Greek προλήψις can hardly be rendered into German, for the German, "vorurtheil" [prejudice], according to the usage of our language, is generally taken in a bad sense. We should rather use the word voraussetzung [presumption, or presupposition]. Origen means that the reader of Scripture ought beforehand to be filled with *the persuasion*, that the Holy Scripture is embued with a Divine spirit, and cannot lead him astray, even when in single passages its Divine nature does not make itself apparent to him.

of regret, that we have no more accurate and authentic accounts of the efficiency of this remarkable man, than the fabulous and rhetorical life written by Gregory of Nyssa, a century afterwards. Perhaps, while he followed the principles of the Alexandrian school in regard to the condescension to the weakness of the many, and to the gradation in religious education, he was nevertheless too yielding, in order to convert the heathen in greater numbers; perhaps he thought, that if once they only belonged to the Christian Church, the spirit of the Gospel and the increasing activity of their teachers might gradually carry them further on. As he observed that many of the people, out of attachment to their former festivities, which were interwoven with heathenism, remained fettered to the religion of their ancestors, he wished to give the newly-converted something to supply their place. After the Decian persecution, during which many in this region had died as martyrs, he appointed a general festival in honour of the martyrs, and suffered the rugged multitude to celebrate this with the same sort of feasts as those, which were usual at the heathen commemorations of the dead (Parentalia), and other heathen festivals. He thought that thus one obstacle to conversion would be removed, and that if they had once become members of the Christian Church, they would by degrees voluntarily renounce sensuous indulgences, after their minds should have become spiritualized through Christianity [1]. But he forgot what an intermixture of heathen and Christian views, and rites, might arise from this acquiescence in heathen customs, as really did happen afterwards, and how difficult it is for Christianity to penetrate properly into the life, when it is debased from the beginning with such an admixture [2].

We have a simple and clearly written *paraphrase of the Preacher of Solomon* [i. e. Ecclesiastes], by Gregory. A confession of faith in regard to the Trinity, which he was supposed to have written in consequence of a special revelation, was used in opposition to the Arians in the fourth century. The circumstance that it was to

[1] Vita Gregor. c. 27.

[2] The canonical letter, which we have, of this Gregory, shows well that in the conversion of large masses of people much may have been merely something external; for he speaks here of persons, who made use of the confusion which arose from the devastations of the Goths in the regions of Pontus, in order to reap advantage from the general calamity, and even to plunder their own countrymen. This letter at the same time gives evidence of Gregory's watchful zeal for morality.

be found in the Church of Neocæsarea in his own handwriting, was appealed to in proof of its genuineness. But although the first part of the confession, in which the peculiar characteristics of the Origenian doctrines appear, might be genuine, yet the second part is clearly a later addition, for it contains decisions, which were thoroughly foreign to the school of Origen, and which first proceeded from the controversies with the Arians in the fourth century.

Among the violent opponents of the Origenistic school we have already mentioned Methodius, at first Bishop of Olympus in Lycia, and afterwards of Tyre, a martyr in the persecution of Dioclesian; but still he appears not to have conducted himself towards that school always in the same manner. Eusebius of Cæsarea, in his continuation of the Apology of Pamphilus, was able to appeal to the circumstance, that Methodius contradicted what he had formerly said in praise of Origen [1]. The ecclesiastical historian Socrates, on the contrary, says [2], that Methodius, who had formerly declared against Origen, in his dialogue, entitled Ξενων, had revoked it all, and had testified his admiration of him. There must be some foundation in truth for this two-fold story. Eusebius and Socrates deduced their judgment about Methodius from his own expressions; but their chronological determinations in regard to these writings apparently did not rest on historical facts, but they here followed only their subjective notions, and in such matters the ancients were not accurate. In the *Symposion* of Methodius, which we are just about to mention, he appears by no means an adherent of the letter of the Church-doctrine, but there is shown in that work an inclination to theosophical views, and a predominant affection for the allegorical interpretation of the Bible, and there appears also much that is congenial to the turn of Origen's mind; there are certainly expressions which at least favour the doctrine of the pre-existence of souls [3]. Much also appears, which is altogether at variance with the doctrines of Origen; as, for example, a certain Chiliasm [4]. It may easily be imagined, that Methodius, a man of no systematic habit of thought, was attracted at first by many of the views and the writings of Origen, which corresponded to *his own* favourite opinions and

[1] Apud Hieronym. l. i. adv. Rufin. Hieron. opp. Ed. Martianay, t. iv. f. 359.—Quomodo ausus est Methodius nunc contra Origenem scribere, qui hæc et hæc de Origenis loquutus est dogmatibus?

[2] Lib. iv. c. 13. [3] Orat. ii. Theophil. § 5. [4] Orat. ix. § 5.

to his own taste, but was afterwards on that very account, the more shocked by that, which in the system of Origen was contrary to *his own* disposition and his own doctrinal principles.

The most important and the most authentic written monument of this Methodius is his *Feast of the ten Virgins*, in eleven dialogues, containing a commendation of single life, which is often highly exaggerated.

That treatise, however, which we have under the name of Methodius *on the freedom of the will* (περι αὐτεξουσιου), belongs rather to the Christian teacher Maximus, who lived in the time of Septimius Severus[1], than to Methodius[2]; it is an attack on the Gnostic dualism.

The presbyter Pamphilus, a man of Cæsarea in Palestine distinguished by his zeal for piety and knowledge, came forward as a defender of Origen against the charges of heresy brought against him by Methodius. He founded at Cæsarea an Ecclesiastical library, which, as late as the fourth century, contributed much to the promotion of learned studies. Every friend of knowledge, and especially every one to whom the thorough and fundamental study of the Bible was an object, found with him every kind of assistance, and he endeavoured to multiply[3], to extend, and correct the manuscripts of the Bible. He made presents of many Bibles, even to women, whom he saw much busied in the reading of Scripture[4]. He established *a theological school*[5], in which the study of Scripture was carried on with great earnestness[6]. The learned Eusebius, who was indebted for every thing to Pamphilus, and looked upon him as a friend, and almost as a father, probably came forth from this school. Pamphilus imparted to his scholars his own veneration for Origen, as the promoter of Christian knowledge; and he endeavoured to oppose

[1] Euseb. v. 27. Hieronym. de Vir. Illust. c. 47. This Maximus can hardly be the same as the Bishop of Jerusalem of the same name mentioned in Euseb. v. 12.

[2] See on this subject my "Genetic Development of the Gnostic Systems," p. 206.

[3] See Montfaucon. Catalog. MSS. Bibliothec. Coislinian. p. 261.

[4] Eusebius says of him in life of him, ap. Hieronym. adv. Rufinum, l. i. p. 358, 359. vol. iv.: "Quis studiosorum amicus non fuit Pamphili? si quos videbat ad victum necessariis indigere, præbebat large quæ poterat. Scripturas quoque sanctas non ad legendum tantum; sed et ad habendum tribuebat promptissime. Nec solum viris, sed et feminis, quas vidisset lectioni deditas. Unde et multos codices præparabat, ut, quam necessitas poscisset, volentibus largiretur.

[5] Euseb. vii. 32. συνεστησατο διατριβην. [6] Eus. de Martyr. Palæstinæ, c. 4.

the narrow-minded spirit, which proceeded from those who branded Origen with the name of heretic. While the blind zeal of these people, as Pamphilus says, went so far, that they pronounced sentence of condemnation at once on every one, who only so much as busied himself with the writings of Origen, Pamphilus during his imprisonment in the persecution of Diocletian in the year 309[1], wrote in common with his scholar Eusebius[2], a work destined to the defence of Origen, and this defence was addressed to the confessors condemned to labour in the mines. After the martyrdom of Pamphilus, Eusebius added a sixth book to the five already existing of the uncompleted work. The first book of this Apology, with the exception of some Greek fragments, we have in the free translation of Rufinus[3].

The example of Pamphilus shows us, how, from one like Origen, who embraced and united so much together, not only a speculative spirit in doctrinal matters proceeded, but also a profound study of the Bible and a careful treatment of the letter of the word, however much this letter may appear to be opposed to his licentious method of allegorizing. Apparently also, the instance of the Egyptian bishop Hesychius is to be traced to the same source, who set on foot a new and corrected recension of the text of the Alexandrian version, the prevalent one in Egypt[4], and who suffered martyrdom[5], probably in the persecution of

[1] A proof of the influence of Pamphilus on the neighbourhood around him is given by the case of his slave Porphyrius, a young man of eighteen years of age, whom he educated with parental affection, and for whose religious, moral, and spiritual edification he provided in every way; and he had communicated to him an ardent love for the Redeemer. When Porphyrius heard the sentence of death pronounced against his beloved master, he prayed that it might be conceded to him to show the last proof of love to him, by burying his corpse after the execution of the sentence had taken place. This request at once excited the wrath of the fanatical governor. And as he now stedfastly avowed, that he was a Christian, and was anxious to sacrifice himself, he was most cruelly tortured, and at last, with his flesh entirely torn from his bones, he was led to the stake. He bore every thing with firmness, after he had only once, when the fire touched him for the first time, called to Jesus, the Son of God, for help. Euseb. de Martyr. Palæstinæ, c. ii. p. 338.

[2] The accusation of the passionate Jerome, that Rufinus falsely attributes such a work to Pamphilus, deserves no credit.

[3] The loss of the Biography of Pamphilus by Eusebius is deeply to be lamented. [N.B. The German word here translated 'free,' is willkürlich—*arbitrary*, or *capricious*. H. J. R.]

[4] Hieronym. adv. Rufin. l. ii. 425.

[5] Euseb. Hist. Eccles. l. viii. c. 13. f. 308.

Diocletian, A. D. 310, or 311; and lastly, in part also to the influence of Origen was owing the seed of a new theological school at Antioch, which received its full development only in the course of the fourth century, from which is derived the sound hermeneutical and exegetical direction properly balanced between the opposite extremes of a carnal and literal, and a capricious and allegorizing, interpretation of the Bible. Learned presbyters in the Antiochian Church, who busied themselves with particular zeal in the study of Biblical interpretation, may be looked upon as the first promoters of this school, especially Dorotheus and Lucian, of whom the latter suffered martyrdom in the persecution of Diocletian, early in A. D. 312[1].

Thus we see here, as the result of the historical development of this period, the formation, the transition into one another, and the oppositions, of different theological dispositions, from the co-operation and opposition of which with each other, the further development of the Christian doctrine, as the leaven for the *whole nature of man*, was destined to proceed; a development and purifying process which passes on from one generation to another, and which can be brought to its destined end by nothing but the everlasting wisdom, which alone searches the depths of the free spirit, and which alone the free spirit follows without prejudice to its freedom.

[1] Lucian made a new recension of the corrected text of the Alexandrian version, and apparently also of the New Testament. The manuscripts prepared according to this text are called Λουκιανεια. Euseb. [Hieronym.?] de Vir. Illustr. 77. adv. Rufin. l. ii. 425. vol. iv. We are unable to determine with certainty what is to be believed about the early connexion between Lucian and Paul of Samosata, as the account of it which we have, Theodoret. Hist. Eccles. l. i. c. 4. from Alexander, bishop of Alexandria, is suspicious on account of party-prejudices from controversial motives. [In regard to Lucian, I find in the edition of Jerome by Victorius the following passage, vol. i. p. 373, in the Catalogus Script. Eccles.:—Lucianus, vir disertissimus, Antiochenæ ecclesiæ presbyter, tantum in Scripturarum studio laboravit, ut usque nunc quædam exemplaria Scripturarum Lucianea nuncupentur. This treatise is also cited as Hieron. de Vir. Illustribus. H. J. R.]

THE END.

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